Fujimori needed the military to sustain his new government. In turn, the
military wanted to gain greater control over the counterinsurgency war. The
two forged an alliance based on a common vision: neoliberalism in the
economic sphere and authoritarianism in the political sphere.
The Peruvian military was an important behind- the-scenes actor in the 1990 presidential elec-
tions. Front-runner Mario Vargas Llosa, an
ardent advocate of orthodox neoliberalism, had the
backing of the navy and its intelligence service. 1 The
army saw Vargas Llosa as the least objectionable of the
candidates, though it didn’t wholeheartedly support his
platform. When Vargas Llosa was forced into a second-
round run-off against an unknown candidate, Alberto
Fujimori, the navy began spreading rumors that a coup
would occur if Fujimori were elected. Fujimori went on
to defeat Vargas Llosa, but the navy’s coup never mate-
Enrique Obando is a researcher on military issues at the
Peruvian Center for International Studies (CEPEI), and teaches at
the Catholic University in Lima. This article is adapted from his
chapter in Steve Stern, ed., Shining and Other Paths: War and
Society in Peru, 1980-1995 (forthcoming).
Translated from the Spanish by Peter O’Driscoll.
rialized. To be on the safe side, however, Fujimori
retired the navy’s Commander-in-Chief and the head of
navy intelligence. This was a prelude to what would
become a constant recourse throughout the Fujimori
administration: the president’s use of promotions and
retirements within the military to weed out opponents
and award supporters.
Rarely has the military not been involved, directly or
indirectly, in Peruvian politics. After 12 years of direct
military rule, the military relinquished power in 1980 in
the wake of massive street protests against authoritari-
anism. Since then, civilian governments have taken dif-
ferent measures to protect themselves from a military
coup. President Fernando Beladnde (1980-85) tried to
ingratiate himself with the military by not interfering in
their internal organization or the underlying military
doctrine that assigned the armed forces a preponderant
role in overseeing the course of the country’s develop-
VOL XXX, No 1 JULYIAUG 1996 31REPORT ON PERU
ment. Alan Garcia (1985-90), by contrast, actively
intervened in the military’s internal organization and
co-opted the High Command in order to ensure his con-
trol over the military. Fujimori expanded upon Garcia’s
methods of co-optation, but with the intention not only
of controlling the military but of using it for his own
political purposes.
When Fujimori took power, he was in an unenviable
position: he had no political party or trade-union sup-
port, and the business community, which widely
backed Vargas Llosa, viewed him with mistrust. With
virtually no allies to sustain his new government,
Fujimori feared that the military would see him as weak
and try to replace him. To prevent this from happening,
he sought to build support for his government within
key military circles
with the help of an
obscure lawyer and for-
mer army captain,
Vladimiro Montesinos.
Montesinos first gained
Fujimori’s trust by
helping him wiggle out
of tax-evasion charges
during the 1990 elec-
toral campaign, and he
soon became one of
Fujimori’s top advi-
sors. Montesinos, who
knew who was who
within the military,
suggested which gen-
erals should be retired
and which should be
promoted to key posts.
By forcing out officers
whose loyalty was sus- Gen. Nicolas Hermoza leads a batter
pect, and rewarding ing down from a probe into military
those whose support
was unconditional, Montesinos helped Fujimori secure
the backing of the military.
In late 1991, Montesinos and Fujimori perfected their
system of co-optation by passing a law that changed the
procedure for selecting the heads of the armed forces.
Traditionally, new commanders-in-chief were selected
each year according to rank. The new law gave the pres-
ident the power to name commanders-in-chief from
among the highest-ranking officers, and to retire any
officer at will. All Fujimori had to do was find a loyal
officer, make him commander-in-chief, and keep him in
power throughout his administration. Following
Montesinos’ advice, he used the new process to remove
high-ranking officers linked to the “institutionalist”
current within the military, which advocated maintain-
ing the military’s independence and avoiding its politi-
cal manipulation. Generals who were slated to become
commander-in-chief in 1992 and 1993 were unceremo-
niously dismissed, while an undistinguished general
recommended by Montesinos, Nicolis Hermoza Rios,
was named commander-in-chief of the army.
