Opposition Outflanked

“THE ONE THING I HAVE LEARNED FROM all of this is how much I have come to hate the
United States.”‘ This remark was uttered almost a year
ago by a leader of Panama’s National Civic Crusade,
the umbrella group of nearly 200, mostly professional
organizations at the forefront of Panama’s opposition.
The speaker was typical of Crusade leadership. Young,
highly educated, smartly dressed, and smoking an ex-
pensive cigar, he sat in the board room of the Panama-
nian Chamber of Commerce, headquarters of the Cru-
sade. He believed then, as did many Panamanians, that
since the United States helped create the problem, it
should help solve it.
Today the opposition’s frustration and the young
man’s hatred have deepened. When the Administration
finally moved reluctantly against Noriega last fall, local
opposition forces were left almost entirely out of the
picture and not one U.S. initiative since then has fa-
vored the Crusade. As Virgilio Ramirez of the Crusade
quipped, “When the United States got involved…it be-
came strictly an argument between Noriega and the
United States, between husband and wife.” 2
A SMALL CIRCLE OF WEALTHY BUSINESS-
men opposed to military rule founded the Civic
Crusade on June 8, 1987 to capitalize on the spontane-
ous anti-government demonstrations sweeping Pan-
ama’s major cities. These were sparked by accusations
against Noriega made by Col. Roberto Dfaz Herrera two
days before, which appeared to confirm government
crimes long suspected by Panamanians. 3 From the be-
ginning the Crusade embraced two vital principles: non-
violence and nonpartisanship, both of which would be
seriously tested in the months that followed. The Cru-
sade jumped into the fray calling nationwide strikes to
demand Noriega’s removal; their success established
the Crusade as the voice of a new opposition.
Noriega was reportedly depressed and feeling vul-
nerable as his unpopularity was revealed to the world,
and was unsure how to react to the most widespread
JUL I/nV UU I o00
1 “‘ “‘*”~””‘ ‘^”” Z 31PANAMA
display of opposition since the inception of military rule
in 1968.’ His first instinct was to negotiate with Pan-
ama’s powerful banking interests, who had always been
supportive of the military government-creator of the
offshore banking center and guarantor of social stabil-
ity. However, a month before the crisis hit, Operation
Pisces-a joint U.S.-Noriega investigation into drug
money laundering-shook investors’ confidence in the
nation’s secret banking laws, and rattled the bankers’
confidence in the General.’ When Panama reached the
verge of chaos following Diaz’s declarations, they too
wanted Noriega out.
Noriega’s colonels held at least three secret meetings
during the summer with a group of bankers headed by
Frederico Humbert Jr., president of Banco General,
Panama’s largest bank. 6 A written agreement was
drawn up which even included a retirement date for the
General, but the “Banker’s Plan” fell through. Noriega
realized his advocates within the Reagan Administra-
tion were still influential and felt encouraged by Wash-
ington’s apparent indecisiveness. In particular, he un-
derstood that the Department of Defense still valued
close ties with the Panama Defense Forces, as regular
consultations between the U.S. Southern Command and
the Defense Forces continued uninterrupted. 7 Equally
important, the opposition had grown cocky. Overesti-
mating its own strength, the Crusade adopted a hardline
“mango” stance (Manuel Go), refusing to bargain with
the government until Noriega left the country.
U.S. Ambassador Arthur Davis at a Crusade fundraiser
A S NORIEGA RETRENCHED, THE WEAK- nesses of the Crusade began to emerge. Pan-
ama’s former vice president Roderick Esquivel, the first
official to publicly criticize his government and Nori-
ega, observed, “There is a free-floating disgust in Pan-
ama, which the opposition will never be able to con-
trol.'” This was due in great part to the Crusade’s
incapacity to rid itself of its privileged, rabiblanco
(white tail) image, the term used to describe the wealthy
oligarchy whose political control of Panama was broken
by the 1968 military coup.’
The Crusade also failed to bridge a broader social
gap. Panama is really two countries: one traditional and
rural; the other modern and urban, grouped around the
canal transit zone. The two areas almost evenly divide
the population with about a million Panamanians in
each. Since the urban elite long ago asserted its domi-
nance through the rising economic importance of the
transit zone, a subtle animosity has permeated the rest
of the country. This polarization of Panamanian society
provided Noriega with a base of support that proved
costly to the opposition.
