Essentially, the movement which formed
around President Aristide’s candidacy
represented an alliance of Haiti’s traditional
merchant bourgeoisie with an array of The L grassroots worker, peasant and student
organizations, commonly referred to as the A lii popular movement.
Since 1986, the traditional bourgeoisie
was represented politically by the “democ- Prc ratic sector,” so called because of its focus
on the mainstays of bourgeois democra- Arisl cy-a constitution and elections-while
eschewing revolutionary tactics, sharp con-
frontation of Duvalierist and U.S. power, PO and radical economic change.’ Democracy
was, for them, a means to overcome the
Duvalierist grip on state power while chan-
neling the revolutionary anger of the Hait-
ian slum-dwellers and peasantry In this sense, the tradi- tional bourgeoisie has been fighting a war on three
fronts. First, the traditional bourgeoisie sought to hold down
and harness the popular uprisings of the Haitian mass- es who were demanding radical economic and political
change. The Haitian masses had generally, since 1986, followed this bourgeoisie’s political lead-most notably
in campaigns for the March 1987 Constitution, the November 1987 elections, and the March 1990
appointment of President Ertha Trouillot. But by late
1990, the Haitian people were looking for alternatives.
On the second front, the traditional bourgeoisie had a
symbiotic rivalry for political power with the land-own-
ing oligarchy, called gwandon, going back almost two
centuries. The gwandon exploit their parceled land- holdings by means of sharecroppers with whom they have feudal relations of production by collecting rent in the form of crops. The traditional bourgeoisie would then sell that agricultural product on the world market.
Historically, whoever controlled power in Port-au-Prince
took the lion’s share of the profit stolen from the Hait-
ian peasant. Trying to protect the oldest and most
entrenched semi-feudal economy in the Western Hemi-
sphere against the incursions of foreign capital, the
Haitian oligarchy is arch-reactionary, opposed to all
social, economic, or political reforms, even those
advanced by the United States. It is represented on the
political spectrum by the Duvalierists-whose armed
expression is the league of thugs called Tontons
Macoute-and the “hard line” in the Army.
Finally, the traditional bourgeoisie,
which imports foreign manufactured
goods and exports agricultural products,
Svalas is also fighting for its economic survival against the onslaught of foreign capital,
tnce which seeks to “modernize” and “Puerto Ricanize” the Haitian economy by intro-
ducing direct foreign investment, thereby
aels cutting out the middleman. Foreign capi- tal, primarily North American, works with
a rival sector of the Haitian bourgeoisie, called the “technocrats.” This sector is
essentially a managerial class tied to the
ver assembly industries and agribusinesses. Its political orientation matches that of
North American businessmen and the
U.S. State Department. Their political
chef de fil was Marc Bazin.
Haiti’s political turmoil since 1986-11 governments
and three coups-is basically a map of the struggle
between these four key sectors: the technocrat bour-
geoisie, the traditional bourgeoisie, the feudal oligarchy,
and the popular movement.
In October, 1990, as national presidential elections
neared, the democratic sector faced a very grim politi-
cal scenario. The oligarchy’s candidate Roger Lafontant, former head of the Tontons Macoute, was rallying
Duvalierists and holding mass demonstrations in down-
town Port-au-Prince. The Army refused to act upon war-
rants for his arrest, and the Duvalierists were clamoring
to be included in the 1990 elections, from which they
were constitutionally barred.
The principal challenge to Lafontant was former
World Bank official Marc Bazin, whose rich, polished,
and oiled electoral machine-financed by the United
States primarily through the NED-was picking up
speed. Bazin was the favorite contender of the U.S. and
multilateral lending agencies to loosen the grip of Haiti’s
Duvalierist landed oligarchy on state power and
finances. The corruption, incompetence and backward-
ness of the Duvalierist bureaucrats hindered the invest-
ment of foreign multinational corporations in agribusi-
ness, mining and light manufacturing. The U.S. embassy
had a dream ticket in a dream situation, where
Lafontant could be the “straw man” for Bazin to con-
front in the elections.
