By the 1930’s, the United States was in the throes of crisis and depression. Hardest hit were the working people, unemployed by the millions, who began a period of unprecedented union organizing. Demonstrations, led by the unemployed, farmers, veterans and the homeless were held throughout the country. The ruling class was confronted with two major tasks: to develop a program for economic recovery and to control discontent among the workers. Far-sighted elements of the bourgeoisie realized that continued repression of the working class would only exacerbate the existing crisis. Consequently, as will be seen below, improving the economic situation of certain sectors of the working class in order to increase their purchasing power, was identified as one way to both stimulate the economy and placate the militant workers. However, in order to develop the necessary programs to meet these goals, the bourgeoisie relied upon the State to impose order in the field of labor-management relations. No state acts in the equal interests of all classes, but is the instrument of the most powerful, economically dominant class. In the era of monopoly capitalism, as under competitive capitalism, the state represehts the bourgeoisie and intervenes forcefully on their behalf. While perpetuating the idea of an impartial State acting in behalf of “the public,” they actually use the State to control the working class both by repression and, as will be seen in the case of contract unionism, by integrating the elements of the trade union leadership and the union structure into the State apparatus, where it can be more easily regulated. In the United States, the legislative arm of the State acted during the New Deal to legally sanction and further control contract unionism, laying the basis upon which labor is forced to operate today. This article will analyze the key national labor legislation – the Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act – which, in spite of their differences, were used by the bourgeoisie to control labor organizing by limiting the options of trade unions in the fight to protect the rights of working people. While this article focuses on the basic legislation affecting unions, it should be pointed out that each President has set up labor-management councils to make anti-labor policies more acceptable to the working class. Under President Nixon, a network of agencies was established to administer his wage controls. The Pay Board, Price Commission, Cost of Living Council, Construction Industry Stabilization Committee and National Committee on Productivity included11 representatives of the union bureaucracy who accepted speedups and wage controls for their members, while prices rose with little constraint. Given the continuing nature of the worldwide economic crisis, President Carter will have to follow in Nixon’s footsteps, despite his assurances to the contrary. His recent feelers about wage controls bear this out. Finally, while legislation affecting unions primarily applies to the organized sector of the work force, this legislation also has profound effects on the unorganized sector as well. As we shall see, by placing further constraints and limitations on the unions, acts such as Taft-Hartley contributed to a significant reduction in unionization drives among unorganized workers. Furthermore, controls on unions which limit their ability to fight for the needs of their members also serve to maintain low wages and poor working conditions of unorganized workers. EARLY LEGISLATION Previous to the New Deal, except for a brief respite during World War I, the State responded to the working class movement almost exclusively with repression. However, in addition to direct physical assaults on strikers and union members, trade unions were viewed as criminal conspiracies and were therefore attacked through the use of court-ordered injunctions. First used against the railway strike of 1877, these injunctions to restrain strikes, pickets and other collective union activities became, by the 1920’s, the most frequently used weapon against unions. As a result, labor disputes were brought increasingly into the courts, and court decisions determined the survival of labor organizations. As the courts were almost unanimously hostile to the labor movement, the working class suffered setback after setback. The courts protected the employer’s right to do business as a property right and were able to apply property laws against the unions. The Sherman anti-trust law, originally intended for use against monopoly business practices, was used against labor unions, by treating them as monopoly associations interfering with interstate commerce. Any strike or boycott that restrained interstate commerce was considered a conspiracy and held illegal. The 1914 Clayton Act was intended to exclude labor unions from anti-trust laws, but was again interpreted narrowly by the courts, leaving the unions susceptible to attack as before. A union found guilty of violating the anti-trust acts could be sued for triple damages, thus further weakening the union. Labor, on the other hand, had no right or ability to bring injunctions or suits against employers, who acted with impunity to carry out all forms of anti-union activity – lockouts, blacklists and discrimination against union sympathizers, espionage, strike-breaking, yellow dog contracts (which forbid workers to join a union) and company unions.’ The first sign of a reformist approach to trade unions was the passage of the Norris-LaGuardia Anti-Injunction Act in 1932, which limited the power of the federal courts to issue injunctions, allowed workers to associate in unions without employer interference, and outlawed yellow dog contracts. This was followed by Roosevelt’s National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) in 1933, which further extended the right of workers to organize through Section 7(a). The NIRA also set up the National Labor Board (precursor to the National Labor Relations Board) chaired by Senator Robert Wagner, which settled labor disputes through mediation and conciliation. When the NIRA was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, Section 7(a) was made the basis of Sen. Wagner’s National Labor Relations Act of 1935. THE WAGNER ACT Senator Robert F. Wagner began his political career during the Reform movement of the early 1900’s, and became a major proponent of welfare and reform legislation. In 1911, he had set up the New York State Factory Commission to investigate appalling labor conditions symbolized by the Triangle Shirtwaist Co. fire in which 150 women lost their lives through the negligence of the factory owners. Wagner rose through the corrupt New York Tammany Hall political machine, which opportunistically supported the reform- minded candidates of the period. Relying on 20 years of experience in pushing reform legislation and the support of the Democratic Party, Wagner was able to win passage of his bill. 2 Significantly, Roosevelt did not support the Wagner Act, withholding his endorsement, even after the Senate voted on it. However, in the time between the Senate and House vote, the NIRA was declared unconstitutional. Roosevelt then saw Wagner’s bill as filling the gap in his economic program and as a political weapon to offset the attack on the NIRA. Only then did he fully endorse it. 3 The Wagner Act was partially defended in ideological terms as promoting industrial peace and democracy in an effort to prove that the contradiction between labor and capital was not antagonistic, but could be resolved peacefully. It was hoped that the legislation would defuse the class struggle by channeling working class militancy into acceptable forms. However the rhetoric used to explain the contributions of the. Act hid this goal, as in Wagner’s statement that, The development of a partnership between industry and labor in the solution of national problems is the indispensable complement to political democracy … That is why the right to bargain collectively is at the bottom of social justice for the workers, as well as the sensible conduct of business affairs . .. industrial peace rests upon freedom, not restraint; upon equality, not subversion; upon cooperation, not domination. 4 Beneath these declarations however, remained the fundamental goals of reducing strikes, building a stable, prosperous business climate, and continuing to guarantee the profits of enterprises and the successful development of capitalism, which was suffering the effects of the depression. Wagner recognized that the depression was caused by overproduction and the inability of people to consume, and observed that the recovery program had failed thus far because, “no adequate purchasing power had been built up to sustain it.” Therefore according to Wagner, Under the new law, every code of fair competition must recognize the right of labor to bargain collectively. Every code must include provisions as to minimum wages, maximum hours, and other working conditions, all of which must be approved by the President. In this way the production and consumption of goods will be coordinated. 5 The Wagner Act did represent important concessions to the labor movement forced on the bourgeoisie by the growing militancy of the workers on the heels of the12 depression. The Act protected the right of workers to organize within set guidelines and to elect the bargaining agent of their choice; it identified unfair labor practices of employers (publicized dramatically during the 1937 La Follette hearings on industrial espionage); and revitalized the NLRB to guarantee these rights. It did not lay out illegal practices of unions, nor allow for an employer to get an injunction against a union. The rate of unionization would have been slower (and more violent) without the protection afforded by the Act. Union membership rose from less than three million in 1933 to between 8 and 9 million by 1939. Furthermore, company unions were eliminated from major sectors of the economy such as steel, rubber and oil refining. For example, in 1935, three-fourths of the organized workers in the steel industry were in company unions; by 1946, 80 percent were in independent unions of their choosing. 7 However, while the bourgeoisie was forced to recognize many of the legitimate rights of working people embodied in the Wagner Act, they controlled how the Act would be implemented and used it to enmesh the trade union movement in the guidelines established by the bourgeois State, and laid the basis for converting the unions into institutions whose primary function was to enforce the contract. Union organizing activity began to be funnelled toward winning votes in an NLRB election. Class conflict was channeled into the collective bargaining process, which took power away from the workers and put it more firmly in the hands of the union bureaucrats. The contract became the goal of union strategy, with all the attendant limitations laid out in the Introduction to this Report. The NLRB had its limitations as well. It had no enforcement powers beyond ordering an employer to pay back wages of workers who were fired for union activities or asking for court orders to uphold rulings, which may or may not have been complied with. There were massive delays in hearing cases (which was intensified with the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act) whereby three to four