On June 8, 2001, a verdict was announced in the Bishop Juan Gerardi assassination case. The Bishop was bludgeoned to death on April 26, 1998, two days after he had released the Catholic Church’s report on violations of human rights during the country’s long internal armed conflict, a report that attributed the vast majority of killings and forced disappearances between 1960 and 1996 to the armed and security forces. Three officers were convicted of planning and participating in the crime: Col. Disrael Lima Estrada, a former chief of military intelligence, Capt. Byron Lima Oliva, his son, and José Obdulio Villanueva, the latter two former members of Guatemala’s feared Presidential General Staff (EMP), a military intelligence unit with a well-known history of human rights abuses and political terror. The tribunal also convicted Gerardi’s assistant, Father Mario Orantes, and exonerated Margarita López, Gerardi’s cook. The court mandated further investigation to identify other material and intellectual authors of the crime, and named General Rudy Vinicio Pozuelos Alegría, former head of the EMP, and five other EMP members as suspects. The judges clearly stated that the crime was politically motivated and carried out with the aid of personnel and resources of the state.
The judges’ historic decision was handed down after years of marred investigations, lengthy delays and acts of intimidation against judges, prosecutors and witnesses. Those years also witnessed the escalation of violence against leaders of human rights organizations and the broad social movement against impunity. Official attempts to obscure the crime began immediately after the 1998 assassination. Authorities tampered with the crime scene and officials in President Alvaro Arzú’s government (1996-2000) portrayed the murder as a common crime or a crime of passion. They arrested a homeless invalid as the culprit and later imprisoned Father Orantes, Margarita López, and Gerardi’s dog, Balú. The prosecution brought a “forensic expert” from Spain to demonstrate that the bishop had been killed by Balú.
Although the implicated army officers were named by witnesses from the very beginning, they were not officially charged and arrested until almost two years after the crime, and only then after the extreme-right Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) candidate Alfonso Portillo replaced the more moderate rightist Arzú as president in early 2000.
The prosecution of the case faced many obstacles. Lawyers, prosecutors, judges and witnesses related to the case suffered years of intimidation by shadowy forces. Soon after the assassination, members of the Archbishop’s Office for Human Rights (ODHA), in charge of the legal case, received death threats. Ronald Ochaeta, one of them, left the country and is still abroad, now serving as Ambassador of Guatemala to the Organization of American States. During the trial, Monsignor Mario Ríos Montt testified that Antonio Arzú, brother of then-president Arzú, tried to bribe the Catholic Church by offering the freedom of Father Orantes if the Church dropped charges implicating the Guatemalan Army in the crime. Six homeless people who were near the Bishop’s home the night of the murder have since died. Carlos René Barrientos, a witness, and his family received death threats. Several more of the original witnesses went into exile, and one of them supposedly killed himself in prison.
Another witness, Rubén Chanax Sontay, returned to Guatemala to act as a key witness, accompanied by five armed guards and wearing a bulletproof vest. The first judge in charge of the case resigned, and the first prosecutor, Otto Ardón, was dismissed for his pro-military bias. On the eve of the trial, the house of one judge was firebombed.
It is ironic that the Arzú government, which signed the Peace Accords in 1996, effectively blocked the prosecution of the crime, while the pro-impunity FRG government allowed the case to proceed. Portillo and the FRG considered Arzú their political enemy, and they had no commitment to the accused officers. In fact, Portillo pledged to solve the case within the first six months of his presidency, a clear sign that he and the FRG aimed to damage the political standing of Arzú.
The leader of the FRG is Guatemala’s former dictator, General Efraín Ríos Montt, who presided over the Guatemalan army’s genocidal 1982-83 scorched-earth campaigns. Ríos Montt is deeply committed to impunity by any means for army officers who ordered and carried out politically motivated crimes and counterinsurgency campaigns. His latest manipulations of public and congressional affairs as President of Congress indicate that he will seek a general amnesty for all crimes committed during the internal armed conflict (1960-1996).
But Ríos Montt does not favor unauthorized actions by groups within the army. Moreover, Col. Lima Estrada, a graduate of the infamous School of the Americas and an officer trained in counterinsurgency and political terror, was a close ally of General Mejía Víctores in the overthrow of Ríos Montt in the “internal coup” of 1983. Both of the Limas were closely connected to Arzú, and their downfall may be part of an ongoing struggle for dominance within the army by the Ríos Montt faction.
