Anti-Americanism has never been ruling Liberal Party, spoke of a shifting
widespread in Honduras, but things are mood in his country: “The kinds of
changing. At a press conference in things that are happening,” he said,
Washington, D.C. on June 12, Jorge “could develop a profound anti-Ameri-
Arturo Reina, leader of a dissident so- can sentiment.” The new mood is cial democratic faction of Honduras’ everywhere. In the recent demonstra-
General Walter L6pez seems intent on “recovering the integrity of the military.”
tions that have brought tens of thou-
sands of protesters onto the streets of
Tegucigalpa and the second city of San
Pedro Sula, there is a single theme.
Even the hand-lettered placards carried
by street vendors bear the message, “Put the interests of the Honduran peo-
ple before those of the United States.”
Though worsening economic condi-
tions and the repression of the last three
years may be the immediate trigger of
the protests, their common thread is
anger that Honduras has prostituted it-
self to Washington and received nothing
in return. The storm has blown up
abruptly. An interview in February with
jen. G.ustavo Alvarez Martinez, com- mander of the Honduran armed forces,
found him immune, as usual, to sug-
gestions that anything was wrong in Honduras. Was there any public senti-
ment against the semi-permanent pres-
ence of U.S. troops? No, replied the
general, “The only expressions of re-
sentment against the United States in
Honduras come from a handful of com-
munists.”
Less than two months later, on March
31, a group of younger Honduran offi-
cers forced Alvarez to resign, and re-
sentment against the United States was
very much on their minds. In the early
hours of the morning, with a subordi-
nate holding a pistol to his head, Al-
varez was packed ignominiously onto a
plane bound for Costa Rica. The inter-
nal coup took the civilian Administra-
tion and the U.S. Embassy by surprise.
In just two years, Alvarez had amassed
unprecedented political power and
gained an impressive amount of per-
sonal control within the armed forces.
In the process, he had violated basic
military norms and procedures.
Alvarez’ problems within the mili-
tary had begun with his appointment as
chief of the armed forces in January
1982. At that time Alvarez lacked the
seniority needed to become a general,
but with the approval of President
Roberto Suazo C6rdova, he modified
Army regulations and was twice pro-
moted, first to brigadier general and
then to general of division. His ascent
Leyda Barbieri, an associate with the
Washington Office on Latin America,
visited Honduras in April. George Black
is editor of Report on the Americas.
JULY/AUUUST 9brought complaints from the Joint Chiefs
of Staff who resented Alvarez’ abuse
of the constitutional law of the armed
forces.
They also objected to other innova-
tions by Alvarez: changed regulations
governing promotions, for example,
and a removal of executive authority
over the minister of defense, who would
now be answerable only to the chief of
the armed forces. Alvarez would habit-
ually present these changes to the Hon-
duran Congress as virtual faits accom-
plis. He would then flaunt the rubber
stamp approval of Congress as an en-
dorsement of his power.
Cowards Or Patriots?
The Honduran Joint Chiefs, known
as the Superior Council of the Armed
Forces (COSUFA), are traditionally the
military’s highest decision-making body.
Alvarez, however, bypassed COSUFA
and consulted only with those generals
and colonels whom he trusted person-
ally. This arrangement proved conven-
ient for the U.S. Embassy; whatever
their qualms about Alvarez’ impetuous
and arrogant manner, it was easier to
work with one man than with a secre-
tive 42-man group, whose full mem-
bership is unknown even to Honduran
politicians.
Alvarez’ pugnacious attitude was also
a key factor in his removal. In his final
meeting with COSUFA, Alvarez made
a fatal error, threatening the assembled
generals, colonels, and lieutenant colo-
nels with a restructuring of the armed
forces in June. His intention was to
replace the traditional leadership with
some of the younger officers, but he
miscalculated and opened a premature
split with the old guard before he had
cemented his new alliance with their
younger rivals, many of whom believed
that Alvarez was corrupt and repressive.
Many in the officer corps had long
disputed Alvarez’ insistence on the need
for military intervention in El Salvador
and Nicaragua. Now, at the COSUFA
meeting, Alvarez further antagonized
those who disagreed with his war plans
by branding them “cowards.”