Although influential, the rabiblancos do not actu-
ally run the Crusade. The leaders are instead a new gen-
eration of elite young professionals, many of whom
emerged prosperous from the economic boom which
began in the 1960s and lasted into the middle years of
the Torrijos regime. They are the progeny of the dy-
namic service economy promoted by Torrijos.
A tacit deal existed between these new young tech-
nocrats and the Torrijos government. Allowed to enjoy
and preside over a basically laissez-faire economy, they
refrained from criticizing the more progressive aspects
of Torrijos’ program, which included long overdue so-
cial reforms and the inclusion of the poor in the political
process. This arrangement broke down under Noriega.
He played favorites among businessmen more than Tor-
rijos, and greatly expanded the economic interests of the
Defense Forces, sowing bitter divisions within the busi-
ness class.'”
The core leaders of the Crusade had never partici-
pated in politics before, and their immaturity debilitated
opposition efforts. When the crisis began, Crusade
founder Roberto Brenes and others flew off to Yale
University to attend seminars in nonviolent resistence.
Brenes acknowledges their “lack of political finesse,”
and worries about their ability to control the old-time
politicians. I
Aware that most Panamanians dislike and distrust
both pro and anti-government politicians, the Crusade
made nonpartisanship a founding principle, along with
nonviolence, and excluded parties and party leaders
from joining. By remaining nonpartisan the Crusade
felt it could become a truly national movement capable
of rising above politics in its quest for a return to civil-
ian rule. The three major opposition parties accepted
this logic.
REPORT ON THE AMER S
n
The most charismatic opposition politician, Arnulfo
“Fufo” Arias, offered the Crusade only passive sup-
port. His health would not allow him to do more. Even
so, as one of Latin America’s last classic caudillos, his
backing gave the opposition an important drawing card.
Yet Arias’ death on August 10 may prove to be a greater
boon to the anti-Noriega forces, since it makes way for a
more unifying leader to emerge. As a Crusade leader
remarked, “He will do more for Panama dead than he
did when he was alive.” 12 With his passing, the Au-
thentic Panamanian Party, having been built on his per-
sonalistic politics, should rapidly deteriorate.
The other two major opposition parties are not nearly
as significant, but have worked much more closely with
the Crusade. MOLIRENA, a right-wing conglomera-
U.S. INTERVENTIONS IN PANAMA
Sept. 19-22, 1856:
“To protect U.S. interests during an insurrection.”*
Sept. 27-Oct.8, 1865:
“To protect U.S. interests during a revolution.”
April 1868:
“To protect the property and lives of U.S. residents
during a revolution.”
May 7-22 and Sept.23-Oct.9, 1873:
“To protect U.S. interests during hostilities caused by
the inauguration of the government of Panama.”
January 18-19, 1885:
“To protect objects of value being moved by Panama’s
railroad, as well as the Company’s safes and vaults
during revolutionary activity.”
March and April 1885:
“To re-establish free transit during revolutionary
activity.”‘
March 8-9, 1895:
“To protect U.S. interests during an attack on the town
of Bocas del Toro by a bandit leader.”
Nov.20-Dec.4, 1901:
“To protect U.S. property in the Isthmus and maintain
transit lines open during serious revolutionary distur-
bances.”
April 16-23, 1902:
“To protect U.S. lives and property in Bocas del Toro
during a civil war.”
Sept. 17-Nov.18, 1902:
“To place armed guards in all crossing trains and
maintain the railway open.”
1903-1914:
“To protect U.S. interests and lives during and fol-
lowing the revolution of independence from Colom-
bia, due to the construction of the canal in the Isthmus.
With short interruptions, the Marines were stationed in
tion of splinter parties, is largely responsible for the
Crusade’s rabiblanco image. The newspaper La
Prensa, shut down by Noriega, represents this wing of
the opposition. The Christian Democratic Party, led by
the energetic and high profile Ricardo Arias Calder6n, a
philosophy professor turned politician, has become
Washington’s favorite within the opposition. His sanc-
timonious style and lack of charisma gained him the
nickname “the holy nun.”
