AT THE END OF 1988, THE U .S.-SUPPORTED Contra war was winding down and thousan of Nica- raaans began flowing upthroughGuaternala andMexico, to Texas and onto Miami. By the beginning of 1989, the stream of new immigrants became a flood. INS officials estimated that as many as 3(X) refugees a week settled in Dade County during the last half of 1988. At the beginning of 1989, Grey-hound assigned special buses to run continuously between the Texas-Mexico border and Miami. In the second week of January, 1989, ten buses arrived in Miami in just one day. The Nicaraguan flow closely paralleled the earlier Cuban migration. The 1988-89 Nicaraguanrefugee crisis, much like the I 98OMariel Cuban refugee crisis, was the culmination of a multi-phased migration that began with the elite, then incorporated the professional and middle classes, and lastly brought the working classes. But there were also important differences. Most notably, the U.S. government was not welconiingto the Nicaraguan immigrants as it had been to the Cubans. The federal government classified most arriving Nicaraguans as illegal aliens, actively tried to prevent them fromentering the United States, and offered them no benefits. The Nicaraguans did, however, have assistance. The Miami Cubans powerful comrades in-arms became their benefactors. “Latin ness” alone was not the reason for the Cubans’ support of their Nicaraguan brethren, just as “Cu- ban-ness” was not enough for membeihip in the old exiles’ moral conununity. Rather, political ideology miliutnt op- position to a Leftist regime cemented this alliance, When the Nicaraguan refugee crisis arose in late 1988, uban-rn City of Miami Manager esar Odio, criticizing “inhuman” conditions at a private shelter for homeless Nica-raguans in Miami, ordered it shut down and bused more than 150 refugees to Bobby Maduro Miami Stadium. a baseball stadium built by Cuban exiles in the 1950s, Odio assured the refugees that they would receive the same consideration that Cuban Mariel refugees got in 1980. He told reporters; “Now they understand they have the full support of the city.” Doctors from Miami” s Pasteur Clinic, run and staffed primarily by Cuban immigrants set up an examination room under a stairway at the Miami Stadium. Miami Cuban city aides Hiram Gome and Edgar Sopo raced from a telephone to the parking lot, calling names in rapid Spanish: “Centro Vasco, Centro Asturiano, Islas Canarias.”Theywere fielding pledges from restaurants, nearly all Miami- cuban. donating focsl. Ignacio Mattinez, a Miami-Cuban exile arid retired grocer, showed up with a cigar in his mouth and a sack of clothes in his hand, “We had our time of need, and now it’s their turn,” he explained. Underneath the stadium seats, two former Cuban political prisoners, Alfrcdo Menocal and An- tonio Candales. staffed a green telephone that rang inces- santly. As City of Miami employees, they assumed the task trying to find jobs for the Nicaraguan refugees. Twodays afterOdio promised Miami’s “full support” for the homeless Nicaraguans, County Manager and Miami Cuban Joaquin Aviflo declared, “We’re pulling out all the stops. There are a lot of people in this community who are close to the President. I think it’s impoitant for those people to be messengers for us.” Those “close to the President” were not the traditional Anglo leaders of Miami. Rather they were the immigrant Miami Cubans. Within a week. Odio had flown to Washing ton to meet with INS Director Alan Nelson. Elio requested that the INS temporarily reverse its policy of denying work permits to the Nicaraguans. in spite of the pleas of Florida’s senators to regain control of the borders, Nelson acceded to Ckllo’s request. promising to prixess the asylum applications of all Nicaraguans in the baseball stadium in three to five days. In a matlerof days, Nicaraguan refugees settling in Miami had secured space on the agendas of local governments that had long argued that the refugees were a federal concern. They achieved this not simply because of the magnitude of the migration problem. but because the Miami-Cuban corn- munity welcomed them and had the power to effect a gener- ous welcome. But as the Nicaraguan community divexified and the Contra war dragged on, crevices slowly appeared in the Miami-Cuban and Nicaraguan anti-Communist solithuity net- work. The moral community failed to prevail over the political and class divisions among the Nieiu-aguans. The defeat of the Sandinistas then split the Nicaraguan community’s loyalties. Nicaraguans had atal option ofreturn, an option thatconfused their local priorities and prevented the emergence of a second distinct Latino voice in Miami.
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