Events in Guatemala and El
Salvador in the months since the
Sandinista victory have provided a
gold mine for “domino theorists”.
In an upsurge of militant actions in
August, members of the Popular
Revolutionary Bloc in El Salvador
took over six factories in the
capital city, while another group of
workers staged a hunger strike in
the main cathedral. The latter
were joined by 150 supporters in
other churches demanding re-
spect for workers’ rights and pro-
testing the cold-blooded murder of
an activist priest by right-wing
forces. Then in early September,
the Popular Liberation Forces (or
FPL, the country’s largest guerrilla
organization) assassinated the
brother of Salvadorean president
Carlos Romero. The following
week thousands of Bloc members
defied a government ban on all
demonstrations. They marched
through the streets of the capital in
a funeral procession for as-
sassinated members of their
organization, even though several
people had been killed the
previous day when troops fired in-
to a crowd of demonstrators.
In Guatemala, the government
broke up a large demonstration
celebrating the FSLN victory, but
was unable to stop smaller rallies
throughout the country. The July
kidnapping of the vice-minister of
foreign affairs by the Rebel Armed
Forces (FAR) was followed in early
August by a militant strike by over
2000 banana workers protesting
the kidnapping of their union
leaders. After a support strike by
7000 workers on a neighboring
plantation the unionists were
released and won indemnity pay-
ments for themselves and striking
workers. Meanwhile students stag-
ed a nine day nationwide strike
against the repressive policies of
the Ministry of Education, and the
Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP)
stepped up their armed propagan-
da actions throughout the country.
Even normally peaceful Costa
Rica experienced a general strike
by workers at the country’s main
port of Limon and the threat of a
strike by public sector unions.
NEW BALANCE OF FORCES
While the recent upsurge in
popular militancy hardly confirms
the falling domino theory, the San-
dinista victory in Nicaragua has in-
troduced an important new ele-
ment to the political balance of
forces in the region, It has given a
powerful impulse to popular move-
ments in the rest of Central
America. At the same time, it has
touched off fears in both local and
U.S. ruling circles that revolution
might come to other countries in
the region.
These fears have a basis in
reality. The military regimes in
Guatemala and El Salvador are in-
capable of dealing with mounting
popular rebellion except by es-
calating their repression. And
Somoza’s downfall also leaves the
remaining dictatorships weakened
and internationally isolated.
Somoza was known as the Central
American “godfather”. His
business empire extended
throughout the region as did his
SeptlOct 1979
political strongarm. He helped
stage electoral frauds in
Guatemala -and sent his air force
to put down rebellions in El
Salvador. During the recent war in
Nicaragua, both countries
reciprocated by sending arms and
soldiers to defend Somoza, a
move that did not help their
popularity in Latin America. In re-
cent months, Venezuelan social
democratic leader Carlos Andres
Perez has called the Guatemalan
and Salvadorean dictatorships
“autocracies as abominable as
Somoza’s, dressed up in electoral
clothes.” And even the Honduran
military Junta has pleaded “not to
be measured with the same yard-
stick as the other two military
governments.”
The destabilizing impact of the
victory on the popular political
consciousness in Central America
has been considerable. Radio San-
dino is easily heard throughout
Central America, and the course
of the popular war against Somoza
was followed closely. Both the left
and the popular masses have un-
doubtedly drawn lessons from the
successes in Nicaragua.
Besides a step up in activity by
revolutionary groups, there are
also signs of growing coordination
among different organizations in
Guatemala and El Salvador. Ac-
cording to the Mexican daily Ex-
celsior, the FPL has started talks
with the country’s other major
armed revolutionary organizations,
the Armed Forces of National
Resistance (FARN) and the small-
er People’s Revolutionary Army.
The FPL spokesperson is quoted
as saying, “Until now, our
movements have been isolated
from each other, and due to an ab-
surd ideological competition, there
were divisions and even mutual at-
tacks, although we all have Marx-
ist orientation. But, since
Nicaragua this has begun to
change…
Communications have also
stepped up among the revolu-
tionary organizations of Gua-
temala. The New York Times
recently quoted “high Guatemalan
sources” in reporting talks among
the Guerrilla Army of the Poor
(EGP), the Rebel Armed Forces
(FAR) and a wing of the Com-
munist Party that is open to armed
struggle.
CONTAINING THE REVOLUTION
The destablilizing impact of the
Sandinista victory has touched off
a major debate within the Carter
Administration over how to deal
with the situation in Central Ameri-
ca. Hard-liners in the intelligence
community are arguing for renew-
ed military aid and unqualified sup-
port for the two dictatorships.
