ARENA’s hard-hitting campaign strategy attempted to exploit
the cleavages in Salvadoran society wrought over a decade of war.
The election became a fight between Right and Left,
and the results were not good news for the Left.
BY GEORGE VICKERS AND JACK SPENCE
he
camera
focuses
close-up
on drawing paper and a
small hand with a crayon
sketching a female figure. A
child’s voice-over says “this is
mommy,” and goes on to draw a
second male figure identified as
“daddy.” The hand then sketches a
third smaller figure identified as
“me.” The drawing of “me” has
only one leg, and the small voice
says that this is the result of a ter-
rorist mine. The child’s soft voice
tells viewers that the terrorists are
hoping people will forget, but the
child doesn’t think mommy and
daddy will forget.
This slickly-produced anony-
mous ad was shown frequently on
Salvadoran television in the last
weeks before the March 20 elec-
tions in which nearly 1.45 million
Salvadorans cast ballots for presi-
dent and vice-president, deputies to
the Legislative Assembly, and
members of municipal councils.
Other ads showed scenes of war
from a decade earlier and warned
that voting for the Left could bring
a return of the conflict. A bumper
sticker proclaiming “patria si,
comunismo no” in the colors of the
right-wing, nationalist ARENA
George Vickers is director of the Wash- ington Office on Latin America (WOLA). Jack Spence is president of Hemisphere Initiatives.
party, but without ARENA’s name, began appearing before the second
round of voting on April 24.
These ads marked the dark side
of the ARENA campaign. The
anonymity was no doubt related to
a United Nations-sponsored agree-
ment among the candidates to
wage a “high road” campaign. The
threatening tone of the ads was
repeated in campaign speeches in
rural areas. It was an attack to
which the Left, in essence, did not
respond.
The ARENA party easily swept
all three elections. Its presidential
candidate Armando Calder6n Sol
nearly received the 50% needed to
win on the first round (against six
other candidates). In the second-
round run-off, he defeated Ruben
Zamora-the presidential candi-
date for a coalition of leftist parties
including the Farabundo Marti Lib-
eration Front (FMLN)–by 68% to
32%. ARENA won 39 seats in the
84-member Legislative Assembly, giving it-together with its ally the
National Conciliation Party
(PCN)-a one-vote majority.
ARENA also won 212 of the 262
municipal councils. The Left
emerged from the elections as El
Salvador’s second force, surpass-
ing the veteran Christian Democra-
tic Party (PDC) and the PCN.
Zamora placed well ahead of the
Christian Democratic presidential
candidate in the first round, and the
FMLN won 21 seats in the Legisla-
tive Assembly compared to the
Christian Democrats’ 18.
The elections were the first since
the January 1992 peace treaty
which ended over a decade of civil
war, the first in which all political
groupings participated, and the first
in which the three levels of elec-
tions coincided in the same year.
This set of coincidences prompted
some to speak of the “elections of
the century.” The results shaped El
Salvador’s immediate future, but
the campaign was in many respects
about the past. ARENA’s hard-hit-
ting campaign strategy attempted
to exploit the cleavages in Sal-
vadoran society wrought over a
decade of war. The election
became a fight between Right and
Left, and the results were not good
news for the Left.
Were the elections “free and
fair”? The center and Left opposi-
tion denounced what they called
technical fraud, while others spoke
of “irregularities.” Even the
Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE)
admitted to a number of “anom-
alies.” Procedures were seriously
flawed despite considerable inter-
national assistance and extensive
monitoring. Many people were
unable to get voting cards. Some
NA6CIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 6UPDATE / EL SALVADOR
74,000 had their applications
rejected, and nonexistent notifica-
tion methods meant that several
times that number-whose appli-
cations were approved-never
received voting cards. On election
day, badly organized voting cen-
ters and the mysterious absence of
names from voting rolls prevented
even more people from voting.
Unclear signs, confusingly ordered
voting tables, faulty transporta-
tion-in general, procedures that
made things more difficult for the
poor and less educated-all hin-
dered the process.
