Nicaragua’s ruling Sandinista Front
has never harbored many illusions that
the general and presidential elections
scheduled for November 4 would
bring peace to the country. As Interior
Minister Tomis Borge puts it, “What-
ever we do Reagan will find an excuse
to attack us. He has decided to destroy
us whatever the cost.”
This conviction has led to increased
defense preparations this year. The
Sandinistas have announced that they
will shortly acquire combat aircraft
and they continue to mobilize thou-
sands of youth to the mountains to
prepare for the consequence of the an-
Tony Jenkins is Managua correspon-
dent for the BBC and The Guardian of
London.
ticipated second Reagan Administra-
tion. At the same time they are con-
vinced that they retain overwhelming
support. “The people voted Sandinis-
ta on July 19 [1979, the date of the
revolutionary triumph],” Borge is
fond of saying. “They voted with
blood and bullets and they will defend
their victory in the same way.”
In this context, for the Sandinistas,
the elections become little more than a
costly distraction from the three-year-
old war against the U.S.-backed coun-
terrevolutionaries. And it was a dis-
traction they long resisted. But at the
end of last year the Sandinistas finally
bowed to pressure from European al-
lies anxious to avoid a conflagration
in Central America. They did so not
because they had been convinced that
Europe could restrain the White
House-the ineffectual European op-
position to the Grenada invasion had
dispelled that idea-but because they
wanted to retain European solidarity
and economic backing.
The decision to hold elections-as
well as the choice of presidential can-
didate Daniel Ortega-highlights the
dominance of one current within the
front. While Junta coordinator Ortega
was convinced of the need for elec-
tions, Borge-who had presidential
ambitions of his own-is said to have
been won over to the idea after confer-
ring with supporters in Europe.
Nevertheless, until early August,
the government was apparently unpre-
pared to relax the sweeping powers it
has held under emergency legislation
since 1982, arguing that the military
situation was worsening. In response
very few parties were prepared to
commit themselves to the elections.
“Either they grant the conditions for
a free and fair election or it’s total
war,” snapped the president of the
Fifty years of Sandinismo: Daniel Ortega announces the November elections.
S
REPORT ON THE AMERICAS 40
E
cc
Independent Liberal Party and one-
time Sandinista ally, Virgilio Godoy.
Godoy-who was labor minister until
he resigned to devote himself to the
campaign-and others claim that the
Sandinistas were afraid to test their
popularity fairly at the ballot box be-
cause they no longer have majority
support.
Bayardo Arce, a member of the
Sandinista National Directorate, chor-
tled with delight at this suggestion. “If
we don’t win 80% of the vote we’ll
have cause to weep,” he boasted. He
claimed that the only concern was that
to lift the State of Emergency would
weaken the government’s defense ca-
pabilities. “If no other party runs we
will turn the polls into a referendum to
endorse everything we have done to
far,” he warned.
They were brave words, but it was
clear that the government was becom-
ing isolated. One senior Spanish
socialist deputy remarked, “Their
idea of revolution is to march towards
a cliff singing the Sandinista an-
them.” And a European ambassador
reflected a feeling among Managua’s
diplomatic community when he said,
“Uncontested elections will give
President Reagan the argument he
needs; the Sandinistas seem hellbent
on a military showdown.”
Inept Political Maneuvering
By late August, the tables had
turned. The Sandinistas have recov-
ered a degree of sympathy among
Western and Latin American govem-
ments and they may well be able to
convince world opinion that their
elections are democratic and represen-
tative. The about-turn is largely due to
some inept political maneuvering by
the Sandinistas’ most consistent do-
mestic critics, the conservative Dem-
ocratic Coordinating Committee
(CDN).
The CDN is an alliance of three
small political parties, two conserva-
tive trade unions and the private busi-
ness organization, COSEP. Linked to
it is the far-right wing of the 150-year-
old Conservative Party (PCN), led by
millionaire businessman Mario Rap-
paccioli. Until now, Rappaccioli and
COSEP have been the dominant voi-
ces inside the CDN.
