The killing of ex-Sandinista soldiers in Esteli, the hostage crisis, the often
Machiavellian role played by Humberto Ortega, and the ever deepening
tensions within the Sandinista party itself-these incidents or critical
issues have placed Nicaragua on the brink of what appears to be
an impending collapse.
A decade and a half after the ouster of the Somoza re- gime, Nicaragua is a coun- try torn by political and social strife. The killing of ex-Sandinista soldiers in
Esteli by Sandinista army
units, the seizure of
hostages by former Con-
tras and then the counter
seizure of UNO politicians
by Sandinista adherents,
the increasingly contradic-
torv and often Machiavel- — Aj . . .. . . . . . . . .
lian role played by San-
dinista army chief Hum-
berto Ortega, and the ever
deepening tensions and d
within the Sandinista party i
all these incidents or critical
have placed Nicaragua on th
of what appears to be an in
ing collapse.
Media coverage of what
pening in Nicaragua tends to
the Sandinistas for the prese
array, ignoring the fact th
starting point for underst
Nicaragua’s current chaos
election of Violeta Cham(
February, 1990. Even aft
elections, the Sandinistas-
Roger Burbach is the director of t
ter for the Study of the Americas. a NACLA staff member from 1
1980, and is currently a men
NACLA’s editorial board.
A Contra soldier guards kidnapped Sandinistas in
August, 1993.
ebates won over 40% of the popular
tself- vote-remained the most consoli-
issues dated and stabilizing political force
e brink in the country. President Chamorro
npend- and her son-in-law, Antonio
Lacayo, who became the de facto
is hap- prime minister, recognized this
blame reality when they agreed to accept
nt dis- many of the changes that had
hat the occurred during the decade of San-
anding dinista rule. These changes includ-
is the ed the agrarian-reform program,
rro in the Constitution and government
er the infrastructure created under the
-who Sandinistas, and perhaps most crit-
ically, the existence and institu- he Cen- tionalization of the Sandinista He was
1973 to army.
Fiber of But this modus vivendi was chal-
lenged almost immediately by the
Contras, their backers in
Miami, important fac-
tions of the UNO coali-
tion, and the U.S. gov-
ernment, all of whom
were intent upon rolling
back the revolution. The
existence of the Sandin-
ista army in particular
was anathema to the
foes of the revolution,
particularly the CIA and
the Pentagon, which
were determined to dis-
mantle and destroy an Quilali in army that had inflicted
heavy damage on the
surrogate forces they
had supported for the better part of
the 1980s. This is why the Bush
presidency, and now even the Clin-
ton Administration, have been
determined to remove all Sandin-
ista influence within the army and
turn it into a force that will not
dare to challenge U.S. interests or
dictates.
While refusing to dismantle the
Sandinista army and depose Hum-
berto Ortega as head of the army,
the Chamorro government did
decide to follow Washington’s
recipe on the economic front by
implementing neoliberal policies.
These policies hit hard at the pub-
lic sector, threw many people out
of work, and caused a depression
in agricultural production, the
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 4UPDATE / NICARAGUA
mainstay of the Nicaraguan econo-
my. In most Latin American coun-
tries, similar neoliberal measures
were implemented during the
course of the 1980s. By 1990 the
state sector throughout much of the
continent had been dramatically
curtailed with only limited public
resistance.
But Nicaragua proved to be a
different story. The revolution had
awakened a popular and class con-
sciousness that adamantly resisted
the neoliberal measures. By July,
1990, Managua was paralyzed by
massive strikes and demonstrations
in the streets. On the surface, this
general strike-with its takeover of
roads and highways, and the erec-
tion of brick barricades-appeared
similar to the popular insurrection
that led to the toppling of the
Somoza regime.
But unlike the late 1970s, the
protesters did not have a revolu-
tionary program or banner around
which the population could coa-
lesce and take political power. The
Sandinista party leadership had not
called for the general strike, and in
fact many leaders believed that a
period of social peace, and even
austerity, was necessary for the
country to move forward. The San-
dinistas were divided between the
leadership which at times moved in
tandem with the Chamorro govern-
ment in quest of stability, and the
popular sectors which were willing
to take to the streets and even take
up arms against the government.
