Newsbriefs

Haitian Putchist Hits
Florida Jackpot
MIAMI, AUGUST 4, 1997
olonel Carl Dorelien, a
high-ranking officer of
Haiti’s bloody military
junta from 1991 to 1994, struck it
rich on July 28 when he won the
Florida State Lottery. The Haitian
officer, who refused to shake
Jimmy Carter’s hand during ne-
gotiations to end the illegal
regime-because, he said, Carter’s
hand had touched President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide’s-fled to
Florida after the junta fell. Clearly
unaware of Dorelien’s back-
ground, The Miami Herald ran a
story on the Lotto winner with the
headline: “Struggling Refugee
Wins $3.2 Million.” According to
Florida State Lottery spokespeo-
pie, Dorelien will receive his
prize in annual installments of
$159,000 for the next 20 years.
Dorelien, who says he is seek-
ing political asylum, joins a
growing population of Haitian
putchists in exile. Coup leader
General Raoul Cedras is in
Panama, where he, his second-in-
command Colonel Philippe
Biamby, and their families took
up an entire floor of a luxury
hotel for many months-paid for
indirectly by the United States
which rents Cedras’ three Port-
au-Prince apartments for $15,000
a month. (Embassy staffers live
in them now.) Dreaded Police
Chief Michel Frangois is in
Honduras, where his extradition
to the United States on drug
charges has been inexplicably de-
layed for months. Both Cedras
and Franqois were reportedly on
the CIA payroll.
Emmanuel Constant, leader of
the Haitian FRAPH death squad,
and erstwhile agent of the Central
Intelligence Agency, resides in
Queens, New York, thanks to a
secret sweetheart deal he struck
with the U.S. government that
has allowed him to escape trial
and even to apply for political
asylum. Constant is accused of
ordering the killing of thousands
of Haitians; in the United States
he is the target of a $32 million
civil lawsuit brought by New
Jersey resident Alerte Belance,
who was bludgeoned and nearly
beheaded by Constant’s thugs
back in Haiti.
One of Constant’s neighbors in
Queens is his friend and former
right-hand hitman “Gwo Fan
Fan,” the former Port-au-Prince
FRAPH underboss. Witnesses
before the Haitian Supreme
Court accused Gwo Fan Fan of
gunning down the Haitian Justice
Minister Guy Malary in 1993–a
crime which a CIA memo, re-
cently declassified in connection
with the Belance lawsuit, has also
linked to Constant.
Ironically, this June the U.S.
Senate voted to exclude any
Haitian “credibly alleged” to be
connected with extrajudicial and
political killings in Haiti from en-
tering the United States. The leg-
islation ignores the fact that
Haiti’s biggest suspects are al-
ready here, rewarded for their
bloodbath with green cards, polit-
ical asylum and Lotto winnings.
During the three years of the mil-
itary regime, 50,000 Haitian
refugees braved the oceans and
arrived on the Florida beaches
seeking political asylum, only to
be sent back home.
Brian Concannon, an American
human rights lawyer contracted
by the Government of Haiti to in-
vestigate crimes committed by
the junta, jokes that the U.S. asy-
lum law’s requirement of a well-
founded fear of persecution
ought to be read as a well-
founded fear of prosecution.
-Catherine Orenstein
Samper Raises Peace Talk
Hopes in Colombia
B(X;OTA, AUGUST 1, 1997
(Jn July 23rd, General Harold
“Bedoya, the Commander of
the Colombian Armed Forces,
was removed from his position by
President Ernesto Samper, putting
an end to a growing rift between
the chief executive and the gen-
eral that reached its peak a month
earlier when guerrillas of the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC) released 70
soldiers who were held hostage
for 288 days. At the time, Bedoya
referred to the release of the sol-
diers as a “circus filled with
clowns,” indirectly criticizing
Samper for agreeing to the terms
set out by the guerrillas in ex-
change for freeing the soldiers.
