Dateline

For the second time in less than a decade,
Ecuador is attempting to make the transition
from dictatorship to democratic rule. The first
attempt. in 1972, ended in dismal failure. The
elections scheduled to end the civilian
dictatorship of Velasco Ibarra were preempted
by a military coup. Today, the military
itself is preparing to step down and hold
Presidential elections in 1978.
Why this graceful retreat to the barracks?
Contrary to official rhetoric, the military’s
decision to relinquish power can hardly stem
from a sense of “mission accomplished” or “a
job well done.” The military government that
seized power in 1972 called itself “nationalist
and revolutionary.” Its claim to legitimacy
was its pledge to carry out fundamental
reforms and to “end the monopoly of wealth
by a privileged few.” The balance sheet, after
5 years of military rule, shows that no reforms
have been implemented; that land tenure has
remained untouched; that conditions have
deteriorated for the popular masses, despite
the expectations aroused by the discovery and
export of oil. Instead, the military rulers of
Ecuador have carried out the dictates of the
ruling class, by substituting repression for
reform and providing a stable climate for
investment.
Candidate Asaad Bucaram
Having abandoned its reformist tasks, the
military has lost all support from progressive
and popular sectors. Yet the main pressure for
a return to civilian rule has come from within
the ruling class itself. Eager to resume direct
control of the state apparatus, Ecuador’s
traditional parties have been calling for free
elections since 1974. Initially, the government
resisted such pressures. But in 1976, a new
group of officers took power in a bloodless
coup and proclaimed the restoration of
“democracy” as its primary task.
Immediately, the wheels of the electoral
machinery were set in motion. A national
plebiscite was planned for mid-1977 to vote on
a new constitution, and Presidential elections
were set for January, 1978. An assortment of
miniscule parties, devoid of any mass base,
met to plan their political comeback.
To date, more than 20 parties or movements,
the majority situated on the right wing
of the political spectrum, have declared their
intention to participate in the elections. The
list of probable candidates is packed with the
familiar names of Ecuador’s ruling elite,
including several past presidents.
Despite these elaborate preparations, however,
many are doubtful that the elections will
ever take place. Indeed, a replay of 1972, with
virtually the same cast of characters, is not
improbable. The man most likely to win any
freely held elections in 1978-as in 1972-is
Asaad Bucaram, candidate of the populist
CFP (Concentracion de Fuerzas Populares).
One-time mayor of Guayaquil, Bucaram draws
his largest following from the suburblee, the
sprawling slums of the coastal cities. He is
regarded as quasi-fascist by the Left and
dangerously demagogic by the Right.
In 1972, the probable victory of Bucaram
prompted a military coup. If elections are held
in 1978, Bucaram is predicted to win 40% of
the vote, with no other candidate winning
more than 25%.
It came as no surprise, then, when the
military announced last month that the
election schedule would have to be pushed
back for at least nine months. The official
explanation-bureaucratic delays in voter
registration-left few people convinced. Rather,
it appears that the military-and the ruling
class-are stalling for time to ensure the
election of a suitable successor.
Several scenarios have been suggested as
possible outcomes of this process.
0 Since the President must be elected by an
absolute majority, the possibility of a second
round, or run-off, has led to frantic attempts
to form alliances among the splintered parties
of the Center and Right. The Conservative
Party has called for a National Civic Front to
counter the CFP menace, while parties of the
Center (Christian Democrats, Democratic
Left, etc.) have proposed a Center-Left
Coalition. It is still much too early to tell
whether any of these proposed coalitions
would stand a chance of beating Bucaram on
the second round.
0 If this coalition-building seems doomed to
failure, many believe that the military will
appoint an interim civilian President. The
most likely candidate for the post is Galo Plaza
-past President of the Republic (1948-1952)
and current President of the Electoral
Tribunal. The interim President would then
convoke a constituent assembly as a prelude
to new elections.
* If all else fails, both the military and the
ruling class would probably prefer a perpetuation
of military rule to a Bucaram Administration.
Currently, a wave of strikes in the cities
and peasant unrest in the countryside are
being severely repressed by the military
government. They could easily be used as a
pretext for postponing a return to constitutional
rule and sharpening the repressive
character of the present regime.
While the electoral maneuvers of the ruling
class and the military continue, the Ecuadorean
working class, the peasantry and the
popular masses view the process with
increasing apathy. Parties on the Left are still
too weak to provide an organizational alternative.
