As the 2010 midterm congressional elections approached, attention to the role of Latinos in the electoral process increased accordingly. This is a familiar pattern, not only in the popular media, both the English and Spanish versions, but also among mainstream academics and political organizations. The format and framing of these works represent a continuation of the approach adopted by the numerous studies that have documented the growth and behavior in the Latino electorate, particularly since the early 1990s. These concerns focus on turnout, partisan loyalties and attitudes, pending or ongoing policy issues, elections or electability of Latino candidates, identifying local, statewide, and national elections in which Latino voters have the potential be the “swing” vote, etc. Although researchers differ in their assessments of the success or failure of these efforts, the underlying assumption of the vast majority of these studies is that the electoral process in the U.S. has the potential to promote the “interests” of Latino communities.
Yet there are few efforts to situate these electoral processes within their broader structural context. The result is a truncated and limited view of Latino politics. Although Latino electoral behaviors and trends are important phenomena, they do not occur in an institutional vacuum, and they represent only one dimension of Latino politics, which encompasses a much broader terrain defined by the multiple levels and forms by which Latinos act politically. A wide range of actions are undertaken by Latino community and neighborhood groups, community-based organizations, nonprofit organizations, home associations, immigrant rights groups, student organizations, labor groups (often linked to domestic and other non-unionized service sectors), and professional organizations to advance their concerns and to affect policies and practices of both state structures and institutions of civil society within which their daily lives are carried out.
The kinds of actions undertaken and policies promoted by these kinds of organizations imply a normative concept of Latino politics that has as its ultimate goal the full incorporation in all spheres of U.S. society and that views electoral behavior as an indispensable but also limited mechanism for pursuing this goal. It is this dimension of full incorporation, then, rather than any particular pattern of electoral behavior, that should be the measure of success in Latino politics. What is most often missing from works that emphasize the primacy of electoral activity is any sustained and detailed discussion of how electoral behavior is linked to this more fundamental question of incorporation. And the discourse that focuses most directly on the level and nature of incorporation is that of political membership and citizenship. So it is really the issue of full and effective citizenship that provides the underlying normativity of Latino politics that is typically not addressed in studies or discussions of Latino electoral activity or patterns.
The challenge, then, is to develop modes of analysis that incorporate this broader conception of Latino politics and to understand how state, economic, and cultural power both affect the degree of Latino incorporation and often limit the possibilities and strategies for social and political change. We must, in other words, locate today’s Latino politics within the context of the neoliberal agenda, which has sought to define economic and political policies since the late 1970s.
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Significant differences in class, race, immigrant status, gender, and national origin make the development of a single “Latino” agenda extremely unlikely. That is to say, the particular interests and needs of Latinos, as with other groups, differ according to their location along these lines. Yet, despite these differences, there are structural processes, policies, and practices that do affect the opportunities, trajectories of economic and social mobility, and life conditions of large numbers of Latinos. The literature on neoliberalism provides a way to identify and understand some of the key domestic structural phenomena and conditions within which Latino politics now takes place.
Neoliberalism has been used to describe the linkage between, on the one hand, the changes in the structure of economic processes and relations that were promoted beginning in the late 1970s in response to the ineffectiveness of postwar Keynesian policies, and on the other hand, the institutional and ideological practices and political policies of governance that were developed to address the inability of state structures to address these problems.1 These new policies not only guided the extensive and long-term restructuring processes adopted within both the economic and state spheres, but also coincided with the period of dramatic and rapid growth in the U.S. Latino population.
The key characteristics of neoliberalism are well-known and have been documented in numerous studies. This does not imply, however, that there is a consensus on the meaning of the term, the interpretation of its characteristics, or the particular significance of its various components. The extensive literature on neoliberalism reflects a broad range of frameworks and an emphasis on different dimensions involved in these processes. Some studies focus on a set of economic policies, others use neoliberalism to define a particular historical period, and still others study it as an ideological phenomenon. In the context of Latino politics, it is useful to focus on how neoliberal economic policies and their consequences have severely limited the possibility that political action channeled through the electoral process alone can seriously address the marginalized conditions that most Latinos face.
Neoliberalism is based on the assumption that an unregulated, free market is the most effective mechanism not only for economic and societal development but also for promoting democracy and freedom. All of the other defining characteristics of neoliberalism flow from these basic assumptions. Deregulating industry and commerce in general, limiting the role of government in economic affairs, privatization, reducing governmental responsibility for social services and community welfare—all of these are policies intended to achieve the ideal of a free market as the foundation for economic prosperity and democratization.2
Yet, despite the fact that this view has been the guiding framework for the structure of governance since the Reagan era, neoliberalism has functioned more as utopian ideology than grounded public policy, as David Harvey suggests.3 The spectacular failure of this ideology that led to the economic crisis beginning in 2008 clearly demonstrated that neoliberalism does not reject government intervention in economic affairs, but rather government intervention on behalf of the working class and minorities. The role of government under this neoliberal regime has been to promote, enhance, and facilitate the growth of corporate and financial sectors, while limiting support for social services, education, health and welfare. The societal effects of this have led some to call neoliberalism “predatory capitalism.” The redistribution of wealth upward and the growing level of inequality in the United States has been so dramatic that even conservative thinkers like Kevin Phillips, in his Wealth and Democracy, have warned of the dire consequences.4
One of the major effects of neoliberalism has been the redefinition of the purpose of governance that emerged from the period of the Depression and lasted through the early 1970s. During the former period, policies were aimed at putting people back to work, addressing the issue of poverty, increasing the standard of living, establishing strict regulatory regimes (reflected in legislation like the Glass-Steagall Act) to prevent another economic collapse, strengthening the rights of labor, establishing a system of social security to ensure a minimum of economic well-being, dismantling of legal structures of racial discrimination and support for the expansion of civil rights, and establishing a health care system intended to make sure that the elderly and poor would receive care.
