The Military Balance

THE RELATIVE LULL IN MILITARY ACTIVITY
after the March 1982 elections, a result of the poli-
tical setback suffered by the insurgents, coupled with
the rumor of serious rifts within the FMLN, gave rise to
speculation about the likelihood of a medium-term mili-
tary victory by the armed forces. By September 1982,
the Salvadorean military was boasting that the guerril-
las’ capacity was limited to “occasional spectacular at-
tacks” and acts of sabotage. According to the defense
minister of the day, Gen. Jose Guillermo Garcia, the
insurgents were in a “desperate” situation. Their death
rattle, he said, was audible.
On October 10, 1982 the FMLN launched its
“Heroes and Martyrs of October 1979 and 1980” offen-
sive. Its scale seems to have surpassed all expectations,
and the campaign forced the Army to reassess its tactics.
For six months, until April 1983, the FMLN sustained a
rhythm of continuous attacks. The results of these
offensives enabled the insurgents to swell their forces to
a degree that perhaps even they had not anticipated.
The expansion of FMLN zones of control and the
recovery of thousands of weapons and large stocks of ammunition forced them to undertake a comprehensive reorganization of its forces in March and April. Just as the FMLN was restructuring, the armed forces revamped their strategy and put new military plans into effect. From October 1982 to June 1983 alone, 7,350 new recruits entered their ranks, forming the first “hunter” (cazador) batallions and reinforcing strategic garrisons. The military received supplemen- tary aid from the United States and inaugurated a crash training program for 1,500 troops at Puerto Castilla, Honduras, to modify the Army’s operational plans. Beginning in June 1983, the military launched a simultaneous counteroffensive on several fronts and embarked on the National Plan (CONARA) in San Vicente and Usulutan. CONARA put into effect the tactics insistently recommended by U.S. advisers. The renewed Army offensive coincided with a marked decline in FMLN activity; since May, the rebels had restricted large-scale attacks to the northern zone of San
Miguel and the southern part of Cuscatlan.
Training for Salvadorean elite batallions at Puerto Castilla Honduras
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 24The Army’s apparent recovery of the initiative on
some fronts led once more to overly optimistic asses-
sments by both U.S. advisers and Salvadorean military
commanders. They attributed improved Army per-
formance to a number of factors:
* the continued training of Salvadorean troops by
U.S. Army specialists;
* the presence of a new Salvadorean defense minis-
ter, Gen. Eugenio Vides Casanova, considered more “aggressive” than his predecessor;
* the adoption of small mobile unit tactics and
seven-day operations, as opposed to the more leisurely
pace of battle previously commonplace;
* the “military civic action” programs which, apart
from winning the hearts and minds of the civilian popu-
lation, would also tend to reduce military abuses against
non-combatants.
O N SEPTEMBER 3, 1983, THE FMLN OPENED
its “Independence, Freedom and Democracy for
El Salvador” offensive with a surprise attack on the
headquarters of the 3rd Infantry Brigade in San Miguel.
The offensive, which is still in full spate in early Febru-
ary, seems to demonstrate that the guerrillas still hold
the military initiative. It confirms too that the FMLN
has managed to reorganize its forces and deploy them in
larger-scale actions through the creation of units equiv-
alent to brigades and batallions. The FMLN shows
substantial progress in its ability to concentrate and dis-
perse troops and a qualitative improvement in its
maneuverability in the field.
The most recent military successes of the FMLN
have hit strategic targets crucial to the fragile military
balance. They include the second seizure of the com-
munications base at Cacahuatique in San Miguel, the
most important in the eastern half of the country; the
rout of the El Paraiso barracks in Chalatenango, head-
quarters of the 4th Infantry Batallion; and the destruc-
tion of the Cuscatlan bridge.
These attacks have taken place in the context of a
continuing erosion and weakening of the armed forces, and persistent problems in their command structure. All
this may suggest that the war is once again moving into a
critical phase. The prospects of a government military
victory appear ever more remote if the current pattern
continues, raising the specter of increased U.S. involve-
ment in the war. Even direct military intervention can-
not be ruled out. In the context of electoral campaigns
in both El Salvador and the United States, all the evi-
dence points to 1984 as a decisive year in the Salva-
dorean war.