Yet whether the outcome of this process
is a civilian or military form of government,
the new regime will most certainly be faced
with growing popular unrest and a more
organized working class and peasantry.
As a continuation of its past work (see
Volume IX, No. 8, Ecuador: OU Up for Grabs),
NACLA will continue to provide periodic
analyses of events in Ecuador over the coming
year. By Janet Shenk
BIBLIOGRAPHY
NACLA’s Report on Ecuador (Vol. IX, no. 8) is still
available and provides an excellent list of biblio
graphical sources on Ecuador. Since its publication,
however, several new studies have appeared that
may be of interest to our readers.
Equateur: Nouvelle Strategle de L’lmperiallsm:
Reformisme Bourgeois et Lutte des Classes, June.
1976. Available in French from CEDETIM. 94 rue
Notre Dame des Champs, Paris 6. CCP France
17.546.1o.
Ecuadort Grietaa en La Dontnalon, by Pairicio
Jioncayo. 1977.’ Available in Spanish from the
Escuela de Ciencias de la Informacion, Universidad
Central, Quito. Ecuador.
El Capltallimo Ecuatoriano Contemporaneo: So
Fundonamileto, by Cesar Verduga. 1976 Available
in Spanish from the Instituto de Investiga.
clones Economicas y Politicas. Faculiad de Ciencias
Economicas, Universidad de Guayaquil. Ecuador.
27
DATELINE e DATELINE
(GUYANA
CHEDDI JAGAN INTERVIEW
To many observers, recent developments
in the small (population I million),
English-speaking country of Guyana
appear quite contradictory. Although the
present Forbes Burnham government
rose to power on the coattails of a by-now
classic CIA destabilization attempt in the
mid-1960 ‘s, Burnham’s People’s National
Congress party [PNC has recently moved
the country to a radically different path.
Burnham has linked Guyana to the b6lc of
non-aligned countries, established
friendly relations with Cuba, nationalized
the nation’s important bauxite mines and
proposed to bring a system of “cooperative
socialism ” to Guyana.
Is Guyana developing as a progressive,
anti-imperialist force on an increasingly
repressive continent? Do Burnham’s
policies warrant the support of progressive
forces in Guyana? These were
some of the questions put to the former
Prime Minister ofGuyana, CheddiJagan,
when he visited NACLA-East in April
Jagan, whose grandparents came to
the then British Guyana from India as
indentured immigrants and whose parents
were sugar workers, first came to the
government in 1953 when his People’s
Progressive Party (PPP) won the elections.
Shortly after, the British intervened,
claiming a “Communist takeover”
of the government, and dismissed
Jagan. He came back to win the general
elections in 1957 and again in 1961. In
1962-63, the country was beset by a series
of strikes and lock-outs which-as was
disclosed later–were the handiwork of
the CIA and its allies in the AFL-CIO.
The destabilization campaign again
knocked Jagan out ojoffice.
What follows is a summary of some of
the issues discussed by Dr. Jagan during
his visit to the NACLA offices.
According to Dr. Jagan, the Forbes
Burnham government is essentially a
reformist regime in the mold of the
Chilean Christian Democratic government
of Eduardo Frei. Much as Frei,
Burnham sees a type of “cooperative
socialism” as the solution to the nation’s
economic problems. Such a solution
proposes that production be organized on
the basis of cooperatives (without defining
either the question of ownership or
the nature of the relations of production
on the cooperatives), and that the
cooperative sector of the economy would
become the dominant area.
In a similar vein, Burnham has
undertaken the nationalization of several
of Guyana’s largest bauxite producers,
including the Reynolds Metals Company’s
subsidiary, Guyana Mines Limited.
But much remains hazy on the
nature of the agreement between
Reynolds and Guyana. The nationalization
occurred after Guyana slapped a
higher tax on bauxite production.
Reynolds refused to pay and took the
issue to court. Soon after, however, the
case was withdrawn and the company
nationalized. The question remains why
Reynolds was willing to pay a similar tax
in Jamaica and not in Guyana. One
possibility, put forward by Jagan, is that
the terms of the nationalization settlement
were far more favorable than
producing under the new tax. Again, this
can be compared to the U.S. copper
companies’ acceptance of the very favorable
“Chileanization” of copper under
Frei.
