“Election Plan in Nicaragua is Cri-
ticized by Opposition”
The New York Times
January 18, 1984
“Going Through the Motions in Nica-
ragua” The New York Times
November 4, 1984
These Times headlines, opening
and closing the pre-election period,
capture the essence of the news
frames for the November 4 Nicara-
guan elections. Would the “key” op-
position group regard the elections as
sufficiently fair, or call a boycott?
When it did finally boycott, the elec-
tion became for the media a ho-hum
affair with the Sandinistas dominating
“smaller” parties and voters “going
through the motions” of showing up
to vote. In media eyes, “many” voted
under pressure or, unable to vote for
favored abstaining candidates, un-
ethusiastically made another choice.
The themes of this coverage stand
in sharp contrast to news frames of the
1982 Salvadorean election. Then,
lead headlines trumpeted large turn-
outs of animated voters braving dan-
gers to excercise their newly found
democratic rights. The press found
vigorous, though mudslinging, cam-
paigns. Comments from U.S. observ-
ers, Salvadorean politicians, U.S.
government officials and the reporters
themselves characterized the Salvado-
rean election as the most fair and hon-
est in the country’s history, establish-
ing a “fledgling” democracy. All
agreed the elections were a resound-
ing defeat for the boycotting Left.
The Salvadorean civilian opposi-
tion boycotting the election-the
FDR-was barely mentioned; its
reasons for not participating went un-
reviewed. The press did not allow
abstention to mar the democratic
lustre of the electoral process.
The most telling difference between
the two elections’ treatment is the
number of articles and television seg-
ments. For El Salvador, three major
dailies (The New York Times, The
Boston Globe, The Washington Post)
ran 34 front-page stories over seven
days, with a total of five front-page
stories and two interior stories the day
after the election. On election day and
the day after, the three networks
broadcast segments averaging eight
minutes out of the 22-minute pro-
Wooden boxes assured secrecy.
Jack Spence, a political science pro-
fessor at the University of Mas-
sachusetts-Boston, has contributed
articles on U.S. media coverage of
Central America to Columbia Jour-
nalism Review, Socialist Review and
Report on the Americas. He was in
Nicaragua for 10 days to observe the
election.
“grams.
By contrast, on Nicaragua’s elec-
tion day the Sunday Times ran a page-
20 story on U.S. observers and the
“going through the motions” piece in
the “Week in Review” section. The
day after the election, the Times pub-
lished two page-20 stories. The Post
ran a page-one story, and The Globe’s
page-one article was below the fold.
Neither got lead headlines.
Television coverage on the network
evening news shows was even scan-
tier. CBS devoted two minutes to the
election on Sunday. Arturo Cruz, the
boycotting candidate who had travel-
led to Nicaragua from his home in
Washington for election day, received
prominent attention. ABC broadcast a
2:20-minute story on Monday. NBC
limited its coverage to a Saturday eve-
ning pre-election piece. Football elim-
inated NBC’s Sunday evening broad-
cast.
Painted in Democratic Colors
Other recent elections in Latin
America have not received as much
coverage as El Salvador’s in 1982,
but, unlike Nicaragua’s, were painted
in democratic colors. For Uruguay’s
presidential election, the press redis-
covered its old pre-Tupamaro label-
“the Switzerland of Latin Ameri-
ca”-despite the fact that one popu-
lar, would-be candidate was in jail
and another was banned from par-
ticipating. The Times’ pre-election
piece (January 14) on Brazil led with
“Brazil will take an important step to-
ward the return to full democracy
Tuesday …. “- despite the mili-
tary’s earlier refusal to permit a direct
election in favor of the electoral col-
lege. The Nicaraguan election was di-
rect, by popular vote.
Yet despite open voting procedures
and the lack of campaign violence
common in Latin American, the
media never portrayed Nicaragua’s
elections in democratic terms. Media
emphasis on the accusations of the
boycotting opposition, the Nicaraguan
Democratic Coordinator (CDN or Co-
ordinadora), continuously cast doubt
on the election’s fairness. These ac-
cusations were mentioned in virtually
every election story from January
1984 to mid-January 1985. The im-
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 10S- – – – –..– … . I
plicit justification for this focus on the
CDN was that it was, in the press’
characterization, the only significant
opposition. The other six opposition
parties were apparently deemed too
weak and divided to merit much atten-
tion. In some 130 articles reviewed
from six major dailies (Miami Herald,
Los Angeles Times, Christian Science
Monitor, Globe, Post and Times, with
a complete 11-month sample from the
last three) and the three major news-
weeklies, one has to search hard for
any mention of the other parties until
election day. There are two excep-
tions to this rule of non-coverage. One
is a feature on the Nicaraguan
Socialist Party leader Domingo Sin-
chez Salgado by Stephen Kinzer in
The Times (October 7). The other
proves the rule. When the Indepen-
dent Liberal Party (PLI) or one wing
of it, decided two weeks before the
election to boycott, it at last became a
respectable party headed by a veteran
leader-and good copy.
The press ignored the fascinating
policy of studied ambiguity pursued
by PLI presidential candidate Virgilio
Godoy. He delayed ten days before
notifying the Election Council of the
party’s decision to drop out of the
race. The Council ruled it was three
days too late for an entire party to pull
out, but that individual candidates
could formally withdraw. Godoy-
Minister of Labor until last March-
never submitted his formal with-
drawal. But as the media represented
it, the PLI stood with the other
boycotters.
The press provided no evidence to
support its characterization of the
CDN as the only significant opposi-
tion. Indeed, facts found within the
coverage suggest that it was no
stronger or more popular than other
opposition parties. Scattered press ac-
counts estimated various CDN rally
crowds ranging from 900 to 50. By
contrast, the Sandinistas’ closing
campaign rally in Managua drew, by
conservative estimate, 150,000 to
200,000.