The recent course of events on the battlefield points
to four major trends:
1. There are strong indications that the FMLN is con-
solidating its military advances on a political level.
First, the declining rate of economic sabotage since
October 1983 (dynamiting power lines, burning crops,
vehicles and government buildings) suggests that the
The Cuscatlan bridge after guerrilla attack, December 1983. Bob Nickelsbera/Woodfin Camp
MAKCLH/AFKIL 1984 25Report o,#, h Americas
EL SALVADOR 1984
GUATEMALA
,HONDURAS
Chaialanango
Santa Ana. :
1 Guazapa volcano’ ”
Is Cabanas. . : . o – . o. .. ,I.
Ahuachapan: – Salvador ,-…..
r, Cuscatlar ” :
‘ooa, a ,San Vicente .-.
“- Sonsonate La Libertad 1 ,’–‘
-‘
,San Vicente ian Migue –
La Union
FMLN-controlled area
La Paz
Migue
A. El Paraiso 7.
B. The Cuscatlan bridge, destroyed December 31, 1983 ”
C. The Puente de Oro, destroyed October 15, 1981
EL SALVADOR
FMLN is putting more weight on political considera- tions than military ones. It seems to have grasped that sabotage-though draining resources from the govern- ment’s war effort-may be counterproductive, affect- ing the living standards of much of the population and damaging the country’s productive capacity. The decline in acts of sabotage may indicate that the FMLN is more interested in winning credibility for its efforts toward a political solution to the conflict, and in regain- ing popular support in regions hardest hit by sabotage. Second, there are increasing signs that the FMLN is gradually building alternative political power structures in its newest zones of control and consolidating those structures in its traditional rearguard areas of northeast Chalatenango, northern Morazan, southern Usulutan and Guazapa volcano, where “popular power” has been underway since late 1982. Press accounts from San Miguel and Morazan in mid-November 1983 reported that the insurgents now function as the main military force and local government authority in 17 towns in these two northeastern departments. In all, as much as one-quarter of the country may be under FMLN in- fluence through alternative modes of government, ranging from “zones of coexistence,” where the guer- rillas move freely but do not interfere with local authori- ties, to “zones of influence” in which the FMLN shares governmental administration, and “zones of control” where the FMLN has named its own authorities and operates as sole power. Third, events during the offensive indicate that the FMLN has at least the embryonic ability to lay down norms for local working conditions. For the first time
since the start of the war, the guerrillas seem to have decided not to interrupt the harvests. Instead, they have distributed leaflets setting forth working conditions and recommended wage scales for farm workers: a daily salary of 14 colones ($5.60), or 15 colones per hundred- weight of coffee picked; a seven-hour day and five-day week; 100% sick pay; double pay for overtime; and a signed labor contract for the duration of the harvest. According to the FMLN’s Radio Venceremos, some plantation owners in San Miguel and Usulutan have ac- cepted these conditions after some negotiation. Accord- ing to the local Salvadorean press, the coffee producers have categorically rejected them as unreasonable, stating that they would rather see the harvest lost. 2. The heavy movement of guerrilla troops to the southern region during the recent offensive points to the failure of the government strategy of containment. This had sought to pin the FMLN down in the economically unimportant northern region, while consolidating Ar- my control of key economic regions through a new plan of civic-military operations. Until August 1983, most guerrilla attacks had been concentrated in the north. Though the FMLN operated widely in the central and southern parts of the country, it had never consolidated zones of control or attempted concerted military offensives in these vital economic areas, the rearguard of the regime. Beyond this, the Na- tional Plan, which began on June 10, 1983, had forced the withdrawal of guerrillas based in San Vicente, around the Chinchontepec volcano, and the next phase of the plan had hit FMLN supporters in Usulutan. But guerrilla operations from September to January
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 26Claude Urracal/ygma
National Guardsmen killed in combat near Santa Rosa de Lima.
represented a quantum leap forward. The three-
pronged attack hit the south and center of San Miguel
and Usulutan; the northeast, including the departments
of San Miguel, La Union and Morazan; and the central
region (parts of Cabanas and Cuscatlan, converging on
San Vicente).
Most of the west of the country, however, princi-
pally the departments of Ahuachapan and Sonsonate,
remains virtually untouched by the war. There have
been sporadic actions there, as in La Libertad and the
north of Santa Ana, but it would seem that FMLN ef-
forts to open guerrilla fronts there have been fruitless.
