A report recently released by
Amnesty International entitled
“Peru: Torture and Extra-judicial
Executions,” has served to con-
firm allegations by the Lima press
and human rights organizations in
Peru concerning the government’s
use of unchecked violence in at-
tempting to eradicate the Maoist
guerrilla movement, “Sendero
Luminoso.” Confining its investi-
gation to complaints filed within
the southern Andean departments
(states) where the fighting has
been the heaviest, Amnesty has
concluded that the nature and ex-
tent of human rights abuse occur-
ring in the context of the guerrilla
war has reached proportions un-
40
precedented in Peru. These south-
ern departments-Ayacucho,
Apurimac and Huancavelica–
have been under military occupa-
tion since December 1982.
The report appeared in the
wake of a series of bombings and
attacks by Sendero in the capital, with President Belaunde’s Popu-
lar Action Party headquarters and
a number of police stations the major targets. In these attempts to
discredit the conservative civilian
regime as a “democratic farce,”
Sendero has gained some mo-
mentum by provoking the state
into responding with more visible
authoritarian measures. The dire
economic situation also continues
to give Sendero leverage. Under
the guidance of Finance Minister
Rodriguez Pastor, a strict ortho-
dox monetarist, Peru’s major eco-
nomic indicators have slumped to
levels on a par with those witnes-
sed at the end of the last century
while the country was at war with
Chile and Bolivia.
In November’s municipal elec-
tions-widely viewed as a plebi-
scite on government policy-
Belaunde’s administration met
with resounding disapproval. The
United Left won handily in Lima
and the other principal opposition
party, the centrist APRA, took the
rest of the country. Belaunde re-
sponded promptly by relieving
NACLA Reportupdate . update . update * update
his finance minister of duties ef- fective January 1.
As the polarization between
Sendero and the state approach-
es its highest pitch, Amnesty’s
findings provoked an expected
round of denials on the part of
President Belaunde. He accused
the organization of having “com-
munist ties,” and of being part of a
subversive network abroad which
he has consistently blamed for
Peru’s present “terrorist cancer.”
Subsequent to the release of the
report, the appearance in Lima of
two Ayacucho school teachers
whom Amnesty had listed as dead
lent some credence to the presi-
dent’s criticisms. The general
public, concerned over the obvi-
ous rise in terrorism and govern-
ment repression, has been more
receptive to Amnesty’s findings
despite the report’s errors.
Verdict: Collective Guilt
At least half the 66-page report
is devoted to analyzing the still
controversial events surrounding
the brutal massacre of eight jour-
nalists last January in the village
of Uchuraccay.* Here, Amnesty
questions the final conclusions
drawn by the government’s inves-
tigative commission headed by
celebrated Peruvian novelist
Mario Vargas Llosa. Contrary to
the official verdict of collective
guilt with impunity for the peasants
involved in the grisly incident, and
complete government ablution,
Amnesty points to the massacre
as a direct result of government
security policy in the military oc-
cupied zone. The report notes the
widespread bloodshed which has
resulted from the indoctrination
and payoff by the military of peas-
ant community patrols organized
to fight Sendero. Because of the
*See “Peru: ‘Dirty War’ in Ayacucho,”
NACLA Report on the Americas (May-
June 1983).
JanlFeb 1984
many unresolved contradictions
and inconsistencies in the gov-
ern’s testimony, Amnesty has ap-
pealed-unsuccessfully-to the
Peruvian government to reopen
the investigation of the massacre
and initiate the proper prosecu-
tion proceedings.
In its documentation of torture
and extra-judicial executions in
the occupied zone, Amnesty pro-
vides a slant quite different from
the picture painted by Vargas
Llosa in his New York Times
Magazine (July 31, 1983) account
of conflict in the Andes. The novel-
ist’s portrayal of a military and
police force committing some in-
fractions because they are “out of
training” for democracy, yet fight-
ing to maintain Peru’s vulnerable
democratic institutions, is a far cry
from the nightly roundups and ar-
bitrary murders documented in
the report. Eye witness testimony
gathered by Amnesty directly con-
tradicts military communiques
which state that the majority of
deaths are occurring during ac-
tive combat against the guerrillas.
The report becomes particularly
heated in its descriptions of torture
tactics employed on suspects,
many of them minors. Victims
have been systematically beaten
and held under water-to the
point of drowning-at “Los Cabi-
tos,” Ayacucho’s military barracks
and torture center.
This is not a novel practice in
41update * update . update * update
E (
Counterinsurgency squads arrive in Ayacucho in August 1982.
Peru, although the torturing of
youths in this manner is something
new. Amnesty discounts official
estimates of disappearances and
extra-judicial deaths as superfici-
ally low, due to the information
blackout in the south, and a total
disregard for due process on the
part of the military command. The
government puts the total deaths
at 1,500 since May 1980 when
Sendero surfaced.
Colombian-Style Stalemate
Although Amnesty’s findings
corroborate what has been sus-
pected all along, the organization
is certainly not telling the govern-
ment anything it does not already
know. Among opposition political
forces, there is a mounting senti-
ment that a blitzkrieg development
42
effort is the only viable solution to
the problems of the improverished
sierra region where Sendero is
strong. Yet the government re-
mains committed to its own form
of terrorism. Press disclosures in-
dicate that defense expenditures
now consume 30% of the national
budget. President Reagan’s fiscal
1984 budget requests a five-fold
increase in military aid to Peru to
support the purchase of high-tech
counterinsurgency equipment.
Given the government’s con-
tinuing disregard for even minimal
economic justice and the ineffi-
cacy of warfare tactics to date, as
well as Sendero’s dogmatic ad-
herence to violent and non-parlia-
mentary solutions, the most likely
scenario is that put forth by ex-
President Morales Bermtidez in a
recent speech in Lima. That is, a
stalemate, regardless of military
or civilian rule, which resembles
the current situation in Colombia.
There, a similar mix of political
and economic contingencies has
perpetuated a deadlock between
the state and guerrilla insurgents
for some 20 years.
The international business com-
munity seems to share this future
vision for Peru. Since Sendero’s
last campaign on Lima, American
International Underwriters has
notified the state insurance com-
pany that it will not be issuing
terrorist protection policies to new
clients this year.
Carol Wise is a graduate student in political science at Columbia Univer-
sity and recently spent a year as a visting researcher at Lima’s Pacific University.
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