How can we understand the many enigmas sur-
rounding the presidency of Alberto Fujimori?
Emerging practically out of nowhere, he defeat-
ed novelist Mario Vargas Llosa in the 1990 presidential
race. While previous administrations had suffered one
policy failure after another in dealing with the country’s
economic and political crises, Fujimori had notable
“success” stabilizing the country’s erratic economy and
defeating the Shining Path guerrilla insurgency. Finally
and perhaps most puzzling, despite the high social costs
of his economic model and the authoritarian style that
has characterized his government, Fujimori has
received consistently high popularity ratings from
Peruvians of all social classes.
Fujimori, an obscure agronomist and university pro-
fessor of mathematics, was a novice in the political
arena when he decided to participate in the 1990 gener-
al elections. At the time, Peruvian law permitted a pres-
idential candidate to run simultaneously for senate
office. Fujimori ran as an independent candidate for
both seats, but it was obvious that his aspiration was to
become a member of parliament. Vargas Llosa, who
was backed by Peru’s principal power brokers and the
U.S. establishment, was widely favored to win. To
everyone’s surprise, Fujimori came in second behind
Vargas Llosa in the first-round vote, and went on to
defeat him in the second round. New social and politi-
cal circumstances made Fujimori’s apparent “outsider”
status attractive to voters fed up with politics as usual.
Fujimori took power at an extremely difficult and
complex moment in Peru’s history. The corruption and
mismanagement of the Alan Garcia administration
(1985-90) had led to a sharp deterioration of state insti-
tutions and of the public’s confidence in government.
The government was also widely discredited for its
inability to quell Shining Path’s violence. Peru was in
dire economic straits as well. In retaliation for Garcia’s
refusal to pay the external debt, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) declared Peru “ineligible” to
receive further international loans. The gross domestic
product (GDP) fell 8.3% in 1988, and another 11.9% in
NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
Guillermo Rochabr&n is professor of sociology at the Catholic
University in Lima. He is the author of Socialidad e individualidad:
Materiales para una sociologia (Pontificia Universidad Catolica
del Pera, 1993).
Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.REPORT ON PERU
1989. Hyperinflation
Coming
out of
soared,
from 1,722%
in 1988, to 2,775% in
nowhere, Fujimori 1989, and 7,650% in
1990.
defeated Vargas Not only did Fujimori
Llosa in 1990. He face a mountain
of
“problems that had
then had “success” piled up over the
stabilizing the years, but he assumed
power in a virtual vac-
economy
and
uum. He had no polit-
ical program, no team
defeating Shining of advisors, and no
contacts or deals with
the powers-that-be–
surprisingly, the business sector,
the multilateral lend-
despite the high ing institutions, the
costs of his
political parties, and
the media. (The one
economic model critical exception was
the military.) Many
and his observers expected
authoritarian
style,
his adminstration
to
be a total flop, while
he is popular others feared he
would be a mere fig-
among Peruvians urehead. Those prog-
of all social classes. nostications were
proven wrong.
Shortly after taking
office, Fujimori–
who had waged an electoral campaign against neoliber-
al reform-made an about-face and implemented the
very orthodox economic policies he had rejected. He
did so in an extremely harsh fashion, in an attempt to
stabilize the economy and bring inflation under control.
In the short term, these measures aggravated the reces-
sion and further jacked up inflation-gasoline prices
increased 30 times overnight, while inflation for the
month of August alone was 400%. In a country of 22
million inhabitants, the number of people living in
poverty jumped from 9 to 14 million.
The administration gradually introduced new mea-
sures that virtually eliminated all forms of legal protec-
tion for salaried workers. Job security was completely
stamped out, and new rules governing contracts were
established that reduced employers’ obligations to their
workers. For example, workers under 24 years of age
are now considered “apprentices,” which means they
can receive salaries below the minimum wage, and they
are not covered by the social-security system.
Once inflation was brought under control and the
economy had stabilized, the government turned its
attention to satisfying Peru’s international creditors. 1
Paying the external debt-referred to in the govern-
ment’s jargon as “international reinsertion”-was the
top priority. One of the government’s principal eco-
nomic advisors joked about putting on knee pads before
his meetings with the IMF to discuss Peru’s debt.