Based on a “sys-
tematic study,” the
UN human rights
monitoring group
ONUSAL estimated
that 25,000 people
who tried to vote
were unable to do so
during the first round.
Opposition groups,
other observer mis-
sions, and many
reporters put the
number as high as
75,000. Taking into
account people who
had not received vot- Electoral proc
ing cards, those pre- vador’s city ha.
vented from voting
may have totaled 20% of the num-
ber who did cast ballots.
Did the “irregularities” alter the
results? In the presidential race,
they clearly did not. The outcomes
of a small number of municipal
races as well as one or two deputy
seats may, however, have been
affected. This is not insignificant
given that two deputy seats became
the margin of difference between
an ARENA-dominated and a cen-
ter-Left majority in the Assembly.
Many of the problems were cor-
rected by the second round. Cen-
ters had fewer people to handle due
to reduced turnout, down 10%
from the first round. Obviously,
however, fewer people came out to
vote because of the earlier “irregu-
larities” and the assumption that
the race was not going to be close.
he Left began the campaign
at a serious disadvantage
because the peace accords
were not implemented in a full and
timely manner. Under the Chapul-
tepec accords, for instance, the
National Police-a key component
of the repressive national security
apparatus in rural areas-was
scheduled to be replaced by a new
National Civilian Police force
(PNC) well before the elections.
edures were seriously flawed. People lined u
II to try to obtain their voting cards.
Because of delays in recruiting,
training and deploying the PNC,
however, the entire western part of
El Salvador and much of San Sal-
vador-areas where the majority of
eligible voters live-were still
patrolled by the old National
Police on election day. Making
matters worse, the military made a
show of force on election day by
patrolling many rural highways.
Delays and obstructions hindered
the implementation of the provi-
sion in the peace accords for the
transfer of lands to ex-combatants
and to civilians in zones formerly
controlled by the FMLN. Thus,
key sectors of the FMLN’s base of
support have received few tangible
benefits from the peace process,
further undermining the Left’s
credibility.
Implementation of the accords
has been a process of constant
renegotiation. This has occupied
the time and attention of the
FMLN’s top leadership for most of
the past two years, diverting its
energies away from election prepa-
rations. This problem was com-
pounded by the FMLN’s hierarchi-
cal internal organization, according
to which only the top ranks of the
organization have the authority to
make decisions. Adding to the log-
jam, high-level deci-
sions must be negoti-
ated among the
leadership of the five
parties that make up
the FMLN.
It was not nearly so
burdensome for the
incumbent ARENA
party to implement the
peace accords and
simultaneously launch
an electoral campaign.
First, the time-con-
suming crises in the
peace accords were
generally the result of
p at San Sal- the government’s foot-
dragging on imple-
mentation-doing
less, not more. Secondly, since
ARENA has more trained people,
more money, and the entire gov-
ernment apparatus at its disposal, it
could maneuver on the various
playing fields without feeling
unduly stretched.
The FMLN’s posture did not
help matters. From the outset, the
former guerrillas did not make
enough effort to deepen popular
understanding of and involvement
in the peace process. Analysts at El
Salvador’s Jesuit Central American
University (UCA) early on criti-
cized the tendency of guerrilla
leaders to favor behind-the-scenes
bargaining with the Cristiani gov-
ernment over popular mobilization
as a method for ensuring compli-
Vol XXVIII, No 1 JURY/AUGUST 1994 7 Vol XXVIII, No 1 JULY/AUGUST 1994 7UPDATE / EL SALVADOR
ance with the accords. Because
popular mobilization was down-
played, Salvadoran voters were
largely apathetic about the “elec-
tions of the century” and vulnera-
ble to death-squad intimidation.
