Peace? What peace? As far as most Colombians are concerned, the peace process is going nowhere fast. “Do you approve of the government’s policies towards the guerrillas?” A resounding 78% in a countrywide poll say no. Two years into the Pastrana government, with only two years left in a term that according to the Constitution he cannot repeat, much of the hope generated from the President-elect’s 1998 embrace of guerrilla leader Manuel Marulanda in the Colombian mountains has dissipated, replaced by the cold shower of interminable violence and atrocities.
The media fosters the outrage with sensational headlines and selective reporting, packing in tidbits of truth while failing to provide a broader context: FARC HOLDS KIDNAPPED CHILDREN IN WITHDRAWAL ZONE. FARC OVERRUNS SMALL TOWN AND KILLS POLICEMEN AFTER THEY SURRENDER. PARAMILITARY CHIEF CARLOS CASTA„O JUSTIFIES MASSACRES BECAUSE THEY WERE ALL GUERRILLAS. The TV news echoes the newspapers with visual soundbites of death, grief and destruction. One station aired a two hour interview with Carlos Castaño in prime time.
The great disillusion is amplified by the worst economic recession in more than 60 years and by palpable insecurity. Unemployment hit 20.4% last month. In the poorer areas of the larger cities, the informal sector cannot sustain the ever-increasing flow of newcomers escaping rural violence: There are now an estimated 1.8 million displaced people throughout the country. For a growing number of the unemployed and undereducated youths in vast urban ghettos where the state has little presence, the real safety nets are violent gangs, popular militias—some loosely associated with the guerrillas—and bands of sicarios, or contract killers for hire.
Rich and poor now feel insecure in their own neighborhoods. According to the Human Rights Ombudsman, there were 403 massacres killing 1,865 defenseless victims in 1999, signaling a 55% increase over the previous year.[1] On average more than one massacre was committed every day in Colombia in 1999. Right-wing paramilitary forces are believed responsible for over 70%. Kidnappings, too, have reached record levels: There were 2,805 in 1999.[2] The guerrillas are believed responsible for over half.
The military conflict is intensifying, with civilians bearing the brunt. In August, a military patrol in Antioquia fired on dozens of school children on a class outing. Showing callous disregard for the truth, senior Ministry of Defense officials said guerrillas were using the children as human shields. Surviving pupils and teachers said they knew of no guerrilla activity in the area. Meanwhile over the last few months, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Colombia’s oldest and largest guerrilla movement, has been overrunning small towns and pitting 200 guerrillas against, at best, 20 policemen.
The one glimmer of hope during the past few months, the start of negotiations in Switzerland between the Colombian government and Colombia’s second guerrilla group, the National Liberation Army (ELN), was largely derailed by escalated attacks by the paramilitary forces. Back in Colombia, the evening news showed the combat between ELN and paramilitary forces known as the United Self-Defense Units of Colombia (AUC), leaving the impression that a major transformation was occurring on the battlefield. Until now, the paramilitaries principally waged a “dirty war” against civilians believed to be cooperating with the guerrillas. Now, however, the paramilitaries demonstrated that they have been largely transformed into a more professional fighting force capable of regular combat. In the north, they are moving against the ELN, and in some areas against the FARC. They are also expanding in the south, particularly in Putumayo.
On top of this, the United States is sending attack helicopters and training two new elite anti-narcotics brigades to operate in zones controlled by the FARC as part of a $1.3 billion package of activities justified by a deafening anti-narcotics rhetoric. What impact will the military aid have on the conflict? In the short term, at least, it is hard to see how U.S. military intrusion will not lead to more casualties and wider war.
