Since the military took power
in 1976, there has been a systematic
effort to undermine the power of the
labor movement, which was
consolidated during the rule of
populist leader Juan Domingo Per6n.
Orlando Bustos, a former leader of the Textile
Worker’s Union, told me in late 1997 that mem-
bership in his union has decreased dramatically,
from 100,000 in 1975 to approximately 12,000 today.
His union had been a powerhouse in the 1950s and
1960s. But today, thanks to the liberalization of the
Argentine economy, most of the jobs in the textile
industry have disappeared as local manufacturing has
been replaced by imports from Taiwan and Korea.
Union membership has declined as a result, while infor-
mal labor had increased dramatically.
Bustos’ story could be repeated by countless other
labor leaders. It is impossible to deny that the liberal-
ization of the economy has reshaped power relations in
Argentina. The country’s once powerful labor move-
ment, which prior to 1989 carried out an average of two
general strikes per year, has lost virtually all its clout.
The central problem is structural un- and underemploy-
ment, which is estimated at 40% of the economically
active population.
Daniel Cieza teaches labor law at the University of Quilmes and sociology at the University of La Plata. His most recent book is La verguenza de haber sido, el dolor de ya no ser. Teoria y prdctica de la politica social en la periferia: Un estudio del ajuste neolib- eral (Editorial Tierra del Fuego, 1997). He is a member of FREPASO and currently a deputy for Buenos Aires province. Translated from the Spanish by Mark Fried.
The dire situation facing Argentine labor is not solely
the result of growing unemployment. Since the military
coup that overthrew the government of Isabel Per6n in
1976, there has been a systematic effort to undermine
the power and the gains of the labor movement that
were consolidated during the rule of populist leader
Juan Domingo Per6n. The generals outlawed collective
bargaining and jailed or killed hundreds of union lead-
ers, setting the stage for a series of management-
friendly reforms that have virtually emptied
Argentina’s historic labor legislation of its original con-
tent. Ironically, it has been President Carlos Menem-
a member of the party of Per6n-who has carried out
the most extensive labor counter-reform in Argentine
history. Menem’s attack on labor-which in many ways
seems like an attempt to return to the horrific labor con-
ditions of the nineteenth century-has not only under-
mined the social base of the labor movement, but has in
fact pushed through a structural reorganization of work
itself. Stable, long-term employment has been increas-
ingly replaced with term-employment contracts and
informal work that offer workers little stability and no
social-security benefits.
These changes in the organization of work have dra-
matically altered the terrain on which the struggle for
workers’ rights takes place. Until the late 1970s, work-
ers could exert pressure on management by lowering
20 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICASREPORT ON ARGENTINA
Retired and unemployed
workers protest govern-
ment cutbacks and priva-
tizations in downtown
Buenos Aires.
occupational safety precautions in the
workplace and a decline in product
quality as a result of such conditions. If
the government’s goal is to increase
Argentina’s ability to compete within
the international economy, then its poli-
cies are leading the economy in the
wrong direction.
production levels in the workplace or stopping work
altogether. Over the past 15 years, the movement has
had to move its protests outside the workplace and
develop new strategies, such as blackouts and blocking
traffic, in order to fight back against this all-out assault
on labor.
The Argentine government insists that “labor flexi-
bility” is the key to job creation, arguing that Argen-
tina’s labor costs are too high. The elimination of work-
ers’ benefits, goes the argument, would lead to greater
insertion into the world economy, and thus to economic
growth and job creation. Yet these measures have not
accomplished their objectives. The practical effects of
the government’s anti-labor policies have included
growing work instability, growing despotism on the
part of management, the deterioration of hygiene and
VOL XXXI, No 6 MAY/JUNE 1998
Until the late 1970s, the labor
movement in Argentina devel-
oped in the context of very low
unemployment. Under these conditions, trade unions
were able to exert strong and sustained pressure on the
state for improved labor legislation, which resulted in
Latin America’s most progressive labor code. In 1915,
the government approved extremely advanced occupa-
tional-safety and workplace-accident legislation drawn
from European experiences. Some 15 years later, the
eight-hour day was established and limits were placed
on overtime and increased monthly work schedules to
protect employment during the Great Depression.
