As the old orthodoxies fade, many progressive analysts and activists have become ambivalent about the most efficacious paths to social justice and development, and even about the shape of the future itself. Some of the most cogent of these analysts now counsel “historical patience” in our attempts to map the future.
David Harvey, for example, in his illuminating study of the origins of neoliberalism, urges us “not to wax nostalgic for some lost golden age when some fictional category like ‘the proletariat’ was in motion.”1 He warns us that new theoretical and practical inquiries into the feasibility of alternatives for meaningful social transformation may take a long time to bear fruit. In particular, he argues that the widespread construction of consent around institutions characterized by private property rights, free markets and free trade has made traditional leftist utopianism a much less promising course of action than in previous epochs.2 His argument brings to mind Marx’s famous comment that “every step of real movement is more important than a dozen programs.”3
Andrew Glyn voices similar cautions. In his latest book, a remarkable discussion of contemporary economic trends under “unleashed capitalism,” he predicts that progressive social change will be viable, though modest in the coming years. At a time when the economic landscape is marked by low inflation, unrestricted freedom for capital and strong domination of market-based solutions, he argues, the defense of social conquests like the welfare state must shift from old certainties to practical propositions. Pointing out that the long-term goal of socialism has been to create continuous changes that enable people to live in more fulfilling ways, he asks, “Is it possible to make serious moves in this direction even within what is still a predominantly capitalist economy?” His answer is an ambivalent yes.4
Bearing this ambivalence in mind, along with the political and analytical caveats about “really existing capitalism,” this article advocates a singular path toward greater social justice, redistributive development and more egalitarian societies. The core concept driving my argument is a redefinition of democracy beyond its mere procedural and institutional arrangement centered on regular electoral contests.
The argument rests on two broad premises. The first is that the last three decades have observed an unparalleled and ruthless process of wealth creation and the commodification of social life, such that market relations are rapidly becoming naturalized and deeply entrenched in culture. A telling illustration of this process is the fact that approximately two-thirds of U.S. companies’ profits nowadays come from so-called intangibles, such as copyrights, trademarks and patents (that is, intellectual property).5 This proportion signals that capitalism is at the height of its phase of financialization, as an ever-growing web of multiple markets permeates everyday life.
Moreover, uncontrolled commodification has created a social incorporation into markets with no political regulation, especially in countries of the global South. In addition to expanding forms of labor exploitation and social exclusion, this process is naturalizing the market domination of social life. As a result, growing numbers of citizens in most corners of the planet are becoming convinced that a self-interested form of economic organization is indeed the only one possible, and promises of “alternative systems” are frequently received with outright disbelief.
The second general premise concerns the standard “democratic” straitjacket now promoted around the world almost as a “non-negotiable idea.” As a consequence of post-1989 historical circumstances, “democracy” as a political model eventually became a tool kit to be sold everywhere, though it didn’t mean much more than holding open and fair elections from time to time. Such procedural democracies, in and of themselves, are woefully inadequate to the task of regulating the incorporation of populations and commodities previously excluded from market relations. In short, while liberal democracies are the paragons of “good governance,” political development and economic modernization, their current manifestations are insufficient.
There is no question but that these processes have created a historical situation in which there seems to be only one game in town. The new situation is formed by two far-reaching hegemonies acting in tandem: neoliberalism, which manages the economy, and electoral democracy, which structures the existing political system. While these propositions certainly require nuanced, geographically specific qualifications, these political and economic processes, even if they are inherently unstable, are so dominant that the sole possibility of moving toward greater social justice and more egalitarian development must be rooted in a new form of politics and, necessarily, a new meaning for democracy that can serve as an effective conduit for change.
In short, it is a non-starter for progressives to insist today on normative notions of “alternative modes of society” or “counter-hegemonic visions,” let alone socialism. The time to defend the teleology so typical of some authoritarian versions of Marxism has long passed. The most viable strategy, crudely speaking, is “to enter the game,” but to play with a crucial difference, that is, to use a more clever strategy in the political realm than that pursued by those at the top of the league.
Why? Because meanings attributed to democracy evolved politically (and theoretically) in the last century, opening the door for promising further developments. After disputes about democracy’s desirability in the first part of the 20th century, Schumpeter’s competition-among-elites thesis reached supremacy and laid the pillars for a restricted vision that was hegemonic at least until the late 1980s. Democracy became a model of restricted participation and largely an intra-elite competition.
Discussions of democracy in that period focused on debates around a number of procedures to qualify a given society as democratic; from free and fair elections to freedom of expression; from control of the military by civilian governments to freedom of the press; from the right to vote to the freedom to form and join organizations; and so on. However, in recent years a growing concern has emerged, at least in developed countries, regarding the concrete potentialities of this democratic recipe in the context of two pathologies: a diminishing interest in participation and a crisis of representation, distancing voters from their elected representatives.