The quid pro quo of the military’s support for
Fujimori was his promise to broadly expand military
power in the counterinsurgency effort. Throughout the
1980s, the military had grown increasingly frustrated
over the failure of civilian regimes to quell Shining
Path’s violence. Fujimori first attempted to broaden the
military’s powers in late 1991 by passing a series of
Draconian decree laws that, for some observers, added
up to a “white coup.” The opposition in Congress over-
turned many of the most noxious measures, which
y of tanks in Lima in April, 1993 to intimidate Congress into back- involvement in the La Cantuta massacre.
Fujimori and his military allies denounced as undue
interference in their efforts to combat Shining Path. 2 In
response, Fujimori closed down Congress and suspend-
ed the Constitution in April, 1992. He then proceeded to
implement the counterinsurgency decrees that Congress
had vetoed. 3
Most officers backed the autogolpe, confirming the
marriage of convenience between Fujimori and the mil-
itary. Other factors were crucial to the alliance as well.
The military’s long-standing disdain for political par-
ties, for example, dovetailed with Fujimori’s anti-party
stance. The military also avidly supported Fujimori’s
attempts to implant a free-market economy. Many offi-
cers believed that Fujimori’s neoliberal program would
allow the Peruvian military to realize its long-standing
dream of making Peru a strong regional power. Both
Fujimori and the military had a common vision: neolib-
eralism in the economic sphere and authoritarianism in
the political sphere.
issension within the military, however, began to
brew. The new procedure for selecting the High
Command became the norm for the entire offi-
cer corps. Promotions and retirements were no longer
based on professional merit, but according to a given
officer’s personal loyalty to Fujimori and Hermoza.
Many officers believed the co-optation of the top brass
endangered the autonomy and professionalism of the
military. Montesinos’ growing power to make or break
the careers of top military officers was also a serious
point of contention within the military. Montesinos’
murky past did not help matters. He had been dis-
charged from the army for allegedly passing classified
information to the U.S. government, and as a lawyer,
spent a good part of his career defending drug traffick-
ers. 4 Many military officers believed it was inappropri-
ate-and dangerous-that an unscrupulous dealer like
Montesinos accrue such power. This sentiment was
exacerbated as Montesinos consolidated his control
over the National Intelligence Service (SIN), a govern-
ment agency charged with collecting information for
national-security purposes. Montesinos expanded the
SIN’s surveillance network of both high-ranking mili-
tary officers and opposition groups.
The fear of a Shining Path victory grew more acute in
the aftermath of the autogolpe, aggravating dissension
within the military. 5 Shining Path, which saw the coup
as an all-out offensive against its organization,
launched a dramatic series of bombings in Lima during
April and May. The government was caught complete-
ly off guard. Its paralysis sent tremors throughout the
hemisphere. In mid-1992, the active-duty institutional-
ist officers began clamoring for a counter-coup against
Fujimori and the co-opted generals in the High
Command. Many of these officers were linked to two
clandestine opposition groups that had emerged within
the military, “Commanders, Majors and Captains”
(COMACA) and “Sleeping Lion.” They believed a
counter-coup would restore Peru to constitutional rule,
rebuff the impending threat of a Shining Path triumph, and end the political manipulation of the armed forces
that they perceived as a threat to the entire military
institution.
The officers grouped in COMACA and Sleeping
Lion had not only grown to mistrust their superior offi-
cers in the High Command, but-revealing the degree
to which the chain of command had fallen apart-they
looked for leadership from the institutionalist generals
who had been forced out by Fujimori and Montesinos
in late 1991. They also sought support from the lower-
and middle-ranking active-duty officers who had grown
frustrated with the military’s low overall budget, which
had crippled its operating capacity. 6 Another source of
discontent was the incredibly low salaries paid to mili-
tary officers-at the high end, a division general earned
$283 per month, while at the low end, a second lieu-
tenant earned about $213 a month.
The surprise capture of Shining Path leader Abimael
Guzmfn on September 12, 1992 threw the institutional-
ists’ plans into a tailspin. The seizure was a spectacular
victory for Fujimori-one that he desperately needed to
shore up his fledgling government. With a Shining Path
victory no longer feared, one of the main justifications
for a counter-coup against Fujimori disappeared. Soon
thereafter, the institutionalists abandoned the idea.
