Like their southern cone counterparts who,
while living under the harsh repression of authoritarian regimes,
came to reevaluate their earlier hostility to “bourgeois
democracy,” so Colombia’s intellectuals have come to value an
end to armed conflict as a necessary precondition for any future
political struggle.
Guerrilla war continues with-
out reprieve in the northern
Andes. After a decade of
attempts to bring Colombia’s long-
standing insurgency to a peaceful
resolution, some guerrillas have
laid down their arms, while others
continue to recruit among Colom-
bia’s rural and urban poor. Today,
as violence increases in many sec-
tors of Colombian society, the
armed movements have more mili-
tary power than at any previous
point in their history.
But in the Colombia of the
1990s, the guerrillas’ political
voice is hardly heard amid the din
of a multiplicity of groups-indige-
nous, urban, regional, local, black,
campesino, feminist, university–
trying to break out of the straitjack-
et of traditional politics. While
Colombia’s fragmented Left has
Marc Chernick is currently a visiting pro- fessor at the Universidad Nacional de Colombia in Bogota, and a member of NACLA’s editorial board. He is working on a comparative study of political vio- lence in Colombia and Peru sponsored by the Guggenheim Foundation.
become polarized between those
who continue to believe in armed
struggle and those who do not, the
guerrillas’ armed actions and eco-
nomic terrorism seem only to
underscore their political isolation.
For nearly half a century,
Colombia has experienced succes-
sive waves of war and violence,
from the inter-party civil war
between Liberals and Con-
servatives in the 1940s and
1950s-known as la Violencia-to
the guerrilla insurgencies and revo-
lutionary focos of the 1960s and
1970s, to the multifaceted orgy of
violence among guerrillas, drug
traffickers and paramilitary groups
that first seduced, then corrupted
and atomized Colombian society in
the 1980s and 1990s.
Throughout the first half of the
twentieth century, the principal
political cleavage was between the
mutually exclusive nineteenth-cen-
tury agendas of the Liberal and
Conservative parties. In the face of
political exclusion during periods
of single-party hegemony, each of
Colombia’s traditional parties
turned to armed struggle as a legit-
imate form of political opposition.
In 1958, after a decade of
extreme political violence, the two
traditional parties agreed to share
power. Old enemies found them-
selves, at first somewhat awkward-
ly, on the same side. Opposition
politics was redefined. The princi-
pal political division was now
between those who accepted bipar-
tisan rule, and those who did not.
Again, many who were excluded
by the narrowly cast two-party
hegemony felt justified in taking
up arms as a legitimate form of
political opposition.
The revolutionary guerrillas date
from this period. In the mid 1960s,
the Fuerzas Armadas Revo-
lucionarias de Colombia (FARC),
the Ej6rcito de Liberaci6n Nacional
(ELN), and the Ej6rcito Popular de
Liberaci6n (EPL) were formed.
The FARC, born of earlier peasant
struggles and Communist organiz-
ing in the countryside, also mobi-
lized former Liberal guerrillas and
peasants in the new zones of agri-
cultural colonization to oppose the
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 8UPDATE / COLOMBIA
The funeral procession for Juan Gabriel Cuadros, a trade unionist in Medellin who was
gunned down on his way to work in December, 1987. Since the 1980s, the bipolar con-
flict between government and guerrillas has turned into a multipolar shooting gallery.
established political regime in
Bogoti. The ELN was formed by
Colombian students in Havana
who sought to replicate the experi-
ence of the Cuban revolution in
Colombia, and saw the closed
bipartisan system known as the
National Front as the equivalent of
other forms of Latin American
despotism. Finally, the Maoist EPL
was founded, reflecting the larger
Sino-Soviet split.
In the early 1970s, the April 19th
Movement (M-19)-named for the
date the presidential election was
overtly stolen from a progressive
candidate in 1970-was founded.
The M-19 represented a “second-
generation” movement. It was more
urban, and combined the languages
of nationalism and Colombian poli-
tics with a heterodox Marxism.
All of these movements found
the soil of politics particularly con-
ducive to guerrilla struggle. They
operated in zones that had long tra-
ditions of armed rebellion against
the state, in some cases dating back
to the mid-nineteenth century.