The removal of Bedoya, among
the strongest opponents of peace
negotiations with the guerillas,
and described by some analysts as
the mastermind behind the current
paramilitary counterinsurgency
strategy in Colombia, set the stage
for the appointment of General
Manuel Jos6 Bonett as the new
Commander of the Armed Forces.
Bedoya announced that he would
run for the presidency in 1998,
and lashed out at Samper
and Defense Minister Gilberto
Echeverri for removing him with-
out any justification.
The General’s departure is one
of several recent developments
raising both expectations and
concerns about the prospects for
peace in Colombia. In late June,
President Samper named a two-
person team to renew contacts
with the FARC and the National
Liberation Army (ELN), in order
to establish a framework for pos-
sible peace negotiations with the
guerrillas. The team was given 60
days to report back to the
President regarding when, and
Vo XI, No 2 SI’Ic 19971rrr~~ Vol XXXI, No 2 SEPT/OCT 1997 1NEWSBRIEFS
under what conditions, a national
dialogue could begin.
Over the last few months, the
war in Colombia has intensified.
Even as the President made his
announcment, the FARC and the
ELN carried out a series of high-
profile attacks that have left the
military reeling. Some believe
the removal of Bedoya is directly
related to the public relations dis-
asters suffered by the military at
the hands of the armed insur-
gency, the most striking being
the capture and release of the 70
soldiers.
More recently, the FARC and
ELN have resumed joint opera-
tions in some parts of the country,
hitting military and police targets
almost daily in order to demon-
strate that they are a major mili-
tary force. In July alone, over 30
soldiers were killed and many
more wounded in direct attacks
by the guerillas. The offensive
strikes, as well as the greater vis-
ibility of their high command, re-
flect a strategy to strengthen their
hand at the negotiating table, if
they ever get there.
Perhaps the most complicated
aspect of beginning a peace
process in Colombia involves the
growth and strength of the para-
military forces. Paramilitary
forces continue to flex their mus-
cles in the northwestern region of
Urabi, in the Middle Magdalena
region, as well as in the central
plains and the southern provinces
of Cauca, Tolima and Narino. In
late July, 30 peasants were mas-
sacred by paramilitaries in the
town of Mapiripan in the pro-
vince of Meta.
Colombian and international
NGOs have accused the military
of working directly with the
paramilitaries in the counterin-
surgency war, targeting commu-
nities perceived to be sympa-
thetic to the guerillas and
conducting major sweeps, which
General Manuel Jose Bonett, newly appointed Commander of the Colombian Arm with the Archbishop of Uraba at an army parade in Uraba Province.
have left hundreds of civilians
dead and thousands displaced.
The paramilitaries insist they
have to be part of any Colombian
peace process-a position re-
jected by many human rights ac-
tivists. It could prove to be the
main roadblock to any future di-
alogue since the guerrillas have
repeatedly stated their demand of
dismantling the paramilitaries
before beginning any talks.
-Mario Murillo
Fujimori’s Heavy Hand
Meets Resistance in Peru
LIMA, AUGUrST 6. 1997
f Alberto Fujimori thought
that his military “victory” in
the recent hostage crisis would
bring him some respite from his
political woes, he was sorely
mistaken. While many Peru-
vians supported the military in-
tervention at the ambassador’s
residence, which sent Fujimori’s
sagging popularity rat-
ing soaring to over
60%, today Fujimori
faces the lowest popu-
larity rating-under
30%-of his seven-
year tenure. He is not
only being berated by
the usual suspects like
opposition journalists,
members of Congress,
students and workers.
Now he is also being
criticized by his old-
time supporters: mem-
bers of the business
elite, formerly staunch
pro-regime newspapers,
and even the U.S. gov-
ernment. This wave of
criticism was sparked
by a government reso-
lution repealing the cit-
izenship of Baruch
Ivcher, a native Israeli
who become a Peruvian citizen in
1984. Ivcher, who owns the televi-
sion station Frecuencia Latina and
apparently had business dealings
with the army, had invoked the
government’s wrath by airing a se-
ries of stories uncovering serious
abuses of authority by the intelli-
gence services.