Just before the run-off, the head
of ONUSAL’s electoral division,
Rafael L6pez Pintor, predicted a
violence-free election day. Few
incidents of violence had marred
the last three months of the cam-
paign period, he noted, and the
first round of voting had gone rela-
tively peacefully. By contrast, in
December, ONUSAL’s human
rights division issued a report
which concluded that the human-
rights situation had seriously dete-
riorated during the latter part of
1993. Its assessment followed the
assassinations of two high-level
FMLN leaders and numerous
assaults on and killings of political
activists not easily attributable to
common criminals.
It is difficult, if not impossible to
measure the impact of such vio-
lence on the electoral process. In
El Salvador, the killing of a politi-
cally prominent figure would no
doubt have a considerably greater
chilling effect than an assassina-
tion in a country with a less bloody
history. Pre-election polls indicat-
ed that a majority of Salvadorans
believe that death squads still oper-
ate with impunity; reflecting peo-
ple’s continuing caution, a large
majority declined to respond when
asked who they thought sponsors
the death squads. Violence, and the
fear it instills, may well have ham-
pered the Left’s recruitment of
local candidates and campaign
activists, particularly in rural areas.
ARENA entered the election
with considerable advan-
tages, among them the ben-
efits of incumbency. Polls indicated
that more Salvadorans gave credit
to ARENA, than to the FMLN, for
the last two years of peace. More-
over, the economy, while not in
great shape, had left most people
better off than or in the same con-
dition as two years ago. Structural-
adjustment policies have had a soft
landing in El Salvador because of
significant foreign aid for post-war
reconstruction and high levels of
remittances from Salvadorans in
the United States.
ARENA had by far the best
financed and best organized cam-
paign. Its campaign platform was a
blend of anti-Left rhetoric, a trum-
peting of ARENA government
achievements, and a populist
promise of good things to come.
Almost totally ignoring the Christ-
ian Democrats, ARENA focused
its attack on the Left. It accused
the FMLN of standing for old-
fashioned “failed ideas with a trag-
ic history,” and warned that a Left
victory would usher in an econom-
ic debacle.
The Calder6n Sol message was
taken to the voters via a massive
media campaign which far out-
stripped that of its rivals. El Sal-
vador does not have campaign-
spending limits or rules for report-
ing sources of campaign funds. A
study by Hemisphere Initiatives
conducted midway through the
campaign found that ARENA was
spending six to seven times as
much money on TV advertising as
the Left coalition.
The price-per-vote formula for
state financing of campaigns also
favored ARENA. Because parties
do not know how many votes they
are going to get, they borrow
against their eventual totals, based
on 70% of votes received in the
previous election. In public financ-
ing alone, this gave ARENA a
50% money lead over the Christian
Democrats, and a 6-to-1 lead over
the Left.
This money advantage afforded
ARENA the opportunity to run a
huge variety of ads, and run them
often. The party’s production team
was nimble. Several days after a
Zamora ad said “I challenge”
The FMLN’s Achilles’ h,
has been lack of unit
Personal squabbles ar
conflicts over quotas
power have eruptec
among its five partie
Calder6n Sol to a debate, the lat-
ter-without mentioning his rival’s
name-replied that his only “chal-
lenge” was building schools and
bridges. Lavish pictures of schools
and bridges washed across the tele-
vision screen. The debate chal-
lenge went unanswered.
he FMLN entered the cam-
paign as the underdog. The
organization was a novice at
electoral politics. It confronted the
daunting task of converting a guer-
rilla front forged on the battlefield
into a viable political party. It also
had to combat over ten years of
government-dominated propagan-
da, which painted the organization
as a band of Communists and ter-
rorists. The end result was a formi-
dable barrier of distrust among Sal-
vadorans. Polls revealed that at
least 20% of the electorate viewed
the FMLN with some degree of
hostility, blaming it, rather than
ARENA, for the war and economic
destruction. Another 20% had
doubts about the Left’s ability to
run the country.