While revolutionary focos failed to
take root or win an enduring social
base elsewhere in South America,
they prospered in Colombia. Many
on the Left empathized with or sup-
ported the armed movements; they
viewed them as a legitimate form
of opposition to an oligarchically
dominated system that relied on
emergency powers and the armed
forces to maintain public order.
Yet by the 1990s, the fault
line of politics had frag-
mented almost beyond
recognition. In the 1980s, the bipo-
lar conflict between government
and guerrillas turned into a multi-
polar shooting gallery, with com-
plex, shifting alliances emerging
among guerrillas, drug traffickers,
paramilitary groups, local political
bosses, and the state.
Partially fueled by the boom in
drug exports to insatiable Northern
markets, violence escalated,
returning to levels not seen since
the 1940s and 1950s. The drug
trade gave new resources to all
actors. Colombian society
appeared to be drowning in its
own rivers of blood, much like
during la Violencia. The state
appeared to be on the verge of col-
lapse. Not only was it no longer
able to maintain order, but it had
also become a major source of dis-
order and a central contributor to
the political violence. Indeed, it
had already partially collapsed in
certain geographic zones and in
the exercise of many of its func-
tions, most notably maintaining
order, providing security, and
administering justice.
Violence, once again, became
the principal currency of politics,
and the principal catalyst of social
decay. Amid the escalating chaos,
a new political fault line now came
to rest between those who contin-
ued to advocate a politics of armed
opposition-both on the Left and
Right-and those who rejected
such a path.
Three successive presidents-
Belisario Betancur (1982-1986),
Virgilio Barco (1986-90) and
Cesar Gaviria (1990-1994) sup-
ported negotiating with the guerril-
las. Each, in his own way, sought
to re-legitimize Colombian poli-
tics, and the stewardship of the tra-
ditional parties, by advocating
political reform and the reincorpo-
ration of the armed opposition.
Unlike the generals who led the
archetypal Latin American “dirty
war” in Argentina, Colombia’s
reforming presidents sought to dis-
tance themselves from reactionary
violence, and attempted-with
only partial success-to limit the
state’s involvement. Yet each step
forward was accompanied by an
escalation of political violence,
particularly directed against
amnestied guerrillas and new par-
ties and movements on the Left.
Out of the antagonistic conflict
between the dirty war and the
peace process emerged the founda-
tional note of Colombian politics
for the 1990s and the early twenty-
first century. Four guerrilla move-
ments-the M-19, the majority of
Vol XXVII, No 4 JAN/FEB 1994 9UPDATE / COLOMBIA
the EPL and two smaller groups–
surrendered their arms in exchange
for political guarantees and partici-
pation in the writing of a new con-
stitution for Colombia [see “An
Interview with Navarro Wolff,”
page 12].
The political experiment raised
great expectations. M-19 leader
Antonio Navarro Wolff served as
co-president of the Constitutional
Assembly, together with represen-
tatives from the Liberal and Con-
servative parties. What emerged
was one of the most enlightened
political charters to be found any-
where, with major advances in
human, civil, social, minority and
ecological rights. The 1991 Consti-
tution provides a still unrealized
The Intellectuals’ Letter
Santa Fe de Bogota, November 20, 1992
Seriores Coordinadora Guerrillera Sim6n Bolivar:
As a group of convinced democrats who oppose violence and authori-
tarian solutions of all kinds, we have the moral right to question the legiti-
macy and the effectiveness of the actions that you have pursued now for
many years.
In the current circumstances, we oppose the means you use to carry on
your struggle. Armed struggle, instead of leading to greater social justice, has engendered all kinds of extremisms, such as the resurgence of reac-
tionary violence, paramilitary forces, merciless crime and excesses commit-
ted by the armed forces, which we condemn with equal energy.
We don’t believe that you represent the popular will. On the contrary, your actions have created a climate of political and ideological confusion
which is converting Colombia into a battle camp in which the most com-
mon form of free expression is that made through the barrel of a gun. Such a situation cannot lead to a common dream of a democratic and joy-
ous society.