The democratic sector, meanwhile, was in disarray.
Under the banner of the National Front for Change and
Democracy (FNCD), it field-
ed a lackluster candidate, Professor Victor Benoit, in
whom the masses were
completely uninterested.
Faced with flagging politi-
cal fortunes, the traditional
bourgeoisie turned to
Father Jean-Bertrand Aris-
tide, who was identified
with the popular move-
ment and symbolized the
Haitian masses’ aspirations.
He had up to that point
rejected the idea of elec-
tions-especially U.S.-spon-
sored elections-until there Haitians line up to cast their
were structural reforms.
Aristide also had close
contacts with the traditional bourgeoisie. A few rich Haitian merchants had underwritten his education and
travels as a young priest as well as his orphanage,
Lafanmi Selavi. Entreated by the bourgeoisie to run and
seeing that the result of a Bazin/Lafontant contest
would be a U.S./Duvalierist compromise similar to Jean-
Claude Duvalier’s regime, he took the gamble of enter-
ing the race. Benoit was unceremoniously dumped, and
Aristide became the presidential candidate of the FNCD.
This combination of the people’s candidate running
under the bourgeoisie’s banner unleashed the electoral
outpouring that became known as the “Lavalas.” The
word means the “flood” and is a biblical image which
had been evoked by popular organizations since 1986
to convey the purifying and sweeping nature of the
popular uprising that would rid the country of the twin
evils of Duvalierist terror and foreign domination.
The essence of Aristide’s promise was democracy and
nationalism. He was the living embodiment of anti-
Duvalierism, having survived several assassination
attempts from the Tontons Macoute. He promised land
redistribution and an end to the Duvalierist favoritism,
corruption and violence which had so traumatized the
Haitian people since Francois “Papa Doc” Duvalier’s rule
began in 1957. In contrast, both the technocrats and
the democratic sector had often proposed “reconciling”
with the Duvalierists and reuniting the “Haitian family.”
Aristide also embodied anti-imperialism. “We would
rather die standing up, than live on our knees,” he
often repeated during his sermons as a fire-brand priest
at St. Jean Bosco in the Port- au-Prince slum of La Saline.
He was a staunch opponent of the U.S. neoliberal prescrip- tions for Haiti which sought to 1) privatize state-run enter- prises like the telephone com- pany, flour mill, and cement factory, 2) reduce taxes, duties, and wages to suit for- eign investors, 3) cut social
spending and insure regular debt payments to foreign
banks, and 4) foster an export-oriented economy, thereby increasing Haiti’s
allots in the 1990 elections. already great dependence on foreign food and capital.
Aristide’s program called for support for Haiti’s faltering national industries, a land reform to revitalize Haitian agriculture and increase self- sufficiency, stanching the hemorrhage of contraband imports through regional ports, raising the minimum wage, and overhauling the government bureaucracy. Such a program was revolutionary in Haiti. Aristide’s entry into the presidential race only 60 days before the polling allowed him to outwit election strate- gists at the U.S. Embassy, who did not expect his candi-
dacy. The result was perhaps the greatest malfunction of all the U.S. election engineering done since the early 1980s throughout Latin America. Despite the money Bazin distributed throughout the country in an attempt to buy votes and the $36 million spent on his campaign, thousands of Haitians poured into the streets during Aristide’s gigantic campaign rallies chanting “Lipa lajan, non, se volonte, wi” (I’m not here for money, it’s of my free will). Aristide’s electoral victory-with 67% of the vote- was one of the most joyous periods in Haitian history. The popular will triumphed-momentarily-with little violence or repression. He dubbed his own inauguration “Haiti’s Second Independence.”
1. There are also different currents within the “democratic
sector,” roughly corresponding to those “democrats” more aligned with the traditional merchant bourgeoisie-Father Antoine Adrien. Louis Roy, Emmanuel Ambroise and Gladys Lauture-and those more aligned with U.S.-backed capital- Jean-Claude Roy, Serge Gilles, Jean-Jacques Honorat and Moise Senatus.
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