Fujimori takes great pride in not being beholden to the interests of any particular group. He did not, for example, take power by cutting deals with politi- cal parties or the business class. While Alan Garcia’s
APRA party and the left encouraged their followers
to vote for Fujimori in the second-round elections in
1990, they did so voluntarily, without establishing
any formal agreement with Fujimori. The business
class, which had widely backed Vargas Llosa’s neolib-
eral platform, was highly skeptical of Fujimori at first.
Two fundamental pillars sustain the Fujimori
regime: the multilateral lending institutions, such as
the IMF and the World Bank, and the military. The
IMF has been the dominant player in defining
Fujimori’s economic model and the state reforms he
has implemented. While he has wavered from
neoliberal orthodoxy on occasion-primarily during
election time in order to pump up public spending-
Fujimori has on the whole been a faithful follower of the neoliberal playbook.
The military has acquired an inordinate amount of power in Peruvian politics under the Fujimori regime. Along with the National Intelligence Service
(SIN), the military has been Fujimori’s most reliable
domestic ally. In exchange for the military’s support,
Fujimori has granted it broad powers to defeat the
Shining Path insurgency, as well as protect individual
officers from investigations into human rights abus-
es. While some question Fujimori’s independence, it is the military that obeys Fujimori, not vice versa. In contrast to 1968, when a group of military officers
took power and launched an ambitious series of
reforms, today no sector of the Peruvian military has an alternative project for the country’s future.
Fujimori is extremely media-savvy. He carefully defines his image, public discourse, and the issues he addresses with the help of a team of Argentine pub-
licity experts. The media-both print and televi-
sion-have, with few exceptions, demonstrated
almost unconditional support for Fujimori. Only a
handful of independent journalists have ventured to
criticize the president directly. While the government
has never hesitated to throw its weight around to
limit the presence of these critical media voices, late-
ly it has grown even more intolerant of direct criti-
cism. For example, selective audits by the tax agency
SUNAT have forced several opposition media outlets
into silence. Such strong-arm tactics serve as a warn-
ing to others who might dare to criticize the Fujimori
administration. The manipulation of government- sponsored as well as private advertising is another
way the government has tried to tame the opposi- tion media. The president’s Argentine publicity
experts serve as intermediaries for high government
officials, pulling advertisements from media outlets
that the government sees as being overly critical.
In terms of day-to-day governing, Fujimori depends
on a small circle of professionals who are personal-
ly loyal to him. Many are from Peru’s small, tight-knit
Japanese community. One of Fujimori’s most impor- tant and faithful advisors was his brother, Santiago
Fujimori. In April, he was relieved of his duties-
allegedly due to clashes over policy with Fujimori’s
other key advisors-and replaced by another brother, Pedro. Another key figure from the Japanese com-
munity is Jaime Yoshiyama, a Fujimori loyalist who
served as president of the previous Congress, and who is currently the head of the powerful Ministry of the Presidency. Through this position, Yoshiyama con-
trols Foncodes, the government’s social-investment
fund. This dependence on a small clique of faithful
advisors reflects Fujimori’s aversion to existing politi-
cal parties, and his unwillingness to compromise his
independent profile by creating his own political organization.
Business and congressional leaders linked to Opus Dei, a conservative Catholic faction, are another
important reservoir of support for Fujimori. The
Catholic Church hierarchy, on the other hand, despite its conservative leadership, has had tense relations
with the government largely because of Fujimori’s
advocacy of family-planning programs. In any event, it is notable that Fujimori has been able to confront a
highly respected institution like the Catholic Church
without damaging his popularity. In fact, since
Fujimori’s first term in office, the Catholic Church’s
mediating role in politics has diminished considerably.
With a few exceptions, Fujimori’s congressional
majority is comprised of uncharismatic henchmen
who defend any project or action that the president
demands. Many of them own businesses that have
benefited from the power that congressional office
bestows. Technical advisors to several key govern-
ment ministries-in particular the Ministry of Economy-have benefited from their positions in
similar fashion. These interests, however, do not
determine the government’s actions.
The same is true for big business. The Peruvian
business elite shares a tacit ideological consensus
with the Fujimori regime regarding fundamental
issues such as trade liberalization, fiscal austerity, and
an anti-party stance. Important leaders of the
Peruvian business community have also held high
positions in Fujimori’s government. It would, howev-
er, be an exaggeration to speak of a coalition
between government and business because the two
are clearly not equal partners.’ The subordinate posi-
tion of business is linked to the increasingly fractured
state of the Peruvian business community over the
past 50 years. As a result of these internal divisions, business interests were increasingly under represent-
ed by the existing political parties. In that regard, the
failure of Vargas Llosa’s conservative political coali-
tion was a lost opportunity for the right.
The business community supports the Fujimori
regime-although not without some misgivings-at
least partly because of its fear of the past. It does not, however, give the government orders. Fujimori clear-
ly retains the upper hand. His government defines its
own policy priorities and initiatives -which coincide
broadly with the priorities of the IMF, international
investors, and the Peruvian financial elite.
1. Manuel Castillo and Andres Quispe, Grupos de interes empresan-
ales y ajuste estructural: Transicion, adaptacion y conflicto
economico (1990-1993), unpublished manuscript.
Menu
