THE REPUTATION OF SECRETARY OF
State George Shultz is hardly based on his abil-
ity to turn a snappy phrase. But on the question of
Grenada, the stolid Shultz touched new heights of
eloquence. It was he who declared the conquered
Caribbean island “a lovely piece of real estate.”
And it was he who best articulated the administra-
tion’s new vision of itself as custodian of the Carib-
bean Basin in the post-colonial era. When British
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher announced her
opposition to the October 1983 invasion, Shultz
brusquely informed her that, “[T]he states in the
area . . . are no longer British colonies…. The
Caribbean is in our neighborhood.”
Since the invasion, the United States has in-
creased economic aid to the region, upgraded its
diplomatic presence and sought new security ar-
rangements for the small Eastern Caribbean states.
As Fred Halliday points out in his essay in this Re-
port, Washington’s new high profile in the Carib- bean may not yet constitute a master plan, but it is a definite declaration of intent.
That intent is based on a clear new perception of the Caribbean as a security zone. Indeed, given the region’s cultural and socioeconomic diversity, one can almost argue that it is only the Pentagon’s geo-
political concerns that define the Caribbean as a
coherent unity. This new attitude has taken root since the revolutions in Nicaragua and Grenada in 1979; the obsession with Cuban contamination is at its heart.
W HY THE OBSESSION? AGAIN, IT IS Shultz who has defined the stakes most sharp- ly. “The Caribbean is an unfenced neighborhood
that we share with 27 island and coastal nations …
a vital strategic and commercial artery for the United
States. . . . If the region should become prey to so-
cial and economic upheaval, and dominated by re- gimes hostile to us, the consequences for our secu-
rity would be immediate and far-reaching.” The recitation of oil routes and sea lanes is a fami-
liar strategic rationale for involvement in Central
America. Now it applies to the small Caribbean is-
lands as well. Their capacity to resist is critically
limited: the Caribbean microstates are divided by a
“dog-eat-dog” mentality and are at the mercy of the
transnational corporations that control their econo-
mies. In this issue, Tom Barry paints a vivid picture
of their anarchic dependency.
The prime casualty of Washington’s hostility has been the Grenadian revolution. For three years the
Reagan Administration did everything possible to make its short life a miserable one. The New Jewel
Movement suffered diplomatic ostracism, while the United States rehearsed invasion and put pressure on the IMF and the World Bank to withhold funds. There was a real ideological vindictiveness in some
of the U.S. actions-such as the refusal to grant Grenada hurricane relief aid. In the end, the NJM
collapsed under the weight of its own internal prob-
lems, a cautionary tale of the dangers of narrowly
based revolutionary rule, but also a reminder of the limited national sovereignty of any small state in the
U.S. backyard.
Grenada, however, is not the end of the story.
Unrest will continue to plague the Caribbean, even though its source is more likely to be Washington
than Cuba. Security assistance for islands who do not want it, and bilateralism for a region that needs
unity, are the recipe for future instability, which fu- ture issues of the Report will study in greater detail.
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