With nearly 50 percent of all U.S. women now full-time wage earners, increasing attention is being focussed on the role of El women in the workforce. In previous issues (July-August 1975, March and April 1977) NACLA looked at the garment and electronics industries, both of which primarily employ women. The following article makes an important contribution to this study by focusing on the experience of Chicano women both before and after the 1972-74 strike at the Farah pants company in Texas. As low-paying labor-intensive industries have moved to the Southwestsince World War II, the use of Chicana/Mexicana labor has been a key factor in their success. Chicanas make up nearly half of all women employed in the apparel industry in Texas, and in border cities like El Paso the percentage is much higher. At the Farah Manufacturing Company, which makes men’s pants, virtually all of the workers are Chicano and 85 percent are women. These women were the force behind a two-year strike and boycott at Farah, disposing of the twin myths that women couldn’t be organized and that the South- west could continue to be a haven for non-union shops. Unlike many other southwest garment plants that ran away from the unionized northeast, Farah got its start in El Paso. By the early 1970’s Farah owned eleven plants, five of them in Paso, making it the second largest employer in town. Many in El Paso saw Willie Farah as a folk hero who gave his workers turkeys at Thanksgiving and parties at Christmas, and provided free health care and refreshments at work. The workers at Farah tell another story. Before the strike wages were low, raises were based on favoritism, and women with several years on the job were still being paid minimum wage. Women who were willing to date their Anglo supervisors were given preferential treatment, while others were subjected to constant harassment. “The supervisors would snap their fingers at you, bang the machine arid push you,” one worker recalled. There was no job security and no grievance procedure. Health and safety regulations were practically nonexistent. Because of faulty equipment, accidents were common. Needles often snapped off the sewing machines, piercing the eyes and fingers of the seamstresses. Many ailments were misdiagnosed by the plant doctor. When women left the plant to have a baby, they lost their seniority; there was no maternity insurance. “They could keep their turkey,” one woman said. “We needed better conditions, better safety.” THE STRIKE In 1969, the workers began a union drive to affiliate with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America (ACWA). As organizing spread through the Farah plants, the company harassed and fired union sympathizers. Despite these tactics, support for the union grew, culminating in a walkout in May 1972. At first, reaction to the strike was hostile. El Paso media virtually blacked out news of the strike. Picketers were verbally and physically assaulted. Even more serious were the tensions created within the Chicano community itself, and between the El Paso Chicanos and the Mexicanos from the neighboring border city of Juarez. Skyrocketing unemployment on both sides of the border, but particularly in Juarez, made it easy for Farah to replace strikers with workers from the swollen ranks of the unemployed. Newspapers and unions in Juarez did support the strike, and a small number of Mexican workers at Farah did join the strikers; but 50 percent unemployment in Mexico made it hard to fight against strikebreaking. Consequently, though many strikers realized that the economic crisis forced people to find work where they could, the conflict tended to exacerbate nationalistic divisions at the precise moment when unity was most needed. As the months wore on, strikers faced increasing financial hardships. Union strike benefits of $30 a week were inadequate for most families. Women who could find work elsewhere did so, but if their new employers discovered that they were Farah strikers they were usually fired. As one striker said, “A lot of our people lost their homes, cars- you name it, they lost it.” A PIVOTAL EXPERIENCE Despite these hardships, the women discovered new sources of support for themselves as workers. The ACWA sent organ- izers to El Paso, disbursed weekly strike benefits, helped organize a nationwide boycott of Farah pants, conducted classes, and showed films. The Catholic Church endorsed the strike and allowed the strikers to meet in local church buildings. Workers from other plants in El Paso and across the country lent support to the strikers. The strike was a pivotal experience for the women involved. They began to do things they had never imagined possible: walking picket lines, speaking at meetings and rallies, and traveling nationally to promote the boycott. Some of the most active strikers formed a rank-and-file group which took the name Unidad Para Siempre (Unity Forever). These experiences changed the way the women look at themselves-as women, wives, and workers-the way they relate to their families, fellow workers, supervisors, and community. During the strike they made their own decisions and began to question their own attitudes. For years, I wouldn’t do anything without asking my husband’s permission. I see myself now, and I think, good grief, married nineteen years and having to ask to buy a pair of underwear! During the strike it started changing. I began to stand up for myself, and I began to feel that I should be accepted for the person that I am. In February 1974, a decision by the Administrative Law and National Labor Relations Board judge prompted Farah to recognize the union. A contract was negotiated and ratified and the workers went back to the plants, hoping