Tomas “Tommy” Herrera, a lawyer, is considered
the principal advocate of the Crusade’s hardline
“mango” stance. His views, similar to Arias
Calder6n’s, imbued the Crusade with an annoying self-
righteousness, posing the battle with Noriega as one of
good versus evil.
the Isthmus from Nov. 4, 1903 until Jan. 21, 1914 to
safeguard U.S. interests.”
Nov. 17-24, 1904:
“To protect U.S. lives and property in Anc6n, at the
time of insurrectionary threat.”
1912:
“At the request of the political parties, U.S. troops
supervised elections outside the Canal Zone.”
1918-1920:
“For police duties, according to treaty stipulations,
during electoral disturbances and subsequent agita-
tion.”
April, 1921:
“A U.S. Navy squadron held maneuvers on both
sides of the Isthmus to prevent war between the
two countries [Panama and Costa Rica] over a
border dispute.”
Oct. 12-23, 1925:
“Strikes and riots by tenants obliged some 600 U.S.
soldiers to disembark to maintain order and protect
U.S. interests.”
Jan. 9, 1964:
To stop Panamanian students who sought to raise
the Panamanian flag in the Canal Zone, U.S. soldiers
killed 21 and wounded more than 500.
March and April 1988:
To overthrow the government, the United States im-
posed devastating economic sanctions.
“* Quotes extracted from a longer list of U.S. interventions
in the hemisphere presented in Senate testimony by Secre-
tary of State Dean Rusk in 1962 to justify the option of
direct intervention in Cuba.
Source: Este Pais #2, July 1986, CEASPA, Panama.
3-1
JULY/AUGUST 1988ReporA
N4
Amre4s
PANAMA
Noriega understood the weakness of such an ap-
proach. While almost every Crusade leader has been
exiled at one time or another, Noriega allowed Herrera
to remain and be a source of tension within the Crusade
leadership. His stance against negotiations increasingly
alienated Panama’s poor who would prefer a quick reso-
lution of the crisis. Brenes and others began question-
ing Herrera’s unwillingness to negotiate and by July of
this year he had resigned from the Crusade leadership.
But in the summer of 1987, Herrera’s views held
sway. The Crusade shunned negotiations and instead
pursued economic warfare by closing the doors of their
businesses. Convinced of an eventual U.S. bailout, the
privileged middle and upper class leadership believed
they could survive the potential destruction of the Pana-
manian economy. There were others who would suffer
deep and immediate consequences.
T HE OMNIPRESENT SLOGAN AT PANAMA’S
national university, “neither the rabiblancos nor
the dictatorship” describes the poor majority’s dis-
pleasure at the choices they are being offered. There is a
general dislike of the current regime and many feel
betrayed by Noriega’s derailment of the Torrijos revolu-
tion.” The Crusade doesn’t appear to be a viable option
either. A laid-off construction worker echoed numerous
Hanging Noriega in effigy
others: “Noriega is no good but my family needs to
eat…leave him alone until the election in [19]89…let’s
see what happens then.” A more ominous warning
came from a day laborer in the countryside, “We are
getting tired of all these politicians…we have waited
many years for a better life…maybe soon we must take
our machetes and cut the biggest branches from the
tree.'””
Unable to bridge class divisions, and with its eco-
nomic warfare hurting those whose support it needed
most, the Crusade arrived at an impasse last fall. It still
had one more hope, or so some of its leaders thought:
Uncle Sam.
Ever since independence, Panama has been domi-
nated by the United States like no other country in Latin
America, except perhaps for Puerto Rico. ” Panamani-
ans, regardless of class or race, admire as well as resent
the dominant power. Faced with the onslaught of U.S.
popular culture, Panama is not merely fascinated, it is
obsessed. U.S. baseball teams are followed closely in
the local papers or, from the middle class upwards, on
Cable News Network (until Noriega shut it down this
year). This conflict of emotions, mirroring a divided
national soul, helps explain how, despite the historical
record, Panama’s opposition expected the United States
would do what was “right” and support their struggle
for democracy. Ultimately, they were to be disap-
pointed.
