Arnoldo Alemin, presidential
candidate of the revived
Liberal Constitutionalist
Party (PLC), arouses strong emo-
tions among his opponents. Former
President Daniel Ortega, addressing
a crowd of 40,000 people on July
19, 1996, the seventeenth anniver-
sary of the Nicaraguan revolution,
warned of what would happen if
Alemdn won Nicaragua’s October
20, 1996 national election. If victo-
rious, he said, “the ‘Somocista-
Liberal’ candidate would eliminate
the Nicaraguan army, take all the
land from the peasants, and con-
tinue the current economic policies
of unemployment.” In short, an
Alemin victory would spell disaster
for ordinary Sandinistas, burying
their aspirations of salvaging some-
thing from the debris of their revo-
lutionary experiment and ending all
hope of reversing the misery that six
years of neoliberal economic poli-
cies have left in their wake.
Ortega’s words were intended to
convince his followers, as well as
undecided voters, into marking the
Sandinista box on the October bal-
lot. The faithful need no such urg-
ing-they will vote for Ortega any-
way. But they are not numerous
enough to stem the rising Liberal
Party tide. Meanwhile, few other
Nicaraguans seem to be listening.
Liberal Party candidate Amoldo Alemin on the campaign trail for Nicaragua’s October 20 presidential elections.
Although the election is not in the
bag, Alemdn has a commanding
lead. According to a Gallup-affiliate
poll carried out in late June, 36% of
the voters intend to cast their ballot
for Alemin in October and only
26% for Daniel Ortega. A first-
round victory cannot be ruled out,
and a second-round victory is more
than likely.
Some Nicaraguans see Alemrn’s
impending victory as the beginning
of the final phase of counter-revolu-
tion, after six years of inconclusive
“democratic” transition under cur-
rent President Violeta Chamorro.
An apocalyptic vision of the
Somocistas sweeping back into
Managua, intent on reversing the
gains of the revolution and deter-
mined to reinstall the pre-1979 dic-
tatorship, haunts many Sandinistas.
Yet a more dispassionate analysis
suggests that both the makeup of the
Alemdn coalition and the reality of
existing domestic and international
6 NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
Mark Caster is a freelance journalist based
in Managua.
6 NACIAREPORT ON THE AMERICASUPDATE / NICARAGUA
Some Sandinistas fear an Alem6n
victory will mean nothing less than a
full-blown return to Somocismo.
Alem n’s chief objective is not
revenge against the Sandinistas.
It is, rather, his own political
aggrandizement-and that is what
Nicaraguans should fear most.
forces will lead to a different result.
Rather than opt for vanquishing the
remnants of Sandinismo, it is more
likely that Alemdin will follow the
well-trodden Nicaraguan path of
deal-making-to the benefit of both
his own political aggrandizement
and Nicaragua’s renascent savage
capitalism. This outcome-which
would likely pave the way for a last-
ing Liberal hegemony-is what
Nicaraguans should fear most.
rnoldo Alemin was a stu-
dent of law and finance
whose father was an official
in one of the Somoza governments.
When the Sandinista revolution
defeated Somoza in 1979, Alem.in
worked in a company called
Nicaraguan Investment and
Development (INDESA), which the
Sandinistas soon nationalized. In
1980, he was arrested in a raid of
supposed counter-revolutionary
plotters and spent nine months in
jail, where, not surprisingly, his
antipathy for the Sandinistas deep-
ened.
Upon his release, Alemdn neither
went into exile nor adopted a stance
of outright opposition. He enjoyed a
modest prominence through most of
the 1980s, first as the head of the
Managua coffee growers’ associa-
tion and then of the national organi-
zation, UNCAFENIC. Only after
June, 1989, with the campaign for
national elections underway, did
Alemdn become a more vocal oppo-
nent of the regime.
He joined other
coffee producers
who were pro-
testing government
control of the dol-
lars earned from
the coffee trade. In
response, the gov-
ernment claimed
that the growers
were engaging in
economic sabotage
and confiscated the
properties of three of them, includ-
ing Alemin’s.
