Mutun, located in Southeastern Bolivia, is a stone’s
throw from Brazil. Its mines contain the largest deposits of
iron and manganese-an estimated 40,000 million tons-in
Latin America, and the third largest in the world. Yet the
deposits are Bolivian only because they fall within its
borders. The nation which controls Mutun, though, can
have a decisive effect on all countries which need its
products.
On August 5, 1971, a small delegation of Brazilian
businessmen arrived in Bolivia to negotiate trade
agreements with the popular government of General Juan J.
Torres. They also hoped to win sweeping concessions over
exploitation and development of the Mutun mines. Five
days after President Torres refused to grant such con-
cessions, he was overthrown by right-wing military units
carrying Brazilian machine guns and flying Brazilian
bombers painted with the Bolivian flag. Before the battle for
control was settled, Brazil had recognized the reactionary
leader of the coup, Col. Hugo Banzer, as head of a new
military government. And it wasted no time pumping
money, credit and more arms into Bolivia. 1
Brazil and the Southern Cone.
Mutun is only one of a number of reasons why Brazil
moved in mid-1971 to consolidate its power in Bolivia; but it
is an important one. The enormous deposits of Mutun are a
natural source on which to build a complete iron-steel
industry. Nevertheless, Brazil does not actually need the
iron of Mutun. In fact, Brazil already possesses 12 percent
of the world’s known reserves of iron ore. The Mutun
deposits in Bolivia stretch over to the fabulously rich mines
or Urutun in the Brazilian state of Mato Grosso. Aside from
this, Brazil owns virtually inexhaustible iron ore deposits in
the “iron quadrangle” of Minas Gerais. 2 Finally, there are
the tremendous deposits in the Amazon’s Serra dos Carajas
where U.S. Steel and a Brazilian government company are
planning to invest up to $600 million to develop its iron
mines. 3
In reality, Brazil’s interest in Mutun stems from its
concern for Argentina, not the iron ore. The reasoning
behind this is fairly clear. Historically, Brazil has searched
for dominance in the South American sub-continent. Its
principal rival in this quest has been Argentina. Brazil,
then, is continually on the look-out for methods to dominate
Argentina both economically and politically. Mutun is one
method.
Unlike Brazil, Argentina does not produce enough iron
ore .for its own needs. In fact, it must import much of its
requirements from Brazil. So great is Argentina’s need for
Brazilian metals that it now spends approximately 40
percent of its total Brazilian purchases on mineral and
industrial imports. Argentine control of Mutun would
therefore lessen its dependence on Brazil. And Mutun is
particularly attractive to Argentina since it is located only
30 kilometers from Puerto Suarez, an inland Bolivian port
on the Paraguay River which flows past the Argentine steel
complex of San Nicolas. 4 So Brazil seeks control of the
Bolivian mines not so much for their iron deposits as to
prevent Argentina from gaining access to them.
But Brazil’s interest in Bolivia in 1971 went further than
Mutun. As Bolivia’s Foreign Minister Mario Gutierrez sees
it. “. .. Bolivia is the geopolitical center of South America
and our country is summoned, by its position, to be the knot
of (South) American integration.”5 Brazil’s search for
hegemony in the sub-continent, therefore, would logically
begin with Bolivia.
In the first place, Bolivia could provide Brazil with access
to Pacific coast countries. Brazilian strategist, always stress
that U.S. development in many respects was determined by
its possession of both Atlantic and Pacific ports. Secondly,
Bolivia borders on both Peru and Chile. In 1971 both
countries had popular and nationalistic governments and
were therefore viewed by Brazil as national security threats.
Finally, Brazil’s economic “miracle” needed new markets
for its manufactured goods and new commercial frontiers to
maintain its high rate of industrial expansion.
The Andean Common Market, which developed rapidly
in 1971, threatened to isolate Brazil from such markets.
Although Brazilian investment analysts were outwardly
pleased with the Andean pact, claiming that it would bring
them mining capital which would normally have gone to
Chile and Peru, it is clear that Brazil was feeling the pinch25
for markets. That same year, the Nixon administration
announced a cutback on imports of Brazilian manufactured
goods as well as the imposition of new tariff barriers due to
the crisis in the U.S. balance of payments.
Clearly unsatisfied with the course of events in 1971,
Brazil was determined to change them. By helping to topple
the government of Torres in Bolivia, it thus made an im-
portant move in its complex game of geopolitics.
Geopolitics and Ideological Borders.
Geopolitics is a science of imperialism: the mapping out
of a strategy for dominance and control. Although the word
has many roots in the old German theories of realpolitik
(much admired by Henry Kissinger), the Nazis adapted it to
give a theoretical veneer to their plans for expansion. Since
then, it has been picked up by the U.S. Pentagon and, more
recently, the Brazilian Advanced War College (Escuela
Superior de Guerra).