In April, Frecuencia Latina aired
two blistering stories about the tor-
ture of one intelligence-service
agent and the grisly murder of an-
other that suggested an intelligence
community gone awry. It followed
with a story about the inexplicably
high income-tax return of Vladimiro
Montesinos, de-facto head of the
National Intelligence Service (SIN)
and one of the three men-includ-
ing Commander-in-Chief of the
Army, Nicolis Hermoza and
President Fujimori-said to com-
prise Peru’s trinity of power.
The opposition newspaper, La
Repaiblica, reported that Montesinos
had sent an intermediary to con-
vince Ivcher not to air these stories.
The intermediary threatened to cut
off Ivcher’s profitable business rela-
tions with the military unless he co-
operated. Undeterred, Ivcher gave
the green light to air yet another
story on the morning of July 13
about an elaborate surveillance
scheme, in which the intelligence
services had tapped the telephones
of nearly 200 people, ranging from
opposition leaders to foreign jour-
nalists. That afternoon, the resolu-
tion repealing Ivcher’s citizenship
appeared in the official newspaper,
El Peruano.
The public outcry against these
and other abuses of authority-such
as the May dismissal of three mag-
istrates of the Constitutional
Tribunal who declared unconstitu-
tional the law passed by Congress
permitting Fujimori to run for a
Readers are invited to address letters to The Editors, NACLA Report on the Americas, 475 Riverside Drive, Suite 454, New York, NY 10115. Letters can be sent by e-mail to: NACLA @igc.apc.org.
4
third term-has been massive.
Street protests against the govern-
ment, rare in past years, have come
to life not only in Lima but in
provincial cities as well. At the po-
litical level, however, the opposi-
tion remains weak and divided. In
the midst of the current crisis, the
largest opposition party, Javier
P6rez de Cuellar’s Unity for Peru
(UPP), has been mired in internal
squabbles between the “liberal”
wing, which supports Fujimori’s
economic plan but not his authori-
tarian style, and the “left” wing,
which rejects Fujimori’s economics
as well as his politics.
The crisis has ignited speculation
about whether Fujimori has lost
control to the military-his allies
since he became president, and es-
pecially after the April 1992 “self-
coup.” But the problem is not
Fujimori’s power vis-a-vis the mili-
tary; indeed, the trinity of power is
as ensconced as ever. Rather, the
government’s problems lie with its
attempts to control all expressions
of opposition, which are beginning
to provoke outrage from all sectors
of society.
Members of Peru’s business
elite-Fujimori’s junior partners–
have grown increasingly jittery over
these abuses and the resulting polit-
ical instability. If a powerful busi-
nessman like Ivcher, once an ally of
the military, is vulnerable, then the
rule of law-always a questionable
concept for most Peruvians-is un-
likely to be able to protect anyone
who clashes with the sinister forces
that hold Peru hostage.
-Jo-Marie Burt
Errata In the introduction to the interview with the Cuban researcher Juan Valdes Paz (July/August, 1997), he is described as having been affiliated with CEA, “the re- cently dissolved Center for the Study of the Americas.” In fact CEA was down- sized but not dissolved. It is still in opera- tion in Havana. In the same issue, the photo of Benedita da Silva was taken by AntOnio Guerreiro.
NEWSBRIEFS
(CONTINUED FROM PAGE 4)
Chilean Students Take
on the “Neoliberal
University.”
SANTIAGO, AUGUST 1, 1997
On July 15, instruction re-
sumed in Chile’s public
universities after more
than seven weeks of nationwide
student protests that began on May
23. These protests constitute the
largest student mobilizations since
the end of the dictatorship. In close
to two months of intense activity
and with support from academics
and staff, tens of thousands of stu-
dents participated in teach-ins,
building occupations and street
demonstrations demanding a polit-
ical and financial commitment
from the government to resolve the
current crisis of public higher edu-
cation.