In the aftermath of these events,
Alemdn decided to enter politics in
earnest. He decided to run in the
1990 elections for the mayoralty of
Managua, and he chose as his vehi-
cle the tiny Liberal Constitutionalist
Party (PLC). The PLC was a splin-
ter group from the National Liberal
Party (PLN), the party of Anastasio
Somoza Debayle. A few years after
Somoza appointed himself presi-
dent in 1967, a former Somocista
cabinet member, Ramiro Sacasa,
defected from the PLN and founded
the PLC. As part of a coaltion of
opposition parties, the PLC tepidly
opposed the dictator until his over-
throw in 1979. Under Alemrn’s guid-
ance, the PLC joined the National
Opposition Union (UNO), the 14-
party coalition that defeated the
Sandinistas (FSLN) in the 1990
national elections. With the help of
supporters in Miami and the High
Council of Private Enterprise
(COSEP), an association of promi-
nent Nicaraguan business leaders,
Alemn won UNO’s backing for his
ultimately successful mayoral run.
An insignificant party in 1990,
Alemdn’s PLC is now the preferred
political option of 30% of Nicara-
guans-roughly the same percent-
age that identifies with the FSLN.
How Alemin rose to his current
heights is an untold story of graft
and patronage. His strategy con-
sisted of three basic components:
building the PLC by investing his
own (and probably municipal)
resources in the party; taking advan-
tage of public antipathy to the
defeated Sandinista regime and
later discontent with the Chamorro
government; and using public-
works projects and other populist
gestures to build a popular support
base. What few people in 1990
anticipated was the skill with which
Alemin would use his mayoral base
as a springboard for accumulating
power.
One of Alemrin’s first steps was to
appoint municipal-council members
to posts in his administration, where
access to graft lured other UNO par-
ties to the PLC. He revived old
taxes, garnered resources from U.S.
AID-funded projects, and brought
in additional aid from his Cuban
friends in Miami’s city hall.
Alemin, who allegedly studied old
Communist Party pamphlets to
learn organizing techniques, spent
his weekends building up the PLC’s
base outside Managua. He began
transforming the PLC from an old
men’s club into a real political party.
By this point, he had already set
about debunking the myth that the
Sandinistas were invincibile by sys-
tematically destroying the symbols
of their rule. Within his first year as
mayor, virtually all the revolution-
ary murals, graffiti and FSLN elec-
tion slogans throughout the city
were painted over, although Alemin
denied responsibility. Such actions
aroused deep hostility among
Sandinistas. Alemin also began to
rankle the Chamorro government,
which he lambasted for developing
a “co-government” with the FSLN.
As frustration with the Chamorro
government mounted, the critique
that former foes had become bedfel-
lows and were jointly impeding
Nicaragua’s economic recovery
became increasingly popular.
To garner support among the vot-
ers, Alemdn set about building
public works-repairing roads and
Vol XXX, No 2 SEPrIOcr 1996 7 Vol XXX, No 2 SEPT/OCT 1996 7UPDATE / NICARAGUA
constructing traffic circles and foun-
tains. In 1993, he rebuilt the palm-
lined Malec6n park along
Managua’s lake front, destroyed in
the 1972 earthquake. Once again
poor people had a place to stroll and
gaze, admittedly at a lake becoming
ever more polluted and foul-
smelling. The Sandinista media dis-
missed projects like the Malec6n as
mere show, but ordinary people,
caught in a cycle of increasing
impoverishment and lacking inex-
pensive ways to spend their leisure
time, flocked to them. At a time
when the Chamorro government
was implementing adjustment poli-
cies that threw massive numbers of
people out of work, Mayor Alemin
was able to make modest improve-
ments in Managua’s popular bar-
rios.
Thus, like Somoza before him,
Alemin developed a popular base
and a formidable political machine
that reeks of traditional clientelism.