The dichotomy continues to this
day to be a major fault line tearing
apart the Sandinista party and the
country as a whole.
To a certain extent, this is a con-
flict between the haves and the
have-nots within the Sandinista
movement. Many Sandinista lead-
ers, in the infamous pinataa,” took
over houses, lands and even gov-
ernment buildings and funds dur-
ing their final days in office,
putting themselves in a much bet-
ter position to weather the neolib-
eral policies of the Chamorro gov-
ernment. The resources they appro-
priated were actually quite limited
compared to what has been swin-
dled by other governments in Latin
America, like those of Carlos
Andr6s P6rez in Venezuela, Fer-
nando Collor de Mello in Brazil,
and even Violeta Chamorro,
where, according to many in
Nicaragua, corruption-though
much less publicized-has reached
proportions akin to the Somoza
era. But by its actions, the Sandin-
ista leadership severely damaged
the moral and political authority
that it once held. It had, after all,
come into office as a “party of a
new type,” a party that was sup-
posed to be immune to the tradi-
tional forms of corruption.
he Sandinista army and
police–insurers of peace
and stability in the coun-
try-were supposed to be above
the political fray and infighting.
Initially there was a clear consen-
sus within the Sandinista party that
the army had to remain intact and
under de facto Sandinista control.
But Humberto Ortega, the army
and the police soon found them-
selves at the epicenter of the politi-
cal and social earthquake tearing
apart Nicaragua. During the strike
and street uprisings of July, 1990,
the army and the police stood
largely on the sidelines, unwilling
to repress the demonstrators and
workers who paralyzed traffic and
production. But as time went on,
Humberto Ortega was driven to
use the military to clamp down
on the popular sectors that had
once been his allies. The Chamorro
government, backed by Washing-
ton, ordered Ortega to take over
worker-occupied farms and facto-
ries, to repress street demonstra-
tors, and to fight against dissident
elements in the countryside who
sometimes took up arms to protest
the government’s grueling eco-
nomic policies.
Compelled to support govern-
ment policies, Ortega and the army
became divorced from the popular
sectors and the base of the Sandin-
ista movement, the very forces that
had given the army its legitimacy
and strength in the long war
against the Contras and the United
States. Ortega himself, recognizing
that he was objectively sustaining
some of the very political forces he
had once fought against, began to
initiate clandestine operations
designed to keep the far right in
check.
Under the Sandinista govern-
ment, the Interior Ministry was in
charge of special operations and
units designed to deal with the
armed opposition and the old
Somocistas. For instance, the
assassination of Somoza in 1980 in
Paraguay was orchestrated out of
the Interior Ministry with the assis-
tance of internationalist guerrilla
units that had collaborated with the
Sandinistas during the final stages
of the war against the Somoza
regime.
With the victory of Violeta
Chamorro, Sandinista control of
the Interior Ministry abruptly
ended, and the army became the
only institution with the capacity to
deal with opponents of the revolu-
tion. There is little doubt that a
Sandinista special unit assassinated
Enrique Bermlidez, an old
Somocista and the former military
head of the Contras, in February,
1991. As one high-ranking civilian
member of the Sandinista Front
who was on the scene at the time
of the assassination noted, “this
was a professional operation. Only
the army or elements linked to it
could have done it so cleanly.”
And it is also likely-although
no hard evidence exists-that
Humberto Ortega and the head of
military intelligence, Lenin Cerna,
orchestrated the formation of the
Ejdrcito Punitivo de la Izquierda
(the Punitive Army of the Left),
which launched its activities in
Vol XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1994 5UPDATE / NICARAGUA
November, 1992 with the assassi-
nation of Arges Sigueira, head of
the Association of Confiscated
Property Owners, an organization
bent on reclaiming for the “Miami
boys” the lands and properties that
had been expropriated under the
Sandinistas. Led by Frank Ibarra,
who may have been an active-
duty officer at the time of the
assassination, though the Army
denies it, this small armed group
carried out a few subsequent
actions of limited importance,
and is now inactive.
