Caldera’s victory and the high rate of abstention point to
a dissatisfaction that has taken two different routes:
support for opposition political players, and deliberate
marginalization from the political system.
On December 5 of last year, 78-year-old Rafael
Calderaon his sixth run for the presidency
was elected president of Venezuela for the sec- ond time. (He first served from 1969 to 1974.) The
process that brought Caldera to power began two yearsalmost to the daybefore his February 2,
1994 inauguration. Just after midnight on February 4,
1992, a group of middle-level military officers, led by
an army colonel named Hugo Chavez, attempted to
take control of the country’s key government buildings in order to overthrow the constitutional government of
Carlos Andrs Perez. Within a few hours, the military
high command, which remained loyal to the govern-
ment, had the situation well in hand, and by 2:30 a.m.,
Perez appeared on national television to announce that
democracy and the Constitution had survived. By the
end of the day. leaders of the major opposition par- tiesincluding Eduardo Fernndez of the social
Christian party Copei, and Teodoro Petkoff of the left-
ist Movement Toward Socialism (MAS)had con-
demned the coup and announced their firm support for
the constitutional government. In the afternoon, Venezuelas Congress met to approve that morning’s cabinet decree which tem-
porarily suspended constitutional guarantees for the remainder of the emergency. The congressional ses-
sion was supposed to be brief and perfunctory, but cx-
presidentthereby life-time senatorCaldera asked
for permission to speak. With the cameras rolling, he
blamed the government’s harsh economic policies for
the coup d’etat. Citizens could not be blamed, he said,
for reacting strongly to the suffering caused by Perez’
misguided free-market policies. He called upon Perez
to correct his mistakes so that a democraticinstead
of a militarysolution to the country’s problems
could be found.
Probably no one hut Caldera could have made such
a speech. One of the fathers of Venezuelan democra- cy, and the founder of the social Christian party,
Copei, Caldera could not be mistaken for a military
plotter. His first presidency, while unspectacular, was
conspicuously incorruptible, and Caldera, though known for his arrogant, even authoritarian personality, was also perceived to be scrupulously honest and
attached to democratic institutions. His persistent pres-
idential ambitions had become something of a joke
among Venezuelans, but from the moment he finished his Senate speech, until the day he was elected,
Caldera led all the presidential polls. And it was his
televised speech, more than anything else, that legit- imized dissent from the neoliberal reforms of the
Perez government. Ten months after the February 4 coup, the plotters
tried again, and once again, they failed to rouse popu-
lar support and were rebuffed by troops loyal to the
Constitution and Perez. Over the next year, however, it
became clear that while Venezuelans preferred ballots
to bullets, they were ready to use those ballots to turn
sharply against anyone associated with the defense of
the Perez Administration. Politicians like Petkoff of
MAS, and Fernndez of Copei, who thought they were
defending democracy on the morning of the first coup,
were perceived as having gone to the defense of Perez
himself. Thus Petkoff, nine days after the second coup,
finished a distant third in his hid to become the first
elected mayor of Caracas, and Fernndez, the popular
leader of Copei, was embarrassed in that party’s presi-
dential primary by a Copei state governor who pre- sented himself as a political outsider.
On the other hand, candidates associated, however
vaguely, with the goals of the plotters did well. The
victor in the race for mayor of Caracas. for example,
Federico Alvarez is a veteran Venezuelan journalist whose work
appears regularly in El Diario oe Caracas, and the magazine
Elite.
Translatea from the Spar.ish by NACLA.
16 N.LA REPORTONTHEAMERICASREPORT ON VENEZUELA
was a previously obscure congressional deputy named
Aristbulo Isttiriz who, like Caldera, was publicly crit-
ical of Perez even as the military crisis unfolded.
IsttIriz’ radical party, Causa R, also benefited because,
like the plotters, they seemed like plain-speaking out-
siders from relatively humble backgrounds, suffering
along with almost everybody else. Causa R, capitaliz- ing on working-class frustration and discontent, has
become an electoral phenomenon of sorts in 1992 and 1993. The million and a
quarter votes received by
the party’s presidential can-
didate, Andrs Velasquez, was an impressive accom-
plishment for a previously obscure party, and most
Venezuelans expect Vels-
quez to be a true contender
in 1998.
