The “Violence” of Aristide
On November 7, 1995, newly
elected legislative deputy
Jean Hubert Feuill6, a cou-
sin and political ally of President
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was gunned
down in a commando-style attack
by right-wing forces. In an angry
eulogy at the funeral, Aristide vent-
ed his frustration with the intema-
tional community’s half-hearted
commitment to disarmament.
“I give the Haitian police the
order to carry out the operation of
disarmament,” Aristide said. “Tire-
lessly, within the law, I am com-
manding you to disarm all crimi-
nals, to carry out a complete and
total legal disarmament.” Haitians
who got in the away, he warned,
would be arrested, and those who
are not Haitian-in reference to the
UN troops stationed in Haiti–
would be sent “back home to their
parents.” He went on to say: “Here
is what I am asking of the Haitian
people: don’t sit back and wait with
your arms crossed. Accompany the
Haitian police when they are going
to enter the home of those who have
big weapons, give them informa-
tion, don’t be afraid.”
The U.S. government interpreted
Aristide’s “outburst” as his signal to
the population to take matters into
its own hands. The U.S. media sin-
gled out for quotation the part of the
speech where Aristide urges his fol-
lowers to go to “the home of those
who have big weapons,” conve-
niently leaving out the president’s
clear delegation of authority to the
police. A New York Times editorial
entitled “Aristide’s Deadly Rhetoric”
intoned: “Aristide has alarmingly
reverted to the demagogic political
style that scarred his Presidency
before the 1991 military coup.”
For long-time Haiti observers, the
sense of ddj& vu was overwhelming.
Once again Aristide’s words were
being taken out of context, his
meaning distorted. Days before the
1990 coup, with the military mov-
ing in on him, Aristide had called on
his followers to defend their rights
and referred to a “beautiful tool”
that they might use against military
supporters. That speech became the
cornerstone of a media campaign
against Aristide. Arguing that the
“beautiful tool” referred to the fiery
tire used to “necklace” political
opponents, the Bush administration
spun a whole theory of how the
Aristide government was engaged
in a systematic campaign to foment
mob violence. This ploy gave U.S.
policymakers a convenient excuse
for not coming down hard on the
military, their long-time secret ally.
Five years later, the Clinton
administration-with the U.S.
media lining up behind it-is
resorting to exactly the same strate-
gy. On this occasion, insinuations
about the president’s proclivity for
violence seem intended to nip in the
bud any hint of independence from
U.S. tutelage on Aristide’s part that
might derail the carefully con-
trolled, U.S.-orchestrated “transi-
tion to democracy” in Haiti.
The incident reflects how dis-
armament has become a piv-
otal issue in Haiti. For
Aristide, until the ex-military’s sup-
porters are stripped of their
weapons and human rights abusers
imprisoned, democracy cannot take
root in the country. For the U.S.
government, disarmament of the
right is anathema, ostensibly
because it would give Aristide a free
hand to pursue a left-wing agenda at
odds with U.S. interests.
Aristide seemed to accept the
terms of the U.S. occupation in the
belief that once back in Haiti, he
would be able to carve out more
space in which to maneuver. He
was, for instance, able to abolish the
Haitian military against the wishes
of the U.S. government. But he has
been less successful in disarming
the paramilitaries. Just before the
invasion, the coup leaders began
distributing stockpiled weapons to
their supporters. U.S. troops were
reluctant to act on reports of these
hidden arms caches provided by the
Haitian public. Such operations
were considered too risky, and
moreover, they ran counter to the
theory that armed right-wing forces
were a vital counterweight to
Aristide.
The U.S. government has also
delayed handing over to the Haitian
government 30,000 pages of docu-
ments seized from the headquarters
of the paramilitary group FRAPH at
the time of the invasion. Its lame
excuse was that the Haitian govern-
ment was not legally entitled to
them. Clearly the real reason for its
reluctance was that the documents
would strengthen Aristide’s hand in
rooting out and prosecuting human
rights violators connected with the
former military rulers as well as
blow the cover on the U.S. govern-
ment’s collusion with the coup
regime right up until the invasion.
Evidence of the extent of that col-
lusion is leaking out more and more
each day. FRAPH leader Emmanuel
Constant told 60 Minutes that he
was a paid CIA informant from
1991 to 1994. He characterized
himself as the United States’ prosti-
tute-someone good enough to bed
down with at night, but not fit to be
seen with in broad daylight.
Jean Hubert Feuill6 was one of
more than 60 supporters of Aristide
killed in political attacks since he
was restored to power 13 months
ago. Once the UN troops withdraw,
the fragile security situation will no
doubt further deteriorate. Given its
refusal to disarm the right-wing
extremists when it had the chance,
the U.S. government will bear no
small part of the responsibility for
the ensuing bloodshed.
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