Months before, however, the SIN had apparently infil-
trated both COMACA
and Sleeping Lion.
Though the two groups’
plans were never acted
upon, more than 40 offi-
cers-including five
generals-were arrest-
ed in November, 1992
on charges of attempt-
ing a coup d’dtat.
With the arrest of the
counter-coup leaders,
Fujimori had van-
quished his main oppo-
nents within the mili-
tary. At that point, he
could have declared an
amnesty for the institu-
tionalists, and thereby
gain the military’s com-
plete support. Instead,
he was determined to
destroy every last seed
of possible opposition
Dissension within
the military arose
from the belief of
many officers that
Fujimori’s
co-optation of the
top brass
endangered the
autonomy and
professionalism of
the military.
within the military. A sweep against the remaining insti-
tutionalist officers ensued, including those who
approved of Fujimori but had not been co-opted. With
this buffer group gone, a head-on collision between the
pro-Fujimori loyalists and the anti-Fujimori institution-
alists seemed imminent.
The clash came in December, 1992, when Gen.
Alberto Arciniega, a pro-Fujimori institutionalist who
had been forced out in Fujimori’s sweep, and Gen. Luis
Cisneros, former minister of war under Fernando
Belaiinde, publicly criticized Gen. Hermoza’s treatment
of the generals involved in the coup conspiracy. Both
men were tried in military courts for “insulting a supe-
rior officer.” Arciniega, who had successfully led a
counterinsurgency campaign against Shining Path in
the coca-growing Upper Huallaga Valley, was subse-
VOL XXX. No 1JULY/AUG 1996 33 VOL XXX, No 1 JULY/AUG 1996 33REPORT ON PERU
quently stripped of his military protection. This move Fujimori publicly defended Hermoza, accusing his pre-
forced Arciniega into exile since it was tantamount to decessors of inefficiency and corruption.
an invitation to Shining Path to assassinate him. The With the battle lines drawn, disgruntled institutional-
confrontation continued when 19 former commanders- ists launched an all-out campaign to discredit Hermoza
in-chief of the army published two letters criticizing and his cronies, which they hoped would force Fujimori
Hermoza’s harsh treatment of the coup leaders and to replace him. In mid-1993, the institutionalists leaked
respected military officers like Arciniega and Cisneros. information to the press and opposition leaders expos-
Anatomy of a Cover-Up: The Disappearances at La Cantuta
T he Enrique Guzman y Valle University, widely known as “La Cantuta,” was occupied by the
Peruvian army in May, 1991 as part of President Fujimori’s effort to combat Shining Path. Located
just east of Lima, La Cantuta is the country’s leading
teachers’ college. The security forces had long sus-
pected it of being a guerrilla training ground.
A military base was established on campus on May
21, 1991. For a time, the university was closed, as sol- diers set up more permanent lodgings and vigilance
points on campus. When classes resumed, strict con-
trols were put on student movement in and out of
campus. Soldiers were posted as guards at key points
and patrolled constantly, especially at night during the eight-hour curfew beginning at 10 p.m. Six months later, the government legalized the
incursion of the security forces onto formerly autonomous university campuses with Decree Law 726. The law authorized the armed forces to occupy campuses “when they are made aware that terrorist elements or groups disturb peace and internal
order.” Along with these public measures, the govern-
ment apparently also authorized military intelli-
gence to infiltrate the student body in search of
Shining Path sympathizers. That infiltration alleged-
ly led to the events of July 18, 1992, a little over a
year after the army’s arrival.
ln the early hours of that day, eyewitnesses say that about 30 hooded gunmen burst into the male stu-
dent dormitory at La Cantuta and forced the 60 stu- dents inside into the hallway with threats and blows.
The students were forced to lie face down on the
floor. One of the armed men went through the group
with a list in hand, ordering that certain students be
pulled out. A similiar operation took place in the
female student dormitory. The gunmen then pro-
ceeded to detain Hugo Munioz in the professors’ res-
idence in front of his wife and a neighboring couple.
ing human rights abuses by a clan
called the “Colina Group.” The mo
tion, which implicated Gen. Her
Montesinos, involved the abduction a
students and a professor from a
known as “La Cantuta” [see “Anatom
this page]. On the day that the Congress called on
Hermoza to testify regarding military involvement in
st serious accusa- the Cantuta case, Lima’s residents awoke to the sound
noza as well as of tanks rumbling in the streets. Hermoza’s intimidation
nd murder of nine tactics worked: he never appeared before Congress, and
public university the case was diverted to a military court.
ny of a Cover-Up,” The institutionalists then changed strategy, raising the
ongress called on issue of military involvement in drug trafficking.