This contrasts markedly with the policies advanced not only by Republicans but also by Democrats like President Clinton, who pushed through NAFTA primarily to open capital markets across borders, relied heavily on tax credits for the wealthy as a basis for influencing economic development, advanced legislation to dismantle the welfare system, and embraced deregulation—supporting the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which many commentators blame for the unleashing of the very kind of market behavior that led to the near collapse of the entire financial system. Today, this has not changed much—the policies of the Obama administration are designed and promoted by advisers who come from the very same companies and sectors who orchestrated that near collapse. Thus, the conception of governance as the guarantor of the corporate class remains largely unchanged.
There is little to indicate that either of the two major parties is likely embrace anything other than the neoliberal repertoire of policies. Although Latino voters helped stave off Republican victories in the midterm elections, the ideological parameters within which the dominant public discourse and public policy options are advanced was hardly challenged. This is not to suggest that voting and electoral behavior are unimportant—quite the contrary. Electoral victories have been an important vehicle for promoting progressive legislation in the past, legislation that has promoted greater levels of Latino incorporation. But in the last 30 years, there have been few instances when either party seriously challenged the fundamental premises of neoliberalism. For this reason, Latino political efforts need to focus on supporting the kinds of changes that would make an alternative possible. This cannot be achieved by Latinos acting alone. But the mobilization of millions of people who came together to support the vision and hope that they believed Obama represented makes it clear that a politics based on providing an alternative to neoliberalism is indeed possible.
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There is no lack of respected economists who consider the United States to be not only in an economic crisis but in a crisis of governance as well.5 As noted, the policies and ideology of neoliberalism have clearly undermined the quality of life for millions of people. Unemployment has reached record levels, millions have lost their homes, social services have been either eliminated or severely limited, most cities and many states are either on the verge of bankruptcy and unable to deal with crumbling infrastructure, faltering educational systems, and inadequate medical facilities. This is the legacy of the neoliberal policies. And yet there is no prospect of removing these polices from the national political agenda.
Latino communities’ particular pattern of growth and development have made them particularly susceptible to these effects. There have of course been very significant advances made by sectors of Latino communities as a result of the changes brought about by the civil rights movements and legislation of the 1960s. A small but significant professional class has emerged that often plays the role of a broker, articulating their version of Latino “issues” and “needs” for mainstream institutions. And the proportion of Latinos who have achieved middle-class status has increased significantly. But a majority still are relatively marginalized. As I mentioned above, the period of significant growth in the Latino population overlapped considerably with the period during which neoliberalism developed in the United States. This is no coincidence: Satisfying the demand for cheap labor was one of the central features of neoliberal restructuring, which promoted large-scale immigration, attracting workers from Mexico in particular.