Given these circumstances, the
FMLN did remarkably well. The
group has adapted to peace and the
rapid political change in Central
America and the world by revamp-
ing its ideology, party structure,
and public image. To varying
degrees, the five parties which
make up the FMLN have shed their
identification with “Marx-
ism-Leninism.” The FMLN
eel -in particular, the Popular Forces of Liberation
y. (FPL)-also demonstrated
its ability to spread its
id political organization over
of the whole of El Salvador’s territory. By election day,
the FMLN claimed an
organized presence in 252
S. out of El Salvador’s 262
municipalities.
The FMLN’s Achilles’
heel, however, has been
lack of unity. Personal
squabbles and conflicts over quotas
of power have erupted among its
five parties, requiring time-consum-
ing leadership negotiations.
The People’s Expression of
Renewal (ERP)-which during the
war was called the Revolutionary
Army of the People-emphasizes
the need to consolidate Left power
in civil society through the creation
of a productive base and a media
vehicle. Identifying itself with
social-democratic ideology, it
favors forging alliances with mid-
dle-class elements and “moderniz-
ing” entrepreneurs. The ERP
viewed winning the 1994 elections
as secondary and possibly even
harmful to the country’s stability.
ERP leaders, most prominently
Joaquin Villalobos, argued that the
Left must acquire maturity and
demonstrate administrative experi-
ence if it is to make itself credible
to the business sector and the broad
Salvadoran public.
By contrast, the FPL gives prior-
ity to developing the Left’s politi-
cal base. It argues that the FMLN
must establish a clear political
identity if it is to win power later
on. Adopting a more traditional
Marxist perspective, the FPL
emphasizes the need to control the
state to ensure full compliance
with the peace accords and develop
an economic base.
Disagreement between the two
parties flared up over the choice of
a presidential candidate for the
FMLN-Democratic Convergence
alliance. Villalobos backed a “cen-
ter” candidate-Christian Democ-
rat founder and wealthy business-
man Abraham Rodriguez.
Villalobos argued that Rodriguez
would broaden the Left’s electoral
appeal and lure financial support
from sectors of the elite. By con-
trast, the FPL insisted on nominat-
ing a distinct “left” standard bear-
er-Rub6n Zamora. It argued that
a fruitful negotiation with the
Right could only occur after the
Left demonstrated significant
strength in the first round of vot-
ing. The FMLN voted 3-2 to sup-
port Zamora, and Villalobos
accepted the choice.
Perhaps the most unpleasant dis-
pute involved the ERP’s Radio
Venceremos (the official voice of
the FMLN throughout the war).
Abiding by a previous agreement
among the candidates not to
engage in personal attacks,
Venceremos refused to run an
unsigned paid advertisement for
the FMLN-Democratic Conver-
gence alliance in April because it
denigrated Calder6n Sol. The
alliance responded by pulling all
its ads from Venceremos. Thus in
the campaign leading up to the run-
off, the ex-official voice of the
FMLN only ran ads for ARENA.
The FMLN and their allies in the
Democratic Convergence have, at
times, also been at loggerheads.
The two organizations ran compet-
ing slates of candidates for
deputies to the Legislative Assem-
bly and the Central American Par-
liament. At the municipal level, the
Left was united in some places and
divided in others. These divisions
further undermined its credibility
as a potential governing force, split
the vote, and no doubt confused
voters. If the Left had not run com-
peting slates, it would probably
have picked up two more Assem-
bly seats and won a handful more
municipal elections.
10 NACL4 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 10 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICASUPDATE / EL SALVADOR
The Left was also hampered by
financial constraints. It did not
have enough money to adequately
target specific campaign messages
to key sectors of the electorate-
in particular women, youth, and
rural voters-in which it knew its
support was weak. In his ads,
Zamora detailed how the coun-
try’s economic problems made
common people suffer. Although
he asserted he had solutions, the
ads themselves did not indicate
what these might be. On the
whole, the FMLN’s campaign was
somewhat defensive and vague
with details.