Your war, understandable in its origins, now goes against the grain of
history. Today your standard tactics include kidnapping, coercion and
forced contributions, all of which are an abominable violation of human
rights. Terrorism, which you had always condemned as an illegitimate
form of revolutionary struggle, is today a daily recourse. Corruption, which
you also rejected in the past, has contaminated your own ranks through
your dealings with drug traffickers. How is it that you ignore the traffick-
ers’ reactionary nature as well as their contribution to the breakdown of
our communities and society?
The untold and useless deaths on both sides, as well as the systematic
attacks against the national wealth and the ecological disasters that you
have caused are a price too high for a country that has already paid too
much. Colombia deserves better. It is time for a deep and patriotic reflection, and a radical rectification of
years of mistakes. It is time to search for a new and innovative form of
politics more in tune with the realities of today’s world. Your war, gentle-
men, lost its historical significance long ago. Recognizing this fact in good
faith will also be a political victory.
Antonio Caballero, journalist; Gabriel Garcia Mirquez, writer, Nicolas
Buenaventura, historian; Fernando Botero, painter; Eduardo Pizarro, soci-
ologist; Apolinar Diaz Callejas, lawyer; Alvaro Camacho, sociologist; Daniel
Samper, journalist; Luis Alberto Restrepo, philosopher; Salomon
Kalmanovitz, economist; Gonzalo Sanchez, historian (plus another 50 sig-
natures). S
framework for a new democratic
politics, together with broad
visions of multiculturalism and a
united and democratic Latin Amer-
ica.
For nine months after the pro-
mulgation of the new Constitution, the government held separate
negotiations with the remaining
guerrilla movements-the FARC,
the ELN, and a dissident faction of
the EPL that had refused to surren-
der its arms. The guerrillas were
now united in the Coordinadora
Guerrillera Sim6n Bolivar
(CGSB). First in Caracas and then
in Tlaxcala, Mexico, negotiators
from each side struggled over the
terms of a cease-fire agreement and
a negotiating agenda.
By March, 1992, the negotiations
had completely collapsed; both
sides prepared to resume the war.
In the second half of 1992, despite
the new Constitution, and the
emergence of the M-19 as a politi-
cal force, armed confrontation
increased. “El pais nuevo,” forged
in the democratic crucible of the
Constitutional Assembly, appeared
to be stillborn, or at best, retarded
in its development.
In this context of renewed
despair, peace became a desired
end in itself for many on the Left,
including many of the nation’s
leading intellectuals. Like their
southern cone counterparts who,
while living under the harsh repres-
sion of authoritarian regimes, came
to re-evaluate their earlier hostility
to “bourgeois democracy,” so
Colombia’s intellectuals came to
value an end to armed conflict and
a restoration of peace as a neces-
sary precondition for any future
political struggle.
n late 1992, a group of intellec-
tuals decided to publicly
denounce armed struggle
through an open letter to the Coor-
dinadora Guerrillera [see “The
Intellectuals’ Letter,” this page].
Increasingly, both the unarmed
NACLA REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 10UPDATE / COLOMBIA
Left and the government began to
blame the guerrillas for the contin-
ued violence and the slow pace of
change. The letter was the fruit of
an intense, often soul-searching
debate among Colombia’s histori-
cally left-leaning intellectual elite.
The signatories, including Nobel-
laureate Gabriel Garcia Mdrquez
(who crafted the final version), the
renowned painter and sculptor Fer-
nando Botero, and a group of uni-
versity professors centered at the
National University of Colombia,
had come together to define a new
politics.
The timing of the letter’s publi-
cation was controversial. On
November 9, two weeks before the
letter was published, President
Gaviria had appeared on national
television to announce a major new
offensive against the guerrillas in
the wake of the breakdown of
negotiations in Tlaxcala, Mexico,
and to publicly reinstate emer-
gency rule in the face of the crisis
of public order. What was disturb-
ing to some, though not all, was
the fact that the letter, which
The Guerrillas’ Response
The mountains of Colombia, December 2, 1992
Sefiores Antonio Caballero, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Nicolas Buveaventura, Fernando Botero and the other signatories of the letter:
We extend our greetings and thank you for your
important observations on the persistence of armed insurgency in Colombia. We, too, would like to share
with you some of our reflections which we hope can be of some use.
