“We want to point out that the
country’s problems will not automati-
cally cease with the reinstatement of
democratic institutions,” Uruguay’s Episcopal Conference warned in May.
“The peace and harmony that we de-
sire demands a respectful and free
dialogue, access to information, the
participation of all without threats and
without terror and the reconciliation
of individual interests with the com-
mon good.” The bishops issued their statement
in anticipation of Uruguay’s first elec-
tion since 1971. The November 25
contest is a vital step in a prolonged transition to democracy that has pitted
the people and democratic political
culture against a brutal and stubborn
ll-year-old military dictatorship.
These elections will be far from
perfect. One major political leader is
in jail, another is free but banned from
accepting his party’s nomination and
hundreds of political prisoners are still
in jail. Nonetheless, even these lead- ers are deeply engaged in an electoral process which is regarded as a crucial
stage in the return to civilian rule–a
return that was aided by the break-
down of the political and economic
game plan of the military.
The economic model the generals applied in 1973 was a watered down version of free market theory. Inter-
nally, production was to be ration-
alized by the lowering of tariffs, so
that efficient, competitive industries would survive while the weak and in-
efficient died. The deliberate suppres- sion of wages would attract foreign in-
vestment capital, while generous in-
terest rates and unregulated banking would convert Uruguay into an im-
portant off-shore banking center.
The model did stimulate a boom
in non-traditional exports-finished
leather and wool products-whose ex-
port was supported by sophisticated
rebate and exchange mechanisms.
Such exports became a significant portion of Uruguay’s trade in the
late 1970s. But ultimately the gener-
als’ model had little success. The worldwide recession and concomitant
rise in protectionism hit exports hard. The collapse of the Argentinian eco-
nomy dried up the only real source of
foreign investment–construction dol-
lars for the real estate boom in Punta
del Este, a traditional summer water-
ing hole for the Argentinian elite, and
the Montevideo suburb of Pocitos. The 1980s have proved an econom-
ic disaster for Uruguay. Between
1981 and 1983 Gross Domestic Pro-
duct fell by some 20%, while unem-
ployment rose to an official 17%.
Uruguay’s foreign debt grew expo- nentially during the last eight years
and currently stands at close to $5
billion. This sum may not sound like
much in comparison to the debts of
Argentina and Brazil, but it is crush-
ing in a society of only 3 million peo-
pie, with annual export earnings of $1
billion. In July economists represent-
ing the country’s three main parties is-
sued a joint call for renegotiation.
The 1980s have also proved to be a
political disaster for the armed forces.
In November 1980, in an attempt to
institutionalize their rule, they submit- ted their constitutional project to a
plebiscite. The plan called for the cre-
ation of a National Security Council with virtual veto power over the pol- icy of any future civilian government,
along with Draconian legislation on
security and “subversion.” Unlike
Chile-where voters approved mili- tary rule by a large margin in a 1978
plebiscite-Uruguay’s voters rejected the constitution by a 58% to 42% mar-
gin.
“When the people rejected the
plebiscite four and a half years ago,”
an observer of Uruguayan affairs said
recently, “that was the beginning of the end for the military. Fifty-eight percent of the population knew they
weren’t alone anymore.”
The military had fought hard to sell
the constitution, and clearly did not
expect to lose. When confronted with the vote, the generals claimed it was
the constitution that had been reject-
ed, not military rule.
After the initial shock of their de- feat wore off, the military high com- mand came forward with a new time-
General Liber Seregni of the Frente Amplio was released in May.
Martin Weinstein is Professor of
Political Science at The William
Paterson College of New Jersey and
author of Uruguay: The Politics of
Failure.
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
o
2
C
12table-Cronograma-for a return to
civilian rule. This called for internal
party elections in November 1982;
negotiations between party leaders
and the military on consitutional re-
form; and presidential and congres-
sional elections in November 1984.
The formal transfer of power would
take place in March 1985.
The 1982 internal party elections–
in which party leaders were chosen–
were an overwhelming defeat for the
dictatorship and its supporters. Eighty-
two percent of the vote went to can- didates who
opposed any formal or
informal continuation of military rule.
The armed forces’ electoral defeat has
been called “the second nail in their
coffin.”
