The Workers Movement in Guatemala

The history of the workers’ movement in
Guatemala includes one of the most auda-
cious chapters in the annals of class struggle
in Latin America: the democratic revolution
of 1944-54. And the counterrevolution that
followed ranks among the most ferocious
known to the continent.
Despite intensely repressive conditions,
Guatemalan workers have been able to over-
come this most difficult period and have in-
Guatemala, like most Central American
countries, has historically relied on one single
export to sustain its economy. With coffee as
king, however, the economy was extremely
vulnerable to price changes on the world
market. In the 1930s, a drop in coffee prices to
less than half their 1929 level, and a decline in
the volume of coffee exports, set the stage for
a long period of economic crisis and political
change.
With the 1944-54 revolution the middle
bourgeoisie–leading a broad-based class
alliance–took power from the hands of the
dominant coffee producing and exporting
groups. A new economic and political project
was formulated emphasizing industrialization
and social reform.
Until the 1940s, urban industrial develop-
ment in Guatemala had been virtually nil,
with the exception of a few food processing,
itiated, since the mid-70s, a newer and
stronger phase of struggle. The workers’
movement has made significant advances in
both consciousness and organization, re-
establishing the bases for independent
mobilization. Under the leadership of this
movement, the working masses are beginning
to formulate their own solutions to the
economic crisis that now engulfs the country,
and the region as a whole.
beer and textile plants. Capitalist relations
were most developed in the transportation in-
dustry, with railroad workers numbering
around 5,500 in 1945, and in the countryside,
where 90% of the labor force was employed.
The rural working class consisted mainly of
coffee workers and the 15,000 workers
employed in United Fruit’s banana enclave.
By the end of the revolutionary period, in
1953, and despite incentives to industry, ur-
ban production was still the province of ar-
tisans and small industries, 77% of which
employed fewer than 20 workers. The in-
dustries with highest employment were tex-
tiles, shoes, garments and food products.
In the 1960s, U.S. capital and the local
bourgeoisies of Central America promoted a
process of economic integration that tied the
region to the more dynamic sectors of the
world economy. Between 1961 and 1966, the
CIDAMO is the Center for Information, Documentation and Analysis of the Latin American Workers’
Movement. This article is an abbreviated version of one that appeared in the November 1979 issue of Car-
ta Informativa, a monthly publication by CIDAMO. The full version in Spanish can be obtained from
CIDAMO, Apdo. Postal 21-132, Mexico 21, D.F.
28
NACLA Reportregion’s gross domestic product (GDP) grew
by 6.3% a year, exceeding the growth rates of
the 1950s. Manufacturing production grew
even faster, at 9.2% A general rise in world
prices for traditional exports, and the addi-
tion of sugar cane and livestock exports to the
list, contributed to this rise in the GDP. In the
case of manufacturing, exports destined for
the regional market were of fun-iamental im-
portance.
Foreign investment, especially North
American, played an important role. From
1959 to 1969, U.S. investment rose 128%,
and in 1969 represented 81.3% of total
foreign investment in Central America. The
relatively more developed economies–
Guatemala and El Salvador- received 45%
of that total between 1963 and 1969. One
consequence of this penetration was a high
degree of monopolization in the region.
In Guatemala, foreign capital had tradi-
tionally controlled the production of
agricultural goods for export. But the early
1960s saw a marked shift into manufacturing.
According to 1977 data, manufacturing ac-
counted for 35.6% of total foreign invest-
ment, followed by agriculture, with 21%, and
commerce, with 16.9%/. The rest was
distributed in smaller proportions, among
services, mining and construction. Foreign in-
vestment in manufacturing naturally flowed
into the most profitable branches: textiles,
food, tobacco, chemicals, automobiles, oil
and iron.
On this basis, Guatemala, whose level of in-
dustrialization was already the highest in the
region at the end of the 1950s, consolidated
its manufacturing sector. But industrializa-
tion was deeply affected by the vicissitudes of
Central American economic integration,
beginning in the mid-60s and aggravated in
1969 by the crisis of the Common Market. In
that year, the region’s GDP grew by only
5.2%, and by 1975, affected by the world30
NACLA Report
capitalist crisis as well, the growth rate of
GDP was down to 2%.
The effects of this situation fell most heavi-
ly on the Guatemalan working class. Rising
rates of unemployment and inflation were
compounded by wage-squeeze policies ap-
plied by successive governments. In 1973, the
consumer price index went up 14%, rising
steadily thereafter, by 10.7% in 1976 and
12.6% in 1977 (Note: These are IMF figures.