Marshal Cordeiro de Farias, founder of the ESG, explained
the origins of the school: “War with the Axis revealed the
necessity for the United States to prepare for a warlike
mentality not only in the Pentagon but also in the allied
powers. The people and the elites of these countries ought to
be prepared for the formation of what is known as the
Military-Industrial Complex.” Brazil’s leading theoretician
of geopolitics, connected to the ESG and presently serving
as president of Dow Chemical Company of Brazil, is
Golbery Couto e Silva. He sees the “inevitability of war” as
the guiding principle of the War College. “There is no way,”
he writes, “to avoid the necessity of sacrificing well-being
for national security when the security of a nation is
threatened. A people who refuses to accept this will learn a well-deserved lesson in the dust of defeat. . . . War is inevitable. It is our duty, therefore, to prepare for it with
determination, foresight and faith.”
According to ESG experts, Bolivia is a geopolitical
“prisoner” because it is presently landlocked. On the other
hand, the Brazilian military considers Bolivia the geographical key to control of the Southern Cone since it borders on Argentina, Paraguay, Chile and Peru. Through Bolivia access is also gained to the Amazon River from the
south and to the Rio de la Plata from the north. And, of course, there is Mutun as well as enormous gas deposits which lie parallel to Brazil’s largest industrial zone, Sao Paulo.
Bolivia’s geographical position and its “internal friction,” according to Golbery, constitute a continual threat to
Brazilian national security. He concludes: “Like it or not, Bolivia will have to subordinate itself to the interests of Brazil or Argentina.” The choice, though, will not be left to
Bolivia. A document of the ESG maintains that the Brazilian military could “use its armed might in any Latin American country,” but two strategic zones are particularly
subject to such an intervention: the border with Uruguay, and the border with Bolivia, especially the Corumba- Caceres region (where the Mutun deposits are located).
Related to the doctrine of geopolitics is the notion of “ideological borders.” In 1965 the president of Brazil, Marshal Castello Branco, declared that the current Brazilian conception of National Security was not restricted to patrolling the physical borders of the nation, but ex- tended to the ideological borders of the Western world as well. This policy was put into practice in that year when Brazil sent troops to support the U.S. invasion of Santo
Domingo. A Brazilian general nominally directed the
operations. The following year Brazilian troops carried out
joint”excercises” on the Bolivian and Uruguayan borders,
bringing up charges of intent to invade if the political
situation in either country turned ideologically unfavorable
to Brazil.
At the 1%6 OAS meeting of foreign ministers, Brazil was
the only Latin American country to support the creation of a
standing “Permanent Peace Force” to be used against
“Communist threats” in the hemisphere. But, while Brazil
was isolated in its belief in geopolitics and ideological
borders in the mid-1960’s, there is no reason to believe that
it ever abandoned these notions. The Brazilian participation
in the Bolivian coup of 1971 is proof this.
The Plot Unfolds.
In January 1971, General Hugo Bethelen, former
Brazilian ambassador to Bolivia, was arrested in La Paz for
financing a plot against the Torres government. It was
proven that some $60,000 had already been turned over to
the conspirators, led by Banzer, and General Edmundo
Balencia, and Bethelen was convicted.
Five months later, the Brazilian weekly news magazine,
Visao, published excerpts from a conversation with
Bethelen in which he proposed that protectorates be set up
over countries like Bolivia which maintained relations with
countries outside the hemisphere which might pose a
security threat. 6 The Bolivian Minister of Foreign
Relations called the statement “provocative and im-
perialist.” Despite efforts of the Brazilian government to
cover up for Bethelen, the general met the press a few days
later and affirmed, “I am in favor of a form of intervention
which the Brazilian imagination, creative in developing new
forms of co-existence among men, can discover in the realm
of international relations, principally among Latin American nations which I consider one family.”l
Then, on August 15, the Brazilian delegation arrived,
anxious to lay claim to Mutun. Not only did Torres turn
them down, but he announced two days later a $200 million
credit from the Soviet Union for the construction of a
metallurgical processing plant in the Mutun region.
From then on, events began to move swiftly. On August
17, the Brazilian-Bolivian Chamber of Integration of
Private Companies (CIBRABOL) was formed in Sao Paulo
with an initial capital of $20 million to operate companies located in Bolivia. Its first president: Hugo Bethelen. That
same day two planes from the Brazilian Air Force (FAB) unloaded a cargo of arms in Santa Cruz consisting of “INA”-stamped machine guns which were manufactured in
Brazil for the exclusive use of the FAB.
Another FAB plane unloaded additional cargoes of arms
and munitions in Santa Cruz the following day. A written denunciation of Brazil was sent to Bolivian Interior
Minister Jorge Gallardo, but by then it was already too late.
As the Bolivian Rangers (Special Forces) unit under the
command of Col. Andres Selich occupied Santa Cruz on
August 20, Brazil ordered troop mobilization on the Bolivian border and prepared a squadron of bombers with freshly-painted Bolivian insignias. Armed civilians
surrounded the university building in Cochabamba early
that same day. Their machine guns bore the characteristic “INA” markings of the Brazilian Air Force.26
Meanwhile, a bomb went off in the mayor’s office in
Santa Cruz where the coup’s high command directed
operations. Mysteriously, the Brazilian consul, Mario
Amorin, was injured in the explosion.