Exiled Blanco Senator Wilson Fer-
reira Aldunate emerged as the undis- puted leader
of his party and a clear
favorite to win a free election. In
1971, Ferreira Aldunate ran on a plat-
form calling for land reform and
nationalization of the banks. While the Blancos (National Party) were traditionally identified with conserva-
tive rural interests, Wilson has moved
the party toward the center and cost it
some support. The Colorados were traditionally dominated by urban lib-
erals, but have shifted to the right in
the last 10 years. Wilson’s stance on
the banks has led financial sectors to
favor the Colorados in the 1984 elec-
tions. Wilson
Returns-to Jail
The deteriorating economic situa- tion and the overwhelming negative
sentiment toward military rule finally
led to a resurgence of mass political
activity. Urguayans seemed to be hit by the ripple effect of the Argentinian
debacle in the Malvinas and of Argen-
tina’s October election, its first in ia
decade. In 1983, on the last Sunday in
November, traditionally election day
in Uruguay, some 300,000 people marched demanding a return to de-
mocracy and the release of some 800
remaining political prisoners. New
student and trade union leaders
emerged and began to coordinate ac-
tivity with the centrist Blanco and
Colorado party leaders and the still il-
legal leftist coalition known as the
Frente Amplio, or Broad Front.
Faced with increased isolation, the
military entered into serious transition negotiations with the traditional par-
ties last March. By May, General
Liber Seregni, the Frente’s presiden-
tial candidate in 1971, was released from jail. Although prohibited to run
for office, Seregni was permitted to
lead his coalition in negotiations with his former peers and jailers in the
armed forces.
Wilson Ferreira Aldunate returned from an 11-year exile on June 16, and as expected, was promptly arrested by the military. Fifty thousand people. turned out
to greet him, and 300 were
later jailed in protests demanding his
release. A charismatic populist, Wil-
son is feared by the military more for
his personal popularity than his poli-
cies. He is charged with insulting the
armed forces and collaborating with
subversives.
On June 27, the eleventh anniver-
sary of the coup, Montevideo was
turned into a ghost town by a general
strike. The Army, in a futile attempt
to convey a sense of normalcy, or-
dered the buses to continue running.
The empty buses did so with signs
which said, “Obligatory emergency service.”
During July, with Wilson, as Sena-
tor Ferreira is commonly known, still
in a military jail and his party there-
fore abstaining from negotiations, the
Colorado Party and the Frente finally
wrested an agreement on elections
from the military. The politicians
were strengthened by what had be-
come a “national fervor” demanding elections. The dictatorship gave up its
long-sought demand for a National Security Council (CONSENA), ac-
cepting instead an advisory body
dominated by the president and his
cabinet. Parties within the Frente
Amplio were legalized for the elec- tion, except for the Communist Party, which nonetheless will run stand-in
candidates under its list (democracia
avanzada) within the leftist coalition. The military also agreed to an im-
mediate review of the cases of all pris- oners who have served at least half
their sentences, some 300 to 400 of
the remaining 700 political prisoners.
But as of mid-October, less than 200
prisoners had been released. The armed forces did not concede everything, however. Wilson re-
mained jailed and banned from run-
ning for office. General Seregni was free to campaign for the Frente but
still prohibited from being a candi-
date. A series of provisional measures
guaranteed the armed forces the right
to choose future commanders, and to
monitor and react to “terrorist” ac-
tivities. Even .these measures can be
abolished or modified by parliament after the new administration takes of-
Blanco Senator Wilson Ferrelra Aldunate-“a charismatic nonulist.”
NOVEMBER/DECEMBER i984 Ifice in March.
In comparison with its counterparts
in Chile and Argentina, the Uruguay-
an military retains a relatively strong
and calm bargaining position. In Ar- gentina
the military was left demor-
alized by its humiliation in the Mal-
vinas/Falklands war. And now offi-
cers are falling over themselves to
avoid being held responsible for the
9,000 desaparecidos. In Chile, the
Pinochet regime seems to have back-
tracked on what little opening it had
granted. Hundreds were arrested in
late October in demonstrations calling
for a swift return to democratic rule,
as over 200 were sent into internal
exile. In the mid-1970s, Uruguay had
more political prisoners per capita than any other nation, and the repres-
sion touched off a worldwide cam-
paign by Amnesty International. In
reaction to human rights abuses, the
U.S. Congress cut off military aid in
1977. Yet no political party has raised
accountability as an issue in this cam- paign. In an interview shortly after his
release from jail, Liber Seregni said
his call for a general amnesty did not
include the military, an indication that
the Frente Amplio may raise the ques-
tion in months to come.