An IMF-mandated tax reform was implemented to
generate revenue to pay off Peru’s debt arrears. A cam-
paign against tax evasion led by the new tax agency, the
National Superintendency of Tax Administration
(SUNAT), helped increase the government’s coffers.
Since 1990, SUNAT’s directors have been trying to
generate greater awareness of the importance of paying
taxes and to link paying taxes to a broader concept of
citizenship. The central government, however, seems
interested only in collecting-as quickly and cheaply as
possible-a certain percentage of the country’s GDP, in
order to comply with the annual agreements established
by the IMF as part of Peru’s debt-repayment plan. Each
year, the government has agreed to higher rates: 10% in
1993, 13% in 1995, and 14.1% in 1996.
The other component of international reinsertion was
the market opening. To that end, Fujimori implemented
the following policies: trade liberalization, drastic tariff
reductions, and the privatization of state-run enterpris-
es. His administration eliminated government regula-
tions and subsidies, and the market now determines the
cost of public services.
neoliberal agenda was Fujimori’s increasing
intolerance for democratic checks and balances.
Since the mid- 1980s, the military has had a strong pres-
ence in national life due to its role in fighting the coun-
terinsurgency war. Through Political-Military Com-
mands established in areas declared as emergency
zones, for example, the military exercises direct gov-
ernmental control in more than a third of the country.
The military’s dominion over vast parts of the country
resulted in grave and systematic human rights abuses in
the 1980s. Under Fujimori, military control over the
counterinsurgency war intensified, prompting a further
deterioriation in the government’s human rights record.
Later, however, in an important shift in strategy, the
government tried to win support from the civilian pop-
ulation by engaging the military in civic-action cam-
paigns in rural villages throughout the country as well
as in shantytowns in Lima.
Fujimori relies on information gathered by the
National Intelligence Service (SIN) to maintain his lock
on power. Consequently, the SIN-and its de facto
head, Vladimiro Montesinos-has accrued a great deal
of power and influence within his administration. It
monitors the telephone conversations of key figures, both outside and within the government. This includes
VoL XXX, No 1 JuLvYAUG 1996 17REPORT ON PERU
the surveillance of members of the armed forces in
order to prevent any organized resistance against the
pro-Fujimori High Command. The SIN also tries to
mold public opinion in the government’s favor. It does
so through public-opinion polls, hiring sympathetic
journalists for government-controlled media outlets,
and planting rumors and staging events to distract pub-
lic attention when necessary.
These authoritarian tendencies culminated in
Fujimori’s coup de main on April 5, 1992. He abruptly
dissolved Congress and the judiciary, concentrating all
the state’s powers in the hands of the president. The
cabinet of ministers became virtually irrelevant as
Fujimori came to rely on a small number of advisors
who had his absolute personal confidence.
Fujimori justified the dissolution of the constitution-
Paralleling his
implementation
of a neoliberal
agenda was
Fujimori’s
growing
intolerance for
democratic
checks and
balances.
al order by blaming Congress for its “irresponsible, sterile, antihistoric and antipatriotic” behavior, “which favors the interests of small groups and party leaders over the interests of Peru.” lie also pointed to a
corrupt and inefficient system
of justice, which he blamed
for the release of convicted
drug traffickers and guerrillas.
More concretely, he criticized
Congress for overturning a
series of decree laws that he
had proposed. It was intolera-
ble, he said, that several laws
designed to attack drug traf-
ficking and its corrupting
influence on government offi-
cials were vetoed. Nor was
Fujimori willing to allow
Congress to pass laws that he
believed imposed unacceptable limits on his ability to govern, such as one measure reducing the president’s
discretion in declaring different regions as emergency
zones.
What Fujimori was announcing-without naming
it-was a revolution of sorts. With the new powers
vested in the office of the presidency as a result of the
coup, he sought no less than a radical modification of
the structure of governance. He delineated the follow-
ing objectives: greater legislative efficacy, an end to
corruption within the justice system, the modernization
of the state bureaucracy, an end to terrorism and drug
trafficking, and the installation of a market economy
which, in the medium term, would substantially
improve living standards. Democracy was a worthy
goal, he said, but it was impossible to obtain “true”
democracy with Peru’s “deceitful” formal democratic
institutions. 2
Patricia Oliart is a ea her at the Rescarch Group for Development: (GRADE) in Lima. She is the co author of El
Peru desde la escuela (nstituto de poyo Agrario 989). Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.
