“I, RONALD REAGAN, PRESIDENT OF
the United States of America, find that the
policies and actions of the Government of Nicaragua
constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the
national security and foreign policy of the United
States and hereby declare a national emergency to
deal with that threat.”
The wording of that declaration on May 1 of an
economic embargo against Nicaragua is some mea-
sure of how far we have travelled, and how far elite
opinion has changed, since the summer of 1979. In
August of that year, just one month into the Nicara-
guan revolution, Sen. Edward Zorinsky, liberal chairman of the Western Hemisphere Affairs Sub-
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Commit- tee, hailed the new Sandinista government as a
“dedicated, impressive group of people whose driv- ing force is Nicaraguan nationalism.” Today, the
congressional consensus has swung violently against
Nicaragua’s revolutionary experiment. Those who once loftily bestowed the benefit of the doubt on the Sandinistas now point to a photograph of Daniel
Ortega in Red Square and cry “betrayal!” U.S./Nicaraguan relations are fast approaching
their moment of crisis: the option of the contra war,
murderous but inconclusive, is fast running out of steam, beset by obstacles in Congress and on the
battlefield. Soon the Reagan Administration will be
forced to choose: either invade Nicaragua, brandish-
ing the picture from Red Square as justification, or recognize the Sandinistas’ right to exist, and
negotiate. That is where we stand today; this issue of
Report on the Americas asks how we got there. It re-
moves the debate over Nicaragua’s foreign relations
from the vacuous world of photo-opportunity poli-
tics and returns to history as the surest way of under-
standing the present.
SINCE JULY 19, 1979, THE NICARAGUAN government has committed itself to a non-
aligned foreign policy. Non-alignment was spelled out in the original 1969 program of the Sandinista
National Liberation Front (FSLN); it was reaffirmed
in 1978; it has since been repeated on innumerable
occasions. In the United States, non-alignment is a poorly
understood term. But even if clearly grasped, and
stripped of conservative suspicions that it hides a
more sinister agenda, it would still challenge his-
toric U.S. policies and practices in the Caribbean Basin. Non-alignment is the expression of a
worldwide phenomenon of Third World nations
seeking their political and economic independence and equitable relations with the developed world. It
is not a strategy for furthering Moscow’s interests,
although of course enhanced Soviet influence may
precisely be the consequence of a refusal by Wash-
ington to take the new Third World nationalism seri-
ously on its own terms. Robert Armstrong’s article
traces the origins of Nicaraguan non-alignment and
the role of Marxism in Sandinista ideology. It finds
the roots of Nicaragua’s contemporary foreign pol- icy in the country’s unique history of U.S. abuse and
in a tradition of rebellion against foreign domination
that owes little or nothing to Moscow.
Nicaragua’s strategy of non-alignment is based on
developing a broad spectrum of ties with the Third
World, Western Europe, the socialist countries and
the United States. Recognizing that to overcome
their dependency would take decades, the Sandinis-
tas have tried with all four to establish trade, aid and
military relations. Some commentators have called
this approach “standing on four legs.” Others have called it the “diversification of dependency”
through relations with countries of distinct ideology
and development. Whatever name it is given, the
core of Sandinista foreign policy is to end the almost
exclusive ties to the United States which have de-
fined Nicaragua’s place in the world through the
whole of the 20th century.
Diversifying trade relations is the easiest part. To
meet its national security needs, Nicaragua has also
sought-though with less success-to diversify its
“military dependency.” Robert Matthews’ article describes that endeavor, and for the first time re-
counts the full story of the FSLN’s repeated attempts
to secure military aid from the West from 1979 to
late 1981, when the Reagan Administration killed
any hope that military supplies might be obtained outside the Soviet bloc.