years could go by before a ruling was made. By that time, the original local union might have collapsed. Furthermore, in order to qualify for protection by the Board, a union had to meet all the various requirements in terms of job classification and behavior (farm workers, for example, were never covered by the Wagner Act or entitled to NLRB processes). And any action that was considered out of line, could result in removal of the union from the Board’s jurisdiction. The Board also had the responsibility to determine appropriate bargaining units in a plant or industry (for example craft or industrial units) which was greatly complicated by the split between the CIO and the AFL in 1937. As a result, the AFL became critical of Board decisions, attacking it for its presumed partiality toward CIO organizing efforts. The AFL tried to negotiate contracts where it only represented a minority of workers, often obtaining the help of employers who were more frightened of the new militant CIO industrial unionism than they were of the craft oriented conservative AFL, which became viewed as the better of two evils.” Employer hostility to the Wagner Act and the NLRB began to be organized after the Act was held constitutional in 1937. The campaign to repeal it was led by the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM), the Chamber of Commerce and the Liberty League (set up by the DuPonts and other wealthy families to fight the Act). These forces persisted, not recognizing that the new legislation actually War Worker Winter. Watercolor by Calvin Burnett represented the long term interests of capitalism. As Wagner said, Every industrialist whose judgement is not betrayed by a nostalgia for a day that is irretrievable knows that anti-unionism as a policy is as dead today as slavery was in 1861. The sooner the few irreconcilables give way to their more enlightened brethren the sooner we shall see an end to civil strife … 9 More than 200 amendments were proposed to the Wagner Act between 1935-47, though most of them were never enacted by Congress. The National Association of Manufacturers did not depend on action by the Federal government, however, and during this period concentrated successfully on the passage of more restrictive state and municipal labor legislation, and the election of anti-union officials to Congress. In fact, only three states ever passed “little Wagner Acts,” indicating strong anti-union sentiment at the local level, particularly in the agricultural and unorganized labor states of the South and Southwest which declared a virtual “legislative war on labor.” 1o WORLD WAR TWO: UNITED FRONT AGAINST LABOR The efforts to repeal the Wagner Act were interrupted by the outbreak of World War II, which saw attempts to control labor taking different forms. With the U.S. declaration of war in 1941, President Roosevelt called a labor-management conference to formulate wartime labor policy which resulted in a no-strike pledge from the AFL and CIO. This agreement put in sharp relief the contradiction between the war effort and the continuing need of the working class to protect its interests against capital. Most rank and file workers13 supported the war, but refused to abandon the strike weapon and give up gains won in earlier struggles. The war years saw continual labor unrest, which challenged the wartime industrial relations system and cut through the facade of labor-management cooperation.” Top-level union leadership, on the other hand, put the war effort above all else; enforcing the no-strike pledge, pushing speed-ups, and punishing independent rank and file activity. Thus, the war years provided the context and the opportunity for the consolidation of the CIO’s class collaboration policies, following the lead of the AFL. As Sidney Hillman of the CIO Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America expressed it, “our primary interest here is war production. If we lose the war, labor has lost everything.” “2 Union officials therefore, joined with the State in trying to control and channel worker militancy, by such actions as suspending local leaders and putting unions into receivership when they carried out unauthorized strikes; and by denying wildcat strikers access to the regular grievance procedures. Collaboration with the war policies of the government went so far that Sidney Hillman, a member of several war-related agencies, even supported the use of federal troops to break up a strike at a North American Aviation plant in 1941. While labor was being asked to make sacrifices for the national interest, capital was not willing to sacrifice profits. Industry initially held back in converting to war production, wanting government guarantees of profits, economy. In fact, several corporations, such as GE, continued collaborating with German firms, putting business above all else. Consequently Roosevelt brought representatives of Wall Street and the Republican Party into his government to placate business demands. Edward Stettinius, Secretary of State, was chairman of the board of U.S. Steel and a former vice president of General Motors. Under. Secretary of Navy James Forrestal (later named Secretary of Defense) was president of Dillon, Read and Co. which floated loans for German cartelists. Donald Nelson, Vice- President of Sears, Roebuck and Co., William Knudsen of General Motors and other financiers, such as Bernard Baruch, Nelson Rockefeller, Robert Lovett (Brown Bros., Harriman) and Artemus Gates (N.Y. Trust Co.) became trusted advisors and members of defense commissions.” 