A Guide to Basics

Foreign policy is the web of guidelines and plans that a government weaves
to manage its relations with the rest of the world. In U.S. foreign policy, there
are two basic categories: national security policy, which regulates the use of
political and military force to protect and advance U.S. interests; and foreign
economic policy, designed to protect and promote the competitive position of
U.S. banks, corporations and currency.
In the United States, conceiving, planning, implementing and evaluating
foreign policy falls to a narrow elite. Its members are leaders of some major
banks and corporations, the military and the legal community, the top
echelons of labor, academia and the media. Its task is highly abstract, demand-
ing mental subtlety, meticulous care, a skill for advocacy, a self-confidence
bordering on arrogance. It is a closed little world which we will call the
Foreign Policy Establishment, or FPE. 1
The FPE shapes the environment and parameters of foreign policy debate.
It defines the issues in specialist journals, at think tanks, research institutes
and policy centers, in the columns of The Washington Post and The New York
Times. It is there, rather than in official statements or congressional
testimony, that the observer can best discern a particular administration’s
stance on foreign policy questions. Elite debate provides the raw material of
policy; an elaborate process of refinement turns it into instructions for the
ambassadors, foreign service officers and bureaucrats who make it reality.
Which is not to say that administration officials stand outside the FPE. The
heads of the State and Defense Departments, the National Security Council,
the U.N. delegation and the CIA are usually at its heart, as are many depart-
mental undersecretaries and assistant secretaries. The FPE includes people
from inside and outside government, both supporters and opponents of cur-
rent policy. It is no monolith; FPE members’ views cover the whole spectrum
of acceptable political and economic opinion, and with the stakes so high
policy debate may give rise to bitter polemic.
Until recently, the bulk of the FPE came from the East, were graduates of
Eastern prep schools and Ivy League colleges, partners in Wall Street law
firms or investment houses, members of the Council on Foreign Relations in
New York. They published in Foreign Affairs, attended the Episcopal, Con-
gregational or Presbyterian church; were white, male and middle-aged.
Lately, though, Demos and its foundling, New Money, have invaded the
sanctums of the FPE, bringing graduates of Stanford, UCLA and the
University of Texas, bankers and lawyers from Los Angeles, Houston and
Atlanta, women and minorities. They may still belong to the Council, but
more likely to the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International
Studies, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institution. They publish in
Washington Quarterly, Policy Review, Commentary.
The FPE is in a constant ferment of debate. This debate produces
“camps,” and camp-watching is a favorite pastime of both the FPE and its
critics. Several camps are identifiable, but all share a common view that the
chief objective of U.S. foreign policy is to contain the spread of Soviet influ-
ence and preserve U.S. interests. Their disagreements revolve around how
to do this.
“THE CHIEF
OBJECTIVE OF
U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY IS TO
CONTAIN THE
SPREAD OF
SOVIET
INFLUENCE.”24 NACLA Report
“THE
REAGAN
CAMP ARE
GLOBALISTS
PAR
EXCELLENCE.”
Within the beleaguered Carter Administration, observers spotted two
camps: globalists and regionalists. The former saw the world’s crises in tradi-
tional Cold War terms, seeing in each a confrontation with the Soviet Union.
The regionalists preferred to focus on the local roots of a problem, mistrust-
ing the Cold War framework. Central America was a clear illustration of the
strain between these two positions as the Reagan Administration came to
power. And the Reagan camp are globalists par excellence.
One camp watcher from outside the FPE offers an interesting analysis of
the two basic camps in contention: one he calls the “Prussians,” the other the
“Traders.” 2 The Prussians within the FPE, supported by the military estab-
lishment and defense-related industries, favor the use and expansion of U.S.
military forces to manage the global crisis. The Traders, meanwhile,
representing the giant transnational corporations and banks, see the expan-
sion of world trade and the use of economic leverage as the best weapon to
overcome the crisis of U.S. dominance.
These debates rage within the two major parties, and the party convention
is their place of resolution. As the coalitions come together, the advocates of
opposing positions will hammer out their differences. From the compromise
will emerge the party platform, which will embody the candidate’s electoral
“. . . AND IT SOUNDED LIKE IT.”
SWEIGERT, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE
President Truman, depicted in Sweigert’s cartoon, established a trend in presidential ignorance of foreign
policy matters which has continued through successive administrations.Nov/Dec 1983
positions on domestic and foreign policy. The FPE experts who steered the
issue this far will now be incorporated into the campaign team to help the
speechwriters and media specialists to package the candidate’s “views.”