Under the banner of the
Confederation of Chilean Uni-
versity Students (CONFECh), 26
student federations from throughout
the country came together to de-
mand an end to the Concertaci6n
government’s neoliberal fiscal poli-
cies towards higher education.
Students sharply criticized the
legacy of the military government,
especially the policy of “self-fi-
nancing,” which forces these state
institutions closer to the private sec-
tor by mandating financial self-suf-
ficiency. They were particularly
critical of the ways in which the
neoliberal model implemented dur-
ing the dictatorship and embraced
by the postdictatorship govern-
ments has undermined the auton-
omy of Chile’s once prestigious uni-
versities by imposing undemocratic
structures of decision making and
by placing both research funds and
capital improvements at the mercy
of private enterprise. The students
also protested recent initiatives to
“modernize” the University of
Chile, which have resulted in soar-
ing fees for students, a two-tier sys-
tem for academic employees, and
skyrocketing deficits which have
only been ameliorated by the liqui-
dation of university assets.
While the first mobilizations only
elicited disciplinary threats, the
government ceded to students’ de-
mands for negotiations once the
movement grew in numbers and be-
came national in scope. As students
stepped up the pressure on both the
Ministry of Education and the ad-
ministrations of individual universi-
ties through building takeovers and
street demonstrations, authorities
adopted a strategy of stalling while
negotiating, with the hope that the
movement would fizzle. The inflex-
ible positions taken by Minister of
Education Jos6 Pablo Arellano dur-
ing several rounds of negotiations
were interpreted as a clear indicator
of this strategy by student leaders.
Building occupations, street demon-
strations and face-offs with the po-
lice continued, resulting in over a
thousand arrests and many injuries.
On July 1, clashes between students
and police forces during a march to
the National Congress in Valparaiso
resulted in over 100 arrests and nine
injuries.
As authorities realized that the
protests were not dissipating, they
shifted their strategy and success-
fully attempted to weaken the
movement by creating divisions
within it. On July 8, a tentative
agreement was arrived at between
some of the student federations in
the CONFECh and government au-
thorities. Leaders from 11 of the 26
universities in the Federation im-
mediately stated that they would
not sign the agreement. Jeanette
Jara, president of the Student
Federation of the University of
Santiago (FEUSACh), accused the
compliant student leaders of violat-
ing a national decision made by the
CONFECh not to accept anything
less than $60 million for the univer-
sities and indicated that mobiliza-
tions would continue.
The fracture of the movement
was officialized at a meeting of
CONFECh leaders in Valparaiso,
where 15 student federations, pri-
marily from the provinces, chose to
accept to negotiate the $60 million
figure while 11 federations, mostly
from the capital and representing a
majority of students in the
CONFECh refused. With this ir-
reparable breach, the national stu-
dent movement lost its ability to ne-
gotiate with the government in a
concerted manner, and individual
student federations had to resume
negotiations with their own univer-
sity administrations. The final fig-
ure offered by the government was
in the vicinity of $35 million. In the
end, the students gained some key
procedural reforms in decision-
making structures and budgetary in-
creases of various proportions-all
much more modest than their origi-
nal demands. Perhaps the most im-
portant gain however, is the experi-
ence of concerted political struggle
for a new generation of students
that has come of age amidst the
low-intensity democracy of the
postdictatorship era.
-Marcial Godoy-Anativia
Protests Build, Dialogue
Wanes in Nicaragua
MANAGUA, JULY 25, 1997
F or two and a half weeks this July,
thousands of students clashed
with riot police in the university cen-
ters of Managua, Leon and Mata-
galpa. They were protesting
President Arnoldo Alemin’s veto of
the National Assembly’s budget that
included a constitutionally mandated
6% for the universities. Under pres-
sure from international lending insti-
tutions, Alemdn had vetoed the bud-
get because the 6% allocated to the
universities would have been funded
by international donations and loans.