In Nicaragua, many believe the PLI
to be the strongest and largest opposi-
tion political party. If one makes the
generous assumption that half of those
who did not vote stayed home because
11
ICDN candidate Arturo Cruz was not
running (leaving only 12% of the elec-
torate too tired, apathetic, cynical or
busy to vote), an election with Cruz
would have garnered the CDN just
slightly more votes than the third
place finisher, or about 12% of the
vote.
Unwarranted Accusations
The CDN also complained that the
Sandinistas were pressuring people to
vote, and to vote Sandinista, through
pro-Sandinista block committees–
which allegedly threatened to with-
hold much valued ration cards. The
press quoted several voters saying
they felt general pressure to vote, but
these charges were not accompanied
by direct evidence of voter intimida-
tion or that this was official policy.
The U.S. media reiterated CDN
charges that Sandinista “mobs” had
broken up their rallies. A politically
diverse group of U.S. observers from
the Latin American Studies Associa-
tion concluded that such accusations
were exaggerated. They concluded
there were threats of violence and
harassment at four pre-campaign
CDN rallies, but also heard testimony
that the police had acted to maintain
order. In one case they quoted a U.S.
witness who said that the disturbance
was spontaneous. In addition, they
found evidence, unreported in the
U.S. press, of CDN-instigated vio-
lence at a small pro-Sandinista rally.
The only serious injury cited was a
Sandinista who had been stabbed at a
rally.
The Electoral Council sustained
charges of group violence, or threa-
tened violence, in five of the eight
cases brought to it by opposition par-
ties. There were 250 officially re-
ported rallies. Almost all complaints
of irregularities came to the Council in
the opening weeks of the campaign.
The press focus on the CDN char-
ges continued well into the three-
month campaign, despite a Washing-
ton Post story (July 30) quoting CDN
leaders who said they had never seri-
ously considered participating, but
only wanted to embarrass the San-
dinistas.
The focus on the CDN’s charges
overshadowed the vigorous cam-
paigns being waged by the other par-
ties, and the actual election proce-
dure. The implication was that there
was no meaningful democratic exer-
cise. The Reagan Administration was
quoted extensively saying the election
was a Soviet-style sham. The New
York Times editorialized (November
7) that “Only the naive believed that
[the] election was democratic or legit-
imizing proof of the Sandinistas’
popularity.”
La Prensa Refuses Ads
Seen differently, the campaign was
not just a chance for the Sandinistas to
improve their international image. It
provided increased political space and
resources to the opposition parties.
All parties took the opportunity to
blame the incumbant Sandinistas for
all that was wrong. Each party could
amplify its campaign voice with cof-
fers of 9 million c6rdobas (75 c6r-
dobas would buy a 30-second radio
spot; 35,000 would suffice for 15 mi-
nutes on TV).
A few press accounts mentioned,
but minimized, the equal guarantees
of two 15-minute TV slots and 45 mi-
nutes on state radio per week. Parties
could purchase as much private radio
and newspaper space as they wanted.
Ironically, the Democratic Conserva-
tive Party charged the anti-Sandinista
daily, La Prensa, with censorship.
(La Prensa had long complained of
being censored by the government.)
In keeping with its hardhitting support
of the CDN, the paper refused to take
campaign ads from participating par-
ties.
Stephen Kinzer reported in The
New York Times that the Sandinistas
offered to expand each party’s initial
electoral chest by 5 million c6rdobas
in a secret, mid-campaign deal. In ex-
change, the parties reportedly agreed
to withhold criticism of forced mili-
tary recruitment. Yet the parties were
heard to criticize the draft again be-
fore the end of the campaign.
Kinzer likened this to the deals
Somoza made to assure a fig-leaf op-
position. The former dictator would
divide up the legislature, lower courts
and other offices with the opoposition
Conservatives. In these take-it-or-
leave-it pre-election “offers,” the So-
moza Liberals always came out
ahead, and other opposition parties
were squeezed out.
In 1984, the results of the election
were not predetermined by fraud, and
the entire electoral framework was
geared toward including, not exclud-
ing, parties. The system of propor-
tional representation virtually guaran-
teed that even the smallest parties
would get one or two seats in the 96-
member Constituent Assembly.
High Turnout Not Convincing
A survey of post-election round-ups
leaves an unclear image of just what
the voters’ prevailing sentiments real-
ly were. Kinzer’s Times report had a
large number of interviews with elec-
tors either not interested in voting,
preferring Cruz, or voting to keep in
favor with the government, thereby
assuring necessary supplies. (He did
find four enthusiastic Sandinistas in
the Army.) Julia Preston in The Globe
found “many” Sandinista supporters
in one paragraph, but spent several
paragraphs on the opposition. Inter-
views conducted by Robert McCart-
ney in The Post and Juan Tamayo in
the Miami Herald roughly corres-
ponded to the vote outcome in their
proportion of preferances.
Final returns put the turnout at 75%
of registered voters. This amounted to
70% of the voting-age population, as
compared to 52% in the United States
and 60-80% (depending on how refu-
gees are counted) in El Salvador in
1982. The Sandinistas received sup-
port from some 44% of the voting-age
population compared to 31% for
Reagan.
Judging from U.S. coverage, these
figures were not legitimizing. To the
contrary, a New York Times piece the
day after the election found Philip
Taubman citing at length administra-
tion views that the elections were
going to worsen relations with the
United States, because they had not
been fair or democratic. In the end,
the whole affair had little to do with
democracy, by U.S. press accounts.
In fact, an electoral process unique
among ruling revolutionary regimes
was treated as an international provo-
cation.
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