Consorting with Tyrants
U.S. policymakers speak of
the inauguration of a new
,era in U.S. Latin America
policy in the wake of the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the Eastern
bloc. The calculus, they say, has
changed: collaboration with brutal
military rulers in order to keep left-
ist forces at bay is a thing of the
past. The government’s primary
concern is now expanding and
strengthening the region’s “market
democracies.”
On its face, U.S. policy towards
Haiti and Guatemala reflects the
government’s decision not to con-
sort with tyrants anymore. In an
apparent reversal of Cold War roles,
a U.S. invasion restored leftist
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide to
power after efforts to dislodge the
military through a negotiated settle-
ment had failed. In Guatemala, the
United States apparently keeps its
distance from the military and has
encouraged peace negotiations to
resolve the country’s prolonged
civil war.
At least, those are the policies
offered for public consumption.
Due to the persistence and determi-
nation of human-rights activists like
Jennifer Harbury and investigative
journalists like Allan Nairn, howev-
er, a different story has begun to
emerge. In this version, the U.S.
government-and in particular its
intelligence services-has been
actively collaborating and propping
up savage military forces and their
paramilitary allies in Haiti and
Guatemala. The U.S. government,
of course, vehemently denies this.
In any government operation,
there is always a paper trail. Haiti
and Guatemala are no exceptions to
the rule. Documents in U.S. gov-
ernment hands have the power to
expose the true nature and scope of
U.S. involvement once and for all.
They would also provide evidence
that could be used to prosecute
human rights abusers-putting an
end to a shameful legacy of
impunity.
merican soldiers in Haiti
confiscated over 160,000
Documents left behind by
the paramilitary group FRAPH and
the Haitian army when they fled in
haste at the time of the invasion.
When the existence of these docu-
ments came to light 14 months
later, the Aristide administration
requested their return. The U.S.
government, however, had the arro-
gance to claim “finders keepers.”
In the face of the Haitian govern-
ment’s unwillingness to drop the
issue, Washington is now trying to
strike a bargain. It offered to hand
over the documents on the condi-
tion that the names of U.S. citizens
(including Haitian Americans with
dual citizenship) be blacked out,
and that access to the documents be
restricted. The Haitian government
is sticking to its guns: it wants the
documents back with no strings
attached.
We can only speculate about the
contents of the documents. Many
believe the documents would reveal
an intricate web of complicity
between the U.S. government and
the coup regime. Others speculate
that they might even provide evi-
dence of an arms pipeline from the
Haitian-American community in
Miami to the Haitian military–
with the knowledge or complicity
of the CIA.
U.S. activities in Guatemala have
also been cloaked under a veil of
secrecy. Jennifer Harbury’s cam-
paign to find out what happened to
her husband, guerrilla commander
Efrafn BAmaca VelAsquez, succeed-
ed in piercing that veil. She
obtained declassified documents
that prove that the CIA was aware
of BAmaca’s capture, and even paid
for information obtained from his
interrogation under torture. In early
1995, Rep. Robert Torricelli went
public with classified information
that revealed that Col. Julio Roberto
Alpirez, a Guatemalan military offi-
cer on the CIA payroll, directed the
torture and murder of BAmaca and
the innkeeper Michael DeVine.
With the scandal hitting the front
pages of the nation’s newspapers
last year, President Clinton felt
compelled to call for a comprehen-
sive review by the Intelligence
Oversight Board (IOB) of all gov-
ernment documents which might
shed light on possible U.S. involve-
ment in the two murders or any
related matters. Only full disclosure
of the documents will reveal to
what extent U.S. tax dollars have
funded murder in Guatemala.
If the information released so far
is any yardstick, however, the U.S.
public should not expect a full air-
ing of the truth from the IOB final
report. In July, 1995, a four-page
summary was the only document
made public from a CIA Inspector
General’s 700-page report on the
issue. In May of this year, the State
Department released 5,000 docu-
ments, but admitted holding back
files which might compromise
“intelligence sources and methods.”
The irony is that it was precisely
the CIA’s use of torturers and mur-
derers as “sources” that sparked the
public outcry in the first place.
The public deserves to know the
truth about U.S. involvement in
Haiti and Guatemala. Yet the U.S.
government is unwilling to let the
relevant documents be scrutinized.
We are left to wonder: what is in the
documents that the United States is
so afraid of revealing?
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