But Washington is not the only party guided by military thinking. All sides—government, guerrilla, paramilitaries—fervently believe that increased firepower will strengthen their position politically. The FARC, ELN, the government and the AUC have two immediate political reference points: first, the municipal elections in October 2000, and second, the peace process. Each of the armed actors wants to increase its territorial influence and control throughout Colombia’s 1,092 municipalities by placing their candidates into the mayor’s office and city councils. One study finds that over 600 of these municipalities are being targeted by one group or another, causing much of the increased violence and political maneuvering. The reconfigured political map after the October elections will help determine some of the key issues to be discussed at the negotiating table, including local political power, the use of natural resources, illicit crops and the arrangements of a cease-fire. Behind the upsurge in violence—especially by the FARC and AUC—is carefully laid political strategy. Those who fail to see it in Colombia«s armed actors are misreading the tea leaves.
Understanding Colombia is like analyzing a game of three-dimensional chess—with multiple actors, motives, strategies and scenarios. Move one, and all other pieces must adjust accordingly. The FARC and the ELN for now are more political adversaries and competitors than ideological allies. In recent months, they have been clashing militarily in search of tactical advantage, creating the unseemly sight of two groups claiming to be fighting for social justice who are ruthlessly killing the other’s mid-level leaders and engaging in open combat.
The paramilitaries are also fragmented, although Carlos Castaño and the AUC have made great strides in imposing a national structure on the country’s separate forces. Their conversion into a national fighting force may be hastened by implementation of the U.S. anti-narcotics and military strategy. The Pastrana government’s “Plan Colombia” is principally focused on FARC-dominated southern Colombia and the Department of Putumayo, where most of the coca is grown. With the Colombian and U.S. governments focusing on the south, the northern-based paramilitaries are seizing the moment, both militarily and in the opportunities to further enter the drug trade. Too many in the Colombian Armed Forces still view the paramilitaries as strategic allies.
Is peace possible in this environment? Most think things will get worse before they get better. But one fact keeps pushing the principal actors back to the negotiating table: No side has the firepower or political support to win militarily. The options are either the status quo, a dynamic but unbreakable stalemate or a negotiated settlement involving real change and reform. At this point, the guerrillas can probably get more at the negotiating table than they could ever achieve through arms. At the same time, the paramilitaries would probably achieve less, and this is part of the problem. The political parties and the government, meanwhile, would generally gain, though certain regional politicians and old political bosses would likely be losers.
The common assumption is that peace is the government’s first strategy, and war is Plan B. But Pastrana has put it best: In truth there is no Plan B. If peace fails, he said, the country returns to the same old war. Moreover, as the maneuvering intensifies into a crescendo of violence and finger pointing, one can discern what is possible over the next few years. The process will not be rapid. Even though the last 18 years have seen several periods of negotiations, this new phase looks to be the definitive one.[3] It is just beginning, and is not likely to conclude before Pastrana finishes his term. The president who governs from August 2002 to 2006 will likely preside over the final accord.
Meanwhile, what has been achieved during Pastrana’s first two years, and what can realistically be expected before he leaves office? The outlines of his peace plans are straightforward. Most efforts have been oriented toward reaching an agreement with the FARC. Recently, the process with the ELN started again, though the first steps were not auspicious. With the paramilitaries, the government has not defined a strategy. Though it seems unwilling to physically confront them or engage them in peace talks, there is a groundswell of opinion for the government to develop a policy towards them. No consensus as yet exists, but the most realistic and potentially effective strategy would be a policy of military engagement against the paramilitaries—something that has yet to be tried seriously, leaving open the possibility of separate talks at a separate table. What is clear is that there can be no peace without the paramilitaries. They can sabotage any agreement between the guerrillas and the government, just as they severely weakened the initiation of talks between the ELN, civil society and the government in Geneva.
In its negotiations with the FARC, the government agreed to create a zona de despeje, or clearance zone, to facilitate negotiations. The state agreed to withdraw its military and police presence from the zone, leaving it under control of the guerrillas and a few civilian state agencies, such as the office of the Human Rights Ombudsman and the elected mayors. Second, the government agreed to negotiate without a cease-fire. Outside the despeje zone the war would continue until substantial progress was made at the table. On this basis, the two parties established an agenda for negotiations and created mechanisms to consult with the population through regional meetings and national conferences held in the despeje zone.