T
he 1992 and 1993
elections took place in a context of great
political instability. Not only did growing unrest prevent the Perez govern- ment from implementing all its economic reforms, but
Perez himself lost all legiti-
macy and was indicted and
impeached on charges of corruption in May, 1993. An interim government led
by an elderly non-partisan historian named Ramn J.
Velasquez barely held
things together through the last half of 1993. The interim government refused to
deal with any of the crucial issues facing the country
save one: it guided Venezuela safely through a period
of great uncertaintyavoiding a third, much feared
military coupto the democratic presidential elec- tions of December 5.
Those elections successfully put a brake on the pres-
sure for a military coup that predominated throughout all of 1993. It is unlikely, however, that the elections
will stabilize the Venezuelan political system in the long term. Abstention in these elections was at a
record-high level: despite the fact that voting is legally
obligatory, 40% of the electorate stayed home. Only
5.6 million of the 9.7 million eligible voters cast bal-
lots. Previously, the highest level of abstention in a
presidential election was the 20% recorded in the 1988
election that brought Carlos Andrs Perez into office. In light of the devastating economic crisis and the
social turmoil that has shaken Venezuelan society
since 1989, political leaders and analysts consider
voter apathy to have grave implications for the future
of the cunent political model. Another disquieting sign in this eighth election
since the start of the “democratic period” in 1958 was that the Supreme Electoral Councilthe highest
authority in the affairtook so long to release official
results. During the week after election day, the only concrete information Venezuelans had was that
Caldera had won the presi- dency. The order of the
other presidential candi-
datesthree of whom har- bored aspirations of victo-
rywasn’t even clear see
“The Parties,” p.19]. From the moment the
Council announced the first
returns, accusations of fraud flourished. The leaders of
Causa R and the two princi- pal groups supporting Caldera, Convergencia and MAS, were the most insis- tent. Accusations abated
after a series of recounts, but the slowness of the vote
count aroused mistrust in the parties and the process.
Making things worse, the results openly contradicted not only the predictions of
pre-election polls, but the exit polls taken on election
day itself. That was particu-
larly striking in the case of the Accin Democrtica
(AD) candidate, Claudio FermIn. The pre-election
polls gave him a maximum of 10%, the exit polls gave
him about 16%, and yet he appeared in second place
with about 23% in the official returns. There are some
credible explanations for such a turnaround. First of all, following the impeachment of AD President Perez, many AD voters may simply have been ashamed to tell pollsters whom they were voting for.
Secondly, in the words of a party leader, “AD mili-
tants may always be badmouthing the party leader- ship, but when they get behind that black curtain, their
heart tells them to vote for the party.”
Thirty percent of votersa mere 20% of eligible
voters when abstentions are taken into account-cast
their ballots for Caldera. The election of a president
without the support of a majority of voters is not a
new phenomenon in Venezuela, where there is no pro-
VOL XXVII, No 5 MAR/APRIL 1994 17
Ca/dera supporters rally in Caracas. The reconstructed Christ-
ian democrat won with about 30% of the vote.REPORT ON VENEZUELA
vision for a presidential runoff. In 1963, for example,
the AD candidate Radi Leoni won with 31% of the
votes, and Caldera himself became president in 1968
with only 28%. The historical conditions of 1994,
however, are not the same as in the past. The general
crisis in which the country finds itself demands strong,
clear leadership. Caldera has not received a strong electoral mandate, and is thus obliged to look for
alliances with other political forces, not only in Con- gress, but also among the non-
party groups in civil
society. Agreements with unions, for example, will be
vital in order to
channel the wave of
wage demands, pro-
tests against the high cost of living and
new taxes, and calls for Caldera to fol-
low through on his
campaign promises for social justice.
J
t is still unknown, however, how a new consensus
can be put together. In 1958, with the overthrow of the
dictator Marcos Perez Jimdnez, and the establishment of a constitutional democracy, the major parties
agreed to an Institutional Pact whose objectives and
limitations were clear. The parties were committed to
certain fundamental principles: the consolidation of
representative democracy based upon universal suf- frage and respect for election results; a mixed econo-
my with strong state participation and the collabora-
tion of classes; and, at the international level, an
alliance with Western powers. That modelwhich
functioned for 36 yearsis now in turmoil.