The coup confirmed one of the
most notable characteristics of
Fujimori’s administration: dis-
dain for legal formalities.
Fujimori systematically alters
the rules of the game whenever
he deems it necessary-either by
creating new laws and applying
them retroactively, or by modify-
ing old ones to suit his purposes.
For example, while Fujimori’s
new Constitution gives the pub-
lic the right to call a referendum
on unpopular laws, his hench-
men in Congress have added
new legal restrictions to impede
the opposition from holding a
referendum on the privatization
of Petro-Perd, the state-owned
oil company.
T he sudden capture of Abimael Guzmbn and
other top Shining Path Military troops patrol in leaders in September, 1992 was a building after Fujimori’s,
watershed for the Fujimori
regime. Shining Path’s military activities declined
sharply thereafter, and it soon became evident that they
no longer represented a major threat to the Peruvian
state. New and repatriated capital began pouring into
Peru, and the privatization process began to gather
steam.
The economy took off in the next two years. Peru’s
GDP grew rapidly, reaching 6.9% in 1993 and 12.9% in
1994. While these high growth rates have been lauded
both locally and internationally as a sign of Peru’s
definitive economic recovery, these figures actually
reflect a return to Peru’s per capita GDP levels in 1989
and 1990. This growth is based on a boom in construc-
tion-due primarily to a dramatic increase in govern-
ment-funded public-works projects, largely designed to
contribute to Fujimori’s reelection. An increased
demand for fishmeal exports also helped boost the
economy. At the same time, however, the government
has not tried to modernize Peru’s productive capacity.
The recovery of the fishmeal industry reinforces a trend
that had been apparent even before Fujimori’s market
opening: Peru’s return to its traditional reliance on pri-
mary-product exports.
The improved economic indicators for 1993 and
1994 led to a slight increase in salaries, but there was
no visible effect on employment. Poverty remained a
daunting problem, and continued to affect more than
half the population. Surprisingly, this has not produced
a generalized disorientation or anomie, much less frus-
front of the Congress April 5, 1992 self-coup.
tration. In fact, the population
in general-including the
poor-began to feel optimistic
about the country’s future.
While some may doubt the
reliability of public-opinion
polls in Peru, it is indisputable
that Fujimori enjoys steady, though not militant, support
from all sectors of the popula-
tion and all parts of the coun-
try. 3 Fujimori’s long-term and
widespread popularity over the
years-given the high social
costs of his economic policies
and his authoritarian governing
style-has been one of the
greatest enigmas surrounding
his regime.
A staggering 80% of the pop-
ulation, for example, supported
Fujimori’s April, 1992 self-
coup. It was international pres-
sure, not local protests, that
forced Fujimori to call congres-
sional elections in November,
1992. After obtaining a congressional majority-by a
slim margin-in those elections, Fujimori promulgated
a constitution tailor-made to his wishes. The new
Constitution permitted Fujimori to run for reelection in
1995, a race which he handily won.
Some observers argue that the root of Fujimori’s
wide popular support is his authoritarianism, which
they say is essentially a reflection of the authoritarian-
ism inherent in Peruvian society. 4 If this were the case,
the population’s clear rejection of some of Fujimori’s
most authoritarian measures would be inexplicable.
The amnesty law that the president pushed through
Congress in June, 1995 is a clear example. The
amnesty, which ended all judicial proceedings against
military and police officials accused of human rights
violations in the context of the counterinsurgency war,
was opposed by 87% of the population according to
one poll. The death penalty-enshrined in Peru’s new
Constitution in cases of treason, but not yet applied-is
also unpopular among most Peruvians.
Others explain his successful reelection in 1995 by
pointing to the vast resources at his disposal through
state-run programs like Foncodes. In reality, govern-
ments of all stripes in Peru have had similar advantages.
