After nearly a year of deceptive
tranquility, following General Omar
Torrijos’ death in an air crash,
Panama became the scene of far-
reaching political shifts.
Between March and September,
the head of the National Guard was
removed; the president was forced
to resign; social democrats within
the government were purged; and a
new general emerged as the key
contender for the strongman role
left vacant by Torrijos.
For a country that has enjoyed
considerable stability within a
volatile region, these events were
extraordinary. Yet because they
were staged so skillfully, and were
in large part predictable, they
caused hardly a stir. Right-wing
sectors, which stand to gain the
most from these changes, went
through the motions of denouncing
this mockery of constitutional pro-
cedures. But the popular outrage
that might once have accompanied
such dramatic shifts to the right was
entirely missing. Panama’s “official
Left,” as reformers within the gov-
erning party are called, had be-
trayed popular interests too many
times. Now they could call on few
supporters to prevent their own
demise.
How did all this come about and
why? The origins of this “constitu-
tional coup” predate the death of
Torrijos. They must be understood
within the context of shifting alli-
ances and priorities toward the end
of his thirteen-year rule.
Regroupment and
Reconciliation
Popular support for the Torrijos
government began to erode as its
promises of reform gave way to the
exigencies of economic austerity
and political pragmatism. By the
late 1970s, a clear political choice
had been made: to compensate for
waning popular support, the regime
would seek a rapprochement with
Panama’s dominant elites-the
very sectors it had alienated with its
rhetoric of reform.*
* For a more in-depth treatment of the fate of reformism under Torrijos, see “Panama: For Whom the Canal Tolls,” NACLA Report on
the Americas (Sept-Oct 1979).
Torrijos was intent on forging a
new coalition, with strong backing
from the private sector, that would
enable his party to prevail in the
elections scheduled for 1984. His
personal popularity, and his re-
markable skill at playing one politi-
Scal faction against another, seemed
to guarantee that he would continue
to dominate any new coalition-
and that Panama’s stability would
be preserved. His sudden death did
not call into question the need for
“regroupment,” but it dramatically
changed the context in which it
would take place.
Without Torrijos, latent rivalries
within the National Guard rose to
the surface; conflicts emerged be-
tween the Guard and the civilian
president, Aristides Royo; and
serious divisions within the ruling
PRD party threatened to dash its
electoral hopes even before the
race began.
The right-wing opposition
pounced on these weaknesses to
score political points. The Reagan
Administration, displeased by
Panama’s resistance to its Central
American policies, also took ad-
vantage of the regime’s vulnerabili-
ty to twist its arm. A new political
balance was in the making. The on-
ly question was who would prevail:
the social democrats, who clung
nostalgically to the reformist image
of Torrijos’ early years, or the
“business wing” of the party, a slick
clique of bankers, industrialists and
financiers, whose influence was
steadily on the rise.
A Changing of the Guard
The first institution to succumb to
these strains was the National
Guard. Torrijos’ death had left its
power diffused among rival officer
cliques, with a line of command that
did not correspond to the real bal-
ance of power within the General
Staff.
Colonel Florencio Flores be-
3update * update *update * update
came commander-in-chief simply
because he was next in line after
Torrijos. But he lacked a following
among the officer corps, recogni-
tion outside the military and strong
ties to the bourgeoisie. Yet he was
certainly ambitious and eager to ex-
pand his role, and Panama’s op-
position parties began to court him
in an effort to circumvent and un-
dermine the more liberal President
Royo. Flores began to negotiate
with the private sector without con-
sulting the General Staff. Instead of
fostering cohesion, his actions
threatened internal unity-and this
was all the excuse his rivals needed
to call for his ouster.
On March 3, the General Staff an-
nounced that, along with other
senior officers, Colonel Flores was
retiring after 25 years of service, as
required by law. Named to replace
him was General Ruben Dario
Paredes, former minister of agricul-
ture, friend of bankers and oli-
garchs and, at age 47, the man
most frequently mentioned as the
PRD’s next presidential candidate.
To maintain a certain balance
among rival cliques within the
Guard, the position of Colonel
Manuel Noriega, chief of military in-
telligence, and other officers was
enhanced. But if the shake-up in
command did not dispel all ten-
sions, it did establish an internal
agreement that would enable the
Guard to reassert itself as the
decisive power in the land. After
four years of standing on the side-
lines, the National Guard, with
Paredes in command, made clear
that it intended to call the shots.
Royo Can’t Resist
The position of President
Aristides Royo was too weak to
pose much opposition to the ambi-
tions of General Paredes. His at-
tempts to make friends with conser-
vative business sectors had been
thwarted by members of his own
40
party, who blocked his legislative
initiatives. The opposition scoffed
at Royo’s impotence, and the
newspapers they control carried
almost daily headlines of govern-
ment corruption and incompetence.