Caldera’s personality raises some doubts, among
those who have followed his career, about his ability
to reach out to allies. He comes from a generation of
political leaders closer to the nineteenth-century Venezuelan caudillos than the modern leaders who
work by consensus. “Caldera,” quipped Perez, his
long-time political enemy, “is the only Venezuelan I know who speaks to God every day.” It was perhaps
after one such conversation that he decided last year to
abandon the party he founded and led for more than
40 years, after its leadership did not select him as its
candidate for the sixth time. A tenacious man, Caldera
succeeded in putting together a heterogeneous politi- cal alliance that runs from the influential MAS on the
left, to a group on the right that wants to bring back
the old dictator, Perez Jimnez. Does this signify sim-
ple opportunism or a change in attitude?
If only opportunism is at play, we are on the thresh-
old of serious conflicts with Congress and in society
at large. If, on the other hand, the effort to realize the
miracle of Calderismo reveals a lucid understanding
of the new circumstances, we can expect the birth of
a new type of consensus, different from the old Insti- tutional Pact. That
agreement would have to materialize in the recently
elected Congress, which is more
complex and pot- entially less gov- ernable than the
previous one.
D
espite the lingering doubts, two incidents at the start of Caldera’s
presidency indicate his willingness to
work within a new
coalition. Just be-
fore he took office, he supported the decision of the
Convergencia congressional leadership to support their MAS allies in rejecting an AD nominee as the
head of the lower house. By traditional agreement, the
party of the president chooses the leader of the Senate,
while the main opposition partyin this case AD
chooses the leader of the lower house. Arguing that
AD’ s choice, a conservative party functionary named
Carmelo Lauria, represented the worst of the old poli-
tics, MAS opposed him for the position. In “solidari-
ty,” despite the expectations of tradition, Convergen- cia supported MAS. The second incident was Caldera’s refusal to reap-
point the former secretary of defense and most power- ful figure in the armed forces, General Radamds
Muoz Leon. His decision triggered a minor wave of
resignations in the Army high command, and a week-
end of political anxiety in the country. The move, how-
ever, not only served to reaffirm presidential control
over the military, but also constituted an olive branch tendered to Causa R. Throughout the campaign,
Mufloz was involved in a public shouting match with
the secretary general of Causa R, Pablo Medina. The
substance of the controversy was a never-substantiated
accusation that Medina had agreed to safeguard arms
stolen by November 27 coup leaders from the store-
house at Army headquarters at Fuerte Tiuna. Medina
denied any wrongdoing and accused Muoz of cook-
ing up the charges for political reasons. As the debate
progressed, Causa Rdemonized by one part of the
population, lionized by anotherrose in the polls. Had
Causa R’s Andrs Velasquez won the presidency,
expectations of a new coup, this time led by the high
command, would have risen considerably. The refusal
to reappoint Munozthough Caldera didn’t present it
this waymay help build a relationship with Causa R,
whose support Caldera will clearly need over the
course of his five-year term. Congress will be a crucial institution in the con-
struction of any new ruling consensus. It will play a
decisive role in financial matters, in the constitutional
reform that Caldera has promised, and in the econom-
ic policy that the new administration chooses to fol-
low. A reading of the congressional results indicates
that Caldera may have his work cut out for him. Con-
vergencia begins with an initial parliamentary force
assuming the coalition with MAS holdsof only 10
senators (of 52) and 50 deputies (of 204). Even it he
successfully reaches out to Causa R. Caldera will still
need some Copei or AD votes to gain a parliamentary
majority. Congress remains in the grip of AD and Copei, even
if the two parties no longer have the hegemony of ear- lier years. It is also clear that four parliamentary
minoritiesor five, if MAS and Convergencia go
their separate wayshave emerged, separated by strong political differences and by ambitions of con-
serving their prestige and influence for the next elec-
tion. From that point of view, the new Congress is less
governable than earlier ones in which AD and Copei
operated as they pleased, fulfilling the duties of their
respective fractions and the old Institutional Pact.