Finally, if the candidate is successful, the expert may find him/herself in a
senior position within the incoming administration; the plum is power, and a
desk on the Seventh Floor of the State Department.
The Foreign Affairs Bureaucracy,
The principal responsibility for foreign relations is vested by the Constitu-
tion in the executive branch. Constitutionally, the State Department is in
charge of U.S. foreign relations, but since World War II other departments
have made increasing inroads. Today, the Defense Department, the National
Security Council, the Treasury Department and the Departments of Com-
merce, Agriculture and Labor all enjoy a foreign policy role. So too do a
number of government agencies and independent governmental corpora-
tions: the Export-Import Bank, the Inter-American Foundation, the Inter-
national Development Cooperation Agency and the Peace Corps.
A favorite media story is the inner circle conflict between policymakers and
managers. Some of these clashes are rooted in the very nature of a complex
bureaucracy.* Though bureaucracy is designed to clarify responsibilities and
streamline decision-making-using the model, say some theorists, of the
modern army-it may engender just the opposite. Reality does not fit easily
into the bureaucrat’s niches, and with overlap and competition comes inef-
ficient management.
For some bureaucrats, control over bureaucratic resources becomes an
end in itself. A particular bureau may be the source of influence and power;
there are resources to allocate and loyalties to cultivate. The logical outcome
is empire-building and bureaucratic turf fights, compounded by genuine
policy disagreements and magnified by personality clashes. The Reagan
Administration has had more than its share: Kirkpatrick vs. Haig; Clark vs.
Haig; Clark vs. Shultz; Kirkpatrick vs. Enders. Under Carter, the clash be-
tween Brzezinski (national security adviser) and Vance (secretary of state)
was notorious.
Once upon a time, foreign affairs were simpler. Not until 1893 did the
United States exchange ambassadors with the European countries; until then
it had made do with “ministers plenipotentiary.”‘ In 1940 the State Depart-
ment had only 6,000 employees and effectively monopolized foreign policy.
But the United States emerged from World War II as the most powerful
nation in the world, and with corresponding global interests. A State Depart-
ment pamphlet describes what happened: “Global responsibilities required a
more complicated foreign relations machinery.”‘ The Departments of the
Treasury and Commerce assumed a new role in managing U.S. economic
“REALITY
DOES NOT FIT
EASILY
INTO THE
BUREAU-
CRAT’S
NICHES.”
*Foreign affairs is the job of 36,000 employees, excluding the Defense Department, which
employs approximately one million people in both foreign and domestic functions. Those at
the top level are political appointees of the president, usually with Senate consent. Below
them are the civil servants, specialists who are not subject to presidential patronage.
2526
NACLA Report
“OVER THE
NEXT
DECADE,
STATE LOST
ITS FOREIGN
POLICY
MONOPOLY.”
”
interests. In 1947, in an Orwellian moment, the War Department became the
Defense Department, while the National Security Council was created in the
Office of the Presidency to coordinate foreign policy.
Over the next decade, State lost its foreign policy monopoly. President
John E Kennedy was repeatedly frustrated by the stodgy State Department
bureaucracy, and became the first president to rely heavily on his national
security adviser at the expense of the secretary of state. In the first Nixon Ad-
ministration, Henry Kissinger’s conflicts as national security adviser with
Secretary of State William Rogers pointed to a structural tension between the
NSC and the State Department which has been repeatedly visible since.
In the early 1970s, further tensions surfaced. With the breakdown of the
Bretton Woods monetary agreement and the oil embargo, the Treasury
Department increasingly guided foreign policy towards Europe and Japan.
Acrimony between Defense and State has also been a recurrent theme since
Kennedy. In September 1983, Fred Ikl6, undersecretary of defense for
policy, strongly implied in a speech in Baltimore that the United States was
pursuing a military victory in Central America. At once the word in
Washington was that State had been eclipsed. Defense, in conjunction with
then National Security Adviser Clark and U.N. Ambassador Kirkpatrick, was dictating Central American policy.