Even the military seems divided on the subject. A high-ranking general
announced at an official ceremony that the armed forces would not accept
any trials. But the navy commander publicly disagreed: “If mistakes were
made, those who made them must an-
swer to the judiciary.” While some
think a victorious Blanco Party might
push for accountability, military cor-
ruption is more likely to become an
issue once civilians take over. A mili-
tary career is not considered prestigi- ous in Uruguay, and salaries are low.
Government power gave the armed
forces ample access to the till. No
Agreement, No Election
Reaction to the early August elec-
toral agreement was predictable. The
Colorado Party and Frente Amplio
negotiators saw it as the best deal that
could be made with an undefeated and
united military. Colorado’s principal presidential candidate, Dr. Julio Ma-
ria Sanguinetti-minister of industry
and commerce in the late 1960s and
Colorado Party
Candidate A: 40
Candidate B: 30
Candidate C: 30
Total 100
Blanco Party
Candidate D: 45
Candidate E:30
Candidate F:20
Total 95
Under this example, the Colorado
Party wins the presidency by 100
votes to 95 and Candidate A, the Col-
orado candidate with the most votes,
minister of education from 1972-1973
-staunchly defended the agreement.
“If there isn’t an agreement, there
are no elections. And if there aren’t
elections, what is there?”
Dr. Alberto Saenz de Zumarin, the
Blancos’ principal candidate and stand-
in for Wilson, was less generous.
“These elections are not the elec-
tions we want.” He promised that if
the Blancos won they would ask Con- gress to call new elections within one
year so that candidates like Wilson could run. Zumarin, a journalist and
human rights activist, was named des- pite the party’s earlier threats to
boycott the contest. The Commander
of the Army, General Hugo Medina,
commented that the military could ac-
cept a Blanco victory as long as the
party lived up to the agreement. “If
not, we will see at the moment.”
Uruguay’s electoral laws, which
have been preserved by the military,
provide for a Senate and Chamber of
Deputies elected by strict proportion-
al representation. The president is
elected by means of the “double simultaneous vote,” which results in
a simultaneous primary and election.
Basically, the election is conducted
via a list system which allows several
presidential candidates to run under
the banner of the same party with the
ballot counting for the candidate and
his party at the same time. The candi-
date who receives the most votes from
the party that receives the most votes
gains the presidency, as seen in the
following example:
14 REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
becomes president even though Can-
didate D of the Blanco Party received more votes (45) than Candidate A
(40).
This electoral system has always made it desirable, if not necessary, for
each of the traditional parties to offer at least two presidential candidates in
order to appeal to a wider spectrum of
voters. The November elections are
no exception. In addition to San-
guinetti, who is clearly identified with the centrist and liberal wing of the
Colorado Party, ex-President Jorge
Pacheco Areco (1967-1971), a tough
law and order candidate, is the stan-
dard bearer for the party’s conserva-
tive wing.
For those Blancos not comfortable
with the liberal and stridently anti-
military position of Wilson’s surro- gate, Dr. Zumardin, there are more
traditional Blancos-Dardo Ortiz, or
the more reactionary Juan Payss6.
The five factions that comprise the
Frente Amplio have agreed, as in
1971, to field only one presidential candidate. He is Dr. Juan Crottognini,
a gynecologist who was the Frente’s
vice-presidential candidate in the last
election.
New Voters are the Wild Card
The last elections in Uruguay took
place in November 1971, and resulted
in a Colorado victory over the Blancos
by 41% to 40% with the Left garner-
ing 19% of the vote. Of the more than
2 million electors expected to partici-
pate in the 1984 elections, some
600,000 will be first time voters. The
young will determine the electoral
outcome. Thus far it appears they have split their loyalty between the
Left and Wilson, yet predictions are
difficult. The Blancos have argued
that a vote for the Frente Amplio is
wasted since the Left cannot win the
presidency. Such votes would guaran-
tee a victory for Sanguinetti and the
Colorados, they say. Sanguinetti ap-
pears to be favored by the military and
Washington. However, the Frente stands an ex-
cellent chance of winning in the De-
partment of Montevideo, thereby con-
trolling the government of the capi-
tal which contains more than 40% of
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 14the country’s total population.* These young voters
therefore have to make a
big decision: support Wilson, thereby assuring a new election, or help the
Left demonstrate its renewed vigor.
There is a burst of social and politi-
cal energy in the new political space
Uruguayans are enjoying for the first
time in eleven years. A reinvigorated
student movement, an innovative fed-
eration of housing cooperatives, a
flourishing union movement and a
Medical Society which voted to estab-
lish a commission to investigate medi-
cal collaboration with torture are but some of the signs of democratic re- newal.
