It is a distinct honor for me to address the delegates of this Eighth Conference of American Armies. I am particularly grateful for the opportunity it affords to join with you in discussing the threats and problems that face our countries…our hemisphere and the Free World, of which our American states are such an important part. The fact that
we – and our countries – are concerned about these threats and problems is clearly manifest by our presence here at
this conference. Equally manifest is our desire to cooperate – both as representatives of our countries and as comrades in the profession of arms – in taking steps to meet the challenges and solve the problems confronting us.
In his invitation. General Adalberto asked that I speak about experiences of a military and professional character
acquired from our operations in South Vietnam. I was pleased to accept that invitation because as military men I believe that we, perhaps more than any other profession in the public service, recognize the immediate threat to the countries and people we serve that is posed by the sort of thing which is taking place today in Southeast Asia. We know that South Vietnam is a communist laboratory. We know that if aggression under the guise of “national liberation” succeeds there, it is ready to be marketed.
Because we recognize these facts, I am happy to have this opportunity to share my experiences nd thoughts with you.
I want to point out at the beginning that I certainly de not have all of the answers. My country has learned much –
but we still have much to learn. Some of the lessons that we have learned “the hard way” can, perhaps, be of benefit to others.
The basis for what I will talk about is, of course, South Vietnam. But, I want to preface my remarks with two observations: first, history has already shown us that each insurgency has differences – that there is no single solution or strategy; second, what began in South Vietnam as a classic example of communist insurgency was greatly expanded by the
introduction of regular forces from North Vietnam. It has become an insurgency backed by outright invasion. Yet,
these two observations do not detract from the lessons that we can learn from our experiences in South Vietnam. The basic ingredients for insurgency are clearly visible… so are the preparations and actions of the insurgents. They are all there for us to examine. It is on these fundamentals that I will attempt to concentrate, because our success against any insurgency depends upon what we do in these areas.
One only needs to read his newspaper to know that the communists have used insurgent warfare throughout the world with varying degrees of success. Through insurgency they have found a cheap way – a means that they can afford – to
attempt to destroy established societies and to confront world powers. The seeds of dissent are, and have always been,
present in every society. All the communists have to do is to find these weak spots and then cause them to ferment and fester.
It is a well recognized fact that it is far easier to destroy something of value than it is to build something of value. Anyone who does not believe that the threats are both real and worldwide should remember these words of the late Che Guevara issued as a typical communist challenge:
How shining and near could we see the future if two, three, or many Vietnamu flourished on the face of the earth with their quota of death and their great tragedies, their daily heroism, their dealing of repeated blows to imperialism, their forcing of the latter to disperse its forces under the blast of the growing hatred of the peoples of the world.
I believe that the confliot in South Vietnam today is a part of mans continuing struggle for freedom. The South Vietnamese are freedom-loving people – they are our friends – they asked us to help them so they could choose their own destiny, a destiny the communist leadership in Hanoi planned – and still plans – to control.
I feel that the prospects of repeated “Vietnams” around the world present a very real danger to the security of every
freedom-loving people. For this reason I believe that the techniques of insurgent warfare are high on the list of threats which each of us must oensider. As I said, we must not expect to find the patterns identical or the techniques always similar. Lenin built his revolution around the proletarian worker. Mao used the peasant as the backbone of his movement. In South Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh is relying on an insurgent trained outside the target country and on an army infiltrated from the same direction.
Two things, however, are likely to remain the same the propaganda describing each insurgency will picture what they
term an “oppressed” people rising to overthrow the alleged oppressor. The objective – a communist dictatorship –
will persist.
Of all the lessons that my country and its Armed Forces have learned recently about dealing with communist subversion
and insurgency, none is more important than the matter of coordinating the efforts of all national agencies, civilian
and military. The target of communist insurgency is the people, so the civilian agencies responsible for caring for
the needs of the people have a major role in eliminating grievances and creating unity, and for building national
pride and confidence in government. Particularly important among the civilian agencies, of course, and again at all
levels are the police forces. Living among the people, protecting them, and enforcing the law in a ust manner places
them in a position where they can do more than any other group of public servants to gain the confidence, respect and
support of the people.
Naturally, everything a nation does – any nation – must be done behind the protective shield provided by its military services. It is the armed forces of a nation that provide the security necessary for law enforcement, nation building, and all else a nation does. We have kept this thought foremost in mind in helping the South Vietnamese to build up their forces, and to give their Army the capability to work with the police in finding and rooting out insurgents throughout South Vietnam. I cannot stress too strongly how important security is, because without it all the other gains a nation makes – such as improvements in government administration, educational progress, and health and welfare – are lost. If security fails, the people cannot help but lose confidence in their government.
But, important as military and police forces are, the other functions of government and society cannot be forgotten.
For instance, economic agencies of national government must administer programs that foster prosperity and hinder inflation. Productivity is a basic requirement. Rationing of resources is critical.
