It is a constant refrain among observers of the
Dominican Republic that the country is evolving
toward “the consolidation of democracy.” Despite
the distance between the refrain and reality, it remains
the touchstone of the standard evaluations of the presi-
dential elections that took place in May and June of
1996. The reality is that in the Dominican Republic,
although public liberties are now respected, and political
lawlessness has considerably diminished, the essential
authoritaritarian outlines of the state system are still
very much intact.
Joaquin Balaguer, the holder of executive power since
1986-and before that, between 1966 and 1978–had
effectively annulled all other powers of the state, main-
taining himself at the head of government through a
combination of procedures that involved electoral fraud,
the exercise of extralegal violence, the repression of
social protests, bribery, the corruption of the highest
spheres of government and, in general, the refusal to
observe the canons of the law.
Political movements opposed to this authoritarian
structure have long existed in the Dominican Republic,
and over the last two decades, Dominicans have partic-
ularly resented the impoverishing effects of the state’s
brutal, self-interested incompetence. During the 1980s,
is over, but many
wonder if the
newly elected
government can
eradicate the old
authoritarian
ways that have
dominated
Dominican
politics for sO
long.
as hopes diminished for
change through electoral
means, social move-
ments emerged which
questioned the country’s
authoritarian structure
and, above all, the dizzy-
ing fall of living stan-
dards. These movements
were never well orga-
nized, and they generally
suffered from a lack of
clear direction. As they
ran their course by the
end of the decade, hopes
returned to electoral
means-and the 1990 presidential elections-as a
means of ousting Balaguer and his cronies.
These electoral hopes, to a great degree, were buoyed
by Juan Bosch’s Dominican Liberation Party (PLD)–a
party which had gained prestige in the wake of the dis-
credit visited upon the center-left Dominican
Revolutionary Party (PRD) after its eight years in the
presidency from 1978 to 1986. Balaguer, however, was
successful in his use of brazen fraud in 1990. Beyond
simple on-the-ground fraud, he ably secured U.S. back-
ing for his presidential race. Despite the desire of many
U.S. policy makers to rid themselves of the inconvenient
Balaguer, Washington power brokers hated and feared
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS
Roberto Cassi is professor of history at the Autonomous University of Santo Domingo. He is the author of Capitalismo y dictadura (UASD, 1983). Translated from the Spanish by NACLA.REPORT ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
PLD candidate Bosch even more. They hated him
because of his old leftist positions and, perhaps above
all, for his unpredictable personal style. They hated him
despite his attempts to change his party into a more
mainstream member of the country’s political system by
stripping it of its old radical positions.
Four years later, in 1994, electoral fraud was harder to
pull off than it was in 1990. First, the PRD, having
resolved its internal divisions, assumed a much more
beligerant position toward Balaguer than Bosch’s PLD.
Second, a new Democratic administration in
Washington brought a new set of U.S. officials to posi-
tions of influence whose primary goal was the departure
of Balaguer and the formation of a legitimate govern-
ment. After events in Haiti, Washington became worried
that Balaguer’s authoritarian impunity might threaten
stability in the Dominican Republic, which could endan-
ger its place within the imperial network. Washington
found it convenient to channel discontent into the two
opposition parties, the PRD and the PLD, and thereby to
undercut the re-emergence of potentially destabilizing
popular movements.
This is why the Clinton administration, despite evi-
dence of widespread fraud in the 1994 elections,
decided to send State Department functionaries to
the Dominican Republic to negotiate a compromise
between the government and the opposition. This com-
promise, called the “Pact for Democracy,” recognized
Young
Dominicans
walk down a Santo
Domingo
street lined
with election
posters.
that the occurrence of irregularities was so routine and
of such a magnitude that the only solution was to mod-
ify the Constitution to prohibit the successive re-election
of the president. The Pact cut Balaguer’s term short to
only two years, and mandated new presidential elections
in 1996. It was also ruled that the 1996 presidential elec-
tions would be contested in two rounds if no candidate
received an absolute majority-the second round con-
sisting of a runoff between the two candidates receiving
the most votes.