Ríos Montt is, in fact, concentrating power in his hands and there are signs that Portillo’s government is evolving from its early populism to a sort of neofascist model, a continuation of Ríos Montt’s messianic political project of 1982-83. Many army hardliners have joined with the FRG, and government officials have increasingly carried out authoritarian measures. FRG leaders have declined to dialogue or negotiate in Congress regarding the law-making process and have arbitrarily contracted and dismissed state employees. Persons linked to powerful repressive groups, particularly at the apex of the military and security forces, have been appointed to key positions in the government.
The administration has strengthened the military and expanded its mandate, both legally and in a de facto manner, and consolidated a social base of right-wing and violent sectors of the middle class and poorer classes (especially among former leaders of the Civil Patrols). The government has allied itself with the most conservative economic sectors and tolerated, if not supported, acts of intimidation and terror against leaders and militants of the human rights movement. Governmental polls in May 2001 indicated that support for Portillo among the population has dropped below 25%, and is less than 20% for Ríos Montt.
There have been systematic acts of intimidation and numerous legal obstacles designed to obstruct efforts to clarify the abuses committed during the internal armed conflict. The many army and intelligence personnel who held power in Guatemala during those years have a common goal: to guarantee that no legal actions affect their lives and their privileges. The assassination of Bishop Gerardi was calculated to send a message to all those seeking truth and justice in Guatemala, including the UN-supported Historical Clarification Commission; their efforts would encounter a violent response.
Theories vary in Guatemala regarding the masterminds of the crime and whether it was an “official” army or EMP operation. The court ruling implied that the assassination was a conspiracy at least condoned by the EMP. But even if it is proven that the crime was the action of a limited group, powerful organized forces within the country’s military, political, and economic elites continue to employ a strategy of selective political violence to impede democratization, block socioeconomic and political change and bolster their own power. Further, profitable criminal enterprises such as drug trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, bank robberies, car thefts and smuggling allow antidemocratic forces to generate “black funds” for violence and repressive operations in the absence of authorized state funding.
Acts of terror and human rights abuses are increasing in Guatemala, frequently camouflaged by the rising wave of common crime and collective attacks by angry mobs. Often, investigators have found that criminal gangs were led by or made up of former or active-duty armed and security forces personnel. Like in Argentina after the 1983 transition to civilian government, the operations by unemployed security agents perpetuate the population’s sense of fear and vulnerability. Now an increasing incidence of lynchings, a new phenomenon that has mushroomed throughout the countryside, has accentuated the population’s sense of helplessness.
According to a recent report by MINUGUA, the United Nations Mission in Guatemala, many acts of lynching have been instigated by persons who in the past enjoyed power at the local level, particularly because of their involvement with the army and its paramilitary Civil Patrols. In many cases lynchings have been carefully organized in advance. That is, lynching is not a random phenomenon as presented in police reports, nor is it an indication of a culture of violence rooted in the population nor simply an expression of frustration and anger at violence and impunity. Rather, the evidence suggests that it is a politically motivated means to instill fear and exert control.
Despite the ominous political and human rights atmosphere in recent years, courageous Guatemalans have continued to struggle for truth and to hold accountable those responsible for atrocious crimes. Important new cases have been opened of late, building on the findings of the 1998 report of the Catholic Church’s Truth Commission and the 1999 report of the Historical Clarification Commission. The most important initiatives include: the strong public demand to solve Bishop Gerardi’s murder; the continuing case against high-ranking army officers accused of masterminding the assassination of anthropologist Myrna Mack in 1990; the case of the 1995 massacre of returned refugees by the army in Xamán; the case of genocide opened in the Spanish Courts by Rigoberta Menchú, against General Ríos Montt and others based on the “Pinochet precedent;” the outstanding cases at the Inter-American Court of Justice; the case opened by a group of survivors and relatives of victims against General Lucas García and others for the crime of genocide, supported by the Center for Human Rights Legal Action (CALDH); and the case for crimes against humanity just opened against Ríos Montt and the army high command of 1982 and 1983.
