Colombia’s two nineteenth-century oligarchical par-
ties, the Liberals and the Conservatives, still dom-
inate the political arena at the close of the
twentieth century. This fact alone separates Colombia
from its South American neighbors, where traditional
post-independence parties ultimately gave way to work-
ing and middle-class political organizations and populist
coalitions. Colombia’s traditional parties managed to sur-
vive the social changes and dislocations of the twentieth
century through a remarkable ability to mediate inter-
party conflict, to negotiate an end to partisan bloodlet-
ting, and to incorporate some of the new political actors
unleashed by the forces of modernization, thus prevent-
ing third parties from making inroads into Colombia’s
electoral politics.
Yet as the country approaches the presidential elections
scheduled for May of this year, both parties are severely
weakened, worn down by decades of corruption,
internecine factionalism and complicity with violent
actors. Nevertheless, in the context of the current crisis,
and in the absence of third parties capable of challeng-
ing the bipartisan hegemony and generating new alter-
natives, it appears that the Liberal and Conservative
parties will continue to dominate the electoral landscape.
Several attempts to challenge the hegemony of the his-
toric parties have emerged throughout this century, but
they all were coopted, marginalized and in some cases,
brutally repressed. The first major challenge came in the
As the country approaches this
year’s presidential elections, both
Liberal and Conservative parties
find themselves severely
weakened. Nevertheless, it appears
that they will continue to
dominate the electoral landscape.
1930s, when Jorge Elidcer Gaitin tried to establish a
multiclass, anti-oligarchical coalition, first from outside,
then from within, the Liberal Party. But on April 9, 1948,
Gaitin was assassinated, sparking a decade of partisan
civil war, known as La Violencia. The bloody decade-
in which over 200,000 were killed-ended in 1958 when
the two parties brokered a power-sharing pact, known as
the National Front, which formally excluded other forces
from the electoral arena. But even as the National Front
brought an end to the partisan violence and consolidated
the Liberal and Conservative hold on power, it generated
new forms of opposition, ranging from dissident
factions of the traditional parties to armed guerrilla
movements.
Events surrounding the April 19, 1970 elections high-
light the exclusionary nature of the National Front
regime. The official candidate, Misael Pastrana, defeated
former President Gustavo Rojas Pinilla of the Popular
National Alliance (ANAPO) by two points, in elections
that many considered fraudulent. Three years later, a
group of ex-Anapistas, together with a dissident faction
of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),
founded the April 19th Movement (M-19). In this con-
text, guerrilla warfare emerged as an extension of the
struggle for reform.
After becoming a legal political party in 1990, the
M-19 briefly thrived, winning 28% of the vote in the spe-
cial election to establish a Constitutional Assembly six
months after laying down their arms. Yet the group showed
little political vision, and the traditional parties quickly
and effectively coopted and marginalized the M-19. By
1994, its electoral support had fallen to less than 2%.
NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
Marc W Chernick teaches in the Department of Government at Georgetown University and is a member of NACLA’s editorial board.REPORT ON CHIAPAS & COLOMBIA
A defaced election
poster in Puerto Rico,
Caqueti, a FARC
stronghold. Few resi-
dents showed up to
vote in the October
1997 municipal elec-
tions, which were boy-
cotted by the FARC.
The other ill-fated attempt at a third-party breakthrough
was the Patriotic Union (UP), a party founded by the
FARC in 1985 within the context of a cease-fire agree-
ment that lasted a scant two years. The UP achieved some
success, winning 14 seats in Congress in 1986. But the
assassination of 3,000 of its leaders and followers–
including elected officials and two presidential candi-
dates-has decimated the movement. The sole UP
senator elected in 1994 was killed the day he took office.
His successor was forced to flee the country and now
lives in exile.
iven this history of failed attempts to break
through the bipartisan political system and the
resulting emergence of armed opposition groups,
it is no surprise that two themes-reformism and vio-
lence-have dominated Colombian politics since the
1980s. Since 1982, every president has attempted to
reform the bipartisan system and to negotiate some sort
of peace with the guerrilla insurgency. Yet guerrilla vio-
lence has spread, a dirty war has proliferated, and para-
militaries have become part of the landscape of violence.