Under Alvarez, the Pentagon had
been given carte blanche. For his crit-
ics, the virtually unbroken stream of
joint military maneuvers and the con-
struction of an extensive network of
Hondurans are not convinced the CREM is at the service of the fatherland.
airstrips, radar stations, military bases
and weapons stockpiles was grounds
enough for complaint. But many of
Alvarez’ fellow officers were incensed
by his willingness to have Salvadorean
troops train at the Regional Military
Training Center (CREM) at Puerto
Castilla. For most Hondurans, their
presence touched a raw nerve of na-
tional pride; since Honduras’ disastrous
defeat at the hands of El Salvador in the
brief 1969 war, the neighboring country
is still regarded as a mortal enemy.
It is now clear that COSUFA will
renegotiate the terms of the CREM,
where U.S. Green Berets last year
trained six Salvadorean batallions and
only two Honduran. Plans for the cur-
rent year had originally called for the
United States to train nine Salvadorean
batallions at the CREM. The new Hon-
duran military leadership seems likely
to demand, at the very least, training
for an equal number of Honduran troops.
The new commander of the armed
forces, Air Force General Walter L6pez,
has restored the authority of COSUFA,
and communicates its decisions to Presi-
dent Suazo and U.S. Ambassador John
D. Negroponte. Recovering the integ-
rity of the military seems his paramount
concern. In his April 5 inauguration
speech, L6pez declared that, “Honduras
needs men who are neither sold nor
bought, but sincere and honest men
. . . men on the side of justice.” He
presides, however, over a military
deeply divided about the future of
Honduras.
Two main camps are in contention.
One sector would like to stay out of
civilian politics altogether and busy
itself with “professionalizing” the
military. Feeling that the coup against
Alvarez has done Suazo C6rdova a
great favor, this group would like to
see the president make some cabinet
changes, improve the efficiency of
government and carry out an investiga-
tion of past corruption and repression.
The other main current within the
military would favor getting rid of Suazo
C6rdova. They see the president as
incapable of carrying out the political
and socioeconomic reforms which vot-
ers demanded in the November 1981
elections. For these officers, the most
logical step would be a reformist mili-
tary government along the lines of the
L6pez Arellano regime, which ruled
from 1972-75. Without urgent reforms,
they believe, the country is heading
straight for violent upheaval.
Pandora’s Box
While Alvarez’ overthrow was pri-
marily an internal military matter, and
not the culmination of a major social
crisis, other factors also came into
play. The scale of the repression under
Alvarez, tacitly endorsed by President
Suazo C6rdova, was unprecedented
in Honduran history. There was wide-
spread distaste in the military for Al-
varez’ determined application of an
Argentine-style doctrine of national
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
I
3
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10O0
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security, involving the destruction of
grassroots organizations and the illegal
disappearance of dissidents.
The officers who engineered the coup
may now be aware that they have
opened a Pandora’s Box. Long-muted
unrest has begun to emerge at every
level of Honduran society.
During the final weeks before the
removal of Alvarez, domestic tensions
had mounted. On March 18, Rolando
Vindel Gonzalez, president of the Elec-
trical Workers Enterprise (STENEE)
was kidnapped in Tegucigalpa. Vindel
was walking on the street when six
heavily armed men jumped out of a
blue minibus without licence plates and
bundled him inside. He had been on his
way to negotiate a new contract for the
electrical workers’ union.
The union responded to Vindel’s
capture by calling for a national strike.
In the wake of his disappearance, Hon-
duran police arrested over one thousand
people, including 600 in the capital of
Tegucigalpa alone. While most were
released by nightfall, those who re-
mained in custody faced charges of “sedition against the State of Hondu-
ras.” Vindel’s whereabouts remain un-
known, and the security forces are
widely held responsible for his disap-
pearance and possible death.
Gustavo Adolfo Morales, assistant
director of the National Lottery, also
disappeared on March 18. Morales,
like Vindel, was dragged into an un-
marked blue minibus by half a dozen
armed men. And like Vindel he has not
reappeared. This time, the kidnapping
took place outside the gates of the U.S.
Embassy. One witness was Supreme
Court Judge, Luis Mendoza Fug6n. “I
saw what happened,” said Mendoza
Fug6n later, “but what could I do?”
The new military leaders also face
growing unrest in the peasant move-
ment. The much-vaunted land reform
program of the early 1970s has ground
to a halt in recent years, and shows no
signs of reviving under Suazo C6rdova’s
Liberal government. Julin Mdndez, leader of the national camhpesino asso-
ciation ANACH, estimates that 156,000
peasant families are landless. “If de-
mands for land are not met,” Mdndez
recently warned, “they will take over
land by different means.”