Perhaps not by mere coinci-
dence, there was a storm of popu-
lar protests against the Royo gov-
ernment during this period of shift-
ing balances and testing of political
waters. The protests, led by striking
teachers, reflected the accumu-
lated grievances of the working and
middle classes. Years of regressive
economic policies had caused ser-
ious hardship and the Royo govern-
ment certainly deserved its share of
blame. But the unexpected ferocity
of the protests, and their manipula-
tion by conservative forces to
discredit the president, was one
more factor in shifting the balance
toward the Right,
Royo tried to recapture popular
support by taking a more assertive,
nationalist stance. He denounced
the U.S. role in the Malvinas crisis
and boldly called for the creation of
a new inter-American organization
that would exclude the United
States. His gestures did evoke a
popular response, but they also
aroused the enmity of Washington,
which had never liked Royo any-
way, and now saw compelling
reason to get him out.
The Final Blow
In April, General Paredes de-
clared emphatically that major
Cabinet changes were needed to
rid the government of corruption
and incompetence. President Royo
countered the next day that no
changes were contemplated. It was
a clear test of strength and, not sur-
prisingly, three days later the Cabi-
net was overhauled.
It was in just this fashion, without
attempts to avoid embarrassment
or dissemble the shift in power, that
the liquidation of President Royo
and his social democratic allies
began. Cabinet posts were filled by
the “business wing” of the PRD and
all blame for past mistakes and
misdeeds was assigned to the luck-
less reformers. If before the military
shake-up Royo was a lame-duck
president, now he was the prover-
bial scapegoat.
The final blow fell on July 31, the
first anniversary of Torrijos’ death.
The government had declared a na-
tional day of mourning and organ-
ized a huge procession to honor the
fallen general. Leading the proces-
sion were General Paredes, clearly
aiming to be recognized as the new
and true successor, and Vice Presi-
dent Ricardo de la Espriella.
The president’s absence was the
subject of much speculation-until
Royo went on television several
hours later. In a perfectly clear and
resonant voice, he announced that
he no longer would be able to per-
form his duties as president due to
a throat ailment. Royo was resigning.
Within an hour, General Paredes
appeared on the same TV screen
to welcome de la Espriella as the
new president, and to suggest that
it would make the president’s job
much easier if the Cabinet and top
government officials, including
diplomats, would submit their resig-
nations-by Monday, please. In ad-
dition to other “recommendations
to the new president, Paredes also
announced the closure of the coun-
try’s newspapers for seven days.
The general’s “I’m in charge” at-
titude did little to endear him to
many Panamanians who would like
to see the military’s role reduced.
But the shift to the right was irresisti-
ble, carried out with crack efficien-
cy. Again, members of the PRD’s
social democratic faction were re-
placed by its “business wing” and
representatives of the right-wing
opposition, while conservative
government officials were quickly
reinstated. A panel of distinguished
NACLA Reportupdate update update*update
jurists, established to revise the
Constitution, was heavily weighted
with members of the country’s tra-
ditional elite.
The only pretense of pluralism in
the new government was cleverly
reserved for two ministries that
would bear the blame for unpopular
policies: housing, put in the hands
of Communist Party representa-
tives, and labor, under the control
of influential union bureaucrats.
Presidential Ambitions
General Paredes makes no
secret of his presidential aspira-
tions in 1984. Between now and
then, he will be building his coali-
tion-offering Panama’s right-wing
opposition better terms than Torri-
jos had he lived, but furthering that
same process of “regroupment”
begun several years ago.
The forces he wants and needs
to unite are extremely fractious,
however. If they coincide in their
opposition to the Left and demands
for the reversal of many reforms,
they differ on everything else.
Paredes, by positioning himself as
the indispensable power broker,
the man through whom all deals
must pass, hopes.to keep his rivals
at bay. But he also knows that
without his base in the National
Guard, his chances for winning the
presidency are virtually nil.
Paredes was scheduled for man-
datory retirement from the Guard in
September 1982, after 25 years of
service. Rumors flew that his chief
rival, Colonel Noriega, and other of-
ficers would make sure-by force if
necessary-that he resign. On Sep-
tember 6, at the request of Presi-
dent de la Espriella and the General
Staff of the National Guard, Paredes
agreed to retain his command for
another two years. He had success-
fully maneuvered for enough time
to prepare for the 1984 elections.
Among those who applauded
Paredes’ new lease on life was
General Wallance Nutting, com-
mander of the U.S. Southern Com-
mand and an ardent supporter of
Washington’s interventionist policy
in Central America. But it remains
to be seen how much Paredes can
move Panama’s foreign policy to
the right. The Torrijos legacy is still
strong. And nationalism is still the
bottom line.
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