The tate Department
Not far from the Vietnam War Memorial, in a part of Washington called
Foggy Bottom, stands the nondescript building of the State Department, which in 1981 employed 13,000 people. Power is concentrated on the seventh
floor, where the secretary of state, the deputy secretary and five undersecre-
taries review recommendations passed up from the lower floors. On those
floors, offices are divided up according to regions and functions. Five bur-
eaus, each headed by an assistant secretary of state, are in charge of policy for
major geographical areas: 1. African Affairs; 2. East Asian and Pacific Af-
fairs; 3. European Affairs; 4. Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs;
5. Inter-American Affairs. The bureaus advise the secretary on policy formu-
lation, guide embassy operation and chair interdepartmental groups on
regional problems.
The functional bureaus-again headed by assistant secretaries-cover
economic and business affairs; intelligence and research; international
organizations; congressional relations; politico-military affairs; oceans, envi-
ronmental and scientific affairs; human rights and humanitarian affairs;
public affairs; refugee programs; protocol; and combatting terrorism.
Again, these offices monitor events, formulate policy options and develop
“policy guidance” (or the official line) rather than making the big decisions.
The State Department also has general supervisory responsibility for:
* THE ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY: re-
sponsible for negotiating arms control with the Soviet Union.
* AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (AID): ad-
ministers the principal U.S. overseas assistance programs.
G ZNov/Dc 1983 27
* INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION
AGENCY: coordinates all overseas aid programs for different branches of
government.
* U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY (USIA): the U.S. propaganda
agency, selling policies and programs through books, cultural programs and
the media.
The smooth coordination of so many diverse agencies calls for the creation
of ad hoc working groups. To deal with a crisis such as Central America, for
example, Assistant Secretary of State Langhorne Motley of the Bureau of
Inter-American Affairs would chair an inter-agency/inter-bureau group em-
bracing Policy Planning, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Politico-
Military Affairs, Economic and Business Affairs, AID and USIA.
Finally, State is responsible for U.S. embassies around the world-in
1982, there were 151 in operation. In each, the ambassador acts as personal
representative of the president. But the ambassador does not personally over-
see all embassy functions; his own staff is relatively small-just a political of-
ficer, economic officer, administrative officer and consul. Most embassies
also include non-Foreign Service staff, for example Foreign Agricultural Ser-
vice, CIA and commercial officers, defense attaches and the military mission
(Milgroup) who all answer to their own department in Washington. Other
governmental agencies may also operate within the embassy frame-
work-the Drug Enforcement Agency, for instance, or the Federal Aviation
Administration.
The Department of Defense
Defense is responsible for the maintenance and development of the U.S. armed forces and the technology of war: new weapons, telecommunications
systems, etc. To advise the secretary, the undersecretary of defense for policy heads what is sometimes called the “Little State Department.” Two bureaus
are particularly important, those of International Security Policy and Inter-
national Security Affairs. The first draws up long- and mid-range security
policy on the U.S./Soviet conflict, NATO, Europe and Disarmament. The second is in charge of policy and programs everywhere except Europe, NATO and the USSR. It supervises U.S. military aid programs, the military
groups attached to foreign embassies and bilateral military agreements. Like State, it is divided into regional directorates, each under a deputy assistant secretary who is, in turn, answerable to the assistant secretary for the area. (The present deputy assistant secretary for inter-American affairs is Nestor D. Sanchez.) The bureau coordinates with State, but has its own policy plan- ning staff. It receives its military advice from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and is chiefly responsible for assisting the secretary in dealing with the National Security Council.
The Intelligence Community
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is the president’s primary adviser on national foreign intelligence, though other departments also perform in-
“THE NSC IS
ONE OF THE
SMALLEST
BUT MOST
IMPORTANT
POWER
CENTERS IN
WASHINGTON.”28
NACLA Anport
“ON FOREIGN
POLICY
ISSUES,
CONGRESS
DOES NOT ACT;
IT REACTS.”
telligence tasks. The State Department has authority to collect intelligence
relevant to foreign policy, though only by “overt” means. DOD uses the
Defense Intelligence Agency for gathering military and related intelligence;
the National Security Agency for intercepting radio and electronic signals;
and offices for satellite, air and sea reconnaissance. Each of the four armed
services has its own foreign intelligence and counter-intelligence arm. Only
the CIA has official authorization to carry out covert action operations.
The Treasury Department collects (through overt means) foreign financial
and monetary information; through its sub-unit, the Secret Service, it pro-
tects the president and his office. Finally, when so requested by the intelli-
gence community, the FBI has powers to conduct counterintelligence opera-
tions abroad.
The National Security Council
Within the executive branch, the NSC has overall charge of reviewing and
directing national foreign intelligence, counterintelligence and special activi-
ties. Created in 1947 “to advise the president with respect to the integration
of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security,”
the NSC supposedly synthesizes the views of the CIA, State and the Pen-
tagon and presents them to the president stripped of departmental bias.