In the end, it is not clear how
much difference the campaigns
made. ARENA’s lavish spending
did not substantially widen the gap
indicated by pre-election polls, nor
did the Left have the wherewithal
to narrow the gap. ARENA was
the front-runner in the polls from
the beginning of the campaign, and
its lead was never in dispute.
Meanwhile, the Left consistently
ranked ahead of the Christian
Democrats in the polls. According
to a February 1994 UCA survey,
ARENA enjoyed sizable leads over
the Left coalition among all age,
educational and social groups,
including lower-class sectors [see
table this page].
Paradoxically, although a rural
military force with a peasant army,
the FMLN fared better in the cities.
The Left cut significantly into the
ARENA margin of victory in San
Salvador, especially in its poor
municipalities. While the FMLN
did well in some of its traditional
rural strongholds such as Las
Vueltas and San Antonio Los Ran-
chos in Chalatenango, ARENA
swept most of the rural areas. The
FMLN and Zamora did, however,
surprisingly well in areas of the
country such as Santa Ana and
Ahuachapin where the Left had
had little presence before. Ironical-
ly, with respect to social sectors,
the Left was stronger among the
PARTY PREFERENCE BY SOCIOECONOMIC SECTOR
Upper Upper Lower Worker Urban Rural
Middle Middle Marginal
None 0.8 2.6 2.7 4.0 3.4 2.5
ARENA 61.2 43.7 38.9 33.8 19.7 28.9
Left 18.2 20.5 18.9 19.0 15.8 10.4
PDC* 1.7 7.4 10.0 10.2 17.1 12.0
Others 1.7 2.2 3.0 2.3 1.3 4.1
Secret 5.0 11.8 10.0 12.5 20.1 15.4
No Response 11.6 11.8 16.6 18.2 22.6 26.8
* Christian Democratic Party Source: The Central American University (UCA), February, 1994.
upper middle class than among the
rural poor.
Now that the elections are
over, the divisions within
the FMLN are likely to
become more intractable. Leader-
ship elections for the new Legisla-
tive Assembly have already exac-
erbated the tensions. After a 3-2
decision by FMLN leaders to boy-
cott leadership positions to protest
procedural changes that enhanced
ARENA’s control of the Assem-
bly, the ERP and the National
Resistance (RN) struck a deal with
ARENA making the ERP’s Ana
Guadelupe Martinez vice-president
and the RN’s Eduardo Sancho a
secretary of the Assembly. Schafik
Handal, speaking on behalf of the
other three parties within the
FMLN, publicly denounced the
move and announced the suspen-
sion of eight leaders-including
Villalobos-from party functions.
The future of the accords is also
very much in doubt. ARENA will
likely cite its electoral victory as
evidence that the people accept the
government’s interpretation of
compliance. Meanwhile, ONUSAL
is increasingly a lame duck, and its
ability to pressure for compliance
will dwindle. The fate of the land-
transfer program and the new
police force hangs in the balance.
The elections also reveal that
ARENA has broken through to a
new level of support, receiving
200,000 more votes than it ever
received before. In prior elections
ARENA demonstrated a base sup-
port of 400,000 to 500,000 votes;
in the 1994 elections it garnered
well over 800,000. Many of the
new ARENA supporters voted in
previous elections for the Christian
Democrats. It will be difficult for
the Christian Democrats to win
these voters back, given the party’s
continuing disintegration. AR-
ENA’s majority in the Assembly
and its firm control of municipali-
ties will enhance its already awe-
some institutional power.
Fears that ARENA’s strength
and the Left’s disunity may lead to
a one-party state are, however, pre-
mature. ARENA had a number of
advantages this time which it will
probably not have in future elec-
tions: an economy with high levels
of external support, two years of
peace, a popular incumbent presi-
dent, and an opponent with little
electoral experience.
Nevertheless, the results of the
elections pose very serious ques-
tions for those who hoped to con-
solidate the peace process through
elections. What has happened,
instead, is a consolidation of power
by the Right and a hastened frag-
mentation of the Left. The center
has collapsed, and Salvadoran
society remains as polarized as
before.
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