During the period of classic Peronism, which lasted
from 1945-1955, labor legislation was strengthened and
a centralized model of trade unionism with strong links
to the state emerged. Following the 1955 military coup
which ousted Per6n, the labor movement played a key
role in what became known as the Peronist resistance,
21REPORT ON ARGENTINA
staging a series of general strikes against the military
regime. During these years, labor struggles continued
alongside demands for the return of Per6n.
When Per6n did return to power in 1973, the labor
movement’s struggle for legislative reform culminated
in the passage of the Labor Contracting Law. Under this
law, collective-bargaining agreements could be negoti-
ated for entire industries, rather than only for individual
companies or plants, and industry-wide agreements
could not be superseded by the latter. The Labor Con-
tracting Law was the most progressive of its kind in
Latin America-comparable only to Mexico’s Federal
Labor Law-particularly in terms of individual work-
ers’ rights. The Argentine law, moreover, unlike its
Mexican counterpart, was actually enforced thanks to
the active presence of stewards in the workplace.
Although the character of the labor movement
changed considerably following the emergence of
Peronism-and the corporatist populism it put into
practice-the movement still retained elements of the
anarcho-syndicalist tradition which had predominated
before World War II. While such historical changes
have deeply affected the movement, a series of features
have persisted over time. The fight for better wages has
always been at the center of labor struggles, and there
has always been a tendency to exert direct pressure on
the state, making the general strike a primary strategy.
Marxist-Leninist ideology, moreover, has always been
marginal within the movement, which has also been
characterized by extensive organization within the
workplace via the corps of stewards and internal com-
missions.
In sum, during the long period of high employment
between 1940 and 1975, progressive labor legislation
was consolidated alongside a strong centralized trade
union movement which exerted constant pressure on
management and on the state, primarily around wage
issues. The workers’ struggle had a direct influence on
the approval of industry-wide collective bargaining
agreements, which reached their peak around 1975.
The labor movement was also involved in the creation
of social-development strategies, particularly during
the Peronist governments, bringing workers into
alliances with business elites. Pacts between the
General Labor Confederation (CGT) and the General
Economic Confederation (CGE), the organization of
small and medium businesses, were also common dur-
ing this period.
With the military coup of 1976 and the brutal repres-
sion that it unleashed, the gains of organized labor were
gradually overturned, sending the movement into a
deep crisis. During the years of the dictatorship (1976-
1983), one-third of the most progressive clauses of the
Labor Contracting Law were eliminated, collective
bargaining was sus-
pended, the most active
union stewards were
persecuted and jailed
and the major unions
were shut down. At the
same time, the first mea-
sures of what would
later become a pro-
found reorganization
of work itself were
implemented.
When constitutional
rule was restored in
1983, collective-bar-
gaining rights were
reinstated and unions
could once again func-
tion, but the gutting of
the Labor Contracting
Law was never re-
versed. By this time,
the neoliberal model
was quickly gaining
ground and its propone
The proliferation of
“garbage
contracts “-short-
term employment
contracts lasting
from three to six
months–creates a
continual turnover
of the labor force,
making union
organizing a
difficult task.
nts utilized the anti-labor
reforms of the military regime to consolidate their
hegemony. In the political and cultural climate of the
early 1980s, there was little room for either strong labor
legislation or powerful unions. In their absence, the
neoliberal mission to atomize the trade-union move-
ment, drain labor legislation of any real content and
reduce labor costs through “flexible” contracting prac-
tices met with few legal obstacles and comparatively
little organized resistance.