Students, angered at the deteriora-
tion of university conditions, built
barricades, burned vehicles and
fought police with molotov cocktails
and homemade mortars. On July 15,
they took over Managua Inter-
national Airport for two hours. The
government received an emergency
shipment of tear gas and rubber bul-
lets from El Salvador to replace its
own dwindling supplies. The clashes
left over 250 students injured, and
another 250 arrested. President
Alemin has threatened to use funds
from whatever university budget is
eventually passed to pay for the
damages caused by the protests.
Three months earlier, peasants
had blocked roads throughout the
country for four days to protest the
government’s plans to repossess
over 14,000 farms for non-payment
of debts to state banks. The fear of a
prolonged peasant strike led the
government to enter into talks with
the FSLN. After 30 days, talks
broke down, with each side blaming
the other for the failure to reach an
agreement. The government then
called for a “national dialogue”
with minor opposition parties, the
Church and other groups. The dia-
logue has also broken down, though
there are reports that the govern-
ment and the FSLN are engaged in
secret talks to resolve the land issue.
-Bayardo Gonzdlez
The Right or Requirement
to Vote?
NEZAHUALC6YOTL, MExico, JULY 7, 1997
A hundred or so voters, who were
turned away when they arrived
too late at Voting Station No. 3160
in this working class extension of
Mexico City, expressed fears that if
their voting cards did not bear the
stamp indicating that they had voted
in this year’s legislative elections,
they would suffer repercussions at
their work places, schools, even
banks.
“If I don’t get my voting card
stamped, the principal of my daugh-
ter’s school won’t let me register
her,” a panicked woman told an
election official, who, a half hour
after the official closing time of 6
PM, had arbitrarily cut the snaking
line of expectant voters in half and
told the tail end to go home.
“We work on Sundays!” yelled a
woman in a ruffled apron, shaking
her fist at the election official
dressed in a suit. “I work an hour-
and-a-half from here!” shouted an-
other. “Everyone in my family
works except my youngest son, and
I was not going to leave my busi-
ness in his hands!”
In Mexico, the photo-identifica-
tion voting card is often required as
the only acceptable identification
for a number of important transac-
tions, including payment of water
bills and property taxes, registration
of oneself or one’s children in
school, and the execution of banking
transactions such as taking out loans
or opening accounts.
Likewise, union leaders who
pledge their constituents’ support to
the ruling Institutional Revo-
lutionary Party (PRI), have insisted
that members show their officially
stamped voting cards after an elec-
toral race. Despite signs at every
voting station that read, “Your vote
is free and secret,” such indirect in-
timidation by union leaders has a co-
ercive effect. By law, workers do not
have to show their voting cards to a
union functionary. In reality, they
know that failure to do so may result
in merciless scrutiny of their job per-
formance or other punitve measures.
At the same time, the sight of a
citizen in an apron confronting an
election official in a suit in defense
of her vote is a heartening one. It in-
dicates increasingly open public ex-
pression of all kinds of grievances,
despite the intimidating presence of
unidentified men who videotaped
the woman and the other protesters
at Voting Station No. 3160, located
right in front of a police station.
-Alison Gardy
Sources
Catherine Orenstein is a New York-based
independent journalist who investigated
human rights crimes for the United
Nations and for the government of Haiti in
1995 and 1996.
Jo-Marie Burt is Associate Editor (on leave)
of NACLA Report on the Americas and a
doctoral candidate in political science at
Columbia University.
Mario Murillo is Public Affairs Director for
WBAI in New York and a member of the
NACLA Editorial Board.
Marcial Godoy-Anativia is Associate Editor
of NACLA Report on the Americas, and a
doctoral candidate in anthropology at
Columbia University.
Bayardo Gonzalez is NACLA’s Circulation
Manager.
Alison Gardy is a freelance journalist who
frequently covers Mexico.