COMACA and Sleeping Lion began leaking informa-
tion to the press in early 1994 naming officers who
were actively involved in drug trafficking and describ-
ing how others were paid “not to see” what the drug
traffickers were doing just a few miles from their bases.
as up, to Pieru’s The accusations implicated the political-military chiefs
e. : Court ito of the Upper Huallaga Valley, the head of the army’s air S.jurisdiction. force, and Hermoza himself. COMACA hoped that the Court hasl these accusations would lead to Hermoza’s ouster, by always ruled in forcing the U.S. government, which was heavily f’the military in involved in counter-narcotics operations in Peru, to s over jurisdic- particularly i, take action.
rights cases,-the After initially denying any wrongdoing on the part of
file of the La the military, Hermoza admitted in January, 1995 that
disappearances some 100 officers were linked to the drug trade. While
mencdous pres- Hermoza promised that the military justice system
the judges: to- would look into the charges, COMACA says that only civilian jurisdic- those military officers who were not part of Hermoza’s s the alternate inner circle were targets of investigation. 7 In order to
eliberated over repair the publicity damage that this incident caused, ocast his tie:: – Fujimori pulled the military out of anti-drug operations g vote, .the in late 1995. ss stealthfully rn the wee hours.’ The institutionalists made one last-ditch effort to
morning ‘a bill bring down Hermoza in early 1995, in the aftermath of
“such a way that the Peruvian military’s unsuccessful attempts to dis-
.aCantuta case. lodge Ecuadorian troops occupying territory in a dis-
0-page case, the puted border region. Fujimori’s policy of assigning he’ 12 soldiers, generals to key posts on the basis of their loyalty rather ars. The military, than their professional qualifications, they argued, had the ‘tolriankiing led to serious mistakes in the war with Ecuador. They killings. At the also criticized Fujimori and Hermoza for not adequate- entences were
rve their time in ly equipping the military, and for failing to avert the
sing them from, conflict in the first place. 8 The political opposition, led
r Benefits. Later by Javier P6rez de Cu6llar’s coalition Union For Peru
‘rison’ed soldiers’ (UPP), jumped into the fray. By criticizing Hermoza’s
rts, cellular tele- leadership of the war, the UPP hoped to bolster its
d’ regular visits chances of winning the April, 1995 presidential elec-
paymaster who tions. Again the attacks against Hermoza didn’t stick. ented by occa- After the conflict came to a close with the help of inter-
national mediators, Hermoza retained his post, and pro- resst passed ohei ceeded to retire all the generals on active duty who had
esty to mem- hm criticized him. nnesty to mern to , investigated, Over this three-year period, Hermoza had consoli-
‘iimes from May, dated his power within the military. Purges of dissident
rst to walk free. officers had seriously weakened his opponents within
prison for the La’ the armed forces. In late 1994, Hermoza ensured that
several of his cronies were promoted to top military
positions, buttressing his own power base within the
VoL XXX, No 1 JULY/AUG 1996 35 VOL XXX, No 1 JULY/AUG 1996 35REPORT ON PERU
armed forces. Moreover, the government’s policy
“successes” on the economic and counterinsurgency
fronts boosted Gen. Hermoza’s prestige among the
military officers. As a result, by 1995, the attacks
against Hermoza, rather than weakening him, had the
Peruvian troops along the Ecuador-Peru border during the
1995 border conflict.
opposite effect: military officers began to feel that the
institution was being beleaguered by opposition
groups with suspect motives. As a consequence, they
rallied around Hermoza and the High Command.
Hermoza was now in a position to exert his indepen-
dence.
he criticisms against Hermoza and the military
took a toll on Fujimori politically. Despite his
enthusiastic defense of Hermoza, it was evident
that the general had become a liability to the President.