In his early years as mayor, even
Alemin’s style resembled that of
the first Somoza. A corpulent, hard-
drinking and rough-mannered
politician, Alemin rubbed shoulders
with women in the Oriental market
and with the poorer classes in gen-
eral in an effort to cultivate an
image of a politician with a popular
touch. The underside of the image
was unsavory-accusations of kick-
backs, misuse of the municipal
funds, and sundry other forms of
corruption began to haunt Alemin.
But in a country where corruption is
a tradition and ordinary people fear
unemployment above all other ills,
many forgave Alemin’s sins
because he was perceived as doing
something for them, while Dofia
Violeta was not.
After the PLC won the Atlantic
Coast regional elections in
February, 1994, national polls
showed Alemin and his party grow-
ing in popularity. In mid-1994,
Vice-President Virgilio Godoy of
the Independent Liberals proposed a
merger of all the Liberal fragments.
Alemsn rejected Godoy’s offer, and
by early 1995, he had cobbled
together the “Liberal Alliance,”
which includes the PLC, several let-
terhead-only groupings and rem-
nants of the old Somocista PLN. As
the May, 1996 deadline for forming
official campaign alliances neared,
Alemin also picked up support
from splinter groups of Independent
Liberals, National Conservatives
and members of the Resistance
Party (PRN) who were eager to get
on the gravy train.
Who is going to vote for this
alliance in October? Viewed demo-
graphically, support for Alemin is
all over the map. He has support
from the young, the old, the well-
educated and the less literate, from
people in the capital, the provincial
cities and the countryside. Though
muted now that the campaign is
underway, his strident anti-
Sandinista stance has made him heir
to the anti-FSLN vote. By all indi-
cations, the Nicaraguan Resistance
is going to vote for him en masse. In
northern Nicaragua, the
remaining recontras are
even engaged in armed
propaganda on his The M
behalf. Clearly, however, the ric
Alemin has gone be-
yond a right-wing, anti- Ameri
Sandinista base, to
occupy space in the cen- helped
ter. He has become the COffer
latest politician Nica-
raguans have found to Alem6 believe in-a rough-
hewn populist who steals suppo
but gets things done, Fidel C hammers away at pow-
erful forces that ordinary
people consider their
enemies, and promises that if they
will recognize his authority, he will
take care of them.
ut as Alemin has prepared to
campaign and then govern, it
has become apparent that he
does not enjoy the confidence of
Nicaragua’s upper crust nor, sur-
prisingly, of significant parts of the
diaspora in Miami. Both sectors
find him too coarse, too divisive, too
unsavory in his associations-in a
word, unreliable as a guarantor of
their present and prospective invest-
ments. To furbish his image, Alemin appointed Enrique
Bolafios, a former president of the
private-sector lobby, COSEP, as his
running mate and fundraiser both at
home and in Miami. Although as
strident as Alemin, Bolafios is
reputed for his rectitude. Since he
came on board, sources say that
Alemin’s campaign has received
individual contributions of up to
$200,000.
It is not the Nicaraguans in
Miami, but rather the extreme wing
of Miami Cubans, led by Jorge Mas
Canosa and the Cuban-American
Foundation, that has furnished
Alemin with the most significant
foreign financing-all of it illegal
under Nicaragua’s revised electoral
law. The Cuban-American Found-
ation supports an Alemin vehicle
iami Cubans, particularly
Sht-wing Cuban-
can Foundation, have
d fill Alemn’s campaign
s. At fundraising events,
in has expressed warm
rt for the overthrow of
:astro.
known as the Nicaraguan
Foundation for Development and
Democracy (NFDD), apparently a
conduit for campaign funds. The
quid pro quo, according to uncon-
firmed reports, is Alemnn’s commit-
ment to allow the Cubans to set up
an anti-Castro radio station in
Nicaragua. At fundraising events,
8NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 8UPDATE / NICARAGUA
Sdnchez Herdocia, a
former Somoza-era
senator and landowner
in Le6n, whose
deceased brother was
contra leader Aristides
Sdnchez; and Sergio
Garcia Quintero, a for-
mer Somocista judge,
who will likely be
Alemin’s defense min-
ister.