In the end, however, Burnham’s
reformist solution, referred to as “people’s
capitalism” by one PNC minister,
has resulted in more intense economic
problems in Guyana rather than in any
resolution of those contradictions. By the
early 1970’s Guyana was beset by a high
rate of inflation, declining production in
rice and sugar-two of the country’s most
important crops-financial problems, and
the existence of a large bureaucracy
created by the PNC. Given these
conditions, Burnham increasingly resorted
to force to crush the labor
movement when it pressed for higher
wages or better conditions. Such was the
case in the important sugar workers
strike of 1971.
Even though Burnham’s reformism
heightened many of the contradictions
inherent in the Guyanese economic
system, the intensification of class struggle
arising out of those contradictions
began to push Burnham to adopt more
progressive stands on many measures.
The major factor in this has been the
increasing unity within the working class,
particularly between sugar workers and
bauxite workers. Since the major strike
of sugar workers in 1971, for example,
bauxite and sugar workers have come out
in support of each other’s struggles. This
growing unity is undercutting generations
of working class divisions based on
race, divisions highlighted by the fact
that most of the PPP’s support originally
came from East Indians (particularly
sugar workers), while the PNC drew its
support from the Black population (urban
and bauxite workers). Together with
other factors, this growing unity has
28
DATELINE DATELINE
pushed Burnham to the Left of his own
PNC. Thus, he has become a strong
supporter of the consortium of bauxite
exporting countries and adopted a more
independent foreign policy including the
strengthening of ties with Cuba and
North Korea.
CRITICAL SUPPORT
These moves have led Jagan and the
PPP to adopt a posture of “critical
support” for the Burnham government,
supporting its anti-imperialist and progressive
measures, opposing any reactionary
policies adopted by the PNC, and
criticizing any obstacles the government
places in the path of worker unity or the
struggle for socialism. Within this policy,
adopted at the PPP’s 1975 congress,
Jagan argues that the balance “can be
weighted more toward the criticism than
the support” due to the balance of forces
in Guyana at the present time. Jagan
sees the greatest danger to Guyana’s
march toward socialism in the right-wing
of the PNC, a fairly weak faction which
lacks a mass base in the country. And,
while Burnham has been trying to
mobilize support for his own position by
arguing that the greatest danger to the
workers comes from the outside (i.e., the
United States, Brazil or Venezuela),
Jagan argues that the main danger is an
internal one should the Right be able to
gain control of the PNC.
Jagan and the PPP see two ways in
which the working class could achieve
power in Guyana. The first is by means
of a political solution. This would imply
the formation of a broad national government
to represent the interests of the
working class, peasantry, progressive
intelligentsia and merchants. Jagan does
not rule the PNC out of such an alliance,
but sees their participation as unlikely
since the PNC “will not consider this if
they are not the ruling force.”
The strength of the Marxist force in
such an alliance, as well as the strength
of the Right will determine, in the final
analysis, if the struggle will be a violent
one, according to Jagan. Should the
political solution fail, Jagan argued that
Guyanese would have to be mobilized
across class and racial lines to prepare for
a confrontation.
By Steve Volk
Back issues of NACLA’S
Latin America and Empire Report
VOLUME X: 1976
Vol. X, no. 1; THE PENTAGON’S
PROTOGES
Latin American Militaries: Two Models,
Many Problems (4 pgs.)
From MAP to FMS: Security on a Cash
Basis (4 pgs.)
Finishing Schools for Gorillas: U. S.
Military Training (10 pgs.)
Urban Counter-Insurgency Operations
(3 pgs.)
U. S. Military Assistance Programs,
1946-75 (Chart) (4 pgs.)
Charts on Training of Foreign Military
Personnel (4 pgs.)
29
VENE;
BRAZIL
Volumes X (1976) and XI (1977)
ORDER FROM:
NACLA-East: P.O. Box 57,
Cathedral Station,
New York, N.Y. 10025
NACLA-West: P.O. Box 226,
Berkeley, California 94701
PRICE: All Issues cost $1.25
plus 254 postage
29
DATELINE * DATELINE
Vol. X, no. 2: NICARAGUA
Sandino and the Rise of Somoza (5
pgs.)
Somoza: State and Estate (4 pgs.)
Central American Fixer (4 pgs.)
Washington’s Baby (9 pgs.)
The Revolutionary Challenge (9 pgs.)
Major Foreign Investments (3 pgs.)