In November 1998, the despeje zone was established in five municipalities in the departments of Caquetá and Meta, together equaling a territory the size of Switzerland, but with only about 100,000 inhabitants. In January 1999, the talks formally began with a large demonstration of international support in the withdrawal zone. These talks were marred by the absence of the FARC leader Manuel Marulanda. His failure to show up left an empty chair on the dais—a great embarrassment for President Pastrana, who was sitting next to it. Many in the international press have seized on this experience to conclude that the peace process is a ruse and that the FARC is not serious. Often left unsaid is that discussions continued between the FARC and the government, and that Marulanda and Pastrana have since met twice. Moreover, their negotiating teams subsequently agreed on a 12-point agenda for the talks that included meetings of citizens, foreign dignitaries and diplomats in the despeje zone. For the last eight months, the two sides have been discussing economic reform and employment.
The FARC initially placed three conditions on the talks: first, creation of the withdrawal zone; second, progress toward weakening and dismantling the paramilitaries; and third, exchange of prisoners. The FARC is currently holding 528 police and soldiers captive; many believe they are in the despeje zone. The state has many guerrilla prisoners, including leaders of the ELN and the People’s Liberation Army (EPL), but none of the senior leadership of the FARC. Little progress has been made on the second and third of the FARC’s initial conditions, though the Pastrana government has removed several generals and colonels from the Armed Forces because of their ties to the paramilitaries. This is more than any previous president has done; though it has not yet been enough.
To see that progress has been made, one needs to look beyond the daily headlines of kidnappings and atrocities, which have resulted, in part, from the agreement to negotiate without a cease-fire. The no cease-fire policy, which was used during negotiations with the FMLN in El Salvador, has led to a perverse logic in Colombia. All the combatants believe in escalating the fighting in order to increase leverage at the negotiating table. The populace, seeing only rising bloodshed and little political will to make peace, is withdrawing its support from all parties and beginning to force the issue. Both sides have now agreed to discuss changing the rules and an early cease-fire.
The cease-fire discussions will be held apart from the formal agenda talks. At the formal discussions, the FARC and the government have agreed to deal with issues such as economic policy and unemployment, human rights and international humanitarian law, illegal crops and alternative development, agrarian, military and political reform. The conclusions of the first discussion on unemployment will be made public soon and have generated intense national debate on the costs of war, the benefits of peace, and policies to stimulate the moribund economy. Taking up the unemployment issue underscores the extent to which the guerrillas have begun speaking a language of social justice within the context of a capitalist society.
Despite foreign correspondents’ continuing use of the term “Marxist rebels,” it is clear that the FARC’s ideology has once again adapted to the times and international political contexts. The group began in the 1950s as a peasant movement with radical agrarian ideas and ties to the Liberals. From 1964 through the 1990s, the FARC was clearly allied with the Communist Party of Colombia and had strong ties to the Soviet Union. But today the bipolar world has been traded in for a multipolar one, where NGOs, distant European governments and national civil society play a role, and at the negotiating table, the group’s programs are practical, nationalist and reformist. It is not ideology that separates the sides. Instead, what keeps them apart is deeply-rooted mistrust, historical resentment and, above all, competition for power and geographical influence in the post-conflict society.
Many say the guerrillas are simply drug-traffickers with few incentives to give up their lucrative involvement in the trade. Yet it is evident to most close observers that the FARC is principally a political-military organization. Yes, they engage in criminal activities—including some in clear violation of international humanitarian law, such as kidnapping civilians for ransom—to finance their war. Within their spheres of influence, they also “tax” all productive activities, including the burgeoning coca trade. They have profited, but it is highly unlikely that they receive the commonly mentioned sums of several hundred million to a billion dollars annually. It is unlikely the economy could support such an inflow of dollars, and one sees no evidence of it in their territories. Most FARC weapons continue to be homemade, such as gas cylinders, which are inaccurate and dangerous to use, not the product of an army overflowing with dollars.