These and other
Alemrn allies are, no
doubt, awaiting the
opportunity to recover
old properties, to harass
Sandinistas, and, in
many cases, to steal.
Behind them stands a
phalanx of other former
property holders who
want Alemdin to recover
their holdings. Not sur-
prisingly, Daniel Ortega
has repeatedly called on
Alemn to negotiate a Alemin supporters at a neighborhood rally. The sign a, to gotat
reads: “If God is with Alemn who could prevail against “pact of governability”
Alemin?” with guarantees against
“revenge-seeking” be-
the Liberal candidate has expressed fore the voting starts. The desire for
warm support for the overthrow of revenge is undoubtedly strong, Fidel Castro. especially the desire to make high-
The governing board of the ranking Sandinistas return, or at
NFDD shares members with the least pay for, properties appropri-
boards of companies in Miami that ated under the so-called piiiata,
purchase supplies for the Managua which took place during the transi-
municipal government, with much tional period after the FSLN’s 1990
raking off the top. Alemnn’s agent electoral defeat and before Violeta
in many of his Miami dealings is Chamorro’s inauguration.
Byron J6rez, known in the city as Equally powerful reasons exist,
“Byron King,” who supposedly par- however, for Alemin and his clique
ticipated in the Mano Blanca to restrain themselves if they come
(White Hand) death squad under to power. In the first place, Alemin
Somoza. Eduardo Sevilla Somoza, a can ignore the power centers in and
nephew of the former dictator, is surrounding Nicaragua only at his
also a prominent board member. peril. Contrary to rumors that he
Additional key Alem.n supporters has promised to reinstate officers of
include, among others: Jaime Somoza’s National Guard, he is not
Morales Carazo, a wealthy lawyer in a position to challenge the
living in Mexico, and Alemdn’s Nicaraguan (“Sandinista”) army, campaign chief, who will likely be which in recent years has won
named secretary to the president; acceptance as an apolitical army in
Lorenzo Guerrero, an architect and a reborn capitalist state. Another
former Somoza official; Enrique constraint facing Alemin is the
lock on Nicaragua’s economic poli-
cies exercised by multilateral lend-
ing institutions, such as the
International Monetary Fund (IMF)
and the World Bank. Given the
country’s continued dependence on
foreign aid, the next government
will have no choice but to uphold
Chamorro’s agreements with the
IMF. Just as important is the fact
that the IMF and the World Bank
want to see stability-not another
wave of destructive conflict over
property. They also want to see cor-
ruption of the kind that has been
rampant under Chamorro held in
check.
These are powerful reasons for
Alemin to engage in the Nica-
raguan tradition of pact-making.
Indeed, the path of least resistance
may also be the path to conven-
tional success. An exhausted
Chamorro administration has
bequeathed Nicaragua a reviving
economy whose exports have dou-
bled in two years, whose debts are
being radically reduced, and to
which foreign donors have commit-
ted large sums. If Alem.n does not
rock the boat, he can expect to ride
the crest of a wave of economic
recovery that will offer him and his
cronies opportunities far more
lucrative than those offered by tak-
ing things away from Sandinistas.
This does not mean that
Sandinistas, many of them poor
peasants, will not lose things any-
way, but it will be mainly to market
forces. The Alemdn campaign has
promised that it will provide prop-
erty titles to poor people who lack
them. But most Nicaraguans can
expect their lives to get modestly
better as the economic recovery
begins to take hold. For that
improvement, Arnoldo Alemin and
his Liberal Alliance can expect-
deservedly or not-to take credit,
thus entrenching themselves in
power. This will not be the return of
Somocismo, or the beginnings of a
new dynasty, but it may be a long
run.
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