With the election of Carlos Menem to the pres-
idency in 1989, a vicious labor counter-
reform was set in motion which mirrored and
legitimized what was already occurring on the shop
floor. The first measure was the enactment of the
National Employment Law which, drawing on similar
legislation in Spain, set out to create new modalities for
term-employment contracts. This fundamentally
altered the original structure of the Labor Contracting
Law, which had only allowed term contracts under
exceptional circumstances.
Although the stated objective of this new law was to
create more jobs, the result was the opposite.
Unemployment increased dramatically after 1992,
reaching almost 20% by 1995, three times what it had
been in 1991. According to the latest figures released
by the National Institute of Statistics and Census
(INDEC) for 28 urban centers, the rate of open unem-
ployment-the percentage of people who are actively
22NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NA A REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 22REPORT ON ARGENTINA
A march
in “defense of
jobs” protests
the dismantling
of the manufac-
turing sector of
the economy.
seeking work and are unable to find it at the time of the
census-is 13.8%. But if we add rural laborers who are
not covered by the social-security system, the urban
informal sector, and those who have given up looking
for work altogether, that figure jumps to over 40%.1 A
study by the Buenos Aires Institute of Analysis and
Projects, a research center connected to the National
Solidarity Front (FREPASO), suggests the figure is
even higher, estimating that 51% of the economically
active population has problems finding adequate
employment. 2
The second step in Menem’s counter-reform was to
modify workplace-accident legislation by reducing the
amount of cash benefits available to workers. In some
cases, these were turned into occasional payments and
only those illnesses named on an official roster of dis-
abilities were covered. Workers no longer had the right
to sue for damages in civil court, and a cap of $55,000
was imposed for death or total disability as a result of
an accident in the workplace. This law turned out to be
even more reactionary than the 1915 accident legisla-
tion which at least allowed workers to sue for damages.
The government then established a differential system
of labor regulations for small and medium-sized busi-
nesses, which allows these companies to temporarily
dismiss employees on cost-reduction “vacations” on
shorter notice, to pay annual salary supplements in three
installments, to negotiate severance packages based on
systems of previous savings and to simplify the filing of
term contracts. Curiously, the law defines small and
VOL XXXI, No 6 MAY/JUNE 1998
medium-sized businesses as those with up to 120
employees, and allows even bigger companies to qualify
as long as the figure is arrived at through a collective
agreement. Although the average number of employees
in such companies is around 50, there is already a prece-
dent of a “medium-sized” company with 300 workers.
A fourth step was to create a system of probationary
contracting for periods of up to six months, and to
implement new forms of term contracting for women,
disabled workers, those over 40 years of age, war vet-
erans, apprentices and student interns. With these
reforms, the traditional Labor Contracting Law has
been completely gutted. Nearly 90% of new hires are
now for term positions, when in fact permanent jobs
ought to be the norm. With the changes in workplace-
accident legislation and the resulting drop in the cost of
legal suits for companies, health and safety conditions
have deteriorated dramatically. According to official
statistics, 97% of employers do not comply with health
and safety regulations. Argentine law is similar to U.S.
law in that it gives the employer control over health and
safety concerns. Although the law is quite detailed, it is
rarely enforced. In the context of structural unemploy-
ment and changes in regulations concerning occupa-
tional hazards, there is less incentive for workers to
demand compliance with safety standards.
In the wake of this counter-reform, structural job
instability has become the central issue for the
Argentine labor movement. Even though open unem-
ployment has fallen since 1995, a series of problems
23REPORT ON ARGENTINA
related to job instability have emerged. Although the
principal objective of the National Employment Law
was to reduce unregulated and unreported labor–for
which workers are paid under the table and receive no
health or pension benefits–the trend over the past sev-
eral years has been the opposite. The law imposes stiff
penalties on unreported work, yet small business own-
ers rarely comply with these regulations, figuring that
legal actions against them will get caught up in lengthy
judicial proceedings. Ac-
cording to official statistics,
about 30% of employees do
not receive health or retire- Dissident trade t
ment benefits. 3 Movement of A Another problem is the pro-
liferation of short-term con- have criticized c
tracts, known in the labor
movement as “garbage con- the CGT hierarc
tracts,” which last from three independence t to six months and have no
provisions for severance pay- gover
ments in the event of layoffs.