Political action is critically important. At every level of civil administration the institutions and rganizations
of government must show the peasant, and the tradesman alike, that his government is looking out for him. Where indifference has existed in the past, particularly in rural areas, it has to be overcome. The people must be encouraged to take part in government.
A military operation is but one of several ways to combat communist insurgency. We have found, through experience,
that the psychological impact of military activity warrants special attention if the operation is to be successful.
Every event in the daily lives of the population has a distinct impact on the minds of the people. Every major military action must be evaluated in terms of what impact it will have on the attitudes of the people. On occasion we
have even altered certain aspects of a planned military campaign because of adverse psychological considerations. We
have learned many lessons in this area, and we must continue to learn. We realize also that we are opposed by a communist foe who s a demonstrated expert in the psychological field. He is not only an expert in the use of psychology for his own purposes, he is an expert in the field of distorting our intentions and capitalizing on our mistakes.
A moment ago I mentioned the importance of coordination. There is another area in which coordination plays a leading
role – that of collecting intelligence. In what we call conventional warfare, the intelligence agencies of one
nation operate in complete isolation from the intelligence agencies of their allies. In most countries the intelligence agencies of government services even isolate themselves from each other. In an insurgency situation this method of handling intelligence will not work. More than ever, intelligence collection must be timely, responsive, and detailed. And, particularly important is the requirement that at each level of government – particularly within the police forces – efforts and resources must be pooled to meet the common need. Intelligence must not be viewed as an end in itself; it must be used as a means to an end. By this I mean that the finest intelligence available is worthless until it is coordinated, evaluated, and put into the hands of the user – the commander – the man who can do something about it.
Another penetrating lesson we have learned from our experiences in South Vietnam is the importance – and the difficulty – of denying intelligence to the enemy. When a regular military force operates in an insurgency or guerrilla
warfare nviroment, it is extremely difficult – if not impossible – to screen installations from enemy observation
and penetration. It is very easy for the enemy to learn your habits of operation by observing your units as they prepare for their various kinds of movements and operations. This is so because there is a relative freedom of movement of the civilian population – there are no neatly drawn combat lines. This, of course, calls for operational procedures that prevent enemy agents from gathering information. It also calls for appropriate population control, including the early issue of identification papers to friendly citizens – papers that cannot be easily stolen or counterfeited. Also, every operations plan should include a counterintelligence annex.
Now let’s turn to another consideration that my country has found to be essential in combating insurgency. I refer
here to activities that we call nation building. Many of your governments, supported by your armies, do this well indeed. Building a strong nation involves many actions. I would not attempt to enumerate or to describe them here. But I believe I can summarize the matter in this way. Nation building takes in all those measures and actions which develop social structure in which the people work in unity to reach common goals. Nation building calls for all elements of government to contribute something. And the key word I mentioned before – coordination – must be forever emphasized.
Although nation building sounds like a function of civil agencies, it has been our experience that military forces –
our own and those of the nation we are seeking to help – must often play a major role and use their special equipment
and capabilities to help the people help themselves. And I would like to emphasize “help the people help themselves.”
It is in the area of civic action that we see exemplified one of the finest attributes of any army – that an army exists for the benefit of the people. An army should be a cross section of the people it protects. Its actions must demonstrate by deed, attitude, and conduct that it is for the people. An army’s reason for existing has been aptly described in these words: “Rampart of the nation – protector of the people.”
Another activity with which we have gained a great deal of experience in South Vietnam is generally termed pacification.
Pacification, simply defined, is the action taken by combined military and civilian processes to restore, consolidate and expand government control so that nation building can proceed. To be successful, pacification must be planned and carried out in a way that will engage the people themselves in self-help, self-government and self-defense.
Self-help means that the people must learn to contribute to their own development by working with their government to
improve the capabilities of local communities to, in turn, provide for the people, Self-government means getting people interested in local administration and involved in such things as the election and activities of local officials. Once they become interested on a local level, they will begin to take notice of and participate on a higher level.
Self-defense means that the people actively and willingly assist the police and military forces in securing their home
areas. It involves cooperation with the police by providing timely intelligence, making guides available to the military and, in special situations, bearing arms to assist in local security. Such participation in common defense not only increases security but serves to isolate the communist insurgents from the people upon whom they must depend for
their existence.
Self-help, self-government, and self-defense all create in the people a greater feeling of belonging to a viable community by contributing to their own local and national salvation. Every nation-building act we adopt, in which the people can take pride and place confidence, is a direct and shocking blow to insurgency.
As military men I realize that you have a special interest in some of the specific tactics and techniques we have learned to use in combating communist insurgency. I wish I had more time to spend on this because it is really a subject in itself, one on which many books have already been written. However, I will simply point out a few principles that we have learned there. We have a saying in our Army, and I am sure you have a similar one in yours, that an army must be able to “move, shoot, and communicate.” In an insurgency situation these requirements become quite specific.
