Guatemala’s Peace Accords
Agree with Susanne Jonas [“The
Peace Accords: An Ending and a
Beginning,” May/June 1997] that
the signing of the Peace Accords in
Guatemala was an historic occasion,
formally ending a 30 year-old civil
war that left around 200,000 mostly
Mayan Indians dead or disappeared.
Yet I have some reservations. As
Jonas herself indicates, the full
implementation of the Accords is far
from assured. Furthermore, even if
totally implemented, the Accords
may actually undermine the possi-
bility of peace and justice in
Guatemala.
The amnesty law and Truth
Commission are troubling not only
because they leave the generals in
the barracks rather than in jail and
the repressive state apparatus intact,
but also because they overlook the
ways in which repression and vio-
lence operated locally. There are
hundreds of clandestine cemeteries
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dotting the rural landscape which
offer silent testimony to the extent
of the violence. Moreover, an unto-
ward number of former civil patrol
members and military commission-
ers continue to live next door to wid-
ows whose husbands they murdered.
Secondly, basing the Accord on
Socioeconomic and Agrarian Issues
on a neoliberal model is contradic-
tory if its aim is to alleviate poverty.
Evidence from throughout the world
suggests neoliberalism tends to
intensify poverty rather than amelio-
rate it. Reducing inequality requires
a strong state, yet the Arzdi
Administration is having a fire sale
on state-owned enterprises.
The Accord on Identity and Rights
of Indigenous People mandates the
official recognition of the indige-
nous population and requires
reforms in educational, judicial and
political systems. However, it fails
to address the question of land
reform. Land is a crucial site of rural
Mayan material and cultural produc-
tion. The paving over of farmlands
for the construction of maquila fac-
tories or second homes for wealthy
Guatemalans, and the production of
non-traditional export crops leave
the majority of rural Mayans to bear
not only the high costs of war, but
also the high costs of peace.
Lastly, Jonas’ assertion that the
Accords open spaces for making
demands on the state seems overly
optimistic; especially so when one
considers that in the United States,
demands for peace and justice are
rarely won from a state that, in many
quarters, has been heralded as an
exemplar of democracy.
Linda Green, New York, NY
Susanne Jonas Replies
ereading Linda Green’s letter
IXafter having spent seven weeks
in Guatemala this summer and sev-
eral days again in September, I
remain puzzled by her argument that
“even if totally implemented, the
Accords may actually undermine
the possibility of peace and justice in
Guatemala” (my emphasis). My
article never suggested that the
Peace Accords would solve Guate-
mala’s monumental problems;
rather, I viewed them as presenting
an opportunity for addressing those
problems. But it is difficult to under-
stand the suggestion that the
Continued on page 44
CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4
Accords themselves (in contrast to
current government policies) could
be a step backward.
Green and I are in agreement in
our criticisms of the flaws, limita-
tions and weaknesses in the Accords
on the Truth Commission and the
amnesty law-although it is not the
case that the Accords leave “the
repressive state apparatus intact.”
Similarly, on social-economic
issues (including the weakness of
the Accord on land reform), Green
and I are in agreement. Further-
more, it seems clear that the govern-
ment’s actual economic agenda
conflicts directly with even the
(very insufficient) commitments
agreed to in the Accords. My article
pointed to neoliberal policies as the
most likely Achilles heel of
Guatemala’s posguerra and a
potentially serious threat to democ-
ratic gains. Indeed, some of the
fears foreshadowed in my article
have already materialized, most
notably increased social violence
and common crime-driven partly
by poverty-leading to governmen-
tal actions that reinvolve the army
in maintaining internal security.
(The government has been reopen-
ing military bases and maintaining
army patrols in city streets-actions
which violate the Accords.)
In short, even recognizing the
problems in the Accords as signed, the most dangerous threats for the
future lie not so much in the
Accords themselves as in the end-
less resistances, excuses, sabotage
and search for loopholes to avoid
compliance with what has been
signed. Those of us concerned
about Guatemala should take seri-
ously the need to monitor the gov-
ernment’s compliance with the
many positive provisions of the
Accords and pressure our own gov-
ernment to condition its assistance
on compliance with all of them.
This includes not just tax reform,
as is currently being emphasized
by donor countries, the IMF, the
World Bank, et. al., but also reform
of the judicial system to end
impunity, constitutional reforms to
limit the army’s role to external
defense and the redefinition of
Guatemala as a multiethnic, multi-
cultural and multilingual nation-
to mention a few.
Finally, I take issue with Green’s
assertion that my assessment of the
importance of the political opening
for democratic stuggles to make
demands on the state is “overly
optimistic.” Taking into considera-
tion that those spaces did not exist
even a few short years ago, I
believe we owe it to the Guate-
malan people to throw our energy
behind those struggles rather than
questioning their importance. If we
miss this opportunity to support
those struggles, we may not have
such an opportunity again for many
years to come.
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