Fujimori was not the first to shore up his support by 5
inaugurating public-works projects, and doling out
foodstuffs and other material goods, including luxury
items like computers. But in contrast with his predeces- $
sors, Fujimori did not use public-works projects and
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICASREPORT ON PERU
hand-outs as a tactic to cover up previous policy fail-
ures or to win last-minute support. The electorate voted
for Fujimori in 1995 because they felt that he had effec-
tively resolved the country’s two central problems:
hyperinflation and guerrilla violence.
It’s important to understand how hyperinflation and
violence profoundly affected people’s daily lives.
Hyperinflation meant more than just a decline in pur-
chasing power; it signified continuous impoverishment,
which sapped people’s energy and made it impossible
to think in terms of the future. By stabilizing prices,
Fujimori helped ease people’s anxieties, and made liv-
ing in poverty more tolerable. People knew that they
could count on their resources, however meager, having
the same value tomorrow as they had today, and maybe
even a little more. By contrast, the dramatic decline in
the quality of public education and health care are not
forefront in people’s minds when judging the current
situation.
The growing violence of Shining Path created a gen-
eralized feeling of insecurity among the population. In
the late 1980s, Shining Path’s military activities in
Lima began to escalate dramatically. Once limited to
occasional acts of sabotage and selective assassina-
tions, the capital city was suddenly rocked by car
bombs and “armed strikes.” The anxiety was height-
ened because this was not a war in which each individ-
ual had a clearly defined position in the conflict. Most
Peruvians saw Shining Path as distant, and did not con-
done their violent methods. This was especially true
among the urban poor, who were unwilling to become
actively engaged in the organization. From their per-
spective, Shining Path brought few benefits and
entailed grave risks of being detained by the police or
the military. At the same time, however, the urban
poor’s attitude toward Shining Path’s violence was not
simple condemnation or rejection. “In the violence
exercised by others against the elites,” one study con-
cluded, “the urban poor seem to unleash their feelings
of hostility and discontent against the rich, the politi-
cians, and the authorities.” 5 By vanquishing the Shining
Path insurgency, the Fujimori regime alleviated a major
source of collective anguish.
ujimori’s popularity cannot be explained without
also taking into account the decline of various
forms of organized opposition. Over the past
decade, Peruvians have witnessed the disintegration of
different forms of social organization that were a factor
in Peruvian politics since the 1960s, in particular trade-
union confederations and their local affiliates. The
decline in union organizing is reflected in the steep
reduction in strikes. The number of man-hours lost due
to strikes totaled 36 million in 1978 and 38 million in
Relatives grieve for those killed in a car-bomb attack by Shining Path in Miraflores, an affluent neighborhood in Lima.
1983, dropped to 15 million in 1990, and plummeted to
barely a million in 1995.6
The labor movement was devastated by Peru’s pro-
longed and profound economic crisis, as well as by the
guerrilla war. The virtual elimination of legal protec-
tions for workers and the reduction of the state’s medi-
ating role in business-labor negotiations further weak-
ened labor’s position. As a result of the state’s incapac-
ity to respond to social demands, many people began
searching for solutions to their problems in informal
networks, family relationships, churches, and non-
governmental organizations. Peruvians have learned to
resolve problems on their own without the help of the
state or politicians. Under these new circumstances-
and as employment opportunities in government and
other sectors of the formal economy have shrivelled
up-a significant portion of the population seems to
take solace in a growing “neoliberal” common sense
that holds that it is better to be your own boss than to be
a dependent wage worker.
These social and economic factors also contributed to
the long-term discrediting of Peru’s political parties. If
one single element were to define the current political
conjuncture, it is the virtual disappearance of the “tra-
ditional” political parties, at least if measured by their
performance in recent elections. In 1980, for example,
the centrist APRA and the conservative Popular Action
(AP) and Popular Christian Party (PPC) together cap-
tured more than 80% of the vote. The electoral rise of
the left, particularly after the formation of a coalition of
Marxist and progressive parties in the United Left (IU)
in 1983, displaced AP and PPC. APRA and the IU alone
garnered 75% of the vote in the mid-1980s. By 1995,
however, all these parties combined captured under
10% of the vote. The IU, after winning up to a third of
the vote in the 1980s, got a miniscule 0.57% in 1995.
