In the 1990 presidential election, political unknown IAlberto Fujimori conducted a deliberately simple
campaign, in sharp contrast to the multimillion-
dollar media blitz of Mario Vargas Llosa. Fujimori
visited dozens of remote Andean villages in the
“Fujimobile,” a makeshift cart pulled along by a tractor. Dressed in ponchos and chullos (hats with
ear flaps worn in the Andes), he danced with the
locals to their regional music. His motto was
“honor, technology and work.” Promising to be “a
president like you,” he delivered short public
speeches, talked and dressed simply, and interacted
informally with ordinary people. This style revealed
Fujimori’s profound, if intuitive, understanding of Peruvian political culture.
Several observers attributed Fujimori’s electoral
victory to the growing crisis of Peru’s traditional
political parties and the decline of the Lima-based
white criollo establishment that these parties histor-
ically represented. Over the past several decades, new social groups have emerged in Peru, including rural migrants who have adopted urban ways, known as “cholos,” and a new “mestizo” middle
class of first- and second-generation migrants who
obtained professional degrees at state-funded uni-
versities. Traditional parties have proven incapable of representing their interests and aspirations. These
new social groups voted for Fujimori, who had no
apparent ties to Peru’s traditional criollo elite, rather
than support Vargas Llosa, who was considered a
pituco-a derogatory Peruvian term for someone
from the upper class who is snooty and pretentious.
They identified with Fujimori because he was not
white, but he wasn’t a cho/lo either, which in Peru’s
complex ethnic hierarchy would have alienated
some groups. As the son of Japanese migrants,
Fujimori was seen by many Peruvians as simple and
hard-working like themselves.
After six years in office, Fujimori remains a wide-
ly popular president. In public opinion polls since
1990, he averages an approval rating of about 65%.
His popular appeal is the consequence in part of his
skillful use of the electronic media, especially televi-
sion. In the middle of an official televised meeting,
for example, Fujimori will pepper his speech with
colloquial language or crack a joke or two.
Frequent T.V. appearances have also helped him
develop a style of relating directly to the people
without the intermediation of political parties.
With the help of a well-honed discourse stripped of
ideological content, Fujimori has been able to cir-
cumvent obsolete and discredited party structures.
Fujimori’s Popular Appeal
Fujimori has also staged
several “media events” to dis-
tract attention at particularly
difficult moments. During the
outbreak of a cholera epi-
demic in 1991, for example, a
series of images of a weeping
virgin “appeared” through-
out Lima. In a highly publi-
cized visit, Fujimori prayed
for Peru’s future before one
of these images.
Fujimori has also developed
a personal and direct style
of relating to the poor by
assiduously cultivating his Fujimori, wearing traditional
image as a “common man.” carries a vicuna at the Inti
Fujimori distances himself from “traditional” poli-
tics. He tries, for example, to defy convention when-
ever possible. In visits to Lima shantytowns and rural
Andean villages, he has been known to tease the
crowd by pretending to throw water at them. On
other occasions, he has interrupted his speeches to
jump on a bicycle, mount a donkey, or climb onto a
tractor.
Fujimori’s speeches are laced with constant attacks
against traditional politicians for being uninterested
in the fate of ordinary Peruvians. These politicians
are the vilified “other” responsible for Peru’s mis-
fortunes, while he and the people are the authentic
“we.” He claims that political parties are merely
vehicles for these corrupt politicians, and not the
channels for popular demands that they purport to
be. Fujimori says he needs no party because he
embodies the interests of Peru’s majority.
At the same time, however, he has a very tradi-
tional image of poor Peruvians. He relates to the
poor as if they were children who need a wise and
strong parent to take care of them. He uses simple
language to inform people of the work he has done
and to outline his future plans. He righteously
defends his government’s actions in the face of the
opposition’s criticism, which he dismisses as a lack of
gratitude.
A helicopter has replaced the “Fujimobile” as the
preferred mode of presidential transport, permit-
ting Fujimori to visit remote parts of the country sev-
eral times a week. He goes out to the “forgotten vil-
lages,” as he likes to call them, in order to personally
supervise government programs. During these visits
-which are broadcast almost nightly on the
evening news-Fujimori asks each community what
their greatest needs are, and promises to send mate-
rials if the people agree to chip in with their labor.
In the first few years of his presidency, when the
Shining Path insurgency was at its peak, the media
portrayed an active presi-
dent traveling throughout
the country, supervising
public-works projects, and
speaking directly to the
people. Fujimori wanted his
presidency associated with
the act of building and gen-
erating new resources at a
time when Shining Path’s
message was perceived as
one of total destruction.
Fujimori’s frequent visits to
outlying areas have helped
mold an image of him as an
accessible, “hands-on” pres- campesino clothing, ident who “goes to the mi Festival in Ayacucho. places where things are
happening” and gets things done. “Philosophizing
and saying nice things won’t get us anywhere,” he
says. Fujimori contrasts this hands-on approach to
the unfulfilled promises of the “traditional politi-
cians,” whom he chides for being unfamiliar with the
“profound” Peru and motivated only by their own
self-interest. His government, Fujimori boasts, has
“done away with the style of governing at cocktail
parties.” He is a “doer” who provides solutions by
dint of his own hard work and dedication. He asks
the people to let him do his work, and in return, he
asks for their approval and trust.
The flip side of this “doer” image is Fujimori’s will-
ingness to bypass laws and other legal norms that
get in his way. There are numerous examples of his
indifference to rules and institutional norms. The
most obvious, of course, is the autogolpe, or “self-
coup,” of April, 1992, when he gutted the
Constitution and shut down Congress. If the law is
an obstacle to his goals, Fujimori finds a way of get-
ting around it, or he simply changes the rules in
order to achieve his objectives. This is an appealing
trait in a country where over half of the working
population labors in the informal sector, and where
bribing a police officer to overlook a traffic infrac-
tion or paying a judge to hand down a favorable
sentence has become commonplace.
In general, Fujimori symbolically fulfills the strong
desire of Peru’s historically excluded majorities to be
included in the political system. He does not, how-
ever, pretend to incorporate the poor in govern-
ment decision-making, or even to encourage them
to strengthen their own self-help organizations. The
style of his presidency-coupled with the substance
of his economic and social policies-reassures the
upper classes that his government will protect their
interests. At no time does Fujimori’s relationship
with his country’s impoverished majority threaten
the status quo.