Although Crusade leaders now claim that all they
wanted was “solidarity,” their pleas to Washington for
help amounted to much more. The opposition’s most
influential representative, Gabriel Lewis Galindo, an
extremely wealthy businessman and Panama’s Ambas-
sador to the United States during the Canal Treaty nego-
tiations, used his money and contacts to establish a
Washington office for the Crusade. Although never a
Crusade member, Lewis lobbied for strong U.S. in-
volvement.
By focusing international attention on Panama, the
Crusade helped force a resolution of the fierce policy
debate which raged within the Reagan Administration
all summer and into the fall. By late October, one White
House official signalled its end: “You can now assume
that backdoor channel things [to get Noriega out] are
going on.'”‘ However, none of the “backdoor things”
that followed were supported by the Crusade, nor did
they help its cause. The first was the “Bland6n Plan.”
With Noriega’s approval, government official Jos6
Bland6n began secret negotiations with the State De-
partment in January, 1988. But when Bland6n’s son
was imprisoned for opposition activity, he switched
sides, testifying before Congress in an attempt to shame
Noriega from office.
Then in early February, federal indictments were
handed down accusing Noriega of drug trafficking.
Although independent of the State Department policy
REPORT ON THE AMER SThe “Pifia busters” proved to be no threat to Noriega
process, this obliged the Reagan Administration to
move faster against Noriega because of its high profile
anti-drug campaign. A few weeks later, the United
States pushed President Delvalle into a bold attempt at
firing Noriega.’ 7 Twelve hours later Delvalle himself
was deposed.
The February coup greatly complicated the efforts of
the Crusade. After nine months of presiding over Nori-
ega’s repression of the opposition, Delvalle suddenly
became the anti-Noriega force the United States recog-
nized as legitimate.'” At this point Gabriel Lewis’ ef-
forts dovetailed with those of Delvalle, whose daughter
is married to Lewis’s son, and the Crusade lost the
support of the person who should have been its best
Washington connection.
The White House coordinated its actions closely
with Delvalle’s representatives, the law firm of Arnold
& Porter, which was retained 24 hours after Delvalle’s
ouster. A partner in the firm is former Assistant Secre-
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs, William D.
Rodgers. Although nominally a private citizen regis-
tered as the agent of a foreign government, Rodgers
became a principal architect of the latest phase of U.S.
policy.” This included severe U.S. economic sanctions
coupled with direct negotiations using the drug indict-
ments as bargaining chips.
The Crusade was unable to reach a consensus on
whether to follow Reagan’s lead and support Delvalle,
or on whether to support U.S. sanctions. Most Crusade
JULY/AUGUST 1988
leaders denounced the sanctions, yet were inevitably
identified with them. When all negotiations finally col-
lapsed in May, the Crusade was left frustrated and
baffled. Although the organization has had a strong
presence in Washington, in the words of Crusade repre-
sentative Virgilio Ramirez, they “have had some
access to policy makers, but very little influence.”2
THE MOST VISIBLE STRUGGLE FOR POWER
in Panama is between a civilian elite based on old
wealth, and a military elite based on wealth and power
accumulated over the last twenty years. In this conflict
the Crusade’s most serious of many miscalculations
was that the Reagan Administration would support their
vision for the future, not the military’s. Preoccupied
with the security of the canal and turmoil in the region,
the United States made its choice long ago; all they
want is a change at the top.
Today the Crusade is at a crossroads, uncertain
whether to participate in next year’s elections or to
pursue their goals by some other means. Its members
are questioning, above all, their adherence to nonvi-
olence. Any attempt to build a political movement
which channels Panama’s nationalism against military
rule will face difficulties and setbacks. The Crusade has
lacked patience and skill for the endeavor. Its members
have learned, however, that the United States can have
even less patience and less skill, and is not an ally to be
trusted.