Although the Pact for Democracy authorized two
additional years for an illegitimate regime, all sides
accepted it on the grounds that it helped to “consolidate
democracy.” Some opposition leaders even elevated
Joaquin Balaguer to the position of exemplary democ-
rat. Compelled to yield to both national and U.S. pres-
sures, Balaguer saw the Pact as the exit from presiden-
tial power most favorable to his interests. In the
meantime, he prepared the greatest number of obstacles
possible to prevent the predicted triumph of the PRD in
1996. For example, he engineered the rejection of the
PRD proposal that a 40% plurality in the first round
would be sufficient to avoid a runoff, and insisted on the
second-round concept. Balaguer’s efforts enjoyed the
open support of the PLD, which saw the PRD as its
greatest competitor. Jos6 Francisco Pefia G6mez, leader
and presidential candidate of the PRD, mistakenly let
these maneuvers pass in the belief that his triumph at the
polls would be great enough to go unchallenged.
Vat XXX, No 5 MARCHIAPRII. 99721 VOL XXX, No 5 MARCHIAPRIL 1997 21REPORT ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
F rom the mo-
ment Joaquin
Balaguer no
Few in the PLD longer figured as a
presidential candi-
leadership showed date, the influence of
doubts about the his Social Christian
Reformist Party
party’s embrace of (PRSC) dwindled
considerably. Bala-
neoliberalism
or
guer had no sympa-
its alliance with thy for the PRSC
candidate, the in-
Balaguer. The cumbent Vice Presi-
con sus was o dent Jacinto Peynado,
who aspired to be
gain power at Balaguer’s political
heir. Bequeathing any price, power to Peynado
was intolerable for
the rightist caudillo,
who was thus faced
with the choice of strengthening his own political fol-
lowing, or avoiding the triumph of his principal arch-
enemy, Jos6 Francisco Pefia G6mez of the PRD. Since
his own party had no chance of winning, and a good
showing by Peynado would run counter to his own per-
sonal interests, Balaguer opted for the second alternative,
and devoted himself to working for the triumph of the
PLD candidate, Leonel Fernandez.
In accordance with that objective, he encouraged the
establishment of close links between the leaderships of
the PRSC and the PLD. With Fernmndez at the helm, the
PLD offered the promise of a “new road,” in appearance
cleaner than the one offered by Pefia G6mez and the
PRD. This did not prevent the PLD from accepting-by
way of Balaguer’s cronies in the so-called “palace
ring”-all manner of helpful resources from the PRSC
and the state.
Despite this maneuvering in favor of Fernandez, the
PRD enjoyed an initial advantage thanks to its history of
militant opposition to the unpopular Balaguer regime.
To make use of that advantage, however, the party had
to propose significant modifications of its past practices.
The party’s weak flank was the public memory of its
two administrations from 1978 to 1986, both character-
ized by incompetence and corruption. Many influential
PRD activists were conscious of the need to put some
distance between the party and its own past, but large
portions of the leadership involved in that corrupt expe-
rience were not prepared to step aside.
Pefia G6mez, as the leader of the party, tried to bring
both perspectives together, offering a promise of sub-
stantial change while preserving the historic symbols of
the party’s identity. To accomplish this, he established
alliances with a large number political sectors-to his
right as well as to his left-in the so-called Santo
Domingo Accord. Above all, he emphasized a moderate
orientation, symbolized by his choice of advisors, and
above all by his running mate, Francisco Alvarez
Bogaert, a political conservative who had been driven
out of the PRSC for trying to displace Balaguer.
In sum, the PRD saw itself trapped between the need
to obtain popular support on the basis of new political
proposals, and that of remaining acceptable to its domi-
nant sectors, without whom it would not be able to win.
And beyond mollifying its own conservative forces, the
party’s rightward drift was meant to maintain crucial
support from big capital and other powerful actors in
order to counterbalance the power of the state apparatus
in the hands of Balaguer.
The party’s solution was to lay out programatic pro-
posals that emphasized modernization and social
reforms, not unlike much of the neoliberal tonic cur-
rently prevalent in Latin America. From the electoral
point of view, the PRD believed that these proposals
would be supported by a majority of the electorate, and
especially the urban poor. And this was the party’s prin-
cipal error. Certain of its triumph, it underestimated the
challenge posed by the PLD which, with large sums of
money put at its disposal by the state, was able to ham-
mer away at the credibility of its rivals.