The offensive has deepened the isolation of key Ar-
my garrisons. As in the October 1982 offensive, a
number of relatively well guarded towns were briefly
taken over by the guerrillas. Government troops aban-
doned less heavily fortified villages to avoid casualties
and the loss of weapons. In the September 1983 offen-
sive, more than 70% of municipalities in Cuscatlan,
Cabanas, San Miguel and Usulutan fell to the FMLN,
cutting off other Army garrisons. The difficulty of get-
ting supplies through to these posts led to the evacua-
tion of many; several have not yet been reoccupied.
While this pattern also marked earlier rebel offen-
sives, it never previously touched such critical areas. The Army’s evacuation of the frontier post of Arcatao, for example, 112 kilometers from San Salvador and 30 from the nearest departmental capital, is a different matter than pulling out of Chinameca, in the heart of a
vital coffee-growing district and only a few kilometers from the third city of San Miguel.
The armed forces have lost a number of fixed posi-
tions which protected major troop concentrations. For
example, a noose is tightening around the headquarters
of the 6th Infantry Brigade in Morazan. In the south-
east, guerrillas threaten the military command in
Usulutan and the 3rd Infantry Brigade in San Miguel. In
the center of the country, there is a serious threat to the
military garrison in Sensuntepeque, Cabanas and the
companies stationed in Ilobasco.
The guerrilla offensive has caused the failure of the
National Plan in Usulutan and checked its progress in
San Vicente. The plan was pivotal to the political and
military strategy of the armed forces. In the view of
U.S. military advisers, victory or defeat hinged on its
success. Speaking at the plan’s inauguration in June,
President Magana declared it to be the National Unity
government’s “most ambitious” attempt to pacify the
country and reactivate the economy. But the plan,
involving at least nine government ministries, has been
frustrated by the failure of its military component.
Between September and November 1983, the FMLN
seized 19 of the 23 major population centers in
Usulutan. It still controls many of them. And the
Army’s attempt to dislodge guerrillas from San Vicente
failed, despite the deployment of 4,000 troops. Major
“clean-up” operations proved necessary, yet they too
have made little headway. In some districts, the FMLN
seems more firmly entrenched than before.
3. The speed of improvement in the Army seems insuffi-
cient to keep pace with the growing capacity of the
FMLN. The course of the war is increasingly unfavor-
able to the armed forces.
Though government forces genuinely enhanced
MARCH/APRIL 1984 27Repo4t o, he Ae4rcas EL SALVADOR 1984
FMLN sabotage of public transportation has tapered ott in recent months.
their efficiency and combat capacity between April and
August 1983, the September FMLN offensive seems to
indicate that a number of shortcomings remain-a lack
of mobility, poor logistical support and command
problems.
For some time, U.S. advisers have criticized the
Salvadorean Army’s poor mobility and urged it to in-
crease mobile patrols by small tactical units to “saturate
the countryside” and impede the free movement of the
FMLN. They have also stressed the importance of night
ambushes in the guerrillas’ “logistical corridors.”
Small unit patrols have been introduced since June
1983, but it has proved harder for the Army to mount
ambushes in FMLN zones of control.
Guerrilla ambushes-occurring at the rate of three
to every one by government troops-seem to have
caused the Army to relapse into its old tactics; reactive
and defensive where U.S. advisers preach aggression. In
response to a spate of FMLN ambushes in September
and October, the Army went back to mounting cumber-
some sweeps by large numbers of troops.
The Army has always had trouble providing swift air
and land support to troops caught in a surprise guerrilla
attack. Those logistical problems were starkly exposed
by the latest offensive. The root of the problem seems
less a lack of communications equipment or transporta-
tion than poor coordination, aggravated by the loss of
control over the secondary road network, especially in
the eastern and central regions. While the Army loses
supply routes, the FMLN opens new ones. According to
the senior U.S. adviser in El Salvador, the guerrillas
have now opened a northern corridor which allows
them to move freely between Chalatenango and La
Union-in trucks and in daylight.