Opposition Outflanked
1. Author’s interview, Panama City, Sept. 8, 1987.
2. Author’s interview, Washington, Aug. 18, 1988.
3. Diaz, cousin of the popular Omar Torrijos (chief of state
1968-78) and the number two military man, had been sacked by
Noriega just a month before he was to assume command of the
Panamanian Defense Forces. After his ouster, he accused Noriega
of personally ordering the deaths of Torrijos and Hugo Spadafora
(Torrijos confidante and long-time Noriega rival and critic), of fix-
ing the 1984 presidential elections, and of widespread corruption in
the government. Interestingly, he never said a word about drug
trafficking.
In accordance with the “Torrijos Plan,” drawn up after the
death of Torrijos by Col. Ruben Ddrio Paredes and signed on
March 8, 1982, Paredes and Lt. Cols. Armando Contreras, Noriega,
and Diaz Herrera agreed on an orderly succession of power for
each of them. It indicated that as each was replaced the retiree
would become active in the official Democratic Revolutionary
Party to ensure its control by the military. This document was one
of hundreds that Diaz Herrera made public.
4. Author’s interview with Omaera “Mayin” Correa, former
Torrijos press secretary, a popular broadcast journalist, and the
only Legislative Assembly representative from a military-con-
trolled party who immediately denounced Noriega, Panama City,
Sept. 22, 1987.
5. Author’s interviews with various Panama bankers, Panama
City, Sept.-Oct. 1987.
6. Operation Pisces was one of many cooperative gestures
made by Noriega to control illicit hemispheric activity. Working
with the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, some bank books were
selectively examined for evidence of money laundering. This
occurred in May, 1987, just one month before the crisis. Since
1982, Noriega received a half-dozen letters of appreciation from
various U.S. law enforcement agencies for his efforts with Pisces
and other drug fighting operations. (New York Times, Aug. 18,
1988).
7. Author’s interview with journalist Mayin Correa, Panama
City, Sept. 23, 1988.
8. Author’s interview with Vice President Roderick Esquivel,
Panama City, Oct. 6, 1987. President Delvalle ordered Esquivel’s
office closed on Oct. 23, 1987.
9. The term has been in the Panamanian language since at least
the turn of the century. It refers to a tropical bird with a white tail
and was orginally applied to the white oligarchic class. There are
also rabiprfetos (mestizos), and rabicolorados (blacks).
10. Mayin Correa has compiled a list of 5,000 people whose
business interests were damaged or taken over by the military.
11. Author’s interview, Washington, November 10, 1987.
12. Author’s interview with Virgilio Ramirez, Washington,
Aug. 18, 1988.
13. Noriega also aggressively purged torrijistas from the PRD
as soon as he took power in 1983. He began by removing Torrijos’
sister Bertha from the PRD leadership. One of the few remaining
PRD officials close to Torrijos, radical firebrand R6mulo Escobar
Bethancourt, was removed as PRD president in July of this year.
14. First quote: interview, Panama City, Sept. 30, 1987. Second
quote: interview, Santiago, Panama, Sept. 11, 1987.
15. Panama has been invaded by the U.S. military twelve times,
second only to China. See Herbert K. Tillema, Appeal To Force
(New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1973); other sources
claim 18 U.S. interventions (see Box. p. 34-35).
16. Telephone interview, Washington, Oct. 23, 1987.
17. Elliott Abrams met with the Panamanian president on Feb.
17 in Miami where Delvalle had traveled to see his dentist. (Am-
bler Moss, Testimony to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, May 4, 1988.)
18. Delvalle is perhaps the most hated man in Panama. Noriega
could at least be admired for his machismo and cunning, but Del-
valle became known as simply la gallina (the hen). Instead of
traveling through Latin America to press for regional support, as
many in the Crusade hoped, Delvalle has remained in hiding (most
likely on a U.S. installation) only to be ferried out occasionaly to
Miami or New York on personal business. His most recent trip, on
Aug. 27, infuriated the opposition. While Panama endures the pain
of U.S. economic sanctions, Delvalle went to Miami to purchase
throrougbred horses.
19. Washington Office on Latin America, Latin America Up-
date, March-May 1988 and James Chace, The New York Review of
Books, April 28, 1988.
20. Author’s interview, Washington, Aug. 18, 1988. In an
earlier interview, Brenes had complained about the problems he
and other Crusade leaders in Washington had with the Department
of State over the status of their visas.