Humberto Ortega’s dual level
of operating, instead of winning
him allies and securing his hold
over the military, actually
turned all sides against him. The
accidental slaying of 16-year-
old Jean-Paul Genie in 1990 by
over-anxious bodyguards of
Ortega and the subsequent
attempts to cover up the killing
emboldened many of Ortega’s
opponents. By late 1992, even
leaders of the Sandinista move-
ment were calling for him to
step down, arguing that he had
become a solitary figure who
followed his own designs, bent Fo
only on amassing personal ta fr( power.
The tarnished image of the San-
dinista army also made it possible
for foes of the military to raise
questions about clandestine opera-
tions carried out during the years
of Sandinista rule. One of the more
mysterious incidents of the Sandin-
ista period that has been reopened
to discussion is the La Penca
bombing of 1984. The target of the
bombing was Ed6n Pastora, one of
the more popular leaders of the
Contras at that time. He escaped
but eight people died, including
three journalists. Because of Pasto-
ra’s more moderate views and his
maverick style of operating, many
independent investigators-includ-
ing some present at La Penca–
concluded that more right-wing
sectors of the Contras in collusion
with the CIA were responsible for
the assassination attempt.
Now, however, new information
has surfaced indicating that the
Sandinistas had a role in the bomb-
ing. While some make the more
extreme claim that this was solely
a Sandinista operation, others like
rmer Sandinista and Contra leader Eden Paste Iks with reporters about the injuries he sustain om the bombing at La Penca in 1984.
Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan
suggest that it may have been a
Sandinista operation in which the
CIA also had a hand. The most
likely interpretation is that the
bombing was carried out by a
rogue international unit with ties to
the Interior Ministry. The National
Directorate of the Sandinistas
appears to have had no direct
involvement; as Honey and Avir-
gan acknowledge, several months
before the La Penca operation, the
directorate even decided not to act
against Pastora because the divi-
sions he fomented within the Con-
tras worked to the Sandinistas’
advantage. An Interior Ministry
official at the time reports that
TomBs Borge, a member of the
directorate and the head of the
ministry, was caught off-guard by
the assassination attempt. Accord-
ing to this official, Borge launched
an internal investigation of the
affair and actually fired or dis-
placed some of those associated
with the bombing.
Regardless of who was responsi-
ble for La Penca, it has to be
borne in mind that the 1980s
was a convoluted time of war
and conflict. Above all it cannot
be forgotten that the real and
consistent terrorists were the
Contras and the CIA. The San-
dinistas faced military foes who
used the most brutal and atro-
cious practices-torturing and
killing teachers, agricultural
technicians and peasants, as
well as destroying civilian eco-
nomic targets like port facilities,
food-storage depots and bridges,
which made people’s daily exis-
tence and survival difficult or
impossible. But today, given the
end of the war and the damaged
reputation of the Sandinista
leadership-and the army in
particular-it is relatively easy
for the international press and
‘ra sectors of the U.S. government 2d to blame everything on the San-
dinistas while completely ignor-
ing the U.S.-backed campaign of
murder and terror.
The explosion of an FMLN arms
cache in Managua in May is anoth-
er event that has to be understood
in the context of the extended con-
flict throughout Central America.
There is no doubt that the Sandin-
istas overtly and covertly assisted
many of the guerrilla movements
in Central America, particularly
the FMLN which was fighting
against a murderous regime that
was fully backed and funded by the
United States. With the defeat of
the Sandinistas in the 1990 elec-
tions, many of these support opera-
tions were dismantled. Others con-
tinued, including some limited
logistical backing and political
support. Certainly sectors of the
6 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 6UPDATE / NICARAGUA
Sandinista leadership-including
Humberto Ortega and Tomis
Borge-knew of the arms cache
that blew up in Managua. Howev-
er, in light of the assassination of
two high-ranking FMLN officials
in October and the very tenuous
peace process in El Salvador, the
Sandinistas should certainly not be
faulted for looking the other way
or even assisting the FMLN.
