In “Recapturing the Memory of Politics” [NACLA, May/June 1998], lnés Izaguirre claims to be speaking against those who violated human rights in Argentina and on behalf of the victims. Her argument, in fact, has some striking parallels to the discourse of those she claims to be speaking against. She suggests that human rights advocates and other progressives should acknowledge that the dirty war was really a class war and therefore identify the popular movement with the armed movements of the period. At the same time, she contrasts this image with the right-wing “theory of two demons,” which she faults for reducing the dirty war to a confrontation between two armed groups.
The theory of two demons, how- ever, is very similar to her own position. Videla and his associates did not only target members of armed groups. Absolutely anyone who refused to think like the gener-als was automatically labeled a sub-versive and an accomplice in the alleged international conspiracy that they believed sought to destroy the Argentine nation. Unarmed opponents were thus transformed into the “demon” that justified the military’s inhuman “response.”
In Izaguirre’s view, those who do not recognize the class war in progress make “the official armed forces appear to be the only actors who are legitimately engaged in the use of violence.” Anyone who is familiar with basic international law should recognize that acknowl-edging that the dirty war was directed primarily against civilians demonstrates that the Argentine military was a gang of cowardly criminals. Similarly, Izaguirre argues that identifying the civilian victims with the guerrillas “would have permitted the categorical transformation of the ‘subversive delinquent’ into a legitimate antag-onist.” She forgets, however, that the right used this very tactic to transform civilians into “legiti- mate” targets of state and paramili-tary repression.
lzaguirre also writes: “My understanding is that war always implies massacre and genocide.” If this is the case, why should we condemn the Argentine military? The Geneva Protocols and other bodies of humanitarian law clearly outlaw such atrocities. This does not mean that they do not happen. But we should not normalize them. Otherwise, it becomes impossible for us to ever hold militaries responsible for their actions.
It may sound romantic to speak of “class war,” but ultraleffist rhetoric plays into the hands of the extreme right. While Izaguirre claims to be speaking on behalf of disappeared, known torturer Captain Alfredo Astiz and his associates throughout Latin America could not ask for a better publicist.
INÉS IZAGUIRRE RESPONDS:
By Inés Izaguirre
Thave carefully read Mr. Ladutke’s letter criticizing my evaluation of the Argentine situation of the 1970s. I will attempt to restate my arguments and the objective facts on which they were based.
First, I spoke of class war because in Argentina there was an open confrontation between two powerful social projects, starting from the time of the ouster of Juan Perón in 1955, when the 50% of the population that considered them-selves Peronist were shut out of politics. Beginning with the “Cordobazo” of May 1969, an important sector of the working class, together with other factions of the popular movement, began to confront the government’s security apparatus in street combat. In response to this open defiance, the government of General Juan Carlos Ongan’a (1966-1970) militarized the Córdoba police and the most reactionary sectors of the armed forces declared a low-intensity war on the revolutionary groups operating in the country.
Second, from 1957 to 1983, the Argentine military participated in the counterinsurgency courses imparted at the renowned School of the Americas in Panama and later Fort Bennig. The enemy was Communism and Marxism more generally, conceived within the logic of global Cold War politics, and located within the dissident population.
Third, from the time of the “Córdobazo,” the principal Argentine guerrilla groups declared that they were engaged in a revolutionary war. The Marxist-oriented Revolutionary Workers Party (PRT) created the People’s Revolutionary Army (ERP) as the party’s armed wing in July 1970. In September 1971, the Peronist Montoneros also opted for the strategy of “popular war” in order to defeat imperialism and pave the way for Perón’g return. Both groups requested recognition as a “belligerent force” from the UN in Geneva in 1975, but the Argentine government made sure that these initiatives failed. Had the guerrilla groups gained this recognition, the armed forces could not have gone ahead with the clandestine killing, and would have been forced to account reach prisoner before international institutions.
Reflecting the state of internal conflict in Argentina, an article entitled “Investing in Developing Countries” in the October 1970 issue of Survey qf Current Businesses ranked Argentina third interms of risk and second in terms of the possibility of revolution and/or civil war in all of Latin America.
Fifth, several studies cited in my article document the number of armed actions between 1973 and 1976 that included the participation of sectors of the population which did not belong to armed groups. Starting in mid-1975, the popular movement suffered many more casualties than the security forces. As I state in my articlc, I agree with these authors’ argument that the beginning of 1976 signaled the defeat of the guerrilla, which led to the demoralization of the popular movement and allowed the armed forces to go ahead with its campaign of genocide starting on March 24, 1976, the day of the coup that ousted IsabelPerón. Throughout the world, genocide has always been unleashed on previously defeated or morally disarmed populations. If there is genocide, it is because there has been war.
Finally, those who support the socalled “theory of the two demons” refer exclusively to the confrontation between the armed forces of both sides as if these had no legitimate roots in broader movements and were not part of political and social processes. To believe that this confrontation was simply an 11 ecstasy of madness” that was removed from society is a fallacy. Many civilians participated as accomplices or as informants for the military, while others sympathized with revolutionary groups. The disappeared were primarily social activists involved in a just cause, but they did not see themselves involved in war-a fact which was carefully denied by the military until the extermination was completed.
I regret that the Mr. Ladutke has dismissed my analysis as “ultraleftist rhetoric.” It is an interpretation of a controversial period in Argentina’s recent history which I have based on the facts.