According to the Economic Research In-
stitute at the University of San Carlos, the cost
of living rose by more than 50% in 1973).
While the labor force expanded by 4-5% a
year, the number of newly created jobs in-
creased by only 1.6%.
The economic crisis is not just conjunc-
tural; rather, it has underlined the need for
fundamental changes in the pattern of
capitalist reproduction. Alternatives being
considered include the development of agro-
industries producing for the world market,
tourism, exploitation of nickel and oil
resources, and the creation of free zones. But
the implementation of any bourgeois strategy
must take into account the presence of a mass
movement that has grown tremendously in
size and stature since 1976. More and more, it
is led by a proletariat created by the in-
dustrialization process itself.
A MULTI-CLASS ALLIANCE
Guatemala’s first trade union organizations
were formed in the 1920s, primarily by craft
workers. From the start, workers had to con-
front violent repression at the hands of
military governments, representing the
bourgeois fractions linked to agro-exports.
The struggles of dockworkers, railroad
workers, day laborers on the coffee planta-
tions and seamstresses continued despite the
dangers, and gained momentum during the
crisis of the 1930s.
The economic crisis- a crisis of the export
economy and the political regime it pro-
duced-created favorable conditions for the
rising middle industrial and commercial
bourgeoisie, in its efforts to check the power
of the agro-export bourgeoisie and the large
landowning class. It was supported in this by
large sectors of the urban petty bourgeoisie,
as well as peasants and the still small pro-
letariat. The immediate target of this multi-
class alliance was the Ubico dictatorship
(1931-1944), the direct representative of the
bourgeois-oligarchical regime in crisis.
The October Revolution, as this process is
known, triumphed in 1944 and lasted a
decade. Under the successive governments of
Arevalo and Arbenz, it undertook a series of
tasks which tended to strengthen the middle
bourgeoisie and promote industrialization. In
addition, an agrarian reform was carried out
under Arbenz to extend the internal market,
raise the level of public consumption and, at
the same time, respond to the peasants’ de-
mand for land.
Despite the small size and dispersion of the
working class, the trade union movement
became a main pillar of support for the
Arbenz government. In 1946, the Second
Congress of the Guatemalan Workers’
Federation (CTG) came out in support of in-
dustrial development and protection of trade,
in addition to supporting the immediate
economic demands of workers. Trade union
policy was based on an alliance between
workers and the incipient industrial
bourgeoisie, a conception that flowed from
the Popular Front theses of the Third Inter-
national and from expectations that a na-
tionalist bourgeoisie could lead industrializa-
tion.
In 1947, there were 65 trade unions in
Guatemala, of which only 11 were legally
recognized. The Labor Code enacted in that
year recognized the right to strike and
established obligatory collective bargaining
for industrial workers. Nonetheless, it ratified
the prohibition on workers’ organizations in
the countryside, on estates with fewer than
500 laborers. Faced with repression by the
Arevalo government, agricultural workers in-
creased their mobilizations and succeeded in
abolishing this prohibition in 1948. The Na-
tional Federation of Agricultural Workers
(CNGG) was formed in 1950, outside the
CTG.
A trend toward unification of the trade
union movement emerged during this period.
The Trade Union Federation of Guatemala
(FSG) became the strongest federation in the
country, and attracted unions in the most
powerful foreign and national firms. Another
step was taken in 1946, with the formation of
the National Committee for Trade Union
30 NACLA ReportJanlFeb 1980 31
Unity (CNUS) and another in 1951, when 400
organizations joined the General Confedera-
tion of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG).
The CGTG, with more than 100,000
members in 1953, and the CNGG, with more
than 200,000 members, were a powerful
force. Together they accounted for more than
75 % of the votes in 1950, and both joined the
National Democratic Front’ in support of the
Arbenz government against internal and ex-
ternal reactionary pressures.
The formation of the CGTG was without a
doubt an important step for the workers’
movement. Its founding congress resolved to
struggle for agrarian reform and in-
dustrialization, for the defense of workers’ in-
terests in the countryside, for workers’ unity at
the national and international levels, and for
the defense of democracy and the national
economy. However, an incorrect policy of
alliances, formulated by the movement’s
leadership, impeded the development of an
independent program for the working class,
restricting its field of action to the struggle for
economic demands and support for the
Arbenz government. With the invasion and
coup d’etat of 1954, the consequences of this
policy became dramatically clear. Workers
found themselves isolated in the resistance,
while the arms that Arbenz promised never
arrived.