Factions of all parties are attempt-
ing to achieve a concertacitn social,
an agreement on policies concerning
such critical issues as wages, debt re-
negotiation, educational reform and
budgetary priorities. Such an under-
standing would allow tlhe new presi- dent to carry out policy despite the
fact that no party is expected to com-
mand a parliamentary majority. A
mid-October poll of 625 residents of
Montevideo gave the Colorados 31.5% of the vote; the Blancos, 21.3%; and the Frente Amplio, 27.5%.
No one wants the military to stop the process of redemocratization, yet
conditions for a successful and stable
democratic government are far from
certain. “The task of our country’s
democratic recuperation can neither
be the work of an enlightened man nor any one party, but a combination
of all political parties and all social
forces,” General Seregni said on his
release. “This first stage up to the
elections and the new government is
difficult, but without a doubt the most
difficult period will be the exercise of
real power, the excercise of democ-
racy. Resolving the deep crisis in
which our country is emersed can’t be
done in a short time.”
*A department, or state, is governed
by an intendente, or governor, who heads a legislative body known as a
junta de gobierno. The Department of
Montevideo consists of the capital
city, and the intendente is thus the
city’s mayor. Voters will also choose these local governments on November 25.
Q-.
Continued from page 2
thousands of factory and field workers
dependent on the industry, there is no
alternative, at least in the short run.
While such problems are pressing, even threatening, Jamail has perhaps
paid insufficient attention to some of the more positive aspects of Belize and the achievements of its govern-
ment. After all, despite the absence of
growth in many sectors of the
economy, Belize has weathered the
recession more successfully than
many other countries in the region.
Unemployment and consequent hard-
ship have increased but most Belize-
ans are better off than their parents
were, and there is little of the extreme
poverty, or inequality, that is charac-
teristic of other Caribbean and Central
American countries. Financially, Be-
lize appears to be in better shape than
most of these countries and has not yet
been forced to renegotiate its debts or deal with the IMF. Consequently, Be- lizeans have not experienced the kind
of belt-tightening and resultant social
unrest that is evident, for example, in
Jamaica and the Dominican Republic.
Another achievement is that Beli-
zeans just celebrated the third anniver-
sary of their independence. Each year
of Belizean sovereignty makes the
Guatemalan territorial claim more ob- viously unjust and unrealistic. Be-
lize’s government took a chance in
1981 when it opted for independence without prior settlement of the
Guatemalan dispute, but, with each new agreement with Mexico or Costa
Rica; and with the recent improve-
ment of relations with Honduras, Be-
lize is isolating Guatemala diplomati-
cally. Of coure, the problem of pro-
viding for Belize’s defense persists, but
that should not obscure the fact
that Belize is consolidating her posi-
tion and thereby making it harder for Guatemala to gain any support.
Belize remains the most peaceful and stable democratic nation in Cen- tral America. The absence of com-
munal violence is an important feature
of Belize’s social history, and sug-
gests, perhaps, that the obsession with
racial divisions and ethnic heterogen-
eity that characterizes most accounts
of Belize is misplaced. Belizean pol- itics
are not racially defined and there
is a 30-year tradition that may be envied elsewhere. When, along with these facts, we consider the high lit- eracy rate and the expanding health
services, it is apparent that there are
clear achievements, as well as prob-
lems, in Belize.
The future of Belize, Jamail would
probably agree, is exceptionally hard to predict because its situation, in
terms of internal factors and external contingencies, is so fluid. The
People’s United Party, which has dominated Belizean politics since its
formation in 1950, is in danger of fis- sion. Prime Minister George Price’s
cabinet shuffle last January only pa-
pered over the growing cracks, just
long enough for the next general elec-
tion which will probably be held at the
end of this year. The new indepen- dence constitution requires that each
district have between two and three
thousand voters and, as’ a result, the
membership of the House of Repre- sentatives, currently 18, will in-
crease–but no one yet knows by how
many. These facts, along with specu- lation about the extent of the U.S. role
in the first national election since in-
dependence, make the result espe-
cially unpredictable. What every
friend of Belize hopes for, however,
is that Belizeans should remain free to
make their own choices and to deter-
mine their own future. About that, I
am sure, Professor Jamail and I are in
agreement.
O. Nigel Bolland
Professor of Sociology, Colgate University Hamilton,
NY
Nigel Bolland is the author of The Formation of Colonial Society-Be-
lize, from Conquest to Crown Colony
and of Belize: The New Nation in
Central America, forthcoming on
Westview Press.
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