Military setbacks, and political splits in the Consti-
tuent Assembly that are reflected in the Army as well,
have exacerbated command problems in the field. U.S.
advisers have reportedly brought about changes in the
Army’s promotion system, rewarding military skill
rather than seniority and partly doing away with the tra-
ditional tanda system which favored time-servers over
more dynamic, younger officers. But the latest offen-
sive displayed again that incompetent officers remain in
key command posts. Their presence accounts for poor
coordination between land and airborne forces, the fail-
ure to provide speedy logistical support and the crush-
ing defeats inflicted on some elite batallions.
CONFLICTS OVER CORRECT COUNTERIN-
surgency tactics also continue to plague the Army,
above all in attitudes toward non-combatants. The
most recent wave of death squad attacks on trade
unionists, cooperative members, public employees and
institutions such as the Catholic Church and the Na-
tional University, reflect these disputes. As well as
highlighting divisions within the Army (even some mili-
tary officers have been threatened by the death squads),
The guerrillas have improved their supply corridors over the last year of fighting.
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 28the attacks show the inability and/or unwillingness of
the high command to put a stop to paramilitary
activities,
Since early November, the Reagan Administration
has increased pressure on the Salvadorean government
to halt death squad activity and take action against
officers “strongly suspected” of links to rightist terror.
The U.S. Embassy has accused two heads of intelligence
with the security forces, three field commanders and a
departmental intelligence chief, as well as the head of
security for the Constituent Assembly.
Military Order no. 15 of November 25, 1983, made
changes in the Army hierarchy that affected some of
those accused. Nevertheless, a significant number of
men singled out for criticism continue in different
military posts. In part, this appears to reflect the exis-
tence of Army decision-making levels above the defense
minister, in charge of reshuffling military commands
and ideologically close to the officers named by the em-
bassy. The mere existence of this unofficial hierarchy in-
dicates either the defense minister’s lack of real power
over the military, or his complicity in this kind of
behavior. The November reshuffle appears to have had
less to do with political change than with the desire to
strengthen field commands with officers able to offer
better results in the fight against the FMLN.
HroE CONTINUING SURRENDER OF GOVERN-
ment troops, sometimes entire companies, shows
the morale problems that still afflict the armed forces.
The rate in fact increased after September 1983. Sagging
morale is also reflected in the token resistance mounted
to FMLN attacks. In the assault on Tejutepeque, for
example, the local detachment of 180 soldiers changed
into civilian clothes and fled to Ilobasco as soon as the
attack began.
Between October 1982 and the end of November
1983, at least 1,518 troops surrendered to the guerrillas.
Most have been released by the FMLN into the custody
of the International Red Cross, local priests or town of-
ficials. Despite a government campaign to slow the rate
of surrenders, it shows no sign of abating. In part, this is
an ideological problem, but it also reflects ill treatment,
poor food, lack of logistical support and inadequate
equipment in the field-the latter a sign of corruption in
the officer corps, for there seems to be no shortage of
supplies.
The FMLN offensive has caused the Army heavy
losses in casualties and equipment. The guerrillas, in
contrast, have augmented their capacity with the weap-
ons captured on the battlefield. Between September 3
and November 27, 1983, the Army suffered 1,418
casualties. In the same period the FMLN took 415
Government troops on maneuvers, San Miguel. Bob NickelsberoaWoodfin Camn
MAKI-H/Ak’KIL 184 29EL SALVADOR 1984
prisoners including several officers: the equivalent of
putting two batallions out of commission in 12 weeks.
New weapons recovered by the FMLN between Septem-
ber and November allowed them to create a new batal-
lion with mobile logistical support similar to their elite
“Rafael Arce Zablah” Brigade.
The FMLN also seems to be having success in
recruiting new combatants. A Miami Herald story of
August 27, 1983 reported that by that date the number
of guerrillas was higher by several thousand than the
5-6,000 estimated in June. This despite the Salvadorean
Army’s claim to have inflicted 2,000 casualties on the
guerrillas in the previous year.
T 1E NEW COMBAT SKILLS OF THE INSUR–
I gent Army have been shown in their ability to
mount far-reaching and simultaneous operations in at
least three different places during the current offensive,
all without leaving their rearguard exposed. The three
principal lines of attack in the offensive may have in-
volved guerrilla contingents of as many as 1,500 or
2,000 men. FMLN assaults on San Miguel and Te-
jutepeque and attacks on the Army’s “hunter”
batallions each demonstrated the guerrillas’ capacity to
defeat as many as three companies at once. According
to figures from the West German news agency, DPA,
around 90 soldiers died in the September attack on the
3rd Brigade in San Miguel after several hours of heavy
artillery bombardment.