Widespread distrust of elitist versions of democracy has provoked a recent debate about democratic theory that further advances a reconstitution of its different meanings and affirms the idea of “deepening democracy.” This analytical rebuilding blends a number of different ideas about direct (or participatory) democracy, and insists on citizens’ informed and reasoned engagement around notions of deliberative democracy. It creates new political circumstances in which a new meaning of democracy can enter the realm of real politics, not as a mere institutional arrangement trapped by built-in inertia, but as a political process of continuous change. If so reconstructed, democracy can become the route to open new political possibilities and create effective alternatives.6
Though it may appear contradictory, the first requirement of a renewed definition of democracy is to accept, as a first step, those procedures proposed by standard definitions of democratic arrangements celebrated by liberal traditions.7 In other words, advocates of social transformation must concede that nothing progressive can be done if an ensemble of formal democratic freedoms is not in place. Yet for this “transformative face” of democracry to emerge, three essential elements (or social processes) must be incorporated into the concept of democracy. If these additional processes are coherently articulated and politically defended, then democracy can gain transformative power and become a progressive political process.
The first crucial aspect is a defense of the idea that the very basis of democratic politics is conflict. Conflict itself must be made legitimate and must be continuously supported by progressive political actors. Not only must conflict be normalized as a facet of social life, but progressive forces must also create safeguards against political repression. This vision of democracy directly opposes conservative visions of democracy that confine conflict to a “passing stage” necessary to reach a stable institutional format. Progressive politics, on the contrary, must be solidly anchored in the analytical interpretation of society as a state of permanent dispute of interests and identifiable opposing purposes. In this interpretation, conflict is inherent in the fabric of any concrete social formation.
Possibilities for a transformative notion of democracy will materialize only when progressive actors accept the idea that human disputes are embedded in “the social,” and understand that the legitimacy of various forms of conflict is key to a democratic society and must be supported by all means, being an essential part of a renewed democratic canon. With neoliberal economics and representative democracy having become such hegemonic concepts, this is the only chance that socially marginalized individuals will be treated as equals in a given polity and be able to strive for their demands without the fear of repression. Prospects for social justice can thus become tangible possibilities.
Several political dilemmas will persist after this initial principle is accepted, from a definition of the acceptable frontiers of conflict in a given society to the forms of supporting conflict as a mechanism to promote social change. Suffice it to say that this progressive vision of democracy must affirm that conflict is the very foundation of politics and must be made legitimate in all social domains. Conservative thought will always hold exactly the opposite view (precisely to maintain a given social order), and this is the main battleground for the left and all progressive forces. Progressive thought that assumes deliberation will produce consensus and harmony must also, in my view, accept the necessity and inevitability of conflict.
A second decisive addition to the process of democracy is a defense of the permanent production of new rights. This is an aspect of democracy that has progressed in the last 50 years. A glimpse of the evolution of rights over this period will lead one to realize that advancement on this front has been extraordinary, from basic civic freedoms and the right to life, liberty and physical integrity to political rights in general. In recent years, a plethora of new social rights has been demanded and, in many cases, enforced.
We are approaching a historical threshold at which economic rights are being put on the table. This is crucial exactly because economic and financial imperatives constitute the major source of world power and social domination. If rights, including economic rights, are a constitutive part of democracy, and if their conquest is a permanent process of individual and social struggles, then there is reason to be optimistic. When economic rights (like the right to a basic income) become a reality, society will routinely discuss (and dispute) redistribution and forms of wealth appropriation. A renewed face of democracy, as a result, requires a permanent defense of new rights as a prerequisite for social transformation.
Finally, a new meaning of democracy must incorporate mechanisms (and the corresponding right) to promote and disseminate independent and free information. It is necessary to devise a democratic vision that promotes freer access to information that enhances knowledge about society. In a world in which media monopolies confront myriad independent sources created, in part, by the Internet, this is a field of urgent political action. This third dimension is made still more pressing given the chaotic flood of new sources of information that could be instrumental channels to diminish the impact of the “naturalization” of the dual hegemonic format of our times. Given the impact of so many powerful forms of alienation and the development of false consciousness, the freer production and dissemination of information is an urgent priority to prevent the creation of a petrified world of misrecognition.
The deepening of democracy in the wake of these new understandings of social transformation, the creation of the political conditions necessary to put these new democratic processes in motion, and the transformation of democracy itself from a mere institutional arrangement to a politicized process—these are the challenges facing progressive forces in the search for a new democratic manifesto.
Zander Navarro is Associate Professor at Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul (Porto Alegre, Brazil) and a fellow at the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex University (England). He is thankful to Leonardo Avritzer, Jonathan Fox and, in particular, Aaron Schneider, for comments on a draft of this article.
NOTES:
1. David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p. 202.
2. Ibid, p. 198.
3. Letter to Bracke, 19875.
4. Andrew Glyn, Capitalism Unleashed. Finance, Globalization, and Welfare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 180.
5. The Economist, June 17, 2006, p. 93.
6. For analytical developments in democratic theory, which is a vast literature, see Santos, Boaventura de Sousa and Leonardo Avritzer, “Opening up the Canon of Democracy in Democratizing Democracy,“ in Santos, Boaventura de Sousa, Ed., Democratizing Democracy: Beyond the Liberal Democratic Canon (London: Verso Books, 2006) p. xxxiv-lxxiv.
7. I am indebted to the Brazilian philosopher Marilena Chauí, a world-renowned specialist in Spinozan philosophy, for initial ideas that inspired me to propose a redefinition of democracy.
