In early October, a potentially,
explosive week-long protest in
Nicaragua’s Atlantic Coast city of
Bluefields was defused by the
government. The demonstrators,
who at one point numbered 2,500
(government sources cite a figure
of 1,000 while the opposition
claims there were more than
5,000), were met by a restrained
but firm military presence, and a
government which subsequently
proved open to legitimate com-
plaints.
Regional Isolation
Most people in Bluefields have
had more ties with the neighboring
Caribbean nations, with Costa
Rica and with the United States
than with their compatriots on the
Pacific Coast. The Atlantic Coast
region, isolated from the rest of
the country by vast roadless
jungle, is rich in mineral deposits,
abundant forest reserves and fer-
tile fishing grounds, all of which
were controlled by the Somoza
dynasty, often in joint ventures
with U.S. firms. Until the new
government remedied the situa-
tion earlier-this year, there had
never even been telephone lines,
or radio or television relays linking
the two parts of the nation.
Bluefields, the largest and most
important city on the coast, is still
accessible only by plane or boat.
Like the rest of the coastal region,
Bluefields was detached from the
most important event of recent
Nicaraguan history. Blufileijos ex-
perienced neither the destruction
suffered by many Pacific Coast
cities during the war of liberation,
nor the jubilation of victorious bat-
tle. After the compas (the San-
dinista fighters) had captured the
barracks in Estel( land Somoza’s
bunker in Managua, the National
Guard in Bluefields quietly placed
their weapons in a pile and sur-
rendered or escaped in the
Guard’s motorboats to Honduras.
Bluefields Under Siege
Many of the Bluefields
demonstrators were protesting the
presence of Cuban doctors,
teachers and technicians working in
the area, but others publicly ex-
pressed their discontent with
government policies and their
distrust and suspicion of the
leadership in Managua.
The demonstrations were well
Center of Bluefields, looking toward Atlantic.
cu co
NovlDec 1980 41update*update update update
organized and orchestrated. A
general strike closed all the stores
and stopped the boats and planes.
However, in the first two days of
the protests, most people ap-
peared unaware of the gravity of
their actions and the atmosphere
was often less than serious. For
some, the demonstration seemed
merely a diversion.
Adding to the confusion, the
streets were filled with people
celebrating the religious festivities
in honor of San Jer6nimo. Gigan-
tonas-young masked men wear-
ing women’s dresses with large
pillows in their backsides-were
chasing people through the
streets, hitting them with rolled-up
newspapers, while people in the
crowd struck back at them. All
around, huge firecrackers were
being set off. It seemed apparent
that the anti-government
demonstration and the festival
were planned to overlap.
On Tuesday, the third day of
protests, a late afternoon
demonstration coincided with the
peak of the San Jer6nimo
festivities. The noise of the
firecrackers blended with the
sound of shots: the Sandinista
military was firing into the air to
prevent demonstrators from enter-
ing the military barracks. In the
resulting confusion some people
ran, laughing, toward the shots.
But when a man bleeding profuse-
ly from a head wound was led
away, the atmosphere turned
serious. (Reports that the man
later died are generally believed to
be false.)
On Wednesday, the
demonstrators mounted one final
march. With the report that
several weapons had been stolen
during the night, the security
forces were directed to take a
stronger stand. The 75 soldiers
42
and militia members flown in from
Managua the previous day asked
the marchers to disperse, then
fired into the air when they refus-
ed. In a few minutes, the
demonstrators scattered and 70
persons were arrested. There
were continued military patrols the
rest of the week, but no more
demonstrations. By Friday, stores
were open and the boats were run-
ning.
FSLN Evaluates Role
In the self-criticism that follow-
ed the events in Bluefields, FSLN
leaders commented that the arm-
ed forces “did not use tact” in
confronting the situation. But after
seeing the entire week of military
actions, I was most impressed by
their patience. In the face of pro-
vocateurs shouting threats and
slogans such as, “Things were
better under Somoza,” and, “You
are the same as the National
Guard,” the security forces acted
with amazing restraint. This was
the first time the Sandinista army
and police had confronted such a
situation. The people in the street
were well aware that the San-
dinistas would go to great lengths
to avoid a confrontation, and ap-
peared surprised when the military
would not back down.
Reactionary Agitation
Nicaragua’s opposition
newspaper, La Prensa, and the
foreign press spotlighted the anti-
Cuban aspects of the protests.