In a country where all the development models have
been tried without success, politics has lost the mean-
ing it once had in the popular imagination. “Identi-
fication with-and not admiration for or consideration
of-a candidate, is key to understanding the changes in
Peru’s political culture,” says journalist Jos6 Maria
Salcedo. “People no longer vote for what candidates
offer, but for what the candidate is or appears to be.
Peruvians, projecting their own virtues and defects on
the candidates, now vote for those they feel are close to
them and with whom they most identify. ‘The political,’
as a result, has become devalued as something far
removed from daily life.”‘
This devaluation of politics
is reflected weekly in televi-
sion comedy programs, which
make fun of the country’s
politicians. Aside from their
frequent appearances on these
popular shows during election
time, politicians engage in
few other activities that bring
them in touch with the elec-
torate. “The origin of the cri-
sis of the political parties is
that they have been acting
behind the back of the country
that they claim to represent,”
says Carlos Ferrero, one of
the few Congress members
from Fujimori’s coalition with
a certain degree of indepen-
dence. “They thought the peo-
ple wanted a legislature inde-
pendent from the executive,
but the people believed that it
was more important that the
legislature help them obtain
access to water and sewerage.
The parties believed that if
there were frequent elections,
everyone would be ‘content’
In a country
where all the
development
models have
been tried
without
success,
politics has
lost the
meaning it
once had in
the popular
imagination.
with the democratic system. What people really wanted was a system that provided them with security and order. The parties thus sought to ‘defend’ things that the people weren’t really interested in, and they showed lit- tle interest in addressing the real problems that people suffered on a daily basis.” 8
Perhaps the first symptom of the fatal decline of the
traditional parties was the wane of party-line voting:
since 1980, voter preferences have fluctuated wildly
from one election to another. This disenchantment then
began to translate itself into backing for candidates who
cast themselves as “ordinary” people, like any neighbor
on the street. This was the case for Alfonso Barrantes,
VOL XXX, No 1 JULY/AuG 1996 23 VOL XXX, No 1 JULY/AUG 1996 23REPORT ON PERU
the leader of the IU coalition
who won the mayorship of
Lima in 1983; Ricardo
Belmont, the first self-
declared “independent” who
was elected as Lima’s mayor
in 1990 and 1993; and finally, Fujimori.
Fujimori is not a charismat-
ic leader who compels
absolute support. On the con-
trary, people carefully think
through their backing for him.
In a poll conducted last
November, for example, while
75% of the people said that
they approved of Fujimori’s
administration, in a separate
question, only 27.5% said they
were sympathetic to Fujimori
and a mere 2.7% declared
themselves “Fujimoristas.” A
hefty 56% said they were
capable of supporting policies
they considered positive, and
of criticizing those with which
they disagreed.9
F ujimori’s economic
successes over the last
few years seem to be in
A boy in a shantytown on the outskirts of Lima.
The recent economic downturn has
prompted a drop in Fujimori’s
popular support. Workers,
university students and retirees
have taken to the
their declining I
danger. Last year, the IMF began to worry that Peru’s high growth rates were contributing to a growing trade deficit. As a result, it began to pressure the Fujimori government to “cool down” the economy, primarily through a cut in government spending. The growth rate has since dropped to approximately 6.9% in 1995 and -1.6% in the first quarter of 1996.1′ Given ongoing concerns about the deficit, it seems unlikely that this downward trend will be reversed any time soon. The economic downturn has been paralleled by a
relative decline in Fujimori’s popular support in the
polls. According to Apoyo, an independent polling
firm, Fujimori’s popularity has dropped from 73% in
December, 1995, to 59% in May, 1996. Peru’s incor-
poration into the Brady debt-repayment plan and large
new investments in gas exploration by Shell-Mobil–
announcements that the government hoped would
improve its sagging ratings-had little effect. Clashes
between protesters and the police have also become
more common, as fishermen, construction workers,
municipal-government workers, university students
and retirees have taken to the streets to protest their
declining living standards. According to one study,
68% of Peruvians now live in absolute poverty.”
