When Guatemalan Bishop Juan Gerardi was found lying in a pool of blood this past April, his face beaten in with a piece of concrete, the crime scene quickly became a zoo. As the house filled with onlookers, investigators from the National Civilian Police and the Public Ministry walked through the blood and passed the apparent murder weapon from hand to hand. Three months later, the prosecutor jailed Father Mario Orantes, Gerardi’s housemate, alleging that his ancient German Shepherd had participated in the murder. A recent exhumation, however, uncovered no evidence of the supposed dog bites that sparked this jailing.
For months now, the Church has accused the government of failing to explore leads that implicate the infamous Presidential High Command (EMP), a military intelligence unit with a long history of involvement in illegal surveillance, intimidation and murder. So confused, sensationalist and ineffective has been the whole investigation of this case, that some local analysts believe that Guatemalan military intelligence may in fact be orchestrating it in an elaborate attempt to discredit the Church and its human rights work.
This case is just one more illustration that two years after the signing of the Peace Accords, Guatemala still has not established full civilian rule of law. The Guatemalan military still is being used by the government to conduct criminal investigations and to patrol the countryside as the most efficient and effective response to common crime. And most Guatemalans, fearful of the criminal insecurity that besets the country, heartily applaud this military presence. Drug trafficking, organized car theft and highway robbery have long been serious problems, and kidnapping has also become a major business. In 1997, according to the local press, there were over 1,600 kidnappings for ransom in Guatemala. Highway robbery is not only on the rise, but is increasingly associated with roadside rape and murder. Constant and lurid press coverage adds to public perceptions of a security vacuum.
Not only is the population alarmed, but—with considerable justification—considers the National Civilian Police incompetent and corrupt, and is increasingly taking the law into its own hands. Lynchings and burnings of suspected criminals, especially in the rural areas, have become common place events and, according to opinion polls, enjoy widespread support. Significantly, the suspects are often wrested right from the hands of the police, whom the populace fears will either release the criminals for a bribe or be unable to provide the courts with sufficient evidence to ensure their conviction.
The Peace Accords signed in December 1996 commit the government to the creation of a new National Civilian Police and the concomitant removal of the military from internal security functions. But the Arzú government, anxious to provide an effective response to the public’s concern over rising crime, does not appear particularly committed to the concept of civilian security. Police reform to date is focused on rapidly increasing the salaries, numbers and equipment of the police, not on ensuring their professionalism or nonmilitary nature.
Ninety percent of the previous force is being “recycled” into the new force with no real vetting process, and recruits are not being held to professional standards. Training is handled almost entirely by the militarized Spanish Civil Guard, with the UN Human Rights Mission (MINUGUA) and the U.S. Criminal Investigations Training Assistance Program playing distinctly subsidiary roles. Recently, in a clear violation of the Accords, some 40 military officers moved straight from the armed forces into a “recycling course” at the police academy and have since assumed positions within the National Civilian Police.
Furthermore, the Arzú government has continued to draw heavily on the military for internal security functions. The presidential EMP is home to a shadowy AntiKidnapping Squad involving military intelligence agents. These investigators are apparently employing illegal investigative practices such as wiretapping, which is prohibited under the Guatemalan Constitution. There liave been several cases, moreover, in which the EMP has Ilegaily detained and even killed suspected kidnappers. The most notorious was the disappearance of Juan José Cabreras Rodas, a guerrilla kidnapper nicknamed “Mincho” who was apparently detained and murdered by the EMP in late 1996, The Arzú government has refused to give MINUGUA full access to verify this incident, as required under the Peace Accords.
Meanwhile, it is official government policy to use the military in patrols. Last year, President Arzú announced the reopening of 12 military bases that had been cosed at the end of war to permit a more extensive rural security role for the army. Military personnel are being used for patrol duty both in regions where the new National Civilian Police have been fully deployed and in those still covered by the old National Police. In the latter case, a few National Civilian Police are sent in, take up residence in the army base, and then “lead” the military patrols sent out to provide security to the region. These heavily armed joint patrols are questionable on many levels: the real degree of civilian control, the use of minimum force and the effectiveness of large-group deployments, at odds with standard police practice of two-person patrols.
One problem with public security reforms in Guatemala is the delay created by the Constitutional reform process. The old Constitution, which gives the military air explicit internal security function, has not yet been reformed. Therefore, the law that created the National Civilian Police did not stress its civilian nature so it would not be declared unconstitutional. Important measures relating to intelligence reform have also been held up in part due to this delay.
The Constitutional reforms will hopefully be concluded by the end of this year. However, even if the military’s functions are finally redefined, it is highly uncertain that the Guatemalan armed forces will leave tile internal security field. The new military mandate of defending “sovereignty and territonal integrity” is being interpreted by some officers to include combating contraband, drug trafficking, protection of the environment and other police functions. In addition, the Peace Accords propose that the president still be able to call on the military for internal security functions “when the ordinary means for the maintenance of public order and domestic peace are exhausted.” Given the currrent crime situation, this is likely to be a long-term situation.
Military involvement in policing will thus probably continue. Many Guatemalan human rights groups adamantly oppose this practice, but other local and international human rights groups, as well as MINUGUA and the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG), have come to see this as an inevitable reality, and possibly preferable to the population taking “public security” into its own hands, All insist, however, that this activity be clearly transitional, and closely controlled to ensure the full subordination of the military to civilian direction. To date, however, proposals of this nature have found little echo in the Arzú government.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR:
Rachel Garst is apolitical analyst currently based in Guatemala City.
