With the collapse of oil prices between 1981 and
1983, Venezuela’s revenue crisis could not be
resolved by demanding a higher share of profits from
the oil companies, as in the past. At first, the crisis was
called “Ia noche post-petrolera,” the post-petroleum
night. Today that phrase has been replaced with “Ia
noche post-rentista,” the post-rentier night. The change reflects the realization that the crisis has not
been sparked, as long expected, by the draining of the oil fields themselves, but by changes in the global
economy. A new policy will need to balance the nation’s inter-
est in extracting a rent from foreign capital, with the
need to keep the industry competitive with the private
transnationals. Oil revenues should be used not so
much as a source of capital to “sow” in other branches
of the economy, but to make the industry itself a motor
of national industrial development. In a world where
international bankers extract extraordinary interest pay-
ments from Third World debtors, Venezuela has every
right to continue collecting a rent for First-World access
to its considerable hydrocarbon reserves. A broader
strategy, however, is needed.
Among the major political forces, Causa R seems to
have most clearly grasped the distinction between rent
and profit in its approach to oil policy. In its official pro-
gram, it argues:
Today it is a recognized fact that [oil] income springs from
two sources of a distinctive nature: petroleum as a source
of rent and petroleum as a productive activity. The first
depends on the monopoly that the state exercises over a
natural resource in great demand which permits the
obtaining of a remuneration for use of it. The second
depends upon the capital and work applied to produc- tion.’
Causa R’s program calls for the state oil company,
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), to develop “strategic
complementary associations that are required by finan-
cial, technological and market necessities. In this latter
respect it is necessary to open possibilities not only for
foreign but private national investment.” Regarding
internal market prices, Causa R asserts, “There is no
doubt that these must be in relation to the cost of pro-
duction plus a normal profit. In this sense, a modest
increase in the prices of combustibles is necessary.”
These positions contrast notably with the traditional
leftist and populist calls for no increases in prices and
rejection of any role for private or foreign capital in
“basic industries.”2
But Causa R’s break with the populist past does not
mean it embraces neoliberalism. The partylike Presi-
dent Rafael Calderaadvocates tying pricing to debt
negotiations, and it opposes renouncing state owner-
ship of natural resources or returning to a system of
concessions. It also rejects the IMF demand to raise domestic gas prices to international levels. “In all
cases,” it claims, “any rational increase of prices must
be to fortify production itself and not to artificially sup-
plement fiscal spending.” The party also calls for taking
“social impact” into account in determining prices.3
C
aldera seems to share many of Causa R’s views, but
he must avoid the populist temptation to resolve
the enormous gap between the projected budget for
1994 and anticipated revenues by taxing PDVSA more
heavily. He must deal realistically with PDVSA’s need to
enter into joint operating agreements with foreign companies. No modern multinational corporation
state-owned or privatecan operate effectively in the
world today without such associations that bring need-
ed capital and technology. Most importantly, Venezuela must maintain propri- etary control over the oil in its soil. This can be an
effective lever in negotiating favorable operating
agreements and joint ventures for PDVSA with foreign
and domestic capital. It also assures the country a
steady source of income, despite falling prices and
higher costs of production.
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