N ICARAGUA’S CONCEPTION OF NON- alignment also benefits from 30 years of
Third World experience, in which several countries,
notably Cuba, have depended heavily on the Soviet
bloc to guide and assist their development. That ex-
perience has demonstrated that such strategies are
not necessarily any more appropriate than capitalist models to the real social and economic conditions of
underdevelopment-as for example when state pro- duction is introduced into primitive peasant econo-
mies. Nor have they been more successful in pro-
moting economic diversification; all too often,
mono-crop agroexport remains the dull outcome of such experiments. And the exclusive reliance on
generally inferior Soviet-bloc technology has lim-
ited the scope for growth which access to Western
technology might have allowed. Important shifts in the international balance of
power, meanwhile, have offered Nicaragua political and diplomatic space in which to pursue non-align- ment, to an extent that was not available to Cuba in
1959. The Sandinista government benefits from the
increased economic clout of the larger Third World nations. The ability of Mexico to supply much of
Nicaragua’s oil, or of Algeria to purchase Nicara- guan sugar after the United States’ quota was cut,
are two cases in point. Latin American nations are more willing politically to challenge the United
States, even if their effectiveness is limited. Europe
has become a more independent international actor
and has offered the Sandinistas trade, aid and dip-
lomatic backing. The socialist countries have grown both more
cautious and more realistic about their involvement.
Their difficult experiences with Cuba and with vari-
ous African governments has made them aware of
their limits; so too has the Soviet preoccupation with arms control. The Reagan Administration has
worked hard to paint a picture of Nicaragua rushing headlong from day one into the arms of the Soviet Union. Marc Edelman’s article, the most com- prehensive and sober rebuttal of that assertion we
have yet seen, reveals a clear pattern: each increase
in aid from the socialist and radical non-aligned na-
tions has come in response to a new act of aggres-
sion from the United States.
T HOUGH MUCH OF THE WORLD HAS
changed, the attitudes of the United States, un-
fortunately, have not. Since the Reagan Administra-
tion came to power, its policies have aimed to thwart
Nicaragua’s strategy of diversifying its dependency. They have forced it instead to concentrate almost
exclusively on the preservation of national security. Washington’s pressure both on Nicaragua and on
many of its new-found allies have worked to the det-
riment of the diplomatic balance that the Sandinis-
tas sought. The Reagan Administration, with con-
summate cynicism, has used the results to charge
that Nicaragua is aligned with the Soviet bloc.
Nicaragua’s commitment to non-alignment, how-
ever, is deeply rooted in the essential task which the
revolution has set itself, and that is to build a new
national identity from the rubble of Somocismo. It is
undergirded by strong traditions of national resist-
ance, nationalism, and-within the Latin American
Left-independence from Moscow-oriented Marx- ism. Though that commitment is powerful, the
threat posed to Nicaragua’s national security by the Reagan Administration places it in jeopardy. Until
now, non-alignment has been the Sandinista govern-
ment’s chosen strategy not only to achieve develop-
ment but to defend national security. If Nicaragua
cannot practice non-alignment and remain secure, then national survival must dictate a change of
course. The challenge which Nicaragua poses to the
United States is not the prospect of a Soviet satellite two hours’ flying time from Miami, but the chal-
lenge of nationalism. The test is a particularly severe
one for this country because U.S. policies have so
repeatedly frustrated Nicaragua’s ambitions as a na-
tion over the past 80 years. But the question extends
beyond Nicaragua. It goes to the phenomenon of Third World nationalism itself, and of the United
States’ capacity to accept nationalism as the legiti-
mate expression of powerful and enduring forces. Nicaragua is a tiny country. Its leaders are the
first to acknowledge that their policies must reflect
the reality of their location in the Caribbean Basin,
where the United States faces less real checks on its power than in other parts of the world. Yet even
here, Washington’s refusal to recognize the legiti- macy of nationalism has led to a disgraceful chapter
in this country’s history: five years of sordid and di- visive warfare, with no end in sight. Third World
nationalism will provoke immeasurably greater challenges elsewhere-the Philippines, Chile and
South Africa are only the most obvious cases-and the costs of opposing it will be correspondingly higher. In the closing years of this century, the
United States will face two options: it can accom-
modate itself to coexistence with nationalism, or it
must be prepared for endless, and probably unwin-
nable, war on the nations of the Third World.
14 REPORT ON THE AMERICA5
Rctpo4 t n4 Aelica4
Sandinista Foreign Policy
any hope that military supplies might be obtained
outside the Soviet bloc.