A coherent and intelligent
opposition would be able to
take advantage of a moment
like this when the economic
tide is turning. And yet, the
opposition has failed to gain
the political upper hand
even once since 1990.
Fujimori has dealt a further
blow to the opposition by
passing new electoral laws
which deny party status to
any political group that
obtained under 5% of the
vote in 1995. As a result,
only the Union For Peru
(UPP), led by Javier P6rez
de Cudllar, and Popular
Action (AP), which regis-
tered as a party under the
previous legislation, are now
legally recognized parties.
All other political groups
must obtain at least half a
million signatures in order
to participate in future elec-
streets to protest tions. Without inflation, without
iving standards. Shining Path, and without
significant levels of eco-
nomic growth, an era is
coming to a close. Fujimori may have successfully
demolished the previous order, but it is doubtful
whether he can build new institutions capable of
addressing the changing times and circumstances.
Beyond specific aspects of public policy that are gov-
ernment priorities, the country’s public administration
and public services are in a state of utter chaos.
The “Fujimori phenomenon” is a consummated fact,
though it is too soon to know how it will be judged by
history. Perhaps Fujimori will be seen as the president
who did the “dirty work” no one else dared to, in order
to unblock Peru’s clogged capitalist development. This
meant doing away with everything or everyone who got
in his way: former allies, the rule of law, Congress, and
the Constitution.
But Fujimori now faces a new moment in history. He
can no longer justify his actions by appealing to the war
against Shining Path and inflation. Opposition leaders
and groups, which are now almost entirely unrelated to
the “traditional” parties, have a golden opportunity-
for the first time in six years-to build a viable opposi-
tion movement and assume the political initiative.
Whether or not they will be able to do so, however,
remains an open question.
Deciphering the Enigmas of Alberto Fujimori
1. The annual inflation rate since 1987 is as follows: 1987, 114%; 1988, 1,722%; 1989, 2,775%; 1990, 7,659%; 1991, 139%; 1992, 56.7%; 1993, 39%; 1994, 15%; 1995, 10%. National Institute of Statistical Information (INEI), Indice de Precios al Consumidor(Lima: INEI, 1996), p. 16. 2. El Peruano (Lima), April 6, 1992, as cited in C6sar Arias Quincot, La modernizaci6n autoritaria: La nueva institucionalidad surgida a partir de 1990 (Lima: Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 1994). 3. I have reviewed the survey data of two polling firms: Imasen, an agency completely independent from the government which employs some professionals from the left, and Apoyo, an inde- pendent firm of neoliberal orientation. In a comparison of polling results for 52 months, Imasen’s registered approval rat- ings of Fujimori were higher than those of Apoyo in 26 cases, they coincided in 3 cases, and Apoyo’s ratings are higher in 22 cases. In general, however, the levels and tendencies registered are broadly similar. 4. See Cesar Arias, La modernizacion autoritaria. 5. Jorge Parodi and Walter Twanama, “Los pobladores, la ciudad y la politica: Un estudio de actitudes,” in J. Parodi, ed., Los pobres, la ciudad y la politica (Lima: Center for the Study of Democracy and Society (CEDYS), 1993), p. 75. This study was based on sur- veys carried out in poor districts in Lima at the end of 1990. 6. Cuadernos Laborales, several issues (Lima: ADEC-ATC). 7. Jos6 Maria Salcedo, Terremoto: ePor qu6 gan6 Fujimori? (Lima: Editorial Brasa, 1995). 8. Carlos Ferrero Costa, “Representaci6n politica, crisis de los par- tidos y construcci6n de la democracia en el Peri,” Socialismo y Participacion, No. 73 (March, 1996), p. 68. 9. Imasen Confidencial (Andlisis y Sondeos de Opinibn), No. 36 (November, 1995). 10. Central Reserve Bank of Peru (BCR), Boletin Mensual, November, 1995, and Nota Semanal, No. 18, May 10, 1996. 11. Adolfo Figueroa, Te6filo Altamirano and Denis Sulmont, Exclusion social y desigualdad en el Peru (Lima: International Institute of Labor Studies, 1996).
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