The FARC have emphasized building a strong army, and they continue to behave like a political organization. They act as the state in the areas they control, organizing such services as education, courts, health, road construction, and loans to farmers and small businessmen. There is no indication that individual guerrilla leaders have personally profited from their connection to the coca and opium poppy trade. Those that do stray are severely disciplined; some have received the death penalty. Indeed what is surprising is not how much the FARC has degenerated into a criminal syndicate since the end of the Cold War. Rather, it is just the opposite, that despite their obvious involvement with the lower ends of the drug trade and other criminal activities, they have maintained their political character.
They have likely reached their limit as a military organization. They are being challenged by the paramilitaries and can expect reverses with the new U.S. military assistance to the Armed Forces. All this leads to one conclusion, which they seem to understand: The only solution to the conflict is a negotiated one. Yet they are willing to wait, and this creates a dilemma for the Pastrana government. Pastrana has two more years. The FARC can wait for a long time. Despite increased military pressure as a result of U.S. aid, the fundamental stalemate is unlikely to change, even as different armed actors suffer reverses or gain ground.
Two years is a short time. Pastrana will not preside over a final peace. But slowly, the major politicians and political parties, including the two presidential candidates defeated by Pastrana in 1998, Noemi Sanin and Horacio Serpa, are becoming involved in the talks. They and other leading politicians have traveled to the despeje zone and are increasingly committed to the peace process.
A U.S. diplomacy of peace—either directly or in support of European or UN initiatives—could be crucial for pushing the process forward. The current ambiguity and primary emphasis on the drug war is not helpful, and could be quite harmful. At one point, the United States was inching towards a role. This period culminated in the meeting between U.S. representatives and the FARC in Costa Rica in late 1998. But the FARC squandered that opportunity when they killed three U.S. citizens working with indigenous populations in Colombia. Still, the bridge between the insurgents and the U.S. government needs to be reconstructed.
The FARC, the United States and the Colombian government need to come to terms on the issue of coca and opium poppies. The matter of illicit crops is on the agenda. Both the FARC and the Colombian government have argued that alternative development programs would be more effective in the context of a peace process, with the guerrillas working with state and international authorities. Agreements over this issue at the negotiating table and perhaps in the context of a cease-fire could substantially change the nature of U.S. involvement in Colombia and dramatically facilitate the wider negotiations. Alternatively, failure to reach agreements on this issue will almost certainly prolong the war.
Nor can there be peace without a policy towards the paramilitaries. Both the United States and Colombia need to develop a policy of first weakening the paras through decisive military actions, then articulating their place within the wider stage of the peace process. These separate talks, despite the political pretensions of Carlos Castaño, should be limited to a narrow set of issues including cease-fire, amnesty within the ever-narrowing judicial space permitted under international law, and dismantling their military capabilities.
There is no alternative to a negotiated settlement to the armed conflict in Colombia. There is a stalemate. Yet it is dynamic and fluid—not the “hurting stalemate” that experts on negotiations speak of as necessary for success at the table. The conflict could last many more years. But peace is too important to be left to the armed actors. Its last frontier is the involvement of Colombian civil society and the international community. Peace is possible in Colombia. The crucial question is, when?
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Marc Chernick teaches in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and is a member of NACLA’s editorial board. He has taught at the University of the Andes and the National University of Colombia, and is currently completing a book on the Colombian peace process.
NOTES
1. Data from the Human Rights Ombudsman Office (Defensoría del Pueblo), 2000.
2. Data from the Colombian National Police.
3. See Marc Chernick, “Negotiating Peace Amid Multiple Forms of Violence: The Protracted Search for a Settlement to the Armed Conflicts in Colombia,” in Cynthia Arnson, ed. Comparative Peace Processes in Latin America (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1999).