Attempts to democratically expand the political arena
have been gutted by a dirty war that makes the emergence
or consolidation of new political parties such as the M-
19 or the UP impossible. At the same time, the inability
of the traditional parties to bring an end to the violence
has weakened them internally, eroding their legitimacy
and undermining the authority of the state. The traditional
parties have always been, to some extent, a conglomer-
ation of individual political bosses. Yet now the parties
are fragmented, with little coherence beyond the attach-
0
ment of the party name to competing interests. Alliances
between local gamonales, or political bosses, paramili-
taries, the armed forces and drug traffickers have trans-
formed much of the Colombian countryside into rival
fiefdoms, a mosaic of armed contenders violently dis-
puting territorial and social control with the FARC and
the National Liberation Army (ELN).
For nearly two decades, successive Colombian presi-
dents have sought to implement political reforms
designed to spur democratization and to decentralize
power. Mayors have been elected directly since 1988,
and governors since 1991. Yet decentralization was insti-
tuted within the maelstrom of local conflicts among polit-
ical bosses, landowners, business interests, drug
traffickers, paramilitaries, guerrillas and the armed
forces. In this context, decentralization has not meant
greater democracy, but greater atomization and corrup-
tion. Liberal and Conservative are only names carried by
local leaders within the contested terrain of local and
regional power, not unlike the 1940s and 1950s. But
today, competition is not between the two historic groups,
but between the traditional parties and other groups seek-
ing power, particularly the guerrillas and paramilitaries.
Colombia’s unrelenting dirty war has made it difficult
for third parties such as the M-19 and the UP to turn this
state of affairs to their advantage. In this context, other
attempts to challenge the hegemony of the traditional par-
ties have emerged. One example is the emergence of “civic candidates”-individuals linked to social and cul-
tural institutions but with no party affiliation-many of
which offer a progressive alternative to the traditional
parties. Currently, over 100 of Colombia’s 1,071 muni-
VOL XXXI, No 5 MARCH/APRIL 1998 39REPORT ON CHIAPAS & COLOMBIA
Horacio Serpa was
chosen as the Liberal
Party’s presidential
candidate at a party
convention on January
25, 1998.
cipalities are governed by civic candidates. But while
civic candidates have made important inroads at the local
and regional level, it seems highly unlikely that they will
be able to articulate an alternative at the national level.
Power, as fragmented as it is, still rests in the hands of
the old party machinery geared to mobilize its share of
the electorate. Apathy and abstentionism-part of the his-
torical legacy of the National Front-are part of the equa-
tion of power. The media, access to financing, and ability
to mobilize the electorate continue to tip the scales in
favor of the traditional parties.
he rise of the drug trade, of course, has resulted in
a major transformation in Colombia’s distribution
of power. Indeed, Colombia is commonly referred
to in the media as a “narco-democracy” in which the drug
lords wield inordinate power over political decision mak-
ing. But despite overwhelming evidence that leading
politicians have knowingly accepted monies proffered by
the cartels, there is little evidence that the drug barons
have been able to buy off the politicians completely. The
drug traffickers have become an intermittently effective
lobbying group on issues that directly affect their inter-
ests, but they do not control Colombia’s political agenda.
Nor have they used their economic and social power to
promote political alternatives or back alternative move-
ments. Rather, they have used their wealth to suborn the
leadership of the traditional parties in order to protect
their interests and to counter the expansion of the guer-
rilla armies that extort their property and threaten their
local power. Their preference seems to be to influence
the existing political arena either through violence, cor-
ruption, or both.
The now infamous case of President Samper, who
apparently accepted financing from the Cali Cartel dur-
ing the second round of the 1994 presidential elections,
is a case in point. The cartel’s principal leaders are now
in jail, and Congress recently passed a law authorizing
the expropriation of properties and goods acquired with
illicit monies. But they have also won a dramatic reduc-
tion of their sentences as part of the government’s sur-
render and plea-bargaining policies, and the cartel leaders
are safe from extradition, as the constitutional amend-
ment recently passed by Congress authorizing extradi-
tion is not retroactive. While collaboration between the
cartel leaders and public officials may exist at levels yet
unknown to the public, the evidence suggests that the
drug barons do not control or even inordinately shape the
political agenda in Colombia. Other groups, including
the leaders of the country’s big industrial conglomer-
ates-financial groups like those built around the hold-
ings of Jos6 Marfa Santo Domingo or Carlos Ardila
Lulle-wield vastly more political power at the national
level than the Cali upstarts.
The 1998 presidential contest has been fundmentally
shaped by the political crisis emanating from the Samper
drug-money scandal. Colombian Attorney General
Alfonso Valdivieso opened an investigation, known as
Proceso 8000, against President Samper and other top
political figures. Political elites split over the investiga-
tion, and Congress ultimately decided that there was not
sufficient evidence to prosecute Samper. Yet prominent
40 NACI REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
2
a
BREPORT ON CHIAPAS & COLOMBIA
leaders from both parties called upon Samper to resign,
and though he has held onto power, his ability to govern
the country has been seriously compromised.