Indeed such collaboration is in the
long-term interest of the survival
of the Left in a region where right-
wing forces are still very deadly
and capable of carrying out mur-
derous activities and campaigns.
The uncovering of the arms
cache has been used as the “smok-
ing gun” by the press and U.S.
government officials to heap all
kinds of accusations on the Sandin-
istas. One of the more insidious
claims is that the Sandinistas were
somehow involved in the New
York bombing of the World Trade
Center after the discovery of five
fake Nicaraguan passports in con-
nection with the investigation into
the bombing. Charges that Sandin-
ista leaders were involved in
preparing documents for those who
undertook the New York bombing
are totally baseless. Indeed an FBI
informant has admitted that the
passports came from a ring in the
U.S. Embassy in Managua.
mong the Sandinistas, it
was not these charges but
the rebellion in Estelf in
July that tore at the heart and soul
of the Sandinista movement. When
Victor Manuel Gallegos, a popular
retired officer of the Sandinista
army, led 150 ex-Sandinista sol-
diers into Esteli to protest the poli-
cies of the Chamorro government
and to demand land for his sol-
diers, he thought that the govern-
ment and the army would negotiate
with him, just as they had done
with uprisings of a similar nature
that have taken place all over
Nicaragua since 1990.
But the takeover of Esteli
occurred at a moment when Ortega
was under increasing political
attack by the right wing and the
United States. When Chamorro
and Lacayo told him to retake the
city, he applied the maximum force
in order to demonstrate his loyalty
to the government. The result was
over 40 dead, mainly ex-Sandinista
soldiers who supported Gallegos.
Few revolutions have
been neat or of short
duration. Once new
social and political
forces are unleashed
at the base, it is diffi-
cult to contain them.
For Sandinistas this slaughter was
shocking. It was simply incompre-
hensible that Sandinista soldiers,
who had once fought together
against the Contras, were now
killing each other.
This incident has led to much
soul-searching within the Sandin-
ista party. For the first time, there is
now serious discussion about reno-
vating the party leadership. Hum-
berto Ortega and his brother Daniel
appear to be increasingly at odds
over where the Sandinista move-
ment should go. It was in fact Dan-
iel who may have helped encourage
the takeover of Esteli when a cou-
ple of days earlier he had suggested
in a public speech that confronta-
tional grassroots actions against the
regressive social and economic
policies of the Chamorro govern-
ment were legitimate. There is
some discussion in Managua
whether this split between the Orte-
ga brothers is real or simply being
staged for popular consumption.
But it makes little difference which
view one takes. The fact is that
Daniel is responding to a real rebel-
lion at the base of the Sandinista
party which is fed up with Sandin-
ista leaders who collaborate with
the Chamorro government.
It is clearly too early to tell
whether or not a new form of
democratization will take hold in
Nicaragua. But even if the process
of social upheaval continues, it is
important to remember that ever
since the era of modern social rev-
olutions began with the taking of
the Bastille in France in 1789, few
revolutions have been neat or of
short duration. Once new social
and political forces are unleashed
at the base, it is difficult to contain
them and find a new equilibrium.
The Cuban revolution, with its rel-
atively short guerrilla movement
and the quick consolidation of the
revolutionary party in power, is the
exception rather than the rule. And
now that the concept of the van-
guard party has largely collapsed,
revolutions will inevitably be more
complex and difficult. It is often
forgotten that the other great twen-
tieth-century revolution in Latin
America, that of Mexico, began in
1910, and did not really consoli-
date until the government of
Ldzaro Cirdenas in 1934. The rev-
olutionary bloodshed, turmoil and
destruction in Mexico were much
more severe and prolonged than
they have been in Nicaragua.
We also need to remember that
Nicaragua is still very much a part
of Central America, where similar
social processes have been set in
motion. El Salvador and Guatemala
may at present be less chaotic, but
they are clearly in the midst of
social transformations that will
very likely lead to tumultuous and
conflictive moments as they grope
for a new social order that is more
responsive to popular demands and
interests.
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