Trade union support was not enough to
protect the October Revolution, which had
promised to respect Guatemalan capitalism
and undertaken to modernize it. Sectors of
the landowning bourgeoisie, threatened by
agrarian reform, hardened their opposition to
the Arbenz regime. The United Fruit Com-
pany, the main representative of U.S. in-
terests, also took the offensive, while new sec-
tors of the Guatemalan bourgeoisie stood by
in silent complicity.
DIVIDE AND RULE
The reactionary offensive, which turned
power over to Colonel Castillo Armas in 1954,
was directed against the working masses and
their organizations. In addition to bloody
repression of the centers of armed resistance,
the military government ordered the dissolu-
tion of the central trade union organizations
and the most combative unions, as well as the
main political parties.
The policy applied by the state was intend-
ed to subdue the workers’ movement through
large-scale repression and division; it was
complemented by an effort to eliminate left
influence in the unions, and to create a
domesticated labor movement under the
hegemony of the international “Western” con-
federations. At the express invitation of
Castillo Armas, three high officials of the
AFL-CIO and the Cuban Federation of
Labor (under Batista) arrived in Guatemala
in 1955, to “reorganize” the country’s trade
union movement. That same year, the Trade
Union Council of Guatemala was set up,
under the auspices of the U.S.-dominated
ORIT (Inter-American Regional Workers’
Organization). Christian Democratic currents
were active as well in this period, particularly
in setting up the Autonomous Trade Union
Federation of Guatemala (FASGUA) in 1956,
with a Catholic orientation.
In 1962, the first signs of recovery of the
mass movement marked the beginning of a
new phase. In April, there was an outbreak of
broad-based popular activity, known as the
Jornadas Civicas. Mass mobilizations pro-
testing the killing of four students took on ma-
jor proportions, and confrontations between
marchers and police produced an undeter-
mined number of arrests, wounded and dead.
The railroad union in turn launched a strike
against government repression, and the
government proclaimed a state of siege.
In May 1966, a new constitution went into
effect that included some labor reforms. Civil
servants were granted the right to unionize
and the possibility of collective bargaining,
although strikes and the right of trade unions
to participate in political struggle were still
prohibited.
While bourgeois currents- and Christian
Democracy in particular- continued to ex-
pand their influence in the labor movement,
the seeds of independent unionism were
already beginning to grow in the 1960s. In
1963, railroad, aviation and sugar workers,
among others, formed the Guatemalan
Workers Confederation (CONTRAGUA).
The Trade Union Confederation of
Guatemala (CONSIGUA) was founded in the
following year, and included the union
representing workers at United Fruit Com-
pany firms (STEUFCO). Also in 1964, the
Jan/Feb 1980
3132
NACLA Report
Guatemalan Workers Federation (FSG) reap-
peared after an eight-year hiatus. While small
in size, the Federation included important
unions such as the Light and Power Company
workers and the Telecommunications
Workers Union.
Despite this proliferation of central trade
union organizations, the rate of unionization
in Guatemala remained below that reached
during the Arbenz government. In 1964, only
2% of the economically active population in
urban areas, and 0.2% in rural areas, belong-
ed to unions.
STRENGTHENING INDEPENDENT
TRADE UNIONISM
In the period 1968-75, the number and size
of workers’ mobilizations increased
significantly. The growing coordination and
unification of popular struggles began to
weaken the pro-government sector of trade
unionism, as well as the Christian Democratic
current. This coincided with a slowdown in
economic growth, linked to the crisis of the
Common Market at the end of the 60s, and to
the outbreak of worldwide economic crisis.
The intensity of repression in this period,
while it failed to contain the upsurge of
popular struggles, did slow down the advance
of the workers’ movement.
In 1971, the government of Carlos Arana
Osorio imposed another state of siege. Trade
union activity was renewed the following year,
however, with a 67-day strike in the Atlantic
Industrial Company that ended in the dissolu-
tion of the union and the “disappearance” of
its secretary general. A railroad workers’
strike was declared illegal in 1974, and repres-
sion broke the movement’s leadership. But
there were victories as well; electricians and
cigar workers mobilized to demand full-time
work and respect of work contracts in 1974,
and won in both cases.
During this period, the government made
yet another attempt to control workers’ strug-
gles. In 1970, the Federated Workers’ Central
(CTF) was created through the merger of
CONTRAGUA and CONSIGUA, with a
leadership criticized for its pro-government
stance. After 1973, however, the CTF was
weakened by defections to other federations
and internal splits. In addition, new unions
and federations emerged, organizing bank
employees, university workers, and municipal
workers.