that their long struggle would result in better working conditions. When the strikers returned to the factory, however, they found that the organization of production had changed dramatically. In an attempt to keep up with the market, Farah was diversifying production to include men’s leisure suits and jackets. Women were given little or no retraining, yet they were expected to meet impossibly high production quotas. Many suffered wage reductions and eventually were fired for low production. At the same time, Farah made serious management errors which undermined his position in the highly competitive garment industry. The recession added to his problems. In the three years following the strike more than half of the employees were laid off, and several of the Farah plants were closed. Many workers filed grievances protesting the high quotas, layoffs, and harassment of union members, overwhelming the shop stewards with the number of grievances. The stewards were then harassed by the management when they tried to enforce the contract, and were among the first to be laid off during Farah’s severe cutbacks. To make matters worse, the inexperienced business agents hired by the union were unable to defend the shop stewards and prosecute grievances. A final problem was that because Texas is a right-to-work state, Farah employees did not have to join the union in order to receive benefits. In the absence of a strong union, Unidad Para Siempre began to play a more active role. It pushed the union to demand more fundamental reforms, including elimination of the quota system, improved training for shop stewards, and – most importantly – greater rank-and-file participation in settling grievances between the workers and the company. But the strength of this organization diminished as the company laid off and fired Unidad members until only a few remained at Farah. Today these ex-employees feel that the ACWA did not fight to defend their jobs because, like the company, it felt threatened by their activism. By the time negotiations for the second contract began in 1977, the position of the workers had been weakened by firings, layoffs, tensions among the workers, and inadequate support from the ACWA. Farah management spent the first few days of negotiations telling the workers about the company’s financial woes. The workers were told, “You can ask for the moon, but if we give it to you we’ll fold tomorrow and you’ll all be out on the street.” Union lawyers urged the negotiating committee to accept Farah’s terms. The 1977 contract calls for a meager 30d pay boost over three years, eliminates dental benefits, retains the quota system, and allows Farah to lay off workers who have seniority and then call them back to work on a different production line at the minimum wage. Although it is still uncertain whether Farah will recover from its economic crisis, it is already clear that under the terms of the 1977 contract, the workers are paying for Farah’s problems. The contract was hastily presented to the workers in a short meeting held in the cafeteria at the Gateway plant. Union officials read it in legalistic Spanish which few workers could understand, and discouraged questions from the floor. Many who attended the meeting say that a clear majority of workers raised their hands in opposition to the contract. But no formal vote was taken, and the presiding union official declared that the contract had passed. This marked a new low in rank-and-file support for the union. Since that time, Farah has closed another of its El Paso plants and the number of union members working at Farah continues to fall. LESSONS Events at Farah since the strike show the continued difficulty of organizing in the Southwest. The right-to-work law, the consolidated opposition of powerful employers, the volatile nature of the garment industry, the threat of runaway shops, and the timidity of union officials are formidable obstacles in the way of a strong workers’ organization. In addition, the abundant reserve army of labor and the resulting competition for jobs in the border area create divisions among workers which employers like Farah can use to their own advantage. It is clear from the Farah experience that successful unionization does not end when the union wins a contract. Organizing and training of workers in everything from rievance procedure to labor history must continue on a long-term basis. In addition a strong rank-and-file movement must be developed -one which can overcome divisions among the workers, build a democratic local union, and encourage women workers to acquire leadership skills. While the Farah strike did not produce a strong, mature rank- and-file movement, it did help to create the conditions in which one can develop. The workers who made the strike were irreversibly changed by it. All of them say that they would organize and strike again; most of them recognize the need for strong support from an international union like the ACWA, as long as it does not undermine the independent organization of rank-and-file workers. “We’re sticking in there and we’re not going to get out and we’re not giving up!” one ex-striker insisted. The Chicanas who comprise the majority of strikers learned that they could speak and act on their own behalf as women and workers, lessons they will not forget. In the words of one striker: I believe in fighting for our rights, and for women’s rights … When I walked out of that company way back then, it was like I had taken a weight off my back. And I began to realize, “Why did I put up with it all these years? Why didn’t I try for something else?” Now I want to stay here and help people to help themselves.
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