The FMLN’s ability to deploy such large troop con-
centrations is ominous for the Army. In order to hold its
strategic containment lines, the Army may need to con-
centrate more troops there, hampering its ability to pro-
tect other areas. Meanwhile, any hope of making in-
roads into guerrilla rearguard zones seems to have fad-
ed. While FMLN troops were attacking en masse in the
south of Usulutan or the north of San Miguel and
Cuscatlan, other units held the Army efficiently at bay
in the zones of control in Morazan and Chalatenango.
4. There is every indication that the Army will explain
recent setbacks as evidence of the need for more re-
sources and materiel, and that Washington will respond
by trying to increase military aid. While augmenting
troop strength and firepower could have a serious short-
term impact on the FMLN’s development, it would be
unlikely to swing the military balance permanently in
favor of the Army.
In fiscal year 1983, the United States gave El Sal-
vador $86.3 million in military aid, made up of training
programs and sales of equipment, weapons and muni-
tions. The training program has enabled the Army to
maintain an aggressive recruiting drive. Between Sep-
tember and November alone, the Arce Batallion gradu-
ated from the Regional Military Training Center
(CREM) in Honduras and four “hunter” batallions
were sworn in.
Yet this expansion did not translate into a real ad-
vantage over the FMLN, which grew proportionately
faster. The Army’s real problem seems to stem from the
inefficient use of resources-sloppy use of firepower,
cumbersome sweeps by thousands of troops, involving
vast logistical efforts, and the use of elite units as pro-
tective forces rather than shock forces. Problems of this
nature will not be solved by throwing more money and
resources at the problem; on the contrary, given present
levels of inefficiency, the FMLN would be the biggest
beneficiary of increased military aid.
The failure of the Army to overcome these prob-
lems, the increased capability of the FMLN and the pro-
gressive involvement of the United States in the civil war
all increase the chances of even more direct U.S. inter-
vention. The White House has taken pains to convince
friend and foe alike that Grenada is an illustration of its
will to use force to reverse situations which it regards as
a threat to its national security.
The FMLN appears well aware of the danger. Re-
cent declarations have expressed the fear that further
military successes by the guerrillas may provoke Reagan
to send in U.S. troops. Indeed, there was a marked
change in the tempo of the FMLN offensive after Octo-
ber 25-the date of the Grenada invasion. The FMLN is
still likely, however, to deliver body blows to govern-
ment forces whenever the opportunity arises. That, at
any rate, is the implication of its most dramatic recent
actions-the rout of a whole company of troops at Ana-
moros, La Union; the attacks on the communications
base at Cacahuatique and the garrison at El Paraiso;
blowing up the Cuscatlan bridge.
EFENSE SECRETARY CASPAR WEINBER-
ger has now publicly admitted that the military
situation in El Salvador is deteriorating. His advisers in
the field confirm that the FMLN has the upper hand in
the war. And the response of the Reagan Administra-
tion appears to be to up the military ante.
Even allowing for the political restraints of an elec-
tion year, the Kissinger Commission recommendations,
the latest requests from the Salvadorean Army and pub-
lic statements from Washington all suggest that a new
military aid package is in the works. Its main compo-
nent would be to take the main strategic thrust of the
war into the air. This would open the way for new kinds
of U.S. personnel involvement, whether as pilots for
new air transport units while Salvadorean pilots are be-
ing trained, in maintenance teams or in training facili-
ties. At the very least, this would imply a delay of several
months for the insurgents to devise fresh plans to cope
with the Army’s tactical innovations and new military
technology.
A shift in U.S. policy toward El Salvador cannot be
ruled out in the event of a Democratic victory in the No-
vember elections. But the Kissinger Commission report
seems designed to do more than just gain bipartisan sup-
port for current military policies. It also looks like an ef-
fort to commit the United States to a course of military
action in the region from which any future administra-
tion, Republican or Democratic, would have the
greatest difficulty disentangling itself.