Thus, by the mid-70s, the Guatemalan
trade union movement had undergone impor-
tant changes, not only in terms of quan-
titative growth, but mainly in the appearance
of new sectors of social struggle. The tradi-
tional union leadership was finding it more
and more difficult to contain the thrust of
workers’ and popular struggles. Confronta-
tion with the state’s repressive bodies and the
bosses, as well as the economic crisis, have ac-
celerated the development of a trade
unionism independent of bourgeois leader-
ship. At the same time, the revolutionary left
has resurfaced. Going beyond the guerrilla
experience, the left has extended its mass
work, supporting the growth of higher forms
of struggle against the dictatorship.
These changes and conditions have
radicalized the Guatemalan mass movement.
The period of workers’ mobilizations which
began in 1976 thus constitutes a new phase:
The proletarian and popular masses have in-
creasingly won their autonomy from the
dominant classes, and a prerevolutionary
crisis is approaching which coincides with
similar situations in the region, particularly in
Nicaragua and El Salvador.
WORKERS ON THE OFFENSIVE
On March 24, 1976, 152 workers from
Coca-Cola were unjustly fired, in an attempt
to destroy that union’s militancy. Theescala-
tion of repression and retaliation against
workers led a number of organizations to con-
vene a National Assembly of Trade Union
Organizations on March 31, where they
unanimously decided to create a unified body
to confront repression: the National Commit-
tee of Trade Union Unity (CNUS). Six days
later, CNUS announced its intention to begin
work stoppages all over the country to halt the
repressive escalation against unions.Coca- Cola
was ultimately obliged by the government to
reinstate the fired workers, and recognize the
juridical personality of the union, but the of-
fensive against labor continued.
Since its inception, CNUS has defined the
scope of its activities to include the whole
working population, and to extend beyond
purely economic demands. Toward this end,
the Committee of Agricultural Workers’ Uni-
32
NACLA ReportlanlFeb 1980 33
ty (CUC) was formed, and later, the
Democratic Front Against Repression.
The unification process begun by the
CNUS soon collided with Christian
Democratic interests embedded in the labor
movement and engaged in divisionist ac-
tivities. In 1978, this collision led to a break
between the CNT and CLAT, the Latin
American Workers’ Confederation, dom-
inated by Christian Democratic forces. It con-
firmed the growing trend toward in-
dependence in the labor movement, and the
rejection of bourgeois options that try to con-
tain the popular movement.
CONCLUSION
The 1954 counterrevolution opened a new
period of class struggle in Guatemala. Count-
erinsurgency dealt harsh blows to the workers,
peasants and popular masses. At the same
time, it created the domestic context for
dependent capitalist development, in re-
sponse to new tendencies in the post-war
world economy. This industrialization in turn
had its counterpart in the growth of an in-
dustrial proletariat, and the reconstitution of
a workers’ movement.
The current crisis of Guatemalan cap-
italism has meant worsening living conditions
and superexploitation for the Guatemalan
masses. It has created the environment for a
new mass uprising, in progress since 1976. A
stronger, independent and united struggle
has allowed the working class to gradually
distinguish itself, organically, politically and
ideologically, from attempts on the part of
the bourgeoisie to confuse and deflect the
revolutionary struggle. Expressed in a grow-
ing challenge- including armed struggle- to
bourgeois domination, this situation has
reduced the maneuvering space of the domi-
nant classes, and has allowed conflicts to arise
within those classes. A solution to the crisis
which favors the interests of those fractions
linked to big national and foreign capital thus
becomes increasingly remote.
The generalized rise of mass struggle in
Central America was best expressed in the vic-
tory of the Nicaraguan people. This is the
new context not only for the worsening eco-
nomic crisis in Guatemala – a crisis of the very
pattern of capitalist development put into ef-
fect after 1954–but also for the inability of
the dominant groups to implement an altern-
ative proposal. The moment is thus ripe for
the advance of the popular struggles in
Guatemala, announcing the possibility that a
pre-revolutionary crisis is near.
THE WORKERS MOVEMENT
IN GUATEMALA
1. Other participants in the Front included the
Revolutionary Action Party, the Party of the Guatemalan
Revolution, the National Renewal Party, and the Guate-
malan Workers Party (Communist, legalized in 1951).
2. The first CNUS members included the United
Sugar Workers Federation (FETULIA), the Central
Workers Federation (FESETRAG), the Trade Union
Federation of Bank Employees (FESEB), the Autono-
mous Trade Union Federation of Guatemala (FASGUA),
the National Workers’ Central (CNT), the Paper
Workers Union, the Central Trade Union of Municipal
Workers, and the Committee of Solidarity with the Coca-
Cola Workers.