The United Nations Development Program’s (UNDP) recent report, “Democracy in Latin America: Towards a Citizens’ Democracy,” aims to stimulate debate on constructive strategies for tackling the region’s economic and political problems, and ultimately to reinvigorate democracy. Commissioned by the UNDP’s bureau for the region, it is an extremely dense document containing all the wonderful contradictions that epitomize the mainstream debate on democratization. The presence of contradictions is not surprising, given that the report was prepared by a team of “experts,” each with his or her own particular orientation, on behalf of the UNDP, which has its own distinct institutional perspective. It is based on interviews with 231 leaders from the region—including almost all sitting presidents and living former presidents—and public opinion polls of almost 20,000 Latin Americans, representing all social classes from 18 countries. Throw in an impressively diverse group of academics to review the theoretical framework of the report and you have your icing on an incredibly complex cake.
The report draws some general conclusions that are helpful in analyzing Latin American democracy’s crisis of legitimacy. The final message is quite simple: despite significant achievements over the last 25 years, regional democracy is in trouble. The report points out the persistent need to strengthen institutions—including legislatures, judiciaries and the police—and to deepen commitment to freedom of the press and human rights protection. It notes a growing disenchantment with elected political leaders who are not seen to be delivering the goods. It also acknowledges that poverty is worsening and that democracy has not significantly challenged the region’s entrenched inequalities. But perhaps the most significant conclusion is that the economy cannot and should not be excluded from democratic decision-making. This is where the difficulties and contradictions arise.
Latin Americans clearly believe genuine democracy should be directly linked to economic well-being. Despite significant gains in civil and political liberties, many Latin Americans are less and less confident about the ability of electoral regimes to seriously address poverty, provide adequate health and educational systems, and better distribute wealth. Because of this, some observers worry that “the door is in fact possibly open for dangerous demagogy, a kind of creeping authoritarianism,” says UNDP spokesman Bill Orme. But are Latin Americans as inclined to authoritarianism as the UNDP report would lead us to believe?
According to Latinobarometro, the polling firm responsible for collecting the statistics, the UNDP misinterpreted the figures. As a result, the report presented Latin Americans as more pro-authoritarian than they actually are. Whereas the report stated 58% of those surveyed would prefer an authoritarian leader who could improve their economic situation over a democratic one who could not, the actual figure was 43%. The UNDP has since apologized for the error. When the report was first released, this inaccurate statistic resonated in the mainstream news and within political circles as evidence that “a majority” of Latin Americans do not favor democracy. The actual figure is still fairly bleak, but is it really surprising in a region where deepening poverty and severe economic inequalities coexist with democratic governance?
To address this reality, the report advocates a broader notion of social citizenship with increased citizen participation in all areas of decision-making. In its brief to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, the UNDP suggests extending the definition and practice of democracy to include citizen participation in determining the economic model: “Debate on the economy, and on diverse ways in which markets can be regulated, should be brought into a public agenda and made subject to citizens’ preferences.” Such a shift is not only desirable but essential, says the UNDP, to solve the region’s profound political, social and economic problems.
All of which sounds good so far. However, the report, in a sleight of hand that is not only deeply ideological but also analytically problematic, uses the Indicator of Economic Reform as one of its measurements of overall economic and democratic development. This indicator measures moves towards market-oriented reforms and is used alongside the report’s Indicator of Electoral Democracy. The use of economic reform as an “indicator” suggests that market reforms are an unproblematic and necessary aspect of development—as is electoral reform—rather than a hugely contested area of policymaking. While the report acknowledges that “70 percent of those surveyed support state intervention in the economy and only 26.4 percent prefer the market,” it also suggests that “progress towards democracy and towards the establishment of clear and legitimate macroeconomic norms must be seen as mutually reinforcing.”
Ultimately, it is unclear what is meant by “legitimate macroeconomic norms.” In the current context of neoliberalism, one would assume that these norms are consistent with the economic reform agenda currently pushed by the international financial institutions (IFIs) and accepted—or at least tolerated—by the UNDP. For example, the UNDP’s agenda calls for “poverty alleviation” in the context of reforms rather than identifying worsening poverty as a possible consequence of those very reforms. The idea is to make neoliberalism a little friendlier. The UN Human Settlements Program, on the other hand, has directly challenged the neoliberal model in their 2003 report on slums. But as a rule in mainstream development circles, the basic parameters of economic policymaking are already agreed upon; it is only after the fact that poverty and inequality can be discussed. Therefore, the question emerges: How can the agenda of neoliberal reform — macroeconomic stability and liberalizing markets — be up for public discussion when the outcome of that discussion must be that neoliberal reforms are essential? We are caught in a paradox.
The deep crisis in party politics, acknowledged by the report as key to the democracy crisis, is of course central to this question. Of the numerous factors behind the crisis, perhaps the most obvious one is that there is very little choice between political party agendas. Left-of-center parties and their leaders become more and more “centered” as they near government, Brazil’s Lula being the most recent example.
According to reigning ideology, maintaining healthy macroeconomic indicators requires neoliberal reform. Carrying out neoliberal reform therefore becomes essential for a country to maintain credit with the IFIs and to ensure investor confidence in its economy. But this process often also requires a government to ignore the wishes of many, if not most, of its citizens. Why should we be surprised that Latin Americans are not that impressed with democracy when most of the key decisions affecting their economic well-being are made by international actors with the help of foreign-trained technocrats? In this context of limited maneuverability, Néstor Kirchner looks quite radical, Evo Morales entirely unrealistic and Hugo Chávez just all around problematic.
Perhaps the panic in the international community about the state of democracy in Latin America is based as much on the recognition that neoliberal policies are being deeply contested by Latin Americans—producing instability throughout the region—as it is on the fact that they may support authoritarians who are able to improve their economic situation. In fact, Latin Americans who vote for pro-neoliberal candidates are arguably already doing exactly what this report condemns: supporting authoritarians who they hope can improve their economic situation. Clearly, many do not see an alternative.
For Latin America, the contradictions in this report reflect the region’s conflicting drives to survive in a severely skewed and unequal international economy, while attempting to build real democracy at home. At the international level, the conflict arises between the desire of particular states and transnational elites to maintain their economic and political hegemony and the recognition that this order is neither democratic nor stable.
Ultimately, two agendas emerge from the UNDP report. One is explicit, involving national agendas for democracy promotion—strengthening institutional frameworks, human rights and democratic culture. The other is implicit, involving the need to draw international actors into the framework of democracy-monitoring in Latin America. The latter would also hold international institutions accountable, not only those decision-makers traditionally associated with the national democratic sphere. Such an approach would help us better understand why Latin Americans are not thrilled with the current state of democracy. It would also force the most powerful states of the North and the international financial institutions that they dominate to engage in a much-needed self-analysis, rather than solely focusing on what Latin Americans need to do to “get it right.”
About the Author:
Terry Gibbs is director of the North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA).