Of the three parties in the CDN,
one-the Constitutionalist Liberal
Party-can barely muster a few
hundred members. The Social Demo-
cratic Party, founded in 1979 by dis-
enchanted Conservatives, has seen its
support drop from a height of 5,000
members in 1981. Only the Social
Christian Party, founded 27 years
ago, has any real party structure out-
side Managua. When the Sandinistas
say the CDN represents a minority,
they are probably right.
But the CDN leaders are wealthy,
well-educated and well-travelled, par-
ticularly in the United States. And
they have access to the media-the
major opposition newspaper, La Pren-
sa, is edited by CDN leader Pedro
Joaqufn Chamorro. This makes the
CDN articulate and vociferous and
has enabled it to assume the role of the
legitimate voice of domestic opposi-
tion to the government.
Of the seven opposition organiza-
tions in Nicaragua, the CDN is the
group whose views are most deeply
antithetical to the Sandinistas. They
favor a free-market economy. They
defend large landed interests and the
anti-Sandinista Catholic Church hier-
archy and they condemn the Sandinis-
tas as Marxist-Leninist puppets mani-
pulated from Moscow and Havana.
As such their participation in the elec-
tions has come to be viewed in
Washington as the touchstone of San-
dinista commitments to pluralism and
democracy.
Challenge to Declare Bankruptcy
But a CDN boycott of the elections
has been in the cards since the San-
dinistas first announced the date of the
polls last November. On December 24
the CDN published a nine-point list of
demands, described by one observer
as “a challenge to the government to
declare political bankruptcy and to
call in the international receivers.”
Among the points were demands for a
general amnesty, a postponement of
the presidential elections and respect
for freedom of religion. The Sandinis-
tas argued that these points had noth-
ing to do with the mechanics of free
and fair elections. “These issues have
been raised as obstacles to justify a
boycott,” one government official
claimed.
Sandinista leadership clearly re-
sented the fact that international reac-
tion to the elections was dependent on
the participation of a group whose in-
terests they believe are allied to the
SEPTEMBER/OCTOBER 1984
“Voting is a duty; choosing is a right!” A February rally in Masaya.
5Nicaragua’s Elections: A Chronology
June 1979: National Reconstruction Govemment Program
promises “a system of effective democracy,” including “the
right of all Nicaraguans to participate in politics and their right to
universal suffrage,” but does not spell out details of democratic
system envisioned. FSLN agrees with traditional parties and anti-
Sonoza businessmen to create 33-seat Council of State. Compo-
silton not precisely defined, but clear private sector and conserva-
tiv’e majority.
May 4, 1980: Council of State convened. Sandinistas, arguing
new balance of forces, alter composition. Of 47 seats, only I I go
to private enterprise and conservatives, 24 to FSLN-affiliated
groups. Many conservatives begin to boycott sessions. Business
leader Alfonso Robelo resigns from Junta in protest.
August 23, 1980: At a rally to mark end of Literacy Crusade,
Defense Minister Humberto Ortega announces elections to be
held in 1985, saying, “Democracy is not simply elections. It
means the people’s participation in the political, economic, social
and cultural spheres. And the more people participate in all these
areas, the more democracy there is. . . . They will be elections to
improve revolutionary power, not to raffle off who will hold
power. ”
November 1981: Debate opens on draft political parties law,
first in committee and private meetings, then in Council of State.
March 1982: Debate halted with introduction of State of
Emergency suspending constitutional guarantees and barring all
non-Sandinista political activity.
November 1982: Debate resumes. Parties allied to CDN
periodically withdraw from Council of State in protest, but are
members of drafting commission and manage to make some
amendments.
1983: Throughout year, multi-party commission-which CDN
members refuse to join-visits several European and Latin Amer-
ican countries and United States to study their constitutions and
electoral laws.
August 17, 1983: Parties Law passed. Parties can hold meet-
ings, criticize government, form alliances, have access to media,
have offices nationwide. Sandinista concessions:
1. Prime object of parties is to win power;
2. Clause dropped requiring 5,000 signatures to create party;
3. Concede details relating to composition of supervising body
(National Council of Political Parties—CNPP). Parties granted
right of appeal from CNPP to Supreme Court.