Jornada. a La Paz daily, carried strong denunciations of
Brazilian backing for the coup, and pointed to the
training-in Brazil and Paraguay-of military and
paramilitary mercenary forces. 8 In Argentina, a right-wing
leader announced on the morning of August 21 that some
8,000 men trained in Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil were
fighting to overthrow the Torres government. 9 On August
22, the Brazilian government, modeling itself on US
government actions of earlier years, raced to recognize the
new regime.
The Post Coup Story.
In his first public press statement, the new Bolivian
president, Col. Hugo Banzer, explained that Bolivia had an
“interest in Brazilian investments,” and that he was “aware
that Bolivia offered various investment opportunities.”
And, as time has shown, Brazil had an interest in those
investments as well. Loans, long and short term credits,
arms transfers and technology transfers increased im-
mediately after the coup, and within a year Brazil had
wedged Argentina out of the Bolivian picture. Bolivia, on
the other hand, had begun to make aggressive moves
against Chile, thus establishing its position as a Brazilian
satellite.
The post-coup story is one of a consolidation of Brazilian
hegemony, what has been termed the sub-imperialist
strategy for Latin America. 1 0 One week after the coup, the
Bolivian Agricultural Bank received $5 million from the
Brazilian Investexport for loans to large landholders in the
Stanta Cruz area, the heart of the reactionary zone. The
loans were earmarked for the purchase from Brazil of heavy
machinery. An identical amount from the Banco do Brasil
went directly to the Bolivian government along with
thousands of match boxes carrying the slogan: “Bolivia
can count on us.”
On September 25, $10 million in credits was awarded to
Bolivia for the importation of heavy machinery and
equipment for building a rail line between Corumba (Brazil)
and Santa Cruz (Bolivia), as well as for highway con-
struction in the same region. This was the first of many agreements set up to facilitate commercial exchange
between Brazil and Bolivia. From Bolivia, the exchange
entailed a continual flow of petroleum products, especially gasoline, diesel oil, kerosene, fuel oil, natural gas, am-
monium nitrates and rubber derivatives. From Brazil,
Bolivia received heavy machinery, manufactured goods and
technical assistance.
One by one agreements and concessions previously in the
hands of Argentina were transferred to Brazil. Two-
hundred kilometers of railway tram lines to be built by
Argentina will now be constructed by Brazil. ALFONSECA,
a large Brazilian construction firm, arranged to build 900
kilometers of asphalt highway in October 1971, offering $50
million in order to link the interior of Bolivia with the
Brazilian state of Mato Grosso. Brazil has also replaced
Argentina as a source of imports and a market for exports.
And, in terms of aid, Brazil provides the Andean nation
with $46 million a year, a sum second only to that provided
by the United States.ll The political price of Bolivian
dependence on Brazil has been high. Ultimately, it has
forced the breakdown of Banzer’s MNR-FSB ruling
coalition since the MNR has traditionally been pro-
Argentina and the FSB, pro-Brazil. (See “Bolivia: The War
Goes On” in this issue).
The pattern of Brazilian intervention in Bolivia-from
arms and advice to machinery and credits–has been and is
being repeated today in Chile.1 2 Chile, too, was an integral
part of the Brazilian geopolitical framework, since Brazil
has always sought an alliance with Chile in order to
surround its tranditional rival, Argentina. 1 3 The Brazilian
government (along with that of its client state, Uruguay), the
first to recognize the Chilean junta, immediately flew in
military personnel to facilitate the “round-up” of Brazilian
exiles and refugees, and awarded huge sums of money in
loans and credits to keep the Chilean military junta afloat.
And Brazilian money, influence and arms are concentrating
around the borders of Peru and Argentina should a threat
to national security be deemed sufficient to carry on the
game of geopolitics. — Ruth Needleman
FOOTNOTES
1. Ramiro Sanchez. Brasil en Bolivia: lecciones de un golpe militar (Santiago de
Chile: Ediciones Letras, 1972), 33. Much of the information in this article is taken
from this pamphlet written with the help of the Frente Brasileno de Informaciones in
Santiago.
2. Chile Hoy (Santiago), Vol. II, no. 59 (July 27-August 2,1973), 20.
3. Business Week (September 25, 1971), 51.
4. Bernabe Vargas, “Bolivia: centro de unificacion latinoamericano o nudo de
discordias geopoliticas,”Inter Press Service release NR 1704/972 (February 1972).
5. Ibid.
6. Visao, May 24, 1971.
7. Jornal do Brasil, July 6, 1971.
8. Jornada (La Paz), August 20, 1971.
9. La Opinion (Buenos Aires), August 21, 1971.
10. See Rui Mauro Marini, “Brazilian Sub-Imperialism,” Monthly Review, Vol. 23,
no. 2 (February 1972), 14-24.
11. Newsweek, August 20, 1973.
12. For documentation of Brazil’s participation in the Chilean coup, see Marlise
Simon, “The Brazilian Connection,” The Washington Post (January 6, 1974).
13. “Chilean Coup: Brazil Goes Over the Andes,” Brazilian Information Bulletin, No.
11 (Fall 1973), 2-3.
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