The NSC is composed of the president, the vice president and the secre-
taries of state and defense. The director of the CIA and chairman of the Joint
Chiefs are permanent advisers. Like State and the DOD’s Bureau of Interna-
tional Security, the NSC subdivides into regional and functional units. Its
chief Latin American analyst currently is Alfonso F. Sapia-Bosch, a 21-year
CIA veteran. 6
Aside from the Cabinet, the NSC is the highest coordinating body in the
national security apparatus; its head is the assistant to the president for na-
tional security. With just over 100 staff in 1983, the NSC is one of the smallest
but most important power centers in Washington. That power may vary
from one administration to the next, depending on how close the president is
to the NSC adviser, how much trust he places in the State Department, how
much he wants to manage day-to-day foreign policy. But since Kennedy, the
NSC has enjoyed an overall ascendancy relative to State. It enjoys certain
built-in advantages: a small staff which is flexible and responsive; physical
proximity to the chief executive (the adviser is on the presidential staff); and
freedom from congressional scrutiny. The national security adviser’s ap-
pointment does not require Senate ratification and he cannot be called to
testify or answer questions in committee. This lack of accountability from the
president’s key foreign policy adviser is increasingly controversial to those
who already bemoan the limits of congressional authority in foreign affairs.
Congress and the Populace-Sometime Actors
On foreign policy issues, Congress does not act; it reacts. Seventeen con-
gressional committees have a bearing on foreign affairs, of which the most in-
fluential are the foreign relations, armed services, intelligence and appropria-
28 28 NACLA ReportNov/Dec 1983 29
tions committees of both houses. They allow for some public accounting of the
foreign affairs bureaucracy, but one whose scope is limited by structural and
political impediments. Congress is certainly no counterweight to the FPE.
It could hardly be otherwise. The framers of the Constitution were wary of
popular involvement in the arcane, complex and potentially dangerous field
of foreign policy. Congress’ constitutional mandate is restricted to control of
the foreign affairs budget and the exclusive right to declare war.
The complexity of international issues in the post-war era of U.S. global
dominance has made Congress’ task harder still. Though Vietnam broke
down the tradition of blind compliance with the president, Congress has re-
mained defensive, easily intimidated by both the executive branch and
special interest pressure groups. It is the rare congressperson who develops
special expertise or influence in foreign relations. Traditionally, the
weightiest voice in Congress is the head of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, but the stature of the individual in the job counts for a great deal.
The incumbent, Sen. Charles Percy, is far from dynamic, whereas Sen. J.
William Fulbright-a vigorous chairman during the Vietnam War-became
a major actor in that drama.
Congressional activism, already hamstrung by the Constitution, is held
back further by prevalent public attitudes. The definition of foreign policy as
abstract, remote, quintessentially the domain of experts, is widely shared.
(“Foreign policy,” commented one worker, “that’s for people who don’t
have to work for a living.”‘7) Raising foreign policy issues in the community
may label one as an elitist; appeals to nationalism, patriotism, the defense of
our standard of living-all are ideological tools to obfuscate the awkward
questions of why we are in Central America, why we support Marcos, why
we maintain relations with South Africa. At best, they inhibit; at worst, they
expose one to virulent attack from the local super-patriot. For most people,
acquiescence is the greater wisdom.
Much the same applies to congresspeople. Congress will not get out in
front on a foreign policy issue unless an overwhelming majority of the elec-
torate-perhaps 75-80 % -demands it to. Washington observers note wryly
that Congress follows its constituents but only if there is little risk back in the
home district or state. A successful U.S. politician attends to the perceived
daily needs of constituents rather than the problems of a remote country, and
unless constituents show a sustained interest, it is improbable that the con-
gressperson will develop much depth of understanding of a foreign issue.
Overworked congressional staffs, like their bosses, will react to “squeaky
wheels” rather than form an independent analysis. They know that those
who importune them act out of self-interest; any reaction must be measured
against the feelings of the folks back home, the likely response of political ad-
versaries, the possible political benefit to be reaped from taking a controver-
sial position. Even constituent response is an unreliable barometer, for its ebb
and flow from week to week may reflect the well-orchestrated campaigns of
conflicting interests. On Central America, for example, pro- and anti-inter-
vention forces, both equally well organized, may cancel each other out when
“THE
ARCANE,
COMPLEX
AND
POTENTIALLY
DANGEROUS
FIELD OF
FOREIGN
POLICY.”30 NACLA Report
“THE
PRESIDENT
CONTROLS
THE PACE
AND TIMING
OF EVENTS.”
lobbying a particular congressperson. In such a case, the real winner is the
status quo, a fact that conservative forces know and exploit.