State Department officials, on the
other hand, have opted for a dif-
ferent strategy to stem the revolu-
tionary tide, more in line with the
one they are pursuing in
Nicaragua (see article in this Up-
date). They are desperately trying to
get the Salvadorean and Gua-
temalan governments to take
some steps towards political
liberalization before it is “too late”.
As one State Department official
told the Senate recently, “The
central issue is not whether
change is to occur, but whether
that change is to be violent and
radical or peaceful and evolu-
tionary.” During recent visits to El
Salvador, Under Secretary of
State Viron Vaky and former U.S.
special negotiator in Nicaragua
William Bowdler put heavy pres-
sure on President Romero to make
at least some minimal democratic
reforms. In response, Romero has
45update . update update. update
promised municipal and congres-
sional elections for 1980 (to be
supervised by the OAS), and has
allowed moderate opposition
figures to return from exile abroad.
Both of these actions were warmly
praised by the Carter Administra-
tion. Similarly, the Lucas govern-
ment in Guatemala has announc-
ed that civilians will probably run
for president in 1982.
While trying to make political
capital of these window-dressing
reforms, the dictatorships have
not lessened their fierce repres-
sion of the popular movements.
Guatemala’s death squads con-
tinue to claim seven to eight vic-
tims daily. And in El Salvador,
where government controlled
death squads murdered 280 peo-
ple during May and June, the kill-
ing of activists continues
unabated. As outspoken govern-
ment critic Archbishop Oscar
Romero of San Salvador summed
up Romero’s response, “The
government reacts to pressure
from the U.S., but it doesn’t
believe its own statements. The
continuing repression indicates
there is little interest in a
democratic opening. Free elec-
tions are a promise that no one
believes in.”
U.S. policy makers are in a
Catch-22 bind in Central America.
Without democratic reforms there
are sure to be revolutionary explo-
sions in both El Salvador and
Guatemala. On the other hand, “moderate” solutions are next to
impossible. As the military regimes
realize, any let-up in repression
would be quickly taken advantage
of by the popular movement. In-
deed, right-wing critics of Romero
(some of them within the armed
forces itself) are accusing him of
being too lenient with the left, and
rumors of a possible coup are cir-
46
culating in the country.
Moreover, the moderate opposi-
tion in both Guatemala and El
Salvador is almost totally
discredited, as are electoral
strategies for change. With almost
no mass base, groups like the
Christian Democrats in Guatemala
are seen as ineffectual at best and
government stooges at worst. In
addition, the leading “moderate”
parties there, the Social Demo-
crats and the United Front of the
Revolution, have been pushed fur-
ther left recently by the murder or
exile of several of their prominent
leaders. Both of these groups now
belong to the Democratic Front
Against Repression, a coalition led
by militant unions and peasant
organizations.
ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY DESTABILIZATION
The new balance of forces in
Central America in the wake of the
Sandinista victory has also sent a
tremor of anxiety through business
circles, leading to a sizeable flight
of capital. During July around
$200 million was transferred from
El Salvador to banks in Miami. In
Guatemala, an estimated $40 mil-
lion left the country and new in-
vestment has slowed to a virtual
standstill. Many transnationals
have been closing up shop recent-
ly, partly because of uncertain
economic conditions.
A major concern of local and
foreign capitalists is the shaky
future of the Central American
Common Market (CACM). If the
new Nicaraguan government with-
draws from the regional trade
grouping as rumored, the already
weakened CACM could very well
collapse.
Those who stand to lose the
most would be U.S. based trans-
nationals with operations in the
region, as well as industrialists
from Guatemala and El Salvador
(which together account for about
60% of exports within the
region ). Costa Rica and Hon-
duras, whose trade balance with
other CACM members has been
consistently negative, are already
chafing at the bit. Honduras, only a
partial participant since the 1969
war with El Salvador, is demanding
special treatment as a condition
for renewed participation. Costa
Rica, almost totally isolated
economically from its northern
neighbors during the war in
Nicaragua, is already calling for
expanded trade with other Latin
American countries to offset the
possible loss of the region-wide
market.
Militarily as well, events in
Nicaragua have upset regional
coordination among Central
America’s ruling circles. The new
Nicaraguan government has with-
drawn from CONDECA (Consejo
de Defensa Centro Americano), a
regional military grouping set up
with U.S. backing in 1964 to coor-
dinate Central American armies,
particularly their counter-
revolutionary activities.
Nicaragua’s withdrawal may have
dealt a fatal blow to the grouping,
whose remaining members are
Honduras, Guatemala and El
Salvador. The presidents of these
three countries, who met several
times recently to discuss the situa-
tion in Central America in the wake
of Somoza’s fall, have already pro-
posed forming a new military
alliance. Their aim is clearly to join
forces in preventing “another
Nicaragua” in Central America.
Menu