3 In exchange for cooperating in the war effort, and to further guarantee industrial peace during the war, the government granted a maintenance-of-membership compromise to the unions. Maintenance-of-membership contracts assured the union a stable membership for the duration of a contract, and guaranteed that employers would continue to bargain with the union. Since unions were supposedly giving up the right to strike it was hoped that the compromise would afford an alternative method of maintaining employer recognition of the union. In turn, however, union leaders were required to discipline members who engaged in unauthorized strikes during the contract. Through this arrangement, industry and government were able to rely on the union bureaucracy to control militant workers, which had the additional effect of strengthening the internal bureaucracy at the expense of the democratic functioning of the unions. In addition, the maintenance-of-membership compromise was denied a union altogether if it engaged in a wildcat strike. However, even these methods failed to control significant sectors of the labor movement, leading in part to Congress intervening more directly to control labor during the war.” 4 The Smith-Connally Labor Disputes Act of 1943, the first anti-strike legislation, was passed over FDR’s veto, and allowed the government to seize struck plants, provided for a 30-day cooling off period before a strike could be called, and went so far as to prohibii political contributions by unions in federal elections. This Act anticipated many of the provisions embodied in the Taft-Hartley Act. Labor’s Role on the War Boards As in World War I, the government set up several agencies to help guide the war effort. In order to settle labor disputes, and avoid strikes, Roosevelt set up the National Defense Mediation Board, replaced in 1942 by the War Labor Board, with the power to determine all disputes concerning war industries referred to it by the Secretary of Labor. The War Labor Board also had the power to stabilize wages, encourage union officials to discipline the rank and file, and issue mandatory rulings. Therefore, after 1941, strikes were not broken by direct violence, but rather, “more subtle and sometimes more effective methods could be used by weaving legal nets to entangle the unions in delaying procedures of courts and government agencies.” ‘s The National Defense Advisory Commission (NDAC) was FDR’s first major agency to coordinate labor and production problems. Sidney Hillman was labor’s representative. The appointment of Hillman indicated the administration’s desire to maintain close ties with the CIO, which had played an important part in FDR’s election and which represented a significant sector of the necessary wartime labor force. Hillman, a staunch FDR supporter and his main labor advisor, was also conciliatory toward the AFL and worked hard, though unsuccessfully to bring the two organizations closer together. NDAC was dominated, however, by business members like Knudsen and was torn by dissension. FDR replaced it with the Office of Production Management (OPM), and put Hillman on an equal footing with Knudsen as co-director. At this time, the UAW was carrying out a major strike effort that finally forced the Ford Motor Co. to recognize it as the legal bargaining agent for Ford’s workers. The threat of additional strikes pressured the OPM to prevent the U.S. government from granting defense contracts to companies that refused to honor the provisions in the Wagner Act. In an effort to hold down the strikes, the OPM began to enforce the directive and the “greatest victory won by labor in the defense program” occurred when Chrysler was given a contract over the still open-shop Ford.”‘ In 1942, the War Production Board replaced the OPM, with Hiliman remaining as head of the labor division. However, labor’s influence on wartime policy was continually weakened by these reorganizations. The War Manpower Commission, which was responsible for coordinating labor supply with production needs, was created with little input from labor. In addition, a longtime CIO proposal for labor-management committees to be set up at the plant level was never adopted. Hillman himself was finally phased out and was urged by union friends to leave Washington, “rather than be used by the administration to preserve the appearance of a pro-labor government.” ” Another union member later summarized the results of labor participation in the government agencies: “Anything that labor has secured through labor participation … it could have secured without labor participation” and without providing a labor front for the agency. Labor participation, he concluded, was more useful for the government administrator, with “ve 7 f little value to the public and none whatever to the union.” a14 In spite of these changes, union leaders continued their strong support for FDR and increased their dependency on the government to settle labor disputes and protect their security. Since they did not fully mobilize the economic and social power of their own membership to stem the conservative drift in wartime domestic politics, they relied even more heavily on FDR and his administration as a bulwark against anti-union forces.1 9 The CIO organized a Political Action Committee (PAC) headed by Hillman to elect Roosevelt for the fourth term, and to make labor a strong political force on the national scene. PAC was not to be a third party, but in Hillman’s conception was to function as full partner in a coalition mainly with Roosevelt Democrats, to give labor a voice in the peacetime reconversion of the economy. When the war ended, prices were up by 45 percent, profits up over 250 percent, yet wages had been held to a 15 percent increase over 1941 rates. However, labor leaders like Phil Murray of the CIO and even Harry Bridges of the militant ILWJ wanted to continue the no-strike pledge, partly in order to receive protection from the State in the event of an anti-labor offensive similar to the one following WW I.20 At the roots of these pledges was the view that labor and management had the same interests. According to Murray, “We have no classes in this country. We are all workers here. And in the final analysis the interests of farmers, factory hands, business and professional people, and white collar workers prove to be the same.”