Fujimori’s Deeper Problems
eru’s President Alberto Fujimori, who has assiduously
cultivated the image of an
iron-fisted imposer of order, was
badly shaken by last month’s
hostage-taking at the home of the
Japanese ambassador to Peru. Since
the fateful capture of Shining Path
leader Abimael Guzmdn in late
1992, Fujimori has had the political
capital to deal with sticky situa-
tions-from serious accusations of
human rights crimes to allegations
of military involvement in drug traf-
ficking. [See Newsbriefs, pp. 1-2.]
But when the Tupac Amaru
Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), a guerrilla group seemingly on the
verge of disappearance, took some
500 powerful party-goers hostage on
December 17, Fujimori-who has
often repeated his absolute unwill-
ingness to negotiate with Peru’s
armed groups-found himself in
quite a pickle. To give in to the
MRTA’s demands might embolden
the more dangerous Shining Path
guerrillas to carry out similar moves
to free their comrades, and would
certainly cause problems for his
alliance with Peru’s hard-line mili-
tary. But a commando-style rescue
attempt would risk a bloodbath that
would harm his image at home and
abroad-perhaps beyond repair.
Fujimori’s two most powerful
international allies-the United
States and Japan-were sending
him opposite signals. While the
Japanese government, with several
of its officials’ lives at stake, urged
him to consider first and foremost
the lives of the hostages, the U.S.
government reiterated its position, in State Department lingo, not to
“reward terrorists.” Washington’s
tone no doubt bolstered the hard-
line position of the armed forces, who are unwilling to change their
no-concessions policy to guerrillas.
The takeover came at a difficult
time for Fujimori, whose popularity
rating has been steadily declining
over the past year. Jobs are scarce
and the economy is stagnating. As
his economic model unravels, toler-
ance for his authoritarian style is
wearing thin. Opposition was wide-
spread, for example, to a recent law
allowing him to run for a third term
(the Constitution imposes a two-
term limit). And, after publicized
rows with the armed forces, his
principal alliance is showing signs
of strain. In this context, the
MRTA’s spectacular action under-
mined the main leg of his populari-
ty: keeping political violence under
control.
With Shining Path’s Guzmin
behind bars, and the MRTA barely
visible, nearly everyone began to
believe the government propaganda
that the “subversive threat” no
longer existed. As the security
forces began to relax their guard, the
guerrillas-the MRTA as well as
Shining Path-began to rebuild
their organizations. Analysts say
that the police were aware of
attempts by the MRTA to regroup in
the last several months, but their
efforts to re-assemble a special task
force to begin intelligence gathering
came too late. In part, the security
forces were far too willing to
believe the government’s own pro-
paganda that the guerrilla move-
ments had been wiped out.
The local and international press
ate up Fujimori’s propaganda like
candy, churning out stories about
the government’s success in control-
ling inflation, stopping the guerril-
las, and installing a free-market par-
adise. Now the press is obsessed
with the “return of terrorism” in
Peru. The fact is that neither the
MRTA nor Shining Path had ever
left; they simply switched gears,
reassessed their plans, and tried to
adapt to circumstances that were
largely unfavorable to their activi-
ties, given the growing power of
Peru’s military. Political violence
has declined significantly since
1992, but the strength of guerrilla
groups cannot be measured only by
the number of violent attacks they
engage in. The local and interna-
tional press were far too willing to
believe the Fujimori myth that
everything was under control.
The deeper problem, of course,
is that Fujimori’s neoliberal
policies have aggravated the
conditions that gave rise to armed
movements in Peru in the first place.
Neoliberal economic reforms have
deepened poverty in the country-
especially in the cities, where the
bulk of the population is now con-
centrated. Fujimori’s “poverty alle-
viation” program has done precious
little to address the needs of most
Peruvians, who have benefited not
at all from neoliberal economics.
And his “success” against Shining
Path and the MRTA has been predi-
cated on repression and the denial of
any semblance of judicial due
process. Military courts have sent
hundreds of innocent people to rot
in Peru’s inhospitable jails. Police
units based on intelligence gather-
ing, like the special unit responsible
for capturing Guzmin, have been
systematically disassembled by
Fujimori and his military cronies, who saw them as a threat to their
consolidation of power. With no
attempt at addressing the underlying
causes of political violence, the
Fujimori government now finds
itself face to face with the failure of
its neoliberal counter-insurgency
policy. The hens, it seems, are com-
ing home to roost.
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