The charges against Samper prompted the U.S. gov-
ernment to “decertify” Colombia in 1996 and 1997,
adding to the sensation of political crisis. With Samper
reduced to practicing the politics of survival, the grow-
ing vacuum at the center of power has prompted many
political sectors-Congress, the military, party leaders,
gamonales, business, paramilitaries, guerrillas-to push
their own agendas and take advantage of the executive’s
weakness.
As has happened so often in the past, the principal
response to the crisis came from within the traditional
parties. Leading the field was Samper’s principal
defender, Minister of the Interior Horacio Serpa, now the
undisputed standard bearer of the official wing of the
Liberal Party. Serpa openly attacked the United States for
meddling in Colombian affairs and attempting to destroy
the Samper presidency. The nationalist rhetoric of Serpa’s
defense appealed to much of the electorate, even as it
caused great alarm in Washington.
One of Serpa’s main adversaries is Alfonso Valdivieso.
Since resigning as attorney general last year, Valdivieso
has been attempting to transform his anticorruption cam-
paign into a successful presidential candidacy. Yet early
polls indicate that he is not likely to succeed. He is seen
as too close to the United States and as having done too
much of its anti-Samper bidding. The other top presi-
dential contender is Andr6s Pastrana of the Conservative
Party. Pastrana, who was the Conservative candidate in
the 1994 elections, is running a nominally independent
campaign, but will seek to mobilize the core Conservative
constituency.
he race is likely to come down to Serpa versus
Pastrana in the first round of voting on May 31. If
neither wins a majority, a second round will be
held on June 21, which Serpa will likely win. His presi-
dency will be embattled from the start, as he will face
opposition from certain sectors within the parties and
among the electorate that are hostile to the idea of conti-
nuity with the current administration. He will also face
the challenge of mending fences with Washington, which
does not view him favorably.
If the presidential crisis helped shape the candidate
pool, it oddly has not defined the campaign issues. With
the exception of Valdivieso’s flagging efforts and a few
minor candidates within the Liberal Party, the campaign
is largely centered on issues of violence and peace.
Virtually all the candidates from the traditional parties
support some form of negotiation with the guerrillas,
although there are differences in their strategies and
possible concessions.
Ironically, the
presidential
candidate
who is most
unacceptable to
Washington–
Horacio Serpa–
may also be the
individual best
positioned to
lead a successful
peace process.
The one dissident voice
comes from outside the tra-
ditional parties-retired
general and former chief of
the armed forces Harold
Bedoya. Bedoya led the
hard-line opposition to the
peace process from within
the government throughout
the Samper Administration,
until he was forced out late
last year. He has since
emerged as an independent
presidential candidate with
a law-and-order platform
that calls for expanding the
counterinsurgency war.
Bedoya, who has made no
secret of his view that the
guerrillas are nothing but a
bunch of drug traffickers,
represents a small but sig-
nificant sector of public
opinion that clamors for a military solution to the grow-
ing insecurity and violence. Some polls have shown
Bedoya with up to 19% of voters’ preferences, and at
times running second to Serpa. Yet it is unlikely that he
will be able to transfer his support into sufficient votes
to reach the second round. How Bedoya fares in the elec-
tions will be a good indicator of how many Colombians
oppose negotiations with the guerrillas. It will also reveal
the strength of the political right.
In Colombia today, peace is the most critical and com-
pelling issue on the political agenda. All of the traditional
party candidates are seeking to promote some form of a
negotiated settlement to the armed conflict and say they
are willing to accept major structural changes in the polit-
ical, social and economic arenas to achieve peace.
Ironically, the person who would be least acceptable to
the United States, Horacio Serpa, may also be the indi-
vidual best positioned to lead a successful peace process.
He has long ties to the left, forged in his native depart-
ment of Santander, but he has pursued his career from
within the Liberal Party, and he is credible with the guer-
rillas as well as with elite business, political and civil soci-
ety leaders. The immediate task for Colombia’s next
president is to negotiate peace with the multiple armed
groups operating in the country. As the twentieth century
comes to a close, a more pluralistic regime can only
emerge in Colombia through a negotiated settlement
among all the actors. If the next round of talks breaks
down, the long-awaited democratization will again be
deferred, and Colombia’s recurring cycles of violence
will continue.
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