N ICARAGUA’S CONCEPTION OF NON-
alignment also benefits from 30 years of
Third World experience, in which several countries,
notably Cuba, have depended heavily on the Soviet
bloc to guide and assist their development. That ex-
perience has demonstrated that such strategies are
not necessarily any more appropriate than capitalist
models to the real social and economic conditions of
underdevelopment-as for example when state pro-
duction is introduced into primitive peasant econo-
mies. Nor have they been more successful in pro-
moting economic diversification; all too often,
mono-crop agroexport remains the dull outcome of
such experiments. And the exclusive reliance on
generally inferior Soviet-bloc technology has lim-
ited the scope for growth which access to Western
technology might have allowed.
Important shifts in the international balance of
power, meanwhile, have offered Nicaragua political
and diplomatic space in which to pursue non-align-
ment, to an extent that was not available to Cuba in
1959. The Sandinista government benefits from the
increased economic clout of the larger Third World
nations. The ability of Mexico to supply much of
Nicaragua’s oil, or of Algeria to purchase Nicara-
guan sugar after the United States’ quota was cut,
are two cases in point. Latin American nations are
more willing politically to challenge the United
States, even if their effectiveness is limited. Europe
has become a more independent international actor
and has offered the Sandinistas trade, aid and dip-
lomatic backing.
The socialist countries have grown both more
cautious and more realistic about their involvement.
Their difficult experiences with Cuba and with vari-
ous African governments has made them aware of
their limits; so too has the Soviet preoccupation with
arms control. The Reagan Administration has
worked hard to paint a picture of Nicaragua rushing
headlong from day one into the arms of the Soviet
Union. Marc Edelman’s article, the most com-
prehensive and sober rebuttal of that assertion we
have yet seen, reveals a clear pattern: each increase
in aid from the socialist and radical non-aligned na-
tions has come in response to a new act of aggres-
sion from the United States.
THOUGH MUCH OF THE WORLD HAS
changed, the attitudes of the United States, un-
fortunately, have not. Since the Reagan Administra-
tion came to power, its policies have aimed to thwart
Nicaragua’s strategy of diversifying its dependency.
They have forced it instead to concentrate almost
exclusively on the preservation of national security.
Washington’s pressure both on Nicaragua and on
many of its new-found allies have worked to the det-
riment of the diplomatic balance that the Sandinis-
tas sought. The Reagan Administration, with con-
summate cynicism, has used the results to charge
that Nicaragua is aligned with the Soviet bloc.
Nicaragua’s commitment to non-alignment, how-
ever, is deeply rooted in the essential task which the
revolution has set itself, and that is to build a new
national identity from the rubble of Somocismo. It is
undergirded by strong traditions of national resist-
ance, nationalism, and-within the Latin American
Left-independence from Moscow-oriented Marx-
ism. Though that commitment is powerful, the
threat posed to Nicaragua’s national security by the
Reagan Administration places it in jeopardy. Until
now, non-alignment has been the Sandinista govern-
ment’s chosen strategy not only to achieve develop-
ment but to defend national security. If Nicaragua
cannot practice non-alignment and remain secure,
then national survival must dictate a change of
course.
The challenge which Nicaragua poses to the
United States is not the prospect of a Soviet satellite
two hours’ flying time from Miami, but the chal-
lenge of nationalism. The test is a particularly severe
one for this country because U.S. policies have so
repeatedly frustrated Nicaragua’s ambitions as a na-
tion over the past 80 years. But the question extends
beyond Nicaragua. It goes to the phenomenon of
Third World nationalism itself, and of the United
States’ capacity to accept nationalism as the legiti-
mate expression of powerful and enduring forces.
Nicaragua is a tiny country. Its leaders are the
first to acknowledge that their policies must reflect
the reality of their location in the Caribbean Basin,
where the United States faces less real checks on its
power than in other parts of the world. Yet even
here, Washington’s refusal to recognize the legiti-
macy of nationalism has led to a disgraceful chapter
in this country’s history: five years of sordid and di-
visive warfare, with no end in sight. Third World
nationalism will provoke immeasurably greater
challenges elsewhere-the Philippines, Chile and
South Africa are only the most obvious cases-and
the costs of opposing it will be correspondingly
higher. In the closing years of this century, the
United States will face two options: it can accom-
modate itself to coexistence with nationalism, or it
must be prepared for endless, and probably unwin-
nable, war on the nations of the Third World.
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