On April 10, Mdndez’ ears were
At center: families of the disappeared
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borne out. Eighty families from vari-
ous villages in the department of Fran-
cisco Morazin decided to claim 352
hectares (870 acres) of land that had
been abandoned by two landowners,
Andrds Noe Valeriano and Enrique
Elvir. When the families arrived early
in the morning at Valeriano’s farm, Las
Pifiuelas, they walked into an ambush.
Fifteen men, among them the landown-
er and members of the security forces,
opened fire. Three peasants died; three
more were wounded. One of them was
hanged; another castrated. Juliin Ose-
guera, a survivor of the massacre, lays the blame on the inactive government
land reform agency INA, which had
ignored the families’ claims for land
for two years.
Scores To Settle
On April 5, the day after L6pez’
inauguration as chief of the armed
forces, more than 20,000 Hondurans
took to the streets to show their support
for the change in command. They also
demanded a prompt investigation of all
human rights violations committed under
Alvarez and the punishment of all those
responsible. The chanting crowd carried
JULY/AUGUST
banners calling for the immediate re-
lease of all political prisoners, the with-
drawal of foreign troops, an end to joint U.S.-Honduran military maneuvers and
the closure of the regional military train-
ing center.
Occupying center stage for the mo-
ment are the families of the 109 desa-
parecidos. The Committee of Families
of the Disappeared (COFADEH) lost no
time in stressing that it sees the change in the high command in itself as only a
partial solution. In an April 6 letter to
the press, COFADEH declared that, “Honor will return to the Armed Forces
when they free the disappeared.” The
letter went on: “We warn the officials
who rebelled against the corrupt and bloody generals that you (the younger
officers) have not yet finished with Al-
varez because his fascist project is still
alive. The repressive apparatus is still
intact, the assassins remain free on the
streets and the next victims could be
those wearing uniforms.”
Several of the families of the disap-
peared have already brought legal ac-
tions against Alvarez and other key of- ficials close to him. They include Col.
Daniel Bali Castillo, former head of the
security forces (FUSEP), Juan L6pez
Grijalba, former head of military intel-
ligence (G-2) and Juan Blas Salazar, former head of the secret police (DNI).
Under Attack from All Sides
The next step for the armed forces
and the Suazo C6rdova Administration
will be a delicate one. How are they to
defuse the tension? For one thing, they
can scarcely ignore the breadth of the
swelling protest movement. A “patri-
otic call” published in the daily La
Tribuna on March 22, a week before
the fall of Alvarez, and demanding the
withdrawal of all U.S. troops from
Honduras, bore the signatures of 126
prominent citizens, including a former
president.
By early June, the escalating series
of mass rallies was including not only labor and peasant unions, student groups
and the families of the disappeared, but
also congressional deputies from the
small centrist party PINU, the Chris-
tian Democrats and even the conserva-
tive opposition National Party. Some
75,000 took part in this year’s tradi-
tional May Day demonstrations.
L I
I IThe Catholic Church, traditionally
one of the most conservative in the
region, was also registering its deep
disquiet by this time. At a ceremony to
welcome the new Bishop of Santa Rosa
de Copin, the Catholic clergy left little
doubt that their central complaint was
the militarization of Honduras by U.S.
forces: “Our western region,” they
declared, ‘has been converted by spe-
cial means in the past few years into a
geo-strategic political-military territory,
inspired by the doctrine of national
security. . . . The already announced
maneuvers, and military constructions
that accompany them, without a doubt
make the situation serious. The pend-
ing and massive presence of foreign
troops multiplies our people’s worry
and suffering, and ours as well.”
Clean-up Or Cover-up?
On May 2, the day after the biggest
demonstrations yet, the country’s new
military leaders received a delegation
of families of the disappeared-the first
such meeting. But while some within
the armed forces may be anxious to
clear their names from the smear of
past human rights abuses, others-both
civilian and military-will be more
reluctant.