In fact, reports indicate that Fujimori first tried to
remove Hermoza at the end of 1994, when military pro-
motions and retirements usually occur. By then, though,
Hermoza had become a powerful figure in his own
right. When a journalist asked him about his possible
removal as commander-in-chief, Hermoza replied, “I
will go when Fujimori goes.”
Fujimori’s sweeping victory in the 1995 presidential
elections seemed to provide him with the perfect oppor-
tunity to force Hermoza to step down. Yet, while
Fujimori replaced the entire top officer corps, including
the commanders-in-chief of the navy and the air force
as well as the minister of defense, Hermoza retained his
post. For many observers, this was proof positive that
Hermoza and his cronies were in control of the govern-
ment, and not Fujimori.
In fact, while Hermoza has gained leverage over
Fujimori, he does not govern the country. The Peruvian
military retains less power and privilege than it did 20
years ago, when Gen. Juan Velasco seized power and
launched an ambitious series of economic and social
reforms. Today, the military refrains from interfering in
non-military aspects of the state’s affairs. Its preroga-
tives are largely circumscribed to three spheres. First,
military officers retain certain perks, such as free lodg-
ing, health care for their families, and education for
their children. Officers above the rank of colonel have a
chauffeur-driven car and a steward at their disposition.
Second, the military enjoys impunity from prosecutions
for human rights violations and drug trafficking. In
June, 1995, Congress passed a sweeping amnesty law
which cut short all judicial investigations of human
rights abuses. 9 Military and police officers arrested for
human rights crimes-even those who had been found
guilty and were serving prison sentences-were freed.
Finally, the military continues to assert its influence in
the counterinsurgency war. Although Shining Path’s
activities have diminished considerably over the past
three years, the military retains control over a third of
the country’s territory.’ 0
The relationship between Fujimori and the military is
far more complicated than it appears on the surface. A
symbiotic relationship has evolved between Fujimori
and Hermoza, based essentially on personal interests.
Fujimori first used the military to shore up his power.
Hermoza and his allies, in turn, used Fujimori to assert
their authority within the military. Now, Fujimori finds
himself unable to remove Hermoza and his cronies
from the upper echelons of power. Hermoza has be-
come a caudillo, or strongman, who controls the military
through a series of alliances with other high-ranking
officers. He backs up those alliances with internal sur-
veillance-with the help of Montesinos and the SIN-
and a special security unit. In effect, Hermoza has
reproduced within the military the same system of co-
optation used by Fujimori to advance his own person-
al interests. Fujimori still benefits from the deal.
General Hermoza’s iron grip over the military institu-
tion lends stability to his government-at least in the
short term.
Fujimori and the Military: A Marriage of Convenience 1. Author’s personal interviews with retired navy officers who par- ticipated in Vargas Liosa’s electoral campaign. 2. Ana Maria Vidal, Los decretos de la guerra (Lima: IDS, 1993). For a progressive critique of the decree laws, see Andean Commission of Jurists, Andlisis de los decretos legislativos dicta- dos por el gobierno peruano en materia de pacificaci6n nacional (Lima: Codice Editores, 1991). 3. Another important element in the autogolpe was the perceived ineptitude and corruption within the judicial branch. Courts had released over 200 known guerrillas in the first two years of Fujimori’s administration. 4. Interview, Gen. Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, February 17, 1994. 5. These impressions are based on presentations by Dr. Manuel Migone, advisor to the Navy High Command and retired Col. Jose Bailetti, director of the National Research Institute on National Defense (INIDEN) in August, 1992.. 6. See the letter written by Minister of Defense Gen. Jorge Torres Aciego to then Finance Minister Carlos Bolonia regarding the lack of funds to engage in basic military action and Bolofia’s response in Carlos Torres y Torres Lara, “Hito 1424: El pacto de caballeros,” Informe para la Comisidn de Relaciones Exteriores del Congreso de la RepOblica (Lima), 1995. 7. La Repdblica (Lima), January 9, 1995. 8. Author’s personal interviews with three air-force colonels, April 6, 1995. 9. The amnesty law also freed those officers who had been involved in the November, 1992 coup plot, as well as those who had been put on trial for criticizing Gen. Hermoza during the conflict with Ecuador. 10. Enrique Obando, “The Power of Peru’s Armed Forces,” Joseph Tulchin and Gary Bland, eds., Peru in Crisis: Dictatorship or Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994).