Fernindez ran on a platform that managed to make the
historic progressivism of the PLD compatible with the
alliance the party was establishing with the PRSC. The
PLD ably responded to PRD accusations of collusion
with Balaguer, pointing out that the PRD too had built
alliances with rightists coming from the PRSC. Few in
the party’s core showed any doubts about its embrace of
neoliberalism, and none publicly expressed any opposi-
tion to the collusion with Balaguerism. There apparently
was a consensus to obtain power no matter what the
price-a stance that received its calm justification from
Bosch’s old preachings on the separation of politics and
ethics.
the same-maintaining the status quo with vague
promises of modernization. A great majority of
the population favored defeating Balaguer and his
administration’s intrigues, and achieving a true transi-
tion to democracy. This helps to explain the early sup-
port enjoyed by Pefia G6mez. The PRD’s long-term
anti-Balaguerist identity became its principal capital in
the campaign.
In the meantime, other sectors sought, for a variety of
reasons, to prevent the triumph of the PRD. Some
opposed the PRD for its past corruption, and some for
22NACI.A REPORT ON THE AMERICAS NACIA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 22REPORT ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
its veiled threats that it would bring Balaguer’s corrupt
associates to justice. This polarization favored the PLD
from the moment it was able to place itself above all the
old practices of state corruption. The PLD offered the
guarantees of impunity from judgement for past
offenses demanded by the high circles of Balaguerism,
at the same time that it kept kept its support base that
saw the party as an instrument of substantial change.
The lack of programatic differences, combined with
these conjunctural positions, led to a polarized and
heated campaign which, in other circumstances, might
have presaged an armed confrontation. Each party was
desperate for victory-a climate that was exacerbated
by the fact that both the PRD and the PLD had reason-
able chances of winning. The result was the division of
the country into two nearly equal voting blocs which
excluded only a dwindling number of undecided voters
and a small number of independents of the left. More
than ever before, Dominicans were placing all their
hopes and expectations on the outcome of the elections.
The PRD’s loss was due fundamentally to a genera-
tional reaction in favor of the PLD. Young-and politi-
cally independent-voters saw in the 42-year-old
Leonel Fernandez a symbol of generational change in
public affairs. Insofar as the younger generation has rel-
egated the question of ideology to secondary status, the
hopes for renewal augured by the PLD succeeded in
transcending the conservative inclinations of the upper-
middle class and the social worries of the popular
classes. This generational sentiment was embedded in
the premise that a new administration should, above all,
combine decency and efficiency.
The social factor was less acknowledged than the gen-
erational, although the groupings with the greatest sense
of tradition and identity among the popular classes
strongly supported the PRD. But the support
of the urban barrios was not able to outweigh
the powerful regional alignments. Neither was
the PRD able to bring the campesino masses
under its wing, most of whom remained loyal
to the PRSC and therefore ended up depositing
their second-round votes for Fernandez.
While the middle class consistently rejected
the PRD–either from a conservative position
or because their expectations of progress and
honesty had been betrayed-big business was
divided, though neither for ideological rea-
sons nor over the debate between protection-
ists and free traders. Oligarchic sectors who
traditionally had access to the highest levels
of government allied against Pefia G6mez, but
a large number of mid-size capitalists sup-
ported the PRD, apparently seeking some
respite from the abuses of power. A
iven his need to inflict decisive blows against the PRD, Balaguer once again raised the specter of
great powers who were plotting to pull apart the
country and unite it with neighboring Haiti. He pre-
sented Pefia G6mez as the principal plotter, given his
probable Haitian ancestry. Balaguer’s slogan throughout
the campaign was that the country needed to elect some-
one “truly Dominican,” a euphemism meant to question
Pefia G6mez’s national identity. As on other occasions,
the right used racist and nationalist tactics to raise anti-
Haitian sentiments to its political advantage.
Without attaching itself literally to the racist cam-
paign, the PLD took advantage of the strategy. It
claimed that 150,000 Haitian citizens had illegally been
registered to vote, and announced that its poll watchers
would object to any voters who looked like Haitians.
This was a clear attempt to link the Haitian nation with
the PRD. In the barrios, an image developed of the PLD
as a party of wealthy white people and intellectuals who
were connected to forces abroad.
The PRD responded with a campaign to defend the
rights of Dominican “morenos,” presumably aggrieved
by the PLD’s campaign, and launched a campaign to
defend black Dominicans as the victims of demagogy.