Since the inauguration of Portillo in January 2000, these struggles for justice have faced a wave of attacks. The first forced disappearance of the post-war era, the abduction of San Carlos National University professor Mayra Gutiérrez in June 2000, was one of many acts of violence against the social movement. Conditions have deteriorated even further in 2001, with three more reported disappearances. Virtually every human rights defender has received death threats or noticed surveillance, and most organizations involved with legal claims have been subject to break-ins.
One, the Center of Studies, Information and Basis for Social Action (CEIBAS), suffered a break-in of its headquarters three times this year and twice in 2000. Files and computers were stolen in these break-ins, except the last time in May, when the only purpose was to destroy the house. In December 2000, one CEIBAS activist, Ricardo Lobo, was shot at, and other members of the organization have suffered kidnapping attempts and robberies. The father of two members of CEIBAS, Judge Alvaro Hugo Martínez, was lynched by a mob on March 13 in circumstances that suggested a planned action. He was held captive by the mob for more than ten hours and the police took no action to free him. The Supreme Court has accused paramilitary operatives of instigating the act. Aura Marina Farfán, leader of the Association of the Relatives of the Disappeared of Guatemala (FAMDEGUA) was also abducted and later released.
Based on recent patterns of violence, it is likely that the recent assassination of Sister Barbara Ann Ford on May 5 was another attempt to intimidate those who work for political and social change in Guatemala. She had been involved for years in work with poor rural communities and she also played a role in evidence gathering for the human rights report of Bishop Gerardi. Sister Ford was killed when she refused to allow robbers to take her car, which was found abandoned very soon afterwards a short distance from the murder site. Investigations are still underway. Another attack, against Amnesty International representative Barbara Bocek on June 11, again evoked dirty war methods. She was found knocked unconscious, bound and gagged in a major Guatemala City hotel. Interior Minister Byron Barrientos, a former military intelligence officer, scoffed at the incident and claimed that it was staged.
While the outcome of the Gerardi case has prompted legitimate joy among human rights defenders, the verdict does not yet guarantee the demise of the era of impunity. It does, however, represent a long-awaited breakthrough for the Guatemalan judicial system, plagued for years by corruption and military infiltration. It is the first real crack in the wall of impunity put into place during almost half a century of repressive militarized regimes. But this case was exceptional, not only because the victim was a member of the Conference of Bishops of Guatemala and the most prominent figure in the Catholic Church’s truth-seeking efforts. The murder was also perpetrated more than a year after the 1996 Peace Accords were signed, when the civilian government seemed to have greater control of the armed forces. Analysis of the crime is difficult given the opaque nature of the armed forces and the police and the criminal and paramilitary groups long associated with them. In fact, the judges could not name the actual assassin.
Since the end of the internal armed conflict and the signing of the accords, recalcitrant sectors in the security and intelligence forces no longer have total freedom or unlimited access to state resources to carry out crimes. There is no longer a system of state terror with secret detention and torture centers, clandestine cemeteries, and other state-supported infrastructure, nor guarantees of non-interference by civilian or military authorities. However, these powerful elements of the former dirty war apparatus continue to be present in state institutions and all three government branches, and they are linked to retired officers identified with the former national security state. These forces of the past still violently oppose democratic progress or advances in human rights.
The Gerardi verdict provides a new foundation for groups in civil society to pursue their efforts for truth, justice, the expansion of democracy, and compliance with the Peace Accords. The international community is also showing renewed concern. Two rapporteurs of the UN Commission on Human Rights recently visited the country, as did a high-ranking delegation of the UN Secretariat’s Political Division, as well as delegations of many non-governmental organizations. The Guatemalan people face a difficult challenge of creeping neofascism and violence, but the Gerardi verdict strengthens their determination to continue their struggle against impunity.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Raúl Molina Mejía, long-time human rights advocate and former mayoral candidate in Guatemala City, is the New York representative for the Rigoberta Menchú Tum Foundation and an Adjunct Professor at New York University. He has authored many articles on Guatemala and human rights.
J. Patrice McSherry is Associate Professor of Political Science at Long Island University and author of Incomplete Transition: Military Power and Democracy in Argentina (St. Martin’s Press, 1997) and numerous articles on the Latin American military. She is on NACLA’s editorial board.
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