‘ President Truman, also urging a continuation of no-strike agreements, called a labor-management conference in November 1945 to develop machinery for resolving labor disputes. Murray supported Truman’s post-war economic policy of wage controls and endorsed the conference: “I know of no better and more effective way to avert strikes than through the universal restoration of collective bargaining . . , The AFL executive board also supported the call for the conference and its president, William Green, promised to urge all membership to exercise restraint in resolving labor disputes. However, the conference failed to reach agreement on how to solve labor problems during reconversion and Truman asserted that since labor and management were unable to reach an accord, “it becomes the duty of the government to act on its own initiative.”23 Since the cost of living had shot up dramatically during the war, 1946 saw the working class explode with one of the biggest strike waves in history, involving two million workers in coal, rail, auto, steel, oil and other essential industries. Despite efforts of the AFL and CIO leadership to control and channel the strikes and to hold their membership to contract terms, the strike wave pushed Republican and Southern Democratic Congressmen to pass the Taft-Hartley Act, in a concerted attempt to reduce the power of the unions and contain labor more directly. An additional factor leading to the Taft-Hartley Act was the postwar international situation. The United States emerged from the War as the strongest country in the capitalist world. The Soviet Union, however, also emerged with great international prestige gained by its victory over fascist Germany. Pro-socialist national liberation movements also came through the war stronger than before, and the liberation of China was imminent. The United States began to prepare almost immediately – ideologically and militarily – for the Cold War, which required a pacified workforce and anticommunist unions. TAFT-HARTLEY – A NEW DEAL FOR AMERICA’S EMPLOYERS Taft-Hartley, which went much farther than the Wagner Act in regulating labor relations and consolidating contract unionism, was initially attacked by all of labor as a “slave labor law.” The CIO wrote in a pamphlet shortly before the Act was passed: When the National Association of Manufacturers calls for a law prohibiting jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes or the so-called secondary boycott, what is it that they are requesting? They are asking for laws to make it a crime for a group of workers to refuse to work under certain conditions. No matter how such laws are dressed up and surrounded by slick slogans. these are simply proposals for involuntary servitude. 2 4 The most common rationale for changing the Wagner Act was that it was one-sided and discriminated against employers. Therefore, Taft-Hartley imposed serious restrictions on labor, identified unfair practices committed by unions while at the same time, greatly reducing the responsibilities of management that had been laid out in the Wagner Act. Following are aspects of the Taft-Hartley Act which placed severe restrictions on labor: “* The closed shop was outlawed. * “* Craft unions were allowed to break up well-established plant-wide bargaining units (thus encouraging raiding and jurisdictional fights). * In a closed shop, a worker must join a union in order to be hired. The union shop requires that a worker join the union, if one exists, within a certain period of time after being hired.15 * States were allowed to adopt compulsory open-shop laws (which led to the formation of 19 “right to work” states where the percentage of organized workers is half that of the rest of the country). * Secondary boycotts and sympathetic strikes were banned, though employers could band together to help break a strike. * Unions were subjected to damage suits even before the NLRB had ruled on a case. * Striking power was seriously curtailed by the requirement that mandatory injunctions be issued in secondary boycott strikes and that a federal 80-day injunction be ordered in strikes affecting national security.”2 At the same time, the employer was able to break up a union organizing drive with increased impunity. Changing the freedom of speech ruling was one mechanism that facilitated these actions. The Wagner Act had enjoined employers from propagandizing against unions in any manner that was coercive and threatening to workers. Taft-Hartley basically eliminated this restriction, enabling employers to hold compulsory meetings of their workers to speak against union organizing activities (Even today, two-thirds of employers use captive audience speeches during organizing drives). At the same time, the Act made it nearly impossible for unions to introduce examples of such speeches as evidence of an unfair labor practice on the part of an employer. Other changes allowed the employer to refuse to continue recognizing a particular union as the bargaining agent, to bring injunctions against unions, and provided a one year rule protecting employers from further organizing efforts if a union did not win an election. Business Week called Taft-Hartley “A New Deal for America’s Employers.””s In fact, according to one Congressman, “The bill was written sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph, page by page, by the National Association of Manufacturers.” Another Congressman stated that the bill was worked on by lobbyists and lawyers for such corporations as Chrysler, General Electric, Allis-Chalmers, Inland Steel and the Rockefeller interests. 