Cali drug lords Gilberto and Miguel Rodriguez
Orejuela rose to the top of the cocaine trade the
old-fashioned way. They got rid of the competition.
Among black marketeers, the easiest way of get-
ting rid of a rival is often to arrange for his or her
capture by the police. In the case of the Rodriguez
brothers, the troublesome rival was Pablo Escobar,
the cocaine godfather of Medellin. Where Escobar
was violent and flamboyant, the Rodriguez brothers
were just the opposite–quiet, publicity-shy busi-
nessmen who preferred making friends to enemies
and liked to get by greasing palms rather than blow-
ing opponents to bits. Even the cops referred to
them as “the gentlemen of Cali.”
Initially, the Cali and Medellin organizations col-
laborated. But something happened that changed
the behavior of the Cali gentlemen, though what it
was is not entirely clear. Perhaps a
glutted cocaine market led to height-
ened trade tension. Perhaps Escobar
took offense when the Rodriguez
brothers refused to join in his mount-
ing war against the Colombian state
(Gilberto’s self-serving explanation for
the rift in a 1991 interview).’ Or per-
haps the boys from Cali perceived a
business advantage in joining a grow-
ing crusade against a competitor who,
all sides agreed, had grown too big
for his britches.
Whatever the case, one thing is cer-
tain: by the early 1990s, the Cali forces
were aiding and abetting the
Colombian government’s campaign to
arrest Escobar and destroy his organi-
zation. Despite their peaceful reputa-
tion, the Call forces reportedly provid-
ed not only information but firepow-
er; as Time magazine put it, they were
“plainly” the motivating force behind
a hit squad known as the PEPES
(People Persecuted by Pablo Escobar),
reportedly responsible for assassinating more than
60 of Escobar’s supporters, associates and employ-
ees. 2 By December, 1993, the goal had been
achieved. Escobar was dead at the hands of the state
security forces, his organization was in disarray, and
the Cali group was firmly ensconced as the No. 1
cocaine-smuggling operation in the world, with bil-
lions a year in revenue.
This was heady stuff for a couple of entrepreneurs
who started life as the sons of an unsuccessful
painter and draughtsman. Gilberto, known as “the
chess-player” for his calm, cerebral style, quit school
at age 15, opened his first drugstore at 25, and, by
the time he was in his 50s, commanded a diversified
I
I
business empire. Although no one knows precisely
when he got into drugs, there is little doubt that
narco-profits were the driving force behind his
above-ground business expansion. Miguel, younger
by a half-dozen years, was usually described as the
more driven of the two, an obsessive Type-A person-
ality who would zealously monitor petty items like
electricity bills and magazine subscriptions to keep
expenses in line. Both described themselves as family
men, sports fans and, in the case of Gilberto, a pas-
sionate poetry devotee. “Most of all I work for the
progress of Colombia,” Gilberto insisted in a 1991
interview. “In Cali alone, I employ more than 4,000
people. This city is the most peaceful and prosperous
in the country.” 3
Perhaps. But drug-enforcement officials say the
Rodriguez brothers used their legal business activi-
ties to launder funds, obtain supplies
and gather intelligence information
needed to keep their underground
operations going. By the mid-1990s,
the Rodriguez brothers were getting
a taste of their own medicine as they
found themselves increasingly under
attack by the United States, by the
Colombian government and by their
own drug rivals. In mid-1995, the
Colombian authorities arrested
Gilberto, Miguel and a number of
their top henchmen. A year later,
narco-assassins opened up on
William Rodriguez, Miguel’s oldest
son and heir apparent, while he was
eating dinner in a Cali restaurant.
William was shot six times but sur-
vived thanks to a bodyguard, who
threw himself in the line of fire and
took 37 slugs intended for his boss. It
was a sign of the Rodriguez clan’s
growing isolation and beleaguer-
ment. A day after the attack, accord-
ing to a Colombian newspaper
report, police intercepted a telephone call in which
Miguel’s chief lieutenant told him: “I don’t know
what to do. You haven’t got a single ally. We haven’t
got anybody, even the ones we called friends are the
ones causing us most harm.” 4 Alone and surround-
ed, the Rodriguez brothers had followed their erst-
while colleague Pablo Escobar to the bottom.E
1. John Moody, “A Day with the Chess Player, Time, July 1,
1991, p. 34.
2. Elizabeth Gleick, “Kingpin Checkmate,” Time, June 19,
1995, p. 32.
3. Tom Quinn, “Passion-fruit Mousse with the ‘King of
Cocaine,’ ” The Sunday Telegraph, June 30, 1991, p. 16.
4. “Tapes Show Colombia Call Kingpins Not Most Powerful,”
Reuters North American Wire, October 13, 1996.
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