The labor force is continually
rotated, making union orga-
nizing difficult. Wages and working conditions have
also been deeply affected by these pro-business
reforms. Generally, large companies combine a small
number of stable, well-paid production workers with
informal or short-term workers in areas like mainte-
nance or marketing.
There have been noticeable changes in the production
process as well. Speed-ups and longer work days are
much more common than before. Workers are increas-
ingly being required to do more. Now, for example, a
machinist must also do clean-up in the workplace–a
task that was once performed by a maintenance worker.
The impact of these changes on the level of employ-
ment should not be underestimated. A study carried out
by La Plata National University found that in breweries
and glass factories, production has increased despite a
notable reduction in the workforce. In the largest brew-
ery, while the stable workforce was cut from 1,500 in
1985 to 600 ten years later, beer production doubled
without any significant technological changes. Finally,
the power and authority of bosses and supervisors have
been strengthened in ways which have directly under-
mined the power and influence of shop stewards, lead-
ing to a rise in the mistreatment of workers.
espite the troubling socio-economic trends fac-
ing Argentina today, it would still be possible to
reverse Menem’s counter-reform. This is an
issue that affects not only wage-earners, but all
Argentines, since a country with an unstable work force
can hardly compete in today’s international economy.
The primary responsibility lies with the trade-union
movement itself, which must break with its double
legacy of dependence on the state and a rigid emphasis
on wage concerns.
There are already encouraging developments, such as
the formation of the Movement of Argentine Workers
(MTA), a dissident current within the CGT which has
garnered support in the strategic transport sector (truck-
ers, bus drivers, air traffic
controllers, etc.). This cur-
unionists from the
raentine Workers
1,
r n
rent has criticized the CGT
hierarchy’s corruption and
lack of independence from
the Menem government.
corruption within Another important develop-
ment is the founding of an y and its lack of alternative labor federation,
rom the Menem the Argentine Workers
Central (CTA), led by
iment. administrative, educational
and judicial employees. In
practice, these dissident cur-
rents work together. Because
traditional strikes or other forms of struggle within the
workplace are very difficult to carry out successfully, they organize national days of protest in which unem-
ployed and retired workers, students and opposition
political groups can rally in support of labor’s demands.
Dissident unionists must also develop links with the
political opposition, particularly the center-left Alliance
for Jobs, Justice and Education, the main winner in the
1997 legislative elections. A number of important MTA
and CTA union leaders have already joined the ranks of
the Alliance. Today, the Alliance and the trade unionists
of the MTA and CTA are discussing common strategies
to counter the final phase of the labor counter-reform
being launched by the ruling party-the reduction of
severance payments.
What is left of the historical protections stipulated in
Argentina’s labor code must be defended and modern-
ized to increase workers’ participation and strengthen
labor in its negotiations with management. Current leg-
islation should be reformed in order to eliminate corpo-
ratist privileges and the fat-cat bureaucrats they protect.
It is also imperative that labor leaders and progressive
sectors oppose all new attempts to undermine the labor
code. A joint strategy between labor and the Alliance
must consist of concrete proposals to deal with unem-
ployment, working conditions and occupational safety.
This is the next crucial step to building a more democ-
ratic, participatory and dynamic labor movement.
Argentina’s future, to a large extent, will be forged in
these struggles.
Argentine Labor: A Movement in Crisis
1. Instituto Nacional de Estadisticas y Censo (INDEC), Encuesta
Permanente de Hogares (Buenos Aires: INDEC, 1997).
2.INDEC, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
3. INDEC, Encuesta Permanente de Hogares.
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