Cubans had been working for
several months on the Atlantic
Coast, mainly in the remote areas
where there is an acute shortage
of medical personnel and
teachers. In the weeks preceding
the Bluefields incident, rumors
about the Cubans had begun to
circulate. Rumors in Bluefields are
an important source of informa-
tion-or misinformation. Stories
spread that Cubans were taking
jobs from Nicaraguans, that gold
from the Atlantic Coast mines was
being sent to Cuba, that Cuban
doctors were making all important
decisions at the local hospital and
that Cuban ships were unloading
arms just off the coast. In a variant
of the old saw, “…like taking coals
to Newcastle,” the current sugar
shortage was rumored to exist
because Nicaraguan sugar was
being supplied to Cuba!
According to early reports from
the Sandinistas, this Cuban
scapegoating had been stirred up
in part by radio broadcasts coming
from Costa Rica, Colombia and the
local Voice of America.
Playing on the frustrations and
fears of the residents, reactionary
leaders were able to create strong
popular sentiment around the
issue of the Cubans. After years of
hearing about “godless com-
munism” from the Somoza media,
reinforced by the anti-communist
rhetoric of some of their fun-
damentalist missionaries, the
Blufilehfos could be moved to
believe the rumors. But there are
reports that strong-arm tactics
were also used by the instigators,
including threats to burn down
shops that did not close.
During the week of the
demonstrations, the Junta went on
television to explain actions being
taken, and stated that counter-
revolutionary actions such as
those in Bluefields would not be
tolerated. A week later, the
government produced one of the
leaders of the Bluefields incident,
Hernan Wesley Savery Harrison,
who confessed to being involved in
a secessionist plot to take over the
Atlantic Coast, and another to kill
the entire FSLN leadership.
NACLA Reportupdate*update update update
Reflections on the Problem
Within days after calm had
been restored, Comandante Jaime
Wheelock visited Bluefields to
meet with townspeople and local
officials for a firsthand account of
what had transpired.
The residents of Bluefields had
many complaints. Workers in the
fishing industry-the largest
employer in Bluefields and primari-
ly state-run-were concerned
over a proposed change in pay-
ment from a percentage of the
catch to straight salary. Some peo-
ple were upset over a delay in the
start of the literacy campaign in
the region (which must be bilingual
to meet the needs of the English-
speaking, predominantly Black
populations of the port cities such
as Bluefields, and the Indian
populations of the Miskito, Sumu
and Rama who predominate in the
inland and coastal regions to the
north). Finally, others were dis-
turbed that there were fewer ships
coming to Bluefields now, and
consequently less opportunities
for work on the docks and fewer
imports to purchase.
In appreciation of the irony that
the demonstrators were exercis-
ing a political freedom that only
came to the coast with the San-
dinista victory, Bluefields residents
explained that this had been the ci-
ty’s first political demonstration in
50 years. Shortly after their
meeting with the Blufilerios, Com-
andante William Ramirez, the
government official in charge of
the development of the region, ex-
plained to a meeting of FSLN
militants, “The movement that
took place in Bluefields was not
counter-revolutionary although its
leadership had a reactionary
character and was opposed to the
revolution.”
The problems of the Atlantic
NovlDec 1980
Coast and the strains between its
people and the government in
Managua will not be alleviated
overnight. Of the 170,000 persons
living in the region, the vast majori-
ty are Miskito, whose ancestors
allied with the British throughout
the colonial period to fight off the
Spanish colonizers. The tradition
of enmity between the costeiios
and what they still call the
“Spanish,” combined with the
regional isolation, racism, cultural
denigration and ruthless extrac-
tion of the region’s wealth by the
Somozas, have left deep wounds.
Even before the Bluefields inci-
dent the government understood
that the long process of integrating
the region into the revolution re-
quired first the construction of
badly needed infrastructure
(roads, medical facilities, develop-
ment projects). In the 17 months
since the Sandinista victory, more
projects to aid the region have
begun than were attempted in the
previous half century. But these
projects have also brought more
contact between the two regions
and thus, more potential for con-
flict.
The meetings that occurred
after Bluefields have provided a
new basis for mutual understan-
ding. The government now
recognizes that its blueprints for
the rest of the country must be
modified for the Atlantic Coast,
and that it is vitally important to
have indigenous forms of organiz-
ed participation in the revolu-
tionary process. The revolutionary
structures and programs
transplanted from the Pacific
Coast will not easily take root in
the Atlantic region. As Jaime
Wheelock commented, “The
political line has to be more
creative. There is a history here, a
culture, a reality for the
revolution.” On the other hand,
Bluefields residents are now
aware that the FSLN is firm in its
convictions to defend the gains of
the revolution.
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