It is important to underscore that the revolutionary
guerrilla struggle in Colombia developed and continues to grow as a result of the permanent violence of the
state that impedes with fire and blood the existence of
an opposition to the establishment. Armed struggle has not been either an end or an objective. It has simply
been a means by which to resist aggression and fight
for democracy and dignity…. The truth is that well before there emerged revolu- tionary armed struggle in Colombia, there existed a dirty war which was fought with complete impunity.
The infamous “pajaros,” paramilitary groups and state
intelligence forces have been the principal protagonists
of this long history of terror. All of Colombia has been a witness to their actions, which at times have been
characterized by selective assassination, and at other times have included massacres and genocide. Always, our nation has been forced to live with torture, disap- pearances, authoritarianism and collective intimidation
which have obliged many compatriots to choose the
route of exile as an extreme recourse in defense of their physical and moral integrity.
It must be said that if certain practices and historical
conceptions have lost their historical significance, it is pre-
cisely the practice of state terrorism and the systematic
use of institutional mechanisms to assassinate and “dis- appear” political opposition. Such practices have convert-
ed despotism into the natural form of governing….
The CGSB [Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar]
remains committed to the search for a political solution
to the crisis. We reject the government’s calls for an “integral war.” We propose an integral solution and a
lasting peace…. You, the “convinced democrats,
opposed to violence and authoritarian options” could use your newspapers, magazines, university posts and
public fora to work for a change in the current atmos-
phere of aggression…. The CSGB rejects and condemns drug trafficking.
You should not let yourselves be confused by a dishon-
est plot cooked up by the U.S. Embassy, the Presidency
of the Republic, the intelligence services and a couple
of Bogota publications that actively attempt to derail
our commitment to the most noble causes in Colom- bia….
The CGSB welcomes the different proposals that have been put forward by various groups to halt the escalation of the conflict into a full-scale war. Particu- larly important are the proposals for national and inter-
national mediation that would supervise the implemen-
tation of a future agreement, ensuring that each side
respects its commitments while enforcing compliance to the agreed upon rules of the game. We also support
those proposals that seek to include a broad range of representatives from Colombian society in the negotiat-
ing process and to seat them at the negotiating table.
The forms of struggle that the Colombian people have chosen to achieve a better future was not a free
decision. It was imposed on them. They were not given a choice. It is incumbent on us all to work toward a
solution that creates an environment where the recourse to arms is only a bad memory of our unfortu- nate history.
Again, we appreciate your interest and your initiative to communicate with us. We hope you will persist in
your efforts for peace. Between us, surely, we can cre- ate the necessary elements that will close the door to
further bloodshed.
Sincerely,
Compatriotas, Coordinadora Guerrillera Simon Bolivar
Manuel Marulanda V., Alfonso Cano, Rabl Reyes, Timolen Jimenez, Ivan Marquez, Manuel P6rez Martinez, Nicolas Rodriguez Bautista, Pablo Tejada, Francisco Galan, Milton Hernandez, Francisco Carabal- lo, Diego Ruiz. E
Vol XXVII, No4 JAN/FEB 1994 11UPDATE / COLOMBIA
appeared in Colombia’s leading
daily, El Tiempo, under the head-
line “Your war, gentlemen, has lost
its historical force,” seemed to echo
the words of the President.
The letter from the intellectuals,
although written and conceived
before the imposition of emergency
rule and Gaviria’s belligerent
speech, put the intellectuals and the
President on the same side oppos-
ing armed struggle. And the con-
text of the letter’s publication made
it appear that the intellectuals were
directly endorsing the President’s
policy of escalated war. There was
an eleventh hour debate about
whether or not the letter should be
published given the new political
conditions. Many still believed in a
negotiated settlement. But the deci-
sion was unanimous to go ahead;
no one consulted withdrew his or
her signature. Even those who still
believed in a negotiated settlement
wanted their voice heard that the
current incarnation of the guerrillas
was no longer worthy of support.
The letter did not open up the
debate as many had hoped. In fact, it reinforced the government’s
position, deferred the democratic
opening, and moved politics fur-
ther down the road to open hostili-
ties. In the circumstances of
Colombia’s war footing in late
1992, the response from the CGSB
[see “The Guerrillas’ Response,”
p. 11] was ignored. Only the Com-
munist newspaper, Voz, printed the
letter signed by Manuel Marulanda
Velez, the legendary commander
of the FARC who first took up
arms in the 1940s as a Liberal
guerrilla, Manuel P6rez, the ex-
communicated Spanish priest who
leads the ELN, and six other guer-
rilla commanders.