2 7 The Taft-Hartley Act also reorganized the NLRB, rendering its administrative structure more bureaucratic and less flexible. The Board was to treat all unions alike, ignoring the differences between company-dominated and independent unions. The time between the filing and the ruling on a case continued to increase. The Board was required to conduct a hearing before every election, further slowing the process. By the time a decision was made, reported a Senate subcommittee, “an anti-union campaign can be a complete success and employee morale shattered.”‘ For example, the Textile Workers Union filed charges against a company in 1947. A final ruling was obtained in 1951, two years at.er the union went out of existence. The same holds true today according to a member of a current drive to organize a restaurant chain: “Even if the NLRB ultimately rules in the union’s favor, the workers’ hands are tied while the machinery grinds on, weakening greatly our ability to continue the union drive.””‘ The Federal Government had established another mediation agency which operated as part of the Department of Labor until 1947, when the Taft-Hartley Act made it an independent organization. The Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service has worked to facilitate collective bargaining between management and labor on any issue affecting contract negotiations (as opposed to the NLRB, which holds representation elections and unfair labor practice hearings). Federal mediators intervene not only at the time of an actual dispute, but also work with labor and management before a contract expires to prevent disputes from arising. As the reliance on collective bargaining expands, the union bureaucrats increasingly look to the State as the legitimate mediator of labor struggles. In recent years, through the Office of Technical Services, the agency has extended its activities further, and set up programs such as: * A new labor-management committee structure for long- term labor peace and improved communication in the Texas construction industry; * A training program for a Southern plant with a history of “wildcat strikes,” utilizing simulated case studies; * A community-wide committee of labor, management, academic and public representatives in western New York that has reversed the exodus of industrial plants and declining employment.” Directors of the Service are called in to negotiate agreements in the public and private sector, and through this position develop close contact with both labor and business leaders. As a result they are important sources of information for the President on the attitudes of each sector when labor legislation is being developed. This agency is a classic example of a government-sponsored organization that allegedly provides “impartial assistance” on behalf of the public sector, similar to the various wartime mediation agencies set up by the government and the private institutions described in Section Three. Effects of Taft-Hartley One of the main effects of the Taft-Hartley Act was to check the spread of unionization. A bi-annual fact book published by the Communist Party, USA in 1951 claimed that the kidnapping of organizers by persons who could not be proved direct “agents” of the employer, stalling in negotiations, invoking of ancient conspiracy doctrines, law suits without merit, have all been used under the Act to block the unions, drain their treasuries, keep their counsel busy with defense and weaken or destroy their security … The Act has been responsible for a throwback to the 1920’s in labor relations, because it puts collective bargaining and individual bargaining on the same footing. 3 According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics and other studies, union membership increased from 8-9 million in 1939 to 15 million in 1947. It decreased, however, during the next few years and has grown only slowly since then, reaching 18.9 million in 1968. As a percentage of the work force, union membership was lower in 1968 (23 percent) than in 1947, and today it is only 22 percent. 2 This can only partially be blamed on the Taft-Hartley Act; the unions themselves must bear primary responsibility for abandoning the goal of organizing the unorganized. While unions say they are committed to organizing the unorganized, and in particular have recently launched campaigns in the South, the resources deployed and the actions undertaken are no match for the task. The minimal efforts of these unions do not represent a concerted attempt to solve the problems of the unorganized. The Taft-Hartley Act also served to perpetuate low wage rates in certain industries where workers have been unable to achieve the full benefits of unionization and collective bargaining because of the barriers raised by the Act.16 Collaboration Against Communism One of the provisions of Taft-Hartley that had the most serious political consequences was the forced signing of anti-Communist affidavits by union officers. The requirement was able to extend the activities of the anti-communist Smith Act to the labor movement. The laws directed against Communists generally were used to split and weaken the labor movement, gathering intensity as McCarthyism developed. The AFL leadership headed by William Green signed the affidavit in 