Given the size and dispersion of Latino populations and the key role they played in several sectors of the economy, they became an integral part of the neoliberal transformation. In the last decade alone, the Latino population grew 42% and is expected to number well over 50 million when the 2010 census is completed; Latinos are projected to compose more than a quarter of the national population by 2050. So it is clear that this population will continue to have an increasing effect on determining what kind of society the United States will become. Because of this, the economic and political conditions of Latino communities and their capacity to become full and equal members of society has to be a national concern and not treated as a “minority” issue. This is particularly clear when one looks at the fact that 20% of schoolchildren and 25% of newborns are Latino. When combined with statistics that show that Latinos between the ages 16 and 25 have a school dropout rate of 17%—almost twice the figure for African Americans and nearly three times that of whites—the demographic trends portend an alarming future of even greater fragmentation, division, and inequalities, with all the ills and costs that these conditions entail.6
Economically, Latinos have been directly affected by neoliberal policies. A 2009 report published by the National Council of La Raza, indicates that in 2007, 42% of Latino workers earned poverty level-wages (or about $10.20 per hour to support a family of four), compared to 34% for African American workers and 22% for white workers.7 And Latinos tend to be concentrated in occupations that are not only on the lower end of the wage scale, with Latino men earning 68% of white male wages and Latinas 77% of the wages of white women. They are also overrepresented in jobs that have been particularly hard hit by the ongoing recession, with a little more than 20% in production and food service jobs, close to a one third in construction and maintenance, and almost 40% in agriculture. The AFL-CIO reports significant job loss in many of these occupations with higher percentages of Latinos during the period between 2001 and 2005. So, for example, there were 289,000 (20%) jobs lost in machinery, 220,000 (47%) in apparel, 58,500 (13%) in furniture products, 260,100 (37%) in semiconductor and electronic components, 235,200 (13%) in fabricated metal products, 144, 800 (24%) in primary metals, 159,300 (20%) in printing, and the list goes on.8
In addition, 48% of Latino workers had no health insurance through their employment, compared to 27% of white workers and 32.9% of African American workers. And two thirds (65%) of Latino workers did not have access to retirement plans in their jobs. At a more general level, a recent measure called the Hispanic inequality index has documented the level of inequality of Latinos. Using a number of statistical indices comparing Latinos to whites in five different areas, including economic standing, social justice, civic engagement, education, and health, the analysis concluded that the overall inequality index for Latinos is 72%, and most pronounced in the areas of economics and social justice.9
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If the measure of success of Latino politics is, as argued above, the full incorporation of all sectors of Latino communities into the major institutions that determine the quality of their lives, then even the brief review of the economic and material conditions of large percentages of Latinos presented here reflects a pattern of uneven, differential incorporation. Although a substantial percentage of Latinos have realized upward mobility and gained greater access to labor markets, schools, and political processes, most Latinos continue to realize only partial incorporation. In the Untied States, neoliberal economic policies have caused the deepening of inequality among the lower two thirds of Latino populations, resulting in formidable obstacles to full citizenship, membership, and incorporation, and continuing to make any significant reform toward greater incorporation highly unlikely.
The long-term, negative societal implications of this kind of situation were delineated more than half a century ago by the British sociologist T.H. Marshall, who argued that the viability of democratic societies depended on developing a form of citizenship that went beyond legal standing to include the principle of fully incorporating various groups into all of the major institutional sites through which power, resources, and benefits are distributed. Marshall argued that formal citizenship was not enough to achieve the type of societal membership that can sustain democratic governance while material inequalities persist. Marshall’s conception has been the point of departure for most studies of citizenship throughout much of the globe.10 And for at least the last two decades, the issue of incorporation has been a predominant concern among not only academics but also policy makers and politicians. This is fitting, given that the dramatic growth in cultural, racial and ethnic diversity has been one of the unintended consequences of neoliberal economic expansionist policies of the last 30 years.
Although social scientific studies and analysis of Latino electoral politics have provided useful knowledge about voting patterns, factors affecting choice of candidates, participation in campaigns, etc., they tell us little about whether these activities have any impact on the level of Latino societal incorporation. It might be contended that this latter dimension is a separate concern and is substantially a different research question. But this would be true only if the conception of “the political” that one embraces is by definition limited to these electoral phenomena. One way of understanding what is at stake here is to look at the process of framing and misframing involved in different conceptions of the political.
A more ample, relational conception of Latino politics would allow us to see that it is highly unlikely that societal incorporation and full citizenship for most Latinos can achieved through electoral means alone, given the effects of neoliberal economic policies on Latinos. Academics and policy makers, must therefore pay greater attention to both the limitations of electoral approaches and to the many new forms of political advocacies that aim to fully incorporate Latinos.11
Raymond Rocco teaches political science at the University of California, Los Angeles.
1. For discussions that focus on this linkage as being the goal of neoliberalism, see Catherine Kingfisher and Jeff Maskovsky, “Introduction: The Limits of Neoliberalism,” Critique of Anthropology 28, no. 2 (June 2008): 115–26; and Jane Lou Collins, Micaela Di Leonardo, and Brett Williams, New Landscapes of Inequality: Neoliberalism and the Erosion of Democracy in America, 1st ed. (Santa Fe, N.M.: School for Advanced Research Press, 2008).
2. For a review of the characteristics and critiques of neoliberalism, Kean Birch and Vlad Mykhnenko, The Rise and Fall of Neoliberalism: The Collapse of an Economic Order (Zed Books, 2010).
3. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2005).
4. Kevin Phillips, Wealth and Democracy: A Political History of the American Rich, 1st ed. (New York: Broadway Books, 2002).
5. Paul R. Krugman, The Return of Depression Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (W.W. Norton and Company, 2009); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Freefall: America, Free Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy (W.W. Norton and Company, 2010).
6. Pew Hispanic Center, “Between Two Worlds: How Young Latinos Come of Age in America” (Washington, December 11, 2009).
7. Catherine Singley, “Fractures in the Foundation: The Latino Worker’s Experience in an Era of Declining Job Quality” (Washington: National Council of La Raza, 2009).
8. AFL-CIO, “China Trade: Deficits, Jobs, Investment and Exploitation,” 2006, available online at afl-cio.org.
9. National Urban League, 2010 State of Black America Report (New York).
10. T. H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, and Other Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1950).
11. For a review and discussion of the various arguments on incorporation, see Thomas Faist, “Diversity—A New Mode of Incorporation?” Ethnic and Racial Studies 32, no. 1 (January 2009): 171–90.