T
he leaders of the Venezuelan Left today savor
the euphoria of victory. For the first time in the
political life of the country. the Left forms part
of the winning formula, and leftists look forward to playing a role in the government, after having
remained for so long in the wide trenches of political criticism (see “An Interview with MAS’ Teodoro
Petkoff,” this page). This challenge faces MAS in par-
ticular, since the rest of the microparties of the so-
called “chiripero”the ad-hoc coalition, or “nest of
bugs,” that backed Calderadisappeared from a legal
point of view when they garnered less than one per-
cent of the vote. MAS has good reason to feel triumphant. It fur- nished the initial platform for the launching of Caldera’s candidacyafter it realized its initial mis-
take in being over-identified with Perez’ salvation
and obtained the highest number of presidential votes
in its history. The party has emerged as the strongest
parliamentary force in the Calderista front. It has also
acquired a new territorial base by winning the gover-
norship of the state of Zuliathe most economically
powerful in the nationwith the triumph of Lolita
Aniyar de Castro. MAS will not, however, be the key party in
Caldera’s government. That role goes to Convergen-
ciathe party formed by the dissident ex-members of
Copei. The MAS leadership has requested key posts in
the social ministries in an
effort to widen its base of
popular influence. This
strategy, however, may
backfire, turning the party
into a wall of contention
for popular discontent, as
the nucleus of dissent
becomes Causa R, riding
its strong electoral show-
ing.
Some analysts consider
Causa R to be a fly-by-
night party, destined to fall
apart in the immediate
future. This might be a
hasty judgment. Up to
now, Causa R has kept all
the strongholds it has con-
quered. The state of Boli-
var demonstrated its confi-
It is clear to all that there is no
way out of Venezuela’s crisis
without a new national
consensus.
dence in Governor Andr6s Velisquez on two occa- sions, and Caracas has just reaffirmed its support for Mayor Arist6bulo Isttiriz. The same can happen in the eastern state of Anzoitegui, an AD area in the past that Causa R just won. Causa R-for the time being, at least-is the center of discontent and a locus of
hope for an alternative.
Causa R’s popularity and the high rate of abstention
point to a dissatisfaction that has taken two different
routes: support for opposition political players, and
deliberate marginalization from the political system.
The new government’s moves will be decisive in pre-
venting this discontent from turning towards the mili-
tarist tendencies that are latent in the national panora-
ma-tendencies which are only waiting for an
opportunity to assert themselves. It would be naYve to
think that the “civic-military option” was exhausted
with the coup attempts in 1992. Solutions of force can
mount on the back of the social turbulence that is
already on the scene.
Caldera has promised to eschew the economic
strategy espoused by Andr6s P6rez, whose goal
was to lead Venezuela from populist protec-
tionism to a market economy. He has harshly criti-
cized the agreements reached between the previous
government and the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. On his first day in office,
he announced the elimination of the new value-added
tax (VAT).
The statements of his advisors, in particular
Asdribal Baptista, the new minister of economic
reform, and Julio Sosa Rodriguez, his minister of
finance, imply that there is no
going back to the economic
model of the 1958 pact.
Arguing that more emphasis
must be placed on social poli-
cy, they assert that economic
growth cannot be the exclu-
sive goal-that growth with-
out social equity is a crime.
This is the rhetoric of Christ-
ian democrats throughout
Latin America. Recently, for
example, Chilean ex-Presi-
dent Patricio Aylwin
observed that while the mar-
ket is capable of creating
wealth and whetting con-
sumer appetites, it creates ter-
rible inequities that the state
must correct.
Other observers put a
damper on things by pointing
out the reigning realities in
the country. Venezuela’s fiscal deficit is now 300 mil-
lion bolivars (about US$3 million)-equal to a quarter
of the national budget and 4% of the GDP. With the
plummeting international price of oil, specialists only
see one route to fiscal health: increasing internal taxa-
tion in a society that pays hardly any taxes, and raising
the price of gasoline that is now sold for less than the
cost of production. Caldera will have to quickly come
up with progressive fiscal alternatives to the measures
he repeatedly rejected in his campaign.
The new government is also divided over privatiza-
tion policies. Caldera seems wedded to a concept of
basic industries, such as the mining enterprises of
Guayana, even though they represent one of the main
sources of government mismanagement and wasteful
spending in recent years. His position with respect to
the participation of private capital-national and for-
eign-in the oil industry is also ambiguous, and is now
in the hands of his main economic advisor and finance
minister, Sosa Rodrfguez, a petroleum engineer.
Caldera inaugurated his presidential candidacy
under the banner of national understanding. The coun-
try, in his judgment, was tired of governments domi-
nated by Venezuela’s traditional parties, AD and
Copei, and tired of the top-down domination of the
political culture by the parties-the system called
“partidocracia.” He called for a “great convergence”
of all sectors, not only party-affiliated organizations.
Even though the electorate’s response did not amount
to a categorical backing of this position, it is clear to
all that there is no way out of Venezuela’s crisis with-
out a new national consensus.
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