The letter from the guerrilla
comandantes answered the intel-
lectuals’ concerns and attempted to
open the door to a renewed dia-
logue, with them and with the gov-
ernment. Yet their letter, although
respectful, underscored a funda-
mentally different analysis of poli-
tics in Colombia. For the guerril-
las, armed struggle continued to be
an extension of popular mobiliza-
tion, not its chief obstacle. The
promise of a new political order
established through the institutions
of the 1991 Constitution remains
quite remote to the daily lives of
many of their followers in the
remote reaches of
the Andes and
throughout the
numbingly verdant
Amazon basin.
Meanwhile, the
guerrilla war con-
tinues to shape
the direction of
national politics.
The government is
investing heavily
in elite counter-
insurgency sol-
diers and heli-
copters, in an
effort to profes-
sionalize-and
win-the war. Par-
ticularly with the A sentry guards renewed legitima- region. cy offered by the
1991 Constitution, and the seismic
changes in world affairs, the gov-
ernment and the military believe
that the long-elusive goal of mili-
tary victory is now possible. The
Minister of Defense cockily
declared that it would take 18
months. As a result, the gunfire,
bombs and accumulating corpses
are threatening to drown out the
new politics.
For many, the Constitution still
has the potential to become a
strong and compassionate midwife
capable of birthing the new soci-
ety. However, consolidating
democracy and waging counter-
insurgency war are not compatible
political processes. The new soci-
ety can emerge only in the context
of a negotiated settlement to the
decades-old war.
s the intellectual Left strug- gles to find its voice, many
of the”other Colombias”are
moving forward without it. This is
best represented by the stunning
emergence of the indigenous and
black movements, creating a new
politics of identity that is redefining
the old political game and leaving
many of the old Left on the side-
lines. It is notable that no indige-
the entrance to a FARC guerrilla base in C
nous or black leader, or intellectual
or activist associated with their
cause, signed the letter to the CGSB.
Neither does the Left’s tormented
revisionism appear to be finding an
echo among the young and restless.
At the National University of
Colombia in Bogota, once a center
of guerrilla support and recruit-
ment, neither the legal Left nor the
Colombian guerrilla seems to com-
mand much respect. There, and on
other university campuses, the
emerging movements are the Shin-
ing Path-inspired Red Guards, and
a belligerent and irreverent group
called Anarchists to Combat. The
Red Guards burned the ballot box
during a recent student election,
symbolically copying the actions of
Shining Path when it began its rev-
olutionary war in Peru. They have
also begun to directly challenge
other sectors of the Left, as well as
university authorities. In mid-Sep-
tember, wielding arms and wearing
ski masks, the Red Guards burned
the car of the Dean of Humanities
and Social Sciences, a sociologist
and former militant in the Commu-
nist Party. In like manner, Anar-
chists to Combat recently kid-
napped the university’s president
and imprisoned him
in a people’s jail on
campus.
The intellectuals
themselves have be-
gun to re-interpret
their own past as
well as the role of
the Left in Colom-
bia. Some are work-
ing with the M-
19/Democratic
Alliance (M-19/AD).
Others are working
with community-
based social move-
ments. Many are
being recruited to
work with the Lib-
olombia’s Uribe eral party, now fully in control of the
country’s destiny.
But to a growing number of peo-
ple outside the cultural main-
stream, the debate over revolution-
ary focos versus grassroots democ-
racy and popular mobilization
seems irrelevant-a relic of a
failed past. Neither the discourse
of the guerrillas, nor of the democ-
ratizing intellectuals, nor of the
amnestied guerrillas such as the M-
19 has any resonance. And the
cauldron of political violence con-
tinues to overflow. The govern-
ment, the aspiring democratic Left,
the ex-guerrillas and the guerrillas
remain caught in a bloody
embrace, defining the political
struggle in their own “enlightened”
terms. Meanwhile, the nation,
increasingly atomized in self-inter-
ested groups, is now creating poli-
tics without them.
Menu
