Antonio Navarro Wolff, a coman- dante of the former urban-based
guerrilla movement M-19, is now running for president as the candi-
date of the M-19/Democratic Alliance (M-19/AD) in the May 1994 elections. He was interviewed in his Bogota office last November by Marc Chernick.
In 1990 the M-19 decided to
accept the government’s offer-
and conditions-to negotiate a
new and lasting peace accord.
How had your original conceptions
of democracy and revolution in
Colombia changed?
Our original idea was that the people would take up arms and
head to the mountains as a result of the general dissatisfaction with
politics in the country. This had occurred in other historical periods when peasants had taken up arms and fled to the mountains in rebel- lion. But two things had changed in Colombia. One, we discovered that Colombia is a much more urban country than we had originally
believed-that people from the city are reluctant to take up armed
action in the mountains. The only people who go are the most mar- ginal or those with a very highly developed political orientation who make a conscientious and ideologi- cal decision. Second, the country began to open up politically, which for us came as a great surprise. Opportunities for politics appeared that previously had not existed.
Such as?
Well, the possibility of organizing
alternative parties and ad-hoc political movements that stood a chance of success, without being excluded.
However, this was also the period
when the Uni6n Patri6tica, born
from the earlier peace accords with
the FARC in the mid-1980s, was
being brutally liquidated.
Yes, but you have to carefully
analyze the earlier peace process. The Union Patri6tica was part of a
project that advocated the simulta-
neous pursuit of armed struggle and political struggle. This type of project is not viable. Given the con-
ditions in Colombia, we could not have an armed wing and an
unarmed political party. This might
work in Ireland or Spain, because
there are different considerations,
particularly with regard to respect
for human rights. But here in
Colombia, no. This does not mean, however, that one cannot create
an alternative political party as an
unarmed movement, or as a move-
ment which has completely dis-
armed. This is what we have done, and we have gained support.
Does this imply a change in your
conception of revolution?
Absolutely. It implies a change in
the way the revolution is made and
in the very conception of revolu-
tion. The triumph of the revolution
through the force of arms that
allows the complete restructuring
of politics and institutions is not
the same thing as reaching power
through elections where you have to govern within the limitations of
existing institutions. We chose the
latter path because of the impossi-
bility of the former. Colombia was becoming an urban country. No
one has been able to create an
army in the cities. In the cities, you
can create support groups. But an army as such, which is necessary to
fight a guerrilla war, has to be built
up in the countryside. We could
either persist in a politics that was
not viable and thus forfeit the pos-
sibility of ever gaining power, or
choose a path that was more polit-
12 NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 12 NACTA REPORT ON THE AMERICASUPDATE / COLOMBIA
“Colombia was becoming an urban country. No one has been able to create a
guerrilla army in the cities. In the cities, you can create support groups.”
ically viable despite the inherent limitations.
Is the M-19/AD a party of the Left and are you the presidential candi-
date of the Left?
Of the center-Left.
For the M-19/AD,what is the cen-
ter-Left?
I would say that we continue to
subscribe to the thesis of our earlier
years. We are fighting for democra-
cy, for political democracy, for the
democratization of the economy.
We are fighting for social justice and
we believe in a concept of the coherent nation-not the idea of a
weakened nation which has arisen
in the wake of the newer processes
of globalization. The national reality
exists. It has its own meaning and
purpose. This is not chauvinism. We
don’t want to fall into the newer
forms of nationalism which are now
appearing in the world, but this
does imply a different notion of
development for Colombian society.
What is your position on armed
struggle and the groups which
today continue to sponsor armed
insurgency?
I believe that it is not possible to
win a civil war in this country
through revolutionary action. How-
ever it is also unlikely that you will
lose. The guerrillas won’t lose. They
can’t be defeated, at least in the
foreseeable future. The guerrillas
can persist in this country for 20 or
30 more years, without reaching
power. Although the country is
now urban, there continues to exist
an important social base among the
peasants which supports and sus-
tains the guerrillas. The question to
ask is, what are they fighting for?
To achieve certain objectives or to
maintain positions that they have
won? My position is that a guerrilla
Candidate Navarro Wolff speaks to the press in Bogota.
movement that does not have a
possibility of reaching power, but
which persists in armed action, is a
guerrilla movement that will
inevitably begin to lose coherence.
It may persist, but its internal posi-
tion will begin to erode. It will dete-
riorate because the guerrillas are
losing their political perspective.
Does the M-19 have a role in any
future negotiations with the guer-
rillas?
Of course. Especially if we win
the presidential elections. [Navarro
smiles.] Look, we have supported all
the peace initiatives. We withdrew
from the current administration
when the government chose to pur-
sue a politics of “integral war.” For
us, peace is basic. We believe that
supporting peace is the best way to
win support among public opinion,
That is our experience. The desire
for peace is so great among the
population that any movement that
embraces it will gain followers. We
are committed to the peace
process. Further, there are sufficient
elements today to create a real poli-
tics for political change.
What would you do as president to
reach a negotiated settlement with
the guerrillas?
I believe that the government has
to be willing to make concessions.
The current government’s position
amounts to little more than the call
for a unilateral surrender [by the
guerrillas]. In our case, we made
such a unilateral gesture in
exchange for a degree of political
participation. We also have a great
deal of public support which we
don’t owe to the government. Our
laying down of arms was based on
our evaluation of the situation and
our appreciation of the tide of pub-
lic opinion. And I believe that we
made the right decision. Despite
the fact that this continues to be a
bipartisan political system, we have
become a significant political force.
Our influence counts in the political
life of the nation. This was the prin-
cipal benefit we gained by aban-
doning armed struggle.
The historical conditions faced by
guerrillas still under arms are not
the same. We were the first. Today,
a similar process would be like a second chapter to what we did. It
would not have the same impact,
and it would place the guerrillas in
an inferior position in relation to us
and with respect to public opinion.
For this reason, the current guerril- las are not likely to make similar
unilateral gestures. As a result, you have to negotiate with them and
you have to make concessions. You
have to make changes in the con-
stitutional structures, and as a
result of an enduring peace
process, you have to reduce the size of the armed forces. If a true
peace is realized, you don’t need so
many men under arms. If you dis-
arm the guerrillas, you also have to
disarm the military. This is obvious.
In general, the current politics of war is a mistake.
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