Some will prefer simply to sweep the
issue under the rug. On April 6, many
Hondurans were outraged by statements
made by the president of the ruling
Liberal Party, Professor Romualdo
Bueso Pefialba, who claimed that all
the human rights violations committed
in Honduras could be laid at the door of
Gen. Gustavo Alvarez and the small
number of his associates forced into
exile along with him. And the vice-
president of the Supreme Court gave a
hint of the problems that would face
any investigation. “On one occasion,”
he recalled, “we presented writs of
habeas corpus to the police (DNI) and
we were told that the ninejudges [of the
Supreme Court] could go to jail if
we were advocating the release of
prisoners.”
In different forms, the military elite,
the private sector and the mass move-
ment all recognize that a drastic change
of course is needed. Gen. L6pez him-
self acknowledged in a nationwide
television speech in early June that
Honduras was suffering “a dangerous
socioeconomic imbalance” made worse
by soaring military expenditure.
Moderate businessmen have realized
that economic recovery has been ne-
glected in the face of Washington’s
obsession with military aid. “We
know,” admitted one member of the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
“that we can’t remain a closed-off
compartment while the rest of the coun-
try burns up.”
The less socially conscious busi-
nessmen are also discontented, though
for different reasons: they had expected
richer pickings in exchange for the U.S.
military presence. Their refusal to risk
fresh investment in Honduras is now
epidemic; over $1 billion worth of pri-
vate capital has left the country in the
last two years. The poor, meanwhile,
have felt the brunt of an economic
package of government cutbacks and
austerity measures which U.S. Ambas-
sador John D. Negroponte presented to
Suazo C6rdova just four days after his
inauguration in January 1982. The pro-
gram is known locally as “Reaganomics
for Honduras.”
Where the Buck Stops
The buck, in fact, may not stop with
the ousted Gen. Alvarez. It may go all
the way to the top, and in Honduras that
means to Ambassador Negroponte’s
office.
Since his appointment in November
1981, Negroponte has overseen a trans-
fer of real power from the civilian
authorities to the military. In the pro-
cess, Washington has squandered its
most precious asset in Honduras–a
popularly elected civilian government–
and has caused deep rifts within the
previously peaceable social fabric. The
ambassador’s failure to foresee the
consequences of U.S. policies is little
short of astonishing.
According to players in the internal
coup d’etat against Alvarez, the U.S.
Embassy was caught unawares by the
news. And contrary to statements from
the embassy after the coup, President
Roberto Suazo C6rdova was also pre-
sented with a fait accompli. According
to informed sources, Suazo was told
that if he opposed Alvarez’ removal,
there was an extra seat on the plane
taking the general to Costa Rica.
Around 11 o’clock on the morning
of Alvarez’ departure, the ambassador
met with President Suazo and Gen.
Lopez. In his statements afterward,
Negroponte tried to paint a rosy picture
of the unwelcome turn of events by
pretending that Suazo had engineered
the change. “Here,” he said, “every-
thing is carried out within the constitu-
tional process. We have always sup-
ported the democratic process in Hon-
duras and we will continue that atti-
tude.” These days, few Hondurans are
willing to take such statements at face
value.
The replacement of Alvarez by L6pez
will surely bring significant changes to
the relationship between Washington
and Tegucigalpa. At a minimum, Hon-
duras will demand a higher rent in
exchange for being used as what many
are calling “America’s newest aircraft
carrier.” But the consequences may
run deeper. Honduras may well stop
placing obstacles in the way of the
Contadora peace process; it will cer-
tainly drop Alvarez’ passionate crusade
to go to war with the Sandinistas; and it
is likely to demand a change in CIA
behavior now that 12,000 contras have
been cut adrift by the U.S. Congress.
On June 7, ABC’s World News To-
night reported that the CIA station chief
in Tegucigalpa had been removed at
the insistence of the Honduran govern-
ment.
Negroponte maintains an unconcerned
public face, claiming that he is “un-
aware of the Hondurans’ desire to
change” a 1954 agreement governing
military relations between the two coun-
tries. But despite official denials, ru-
mors at the highest levels of the Hon-
duran government and armed forces
reveal a movement in favor of Negro-
ponte’s removal. Many senior officials
believe that Negroponte is quite capa-
ble of creating another Alvarez, and
that his departure would diminish ten-
sions between Honduras and Nicara-
gua. One commented that, “We would
have more space to act [without Negro-
ponte].”
The ambassador is well known to
covet a high State Department post in a
second Reagan Administration. Rather
than wait for his name to be associated
too closely with an unravelling policy
in Honduras, he too might welcome a
quick onward posting.
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