After Alberto Fujimori’s sudden call on September 16 for new elections and for dissolution of the Gestapo-like National Intelligence Service (SIN), many Peruvians hoped a transition to democracy was at hand. With his November 20 resignation, that transition may be close indeed.
After Fujimori’s call for elections, Vladimiro Montesinos, SIN’s real boss and the real power in Peru, immediately fled to Panama, suitcase in hand and with his bank accounts full of dollars. From there he continued giving orders to his henchmen. Meanwhile, the SIN’s surveillance equipment and its key personnel were simply transferred to the Army Intelligence Center (DINTE), and continued operating from there.
Then, on October 22, Montesinos made a surprising return to Peru, deepening the country’s crisis and disquiet. He arrived protected by Peruvian soldiers and with authorization from Fujimori himself. But Montesinos’ presence was so unbearable that it forced Fujimori’s resignation. Meanwhile, the economy is paralyzed, and after two years of deep recession, desperation runs through all sectors of the population, from corporate executives to street vendors.
Though it looked like a democracy, Montesinos’ and Fujimori’s regime was a dictatorship that dated from the coup of April 5, 1992. It possessed two basic characteristics of a dictatorship: It concentrated all power, and it aimed to use that power to perpetuate itself indefinitely. The elections that were held periodically were carefully controlled, and had as little significance as those conducted by Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay, Rafael Leonidas Trujillo in the Dominican Republic, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, or Suharto in Indonesia. None of those men ever lost an election. Neither did Montesinos and Fujimori.
But because the United States and the international community would no longer tolerate direct military rule in Latin America, Montesinos and the leadership of the Peruvian Armed Forces adopted a scheme similar to those of the dictatorships mentioned above: They used fraudulent elections to legitimize their power. This was, moreover, a personalistic dictatorship, revolving around Montesinos, Fujimori and a small group of corrupt military officials who used the Armed Forces to maintain themselves in power.
After the electoral fraud of April and May this year, Montesinos and Fujimori found themselves in difficult straits. Their drastic loss of prestige was due mainly to economic disaster, growing unemployment and massive business failures. Peruvians were thus exasperated by the regime’s corruption and its attempt to stay in power for five more years. April saw the start of massive and continuing demonstrations against the government.
The regime’s isolation was complete after international election observer missions withdrew due to systematic irregularities. The U.S. government, concerned by the instability that would surely follow if Montesinos and Fujimori were to remain in power, also pushed for their exit. But, as always happens with personalistic dictatorships, the two refused to relinquish power until they were forced out.
Montesinos’ power was apparently undermined because of his involvement in arms trafficking to the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). On August 21, Montesinos and Fujimori appeared on national TV announcing that they had dismantled an organization based in Peru that had sold 10,000 rifles to the Colombian guerrillas. But newspaper reports soon linked the traffickers with Montesinos and with Fujimori himself. According to many analysts, this was why the CIA finally stopped protecting Montesinos, who was reportedly on the CIA payroll in the mid-1970s and clearly had the agency’s support during the Fujimori government.
The public airing of a videotape showing Montesinos bribing an opposition congressman—a video filmed by Montesinos himself—is also attributed to the CIA and to military officials who are enemies of Montesinos. The airing of the tape on September 14 was the last straw for an indignant citizenry. Fujimori was apparently pressured by Washington to fire Montesinos and dissolve the SIN. But Fujimori could not discharge Montesinos, who was the true holder of power. Unable to get rid of the real chief of the intelligence services, and hounded by Washington, Fujimori announced on September 16 that he would resign as president and called for new elections.
This pitted Fujimori against his former allies, as he now was seen by Montesinos and the military leadership as a traitor. But under these circumstances, Montesinos had no choice but to flee. His only other option—seizing power through a military coup—was impossible, due to foreign pressure and lack of domestic support. Despite his departure from Peru, however, little changed in the weeks that followed.
Hours before Montesinos’ return, the government proposed to incorporate a provision into the Constitution granting a sweeping amnesty to soldiers and civilians implicated in human rights violations, narcotrafficking and corruption. The amnesty proposal was the government’s quid pro quo for holding new elections next year. It provoked a breakdown in the talks that had been brokered by the Organization of American States (OAS) between the government and the opposition.
Amid the crisis created by Montesinos’ return and following strong criticism by OAS General Secretary César Gaviria, the government backtracked and declared that elections would be held in any case. But many doubted the government’s word. Meanwhile, amid the decomposition of the regime, its civic wing fractured into a thousand pieces. Pro-government congressional leaders and ministers began bickering among themselves and publicly accusing each other of corruption and disloyalty.
Since last year, the United States had been pressuring to change the Montesinos-Fujimori government. But its fear that a government collapse would unleash more instability led Washington to reconcile itself to Montesinos and Fujimori after the scandalous electoral fraud of April and May. At that point, U.S. strategy was to slowly “democratize” the regime to allow for a peaceful change in 2005. This was illusory, of course, because the country could not stand five more years of dictatorship. And Montesinos and Fujimori were not ready to leave power. They would have to be thrown out.
After the crisis erupted, Washington backed Fujimori against Montesinos, under the supposition that the former could oversee the transition process. It failed to notice that Fujimori, visibly disoriented, powerless and repudiated by the populace, has been—in the words of Human Rights Ombudsman Jorge Santistevan—”part of the problem, not the solution.”
The United States has played an ambiguous role in Peru’s ongoing crisis. By pushing for democratization, it may have helped prevent the worst excesses of Montesinos’ and Fujimori’s dictatorship. At the same time, however, Washington unblinkingly backed Montesinos for a decade. Then it did the same for a weak and repudiated Alberto Fujimori.
But on November 11, the brother of deceased Colombian drug lord Pablo Escobar revealed that, through Montesinos, the Escobars funded Fujimori’s 1990 electoral campaign. And on November 16, a moderate and well-respected opposition leader, Valentín Paniagua, was elected president of the Congress after its pro-government head was voted out of office. As we go to press, it seems likely that Paniagua will replace Fujimori as Peru’s President now that the latter has resigned. Changes will come quickly, given the lightning swiftness with which the dictatorship has collapsed of its own weight.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Fernando Rospigliosi is a columnist for the Peruvian magazine Caretas, and a professor of Communications at the University of Lima. He has published several books, including El arte del engaño: las relaciones entre los militares y la prensa (Editorial Tarea, 2000). Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.