Vol. X, no. 3: AMAZING GRACE: THE
W. R. GRACE CORPORATION
The Story of W. R. Grace and Co. (12
pgs.)
Grace’s Chemical Reaction (9 pgs.)
Last Tango in Lima (7 pgs.)
Vol. X, no. 4: CHASE’S ROCKY ROAD
(THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK)
The Genesis of Chase (2 pgs.)
Chase in Latin America (6 pgs.)
Puerto Rico in New York (3 pgs.)
Workers’ Pensions (7 pgs.)
Chase’s Work Force (4 pgs.)
Financing Black Capitalism (7 pgs.)
Bankers’ Coup in New York City (5
pgs.)
Vol. X, no. 5: U. S. UNIONS IN PUERTO
RICO
Early Courtship (4 pgs.)
Tying the Knot (8 pgs.)
Marriage on the Rocks, Militancy on
the Rise! (8 pgs.)
Teamsters in High Gear (8 pgs.)
Vol. X, no. 6: HARVEST OF ANGER:
AGRO-IMPERIALISM IN MEXICO’S
NORTHWEST
The Unmaking of the Mexican Revolution
(7 pgs.)
Runaway Crops: The Big Tomato Deal
(6 pgs.)
Organizing in the Sunshine State
(1 pg.)
Dope, Dollars and Death: The Mexican
Heroin Connection (1 pg.)
Merchants of Repression: U. S. Police
Exports to the Third World (8 pgs.)
Vol. X, no. 7: BITTER FRUITS: THE
DEL MONTE CORPORATION
California: Planting the Seeds of
Empire (8 pgs.)
Unrest in the Canneries (1 pg.)
Mexico: Canned Imperialism (4 pgs.)
Hawaii & Philippines: Plantation Plunder
(7 pgs.)
Del Monte’s African Safari (1 pg.)
Guatemala: Del Monte’s “Banana
Republic” (7 pgs.)
Vol X, no. 8: OIL IN THE CARIBBEAN,
FOCUS ON TRINIDAD
The Caribbean Export Refining Center
(11 pgs.)
Focus on Trinidad (16 pgs.)
Caribbean Island Refineries and Associated
Facilities (Chart) (pg. 1)
Vol. X, no. 9: CHILE: RECYCLING THE
CAPITALIST CRISIS
The Capitalist Crisis and the Chilean
Coup (9 pgs.)
Political Economy of the Junta (14
pgs.)
Perspectives: Alternatives & Alliances
(5 pgs.)
Vol. X, no. 10: TIME OF RECKONING:
THE U.S. AND CHILE
The Policy Dilemma (8 pgs.)
Death Merchants (1 pg.)
The Debt Dilemma (5 pgs.)
Investment Dilemma (6 pgs.)
Foreign Investments Over $100,000
Since Sept. 1973 (Chart) (1 pg.)
Banks to the Rescue (2 pgs.)
Aid: Facts and Figures (5 pgs.)
VOLUME XI: 1977
Vol. XI, no. 1: ARGENTINA
Argentina: The War Goes On (14 pgs.)
Firmenich: A Political Analysis
(6 pgs.)
Bankrolling the Junta (Chart) (1 pg.)
Sources and Resources (1 pg.)
Arms, Technology & Dependency-
U. S. Military Co-Production Projects
Abroad (Chart) (6 pgs.)
Dateline (6 pgs.)
Vol. XI, no. 2: NO ISSUE
Vol. XI, no. 3: CAPITAL’S FLIGHT: THE
APPAREL INDUSTRY MOVES SOUTH
The Needle Trades (6 pgs.)
An Industry on Wheels (7 pgs.)
Labor’s Response (15 pgs.)
Dateline (7 pgs.)
Vol. XI, no. 4: ELECTRONICS: THE
GLOBAL INDUSTRY
Run for Their Money (8 pgs.)
The View From Abroad (7 pgs.)
The Job You Save May Be Your Own
(7 pgs.)
Dateline (6 pgs.)
30
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HUMAN RIGHTS
IN CHILE
TO THE PEOPLE OF THE WORLD
a 21 minute color documentary
-featuring the personal accounts of Laura Allende
and Carmen Castillo, both released from prison
as a result of international pressure
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and in the International Solidarity movement
“Each woman, each group, can spend just a little time
organizing campaigns, participating in this way in the great
historical task of liberation of the people of Latin America.”
Laura Allende
111110
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