1947; CIO officers held out for two years, though individual local leaders signed on their own. The United Mine Workers and several other unions refused to cooperate in the witch hunt. However, the repercussions were severe, since any union whose officers refused to sign could not be recognized by or use the services of the NLRB. Certifications of unions whose officers did not sign were thrown out by the Board as well. The Board was also able to question the veracity of the affidavits, which resulted in perjury trials and jail terms for local officers. The AFL had used red-baiting tactics against its own members in 1919, and later against the founding unions of the CIO, to try to discredit the new industrial movement. By 1949, the CIO, led by some of the very leaders who had been similarly attacked earlier by the AFL, turned on its most progressive unions and most experienced organizers and expelled them from the Congress. Eleven unions were expelled, including the United Electrical Workers of America (UE), the third largest CIO union. Only two survive today as independent unions (the UE and ILWU). The UE was attacked by the- press, the House UnAmerican Activities Committee, grand juries, Taft-Hartley, the Justice Department and the CIO. The Truman administration intervened by sending Secretary of Labor Maurice Tobin to a GE plant to influence workers against the UE. Truman himself publicly expressed his support for the rival union created by the CIO to replace UE. 3 The CIO proved itself a loyal supporter of government policy through this attack on progressive, militant unionism, and the purges helped pave the way for the eventual reunion of the AFL and CIO in 1955. THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT During the Eisenhower years, the AFL-CIO worked to amend Taft-Hartley, but with little enthusiasm. Eisenhower also did little to push any changes in the Act. Martin Durkin, his Secretary of Labor, resigned in 1953 protesting that the White House had backed down from a promise to amend the Act. Durkin had participated in drafting proposed amendments, but they were attacked as too pro-labor.* Vice- President Richard Nixon, who was a member of the House Labor Committee in 1947 when Taft-Hartley was written, was chiefly responsible for killing the amendments.34 In 1959, the act was amended, but in a far different fashion from Durkin’s ideas. The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin), proposed by anti- labor members of Congress, provided for more government regulation of labor-management relations and of the internal affairs of unions. The Act was passed in response to hearings on union corruption held by Senator McClellan and the purpose was to curb the growing power of the unions. The bourgeoisie wanted a responsible union leadership that would le- * Durkin wanted to repeal the “right to work” clause in the Act that permitted states to ban compulsory union membership. gitimize the system of collaboration, not a leadership under constant investigation for fraud and mismanagement or that maintained its position through force and intimidation. In addition, the misdeeds of a few unions were generalized to the whole of organized labor in order to keep tighter control over all their operations. However, continuing scandals involving the Teamsters and Culinary Workers Union, among others, show that the Act has had little effect on curbing corruption. Nominally, the Act was supposed to ensure the democratic functioning of unions by drawing up a Bill of Rights for union members and requiring that unions file all financial records concerning dues, pensions, welfare funds, etc. with the Secretary of Labor. In fact, however, the Landrum- Griffin bill gave the Secretary of Labor police powers. As a result of union reports on financial activities and elections, he could initiate law suits, either civil or criminal, if he suspected that the intent of the law had been violated. The Secretary was given investigative and subpoena powers. He could invoke all the facilities of the Federal government, including the Justice Department and the FBI, raising the fear that with these powers, he could immobilize or demolish any union that incurred his displeasure.ss In addition, union democracy was not strengthened because the Act increased the bureaucratic nature of the unions and gave more power to the leadership. Furthermore, the Act interfered with a union’s strike ability by allowing employers to see union financial records and evaluate their ability to finance a strike. CONCLUSION The legislation described above set the context for industrial relations in the United States. It imposed serious structural limitations on the trade unions by regulating their activities and setting up the guidelines within which they can function. The role of the State in mediating labor relations increased with the passage of the various laws, the creation of the National Labor Relations Board, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and other governmental agencies. This process was particularly pronounced during the War years. By accepting the legitimacy of these mechanisms, the trade union leaders became more committed to capitalism and its legal order. They joined with the State in maintaining illusions among workers about the “impartiality” of the courts, their justice and non-class character. In addition to the union bureaucrats holding back the workers’ struggle through class collaboration, the bourgeoisie through the State has placed ‘structural limits on the unions, which make it increasingly difficult for them to defend even the basic economic interests of their members.
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