The PLD’s counter-campaign may have contributed to
the strengthening of its rivals, however, given that it
only involved sectors of the poor population already
solidly behind Pefia G6mez. But for the most part, the
racial campaign either had very little effect or was actu-
ally counterproductive. The great majority of the popu-
lation questioned the racial arguments of both sides, or
simply didn’t consider them primary elements in decid-
ing how to vote. This is not to say that there was not a
certain amount of racist opposition to Pefia Gomez as
much for his presumed Haitian ancestry as for the color
of his skin. But in general, despite the complaints of the
PRD candidate that the country wasn’t ready to vote for
a black leader, the vast majority cast its votes strictly on
the basis of politics.
In the first round which took place on May 16, the
PRD finished first with 46% of the vote, followed by
the PLD with 39% and the PRSC with 15%.
Paradoxically, these results did not favor the PRD,
which had placed all its hopes on receiving the 50% nec-
essary to win on the first ballot. For its part, the PLD
was delighted, and began to project itself as the proba-
ble winner in the second round.
As a response to the tightness of the race, the PLD
entered into an alliance with the PRSC called the
National Patriotic Front (FPN). The front-which had
been decided on before the first round by way of a secret
accord between Fernmndez and Balaguer-had as its
sole objective the election of Leonel Fernmndez. This
revealed the lengths to which Balaguer was willing to go
to prevent the election of Pefia G6mez. While the
Femrnndez campaign was never actually directed by
Balaguer, the discourse of the old caudillo prevailed. In
this way, the PLD-by way of the Balaguer-Fernindez
“front”-wove racist and conservative arguments into
its campaign with more clarity. The front had no other
declared objective than to “preserve Dominicanness.” In
the background, the pact guaranteed immunity from
investigation and prosecution to the old leaders of the
PRSC after they left power. It also contained implicit
guarantees that the PRSC would have a quota of posi-
tions in the new government.
To seal the agreement, Femindez proclaimed that the
thought and work of Balaguer would be essential refer-
ence points for his presidency. This adulteration of the
historical trajectory of the PLD was unani-
mously supported by the party’s leadership.
Even prestigious individuals who had come
from the party’s left supported the historic reha-
bilitation of Balaguer. In the end, the assumption
of power by Fernandez showed that Balaguer’s
final triumph was his own successful manage-
ment of his departure from the presidency.
Meanwhile, the PRD tried to defend itself
against the PLD-Balaguerist offensive, but
could not manage an effective response. The
party created a new focus for the campaign, the
so-called “Growth Commando,” which
attempted to give more force to progressive sec-
tors, and to distance itself from the party’s past
performance. It was clear, however, that the
Growth Commando lacked backing from the
party’s ruling apparatus, which preferred to sim-
ply maintain old slogans.
Far from putting together a discourse around social
themes or substantial political reforms, the PRD centered
all its energies in attracting sectors of the PRSC-begin-
ning with its defeated presidential candidate, Jacinto
Peynado-supposedly discontent with Balaguer’s
“palace ring.” Rafael Corpornn, an old PRSC functionary
from Santo Domingo, announced his support for Pefia
G6mez and was promptly elevated to the position of hero
of the hour. But the idea of turning the PRSC against
Balaguer was destined to fail since the party had always
operated according to the will of the old caudillo.
The PRD did not direct enough attention to undecided
voters who were disturbed by the formation of the FPN.
Many polls indicated that immediately following the
formation of the FPN, there was a noticeable drop in
support for Fernindez, which made the triumph of Pefia
Gomez a distinct possibility. In the end, however, the
PRD failed to capitalize on this sentiment, and
Fernmindez won the presidency with 52% of the vote.
As the PLD settles in, it is premature to attempt an
evaluation of its governing style. Its shameful metamor-
phosis into a clientelistic party, however, means that
only with great difficulty will its genuinely reformist or
progressive voices succeed in making themselves heard.
Nor can we harbor any great hopes of a principled oppo-
sition from the PRD, the majority of whose leaders are
already scheming with Balaguer in an attempt simply to
undermine the new Fernandez administration. There are
no forces on the left currently capable of effectively
channeling the demands of the large masses of
Dominicans. The situation therefore presents the same
risk the country faced in 1978-that the frustration
brought about by the unmet expectations raised by a
new ruling party will lead the country back to its old
authoritarian ways.
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