Let’s look at maneuver – the moving part – first. We use what might be called a combination of the old and the new because our operations usually begin by a slow intensive area search, followed by a violent and decisive application of power once we have fixed the enemy. Our elements maneuver so as to cause the enemy to mass and present a lucrative target for artillery and air power. When this firepower has done its work, infantry units move – by air, water and land to out off his avenues of escape. We make extensive use of long-range patrols to acquire intelligence on a route of approach or withdrawal of the enemy.
We use our firepower in every way possible to save manpower. Of particular importance in South Vietnam has been the
close support of tactical aircraft, and the massed fires of artillery positioned to fire from central positions at many different targets.
Communications in an insurgency situation are critical. In difficult terrain against guerrilla-type enemies, communications between units must be quick and reliable. In the climate of South Vietnam reliable wire communications are
often difficult to maintain. In most situations radio is the chief means of communication. But special measures must be taken, particularly in jungles and mountainous areas, to extend the range of unit radios. This is usually done by positioning relay stations on hills or mountaintops or by relay from a light aircraft.
The heavy and special logistical requirements of this kind of warfare demand an especially close relationship between
combat and combat support units. Supply forces must deploy with the combat forces in the early stages of the conflict.
They must be able to respond to every movement and kind of operation of the fighting units they support. Supply economy and supply discipline must be practiced by every unit and by every member of the unit. Excess baggage and excess stocks are not only wasteful, they make a unit sluggish on the move.
Our experience in training men and units for the war in South Vietnam has revealed two things – first, that our training policies are basically sound, and, second, the specialized jungle or other area training must be given in addition to standard programs of instruction. A great deal of attention must be directed at the training of the individual soldier and the small unit leader. Above all, I believe, an army must be trained to work in the bush – to invade and operate in the kinds of rough terrain and remote areas where the communist insurgents usually live and function. Men and units must be able to make the guerrilla’s habitat their own – to learn the guerrilla’s techniques and use them against him.
It is interesting to note in this connection – and to me gratifying – that armies which have enjoyed the most success
in recent years have been those which have moved off the parade ground and away from the comforts of the garrison, and
have trained under conditions that more closely resemble those that the soldier generally finds in the actual battles
against guerrillas. In South Vietnam we have had to seek out the enemy in high mountains, in deep jungles, and along
lowland waterways. Some of this terrain has been as inaccessible as the mountains of Ecuador, the jungles near the
headwaters of the Amazon, or – on the other hand – as open as the coastal plains near Guayaquil. It was my privilege,
incidentally, to have visited each of these otherwise beautiful places thirty-two years ago while a second lieutenant – a shavetail Just out of West Point.
I could quote several examples of what I mean by learning the guerrilla’s tricks, but I will mention just one. I refer to our becoming masters of the ancient tactic of the ambush. Once the Viet Cong controlled the countryside by his expert use of ambushes – the classic guerrilla tactic. Now – night and day – the Viet Cong has become the hunted instead of the hunter. Our use of his own tactic has turned his environment against him.
An army must be prepared to accomplish all of its assigned missions – to meet all threats. Its systems must be flexible and adaptable. We have found through experience that military operations against guerrillas tend to sharpen the ability of forces to meet all threats. A well trained infantry batallion can fight and defeat either guerrillas or larger forces. Control, skillful use of terrain, security, fire and maneuver – all are common denominators in any type of battle.
In this same vein I am pleased to tell you that we have found that the great majority of our equipment has proved adaptable to counterinsurgency operations. The premium is – as always – on ingenuity. You and I both know that fighting men are masters of ingenuity. To see ingenuity commonplace on the battlefield in Vietnam was one of my most gratifying experiences.
If I were to list some of the peculiar demands upon both governments and armies in fighting insurgency, I would cer-
tainly include these:
o Determination. We know – and respect – the determination of the insurgent. We must have at least equal determination – persistence.
o Wariness and vigilance. Weariness must never be permitted to cause the fighting man to drop his guard. The insurgent is waiting for the first sign of carelessness.
o Professionalism. The time-honored demand for effort and skill is ever-present. Expediency must never become an excuse for low standards of performance. In fact, the demand for individual skills is perhaps far greater in this sort of warfare because there are more small unit operations – more demands placed on the individual soldier and small unit leader.
In conclusion, let me emphasize these thoughts:
o The insurgency environment is dynamic. The world has many dissatisfied people whom the communists can exploit in their quest for destruction of free society. This poses a threat that will be present for a long time.
o As in all conflicts, all of us are prone to learn the hard way but, in my judgment, what we learn the hard way we learn better.
o It is to our mutual benefit to share experience. Our strength lies in cooperation. The fact that we are here
is proof of that desire for cooperation.
I cannot close my diseusion of military operations in South Vietnam without paying tribute to the gllant men of all
the armed services of my country and of South Vietnam – and of Australia, Korea. New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. They have joined forees courageously in the fight to help a small nation throw back aggression and withstand the savagery ef terrorism and intimidation while building a free country. I am proud of then and I am proud to have been with them in that struggle for freedom.
Again, may I express my deep appreciation for the honor you have bestowed upon me today in permitting me to address
tia conference.