Central America looms as an election issue in 1984. Yet Republicans and
Democrats alike in Congress are tripping over themselves to avoid it. There
are several plausible explanations:
1. The president controls the pace and timing of events. A foreign policy
crisis may be defused after the contender has staked his campaign on it-the
syndrome which devastated George McGovern in 1972 when Nixon an-
nounced an imminent negotiated settlement in Vietnam.
2. Public dissent is hard to quantify. Public opinion polls show dissatisfac-
tion with Reagan’s Central American policies, but will this manifest itself in
votes?
3. Reagan has broadcast his intention to blame opponents for any set-
back in Central America. The president can accuse dissenters of “losing” El
Salvador-a charge scarcely likely to assure re-election. Which Democrat
opposes U.S. interference fiercely enough to withstand a presidential propa-
ganda blitz?
All of this is true. And yet, at the risk of wearisome repetition, Vietnam did
suggest the potential effectiveness of grassroots opposition. This kind of mass
dissent against foreign adventures is not a common occurrence in the history
of nations; it is a new and sketchily understood phenomenon. It continues to-
day in the European anti-nuclear movement, and in the anti-war and anti-
intervention movement here in the United States.
In three important sectors of U.S. society-the trade union movement,
the churches and the minority communities-important steps have been
taken to place foreign policy issues on the agenda. At the recent AFL-CIO
convention in Florida, union leaders voted to halt aid to the Salvadorean
government. In part, that vote reflects the frustration of the AFL-CIO lead-
ership at the failures of El Salvador’s agrarian reform; but it also stems from
the work of bodies like the Trade Union Committee for Democracy and
Freedom in El Salvador, which have worked to change the direction of post-
war AFL-CIO foreign policy.
In the religious community, churches around the country have launched a
campaign of civil disobedience by providing sanctuary to refugees fleeing
government violence in Guatemala and El Salvador. The recent statement of
American Catholic bishops against nuclear weapons caps years of commun-
ity activism in local parishes and among nuns, priests and the committed laity.
At the August 27 march for “Jobs, Peace and Freedom,” black political
and community leaders combined their call for freedom and justice at home
with a stinging condemnation of the war buildup and U.S. involvement in
Central America.
It may be premature to herald any of this as evidence of a new mass-based
activism which will halt Reagan’s foreign policy in its tracks. Yet in it there is
at least the hint of mass acquiescence and indifference being overcome, of the
first links being made between the complexities of foreign policy and the im-
mediate palpable threats posed by this administration at home.
A GUIDE TO BASICS
1. Two books have been particularly helpful in clarify-
ing the notion of the Foreign Policy Establishment: Trilat-
eralism: The Trilateral Commission and Elite Planningfor World
Management, (Boston: South End Press, 1980) and Peddlers
of Crisis: The Committee on the Present Danger and the Politics of
Containment, (Boston: South End Press, 1983). For analy-
ses of the ruling class in the United States, see G. William
Domhoff, Who Rules America, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, 1967), The Higher Circles, (New York: Ran-
dom House, 1970), and The Powers That Be, (New York:
Random House, 1978).
2. Michael Klare, “The Traders and the Prussians,”
Seven Days, vol. I, no. 4, March 28, 1977, p. 32.
3. Information for this section is from the Office of the
Federal Register, The United States Government Manual–
1982-1983, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Federal
Register, National Archives and Records Services, Gener-
al Services Administration, 1982); John H. Esterline and
Robert B. Black, Inside Foreign Policy: The Department ofState
Political System and Its Subsystems, (Palo Alto, California:
MayfieldPublishing Company, 1975); C.W. Borklund,The
Department of Defense, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger,
Publishers, 1968); Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks,
The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1974).
4. Harry F. Young, Atlas of United States Foreign Relations,
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of
Public Affairs, 1983), p. 4.
5. Ibid.
6. The Washington Post, May 16, 1983.
7. Quoted in Richard J. Barnet, Roots of War: The Men
and Institutions Behind U.S. Foreign Policy, (New York:
Penguin, 1971, 1972), p. 248.