CDN objections:
I. Parties obliged to respect “basic principles of Popular San-
dinista Revolution”;
2. Believe CNPP will be FSLN-dominated;
3. Argue that obligation to “patriotic unity” and “consolida-
tion of the political, economic and social conquests achieved by
our people” could be interpreted to justify harassment of CDN.
September 21, 1983: Commission appointed from Council of
State to draft electoral law. Composed of FSLN, Sandinista allies
and Left opposition. No CDN members.
October-November 1983: Commission meets with members
of all parties to take evidence for drafting of new law.
December 4, 1983: Government announces start of electoral
process. Guarantees parties freedom to meet to discuss their posi-
tions. Announces amnesty for all contras except top leadership
and ex-Somoza National Guardsmen.
December 24, 1983: CDN publishes nine-point program, de-
manding “dialogue of national reconciliation” to discuss:
1. Separation of state, party and Army;
2. Halt to human rights violations;
3. Suspension of State of Emergency;
4. Respect for freedom of religion;
5. General amnesty;
6. Trade union freedom;
7. Independence of judiciary;
8. 1979 Fundamental Statute to be inviolate until new con-
stitution written following assembly elections, to prevent im-
mediate presidential elections;
9. Dialogue to include contra leaders; elections should lead to
Western democratic system; head of state to be barred from re-
election.
FSLN refuses even to respond to document, claiming most of it
is unrelated to mechanics of elections and based on false prem-
ises.
January 4, 1984: Debate on electoral law starts. Mass organi-
zations not involved, though leadership of some proposes amend-
ments.
January 14, 1984: FSLN submits three key proposals to draft-
ing committee:
I. Creation of a legislative assembly for a six-year period;
2. First two years of assembly to be devoted to drafting new
constitution;
3. Presidential elections to ensure strong government while
new constitution is written.
January 31, 1984: Electoral period officially opens.
February 8, 1984: Draft electoral law presented to Council of
State. Sandinista-controlled commission set up to revise law and
consider amendments.
February 13-16, 1984: Commission meets with opposition
parties; some of their suggestions taken into account and new
draft prepared.
February 21, 1984: FSLN announces election date: November
4, 1984. President, Vice-President and Constituent/Legislative
Assembly to be elected. Sixteen-year-olds eligible to vote. State
of Emergency not lifted as some had expected. CDN objects that
election date leaves insufficient time to prepare. Objects to presi-
dential elections. Some object to voting age as benefitting FSLN;
others argue that opposition to compulsory military service will
aid CDN vote. CDN demands immediate lifting of State of
Emergency. First threat of boycott.
February 22, 1984: Draft election law goes to full Council of
State for debate and amendment. CDN members start to with-
draw periodically in protest.
March 26, 1984: Electoral law passed. Presidential and Vice-
Presidential elections to be decided by simple majority. Ninety-
seat National Assembly to be elected by regional proportional
representation, to help smaller parties. All parties guaranteed ac-
cess to media, right to organize public demonstrations. Each par-
ty to receive $600,000 in state funds. Parties permitted to receive
funds from abroad.
CDN objections:
I. Voter registration open to fraud, because no national iden-
tity cards;
2. Parties which do not stand in elections lose legal status;
3. Army allowed to vote, “counter to Latin American tradi-
tion”;
4. Ex-Somoza National Guardsmen and contra leaders banned
from elections;
5. Regional division of representation unfair, favoring areas
where FSLN is popular.
Sandinista concessions:
I. Altered system of proportional representation to favor smal-
ler parties;
2. Television access time increased from 10-30 minutes per
party per week;
3. Members of armed forces cannot be candidates.
April 1984: Members of Supreme Electoral Council named; all
6
REPORT ON THE AMERtCAS
6 REPORT ON THE AMERICASthree are Sandinista sympathizers. CDN objects.
May 1984: Supreme Electoral Council announces election
timetable. Campaign will last less than two months; nominations
close end of June. CDN says conditions not created for free and
fair elections; campaign far too short and nominations close too
early.
May 25, 1984: Supreme Electoral Council bows to CDN pres-
sure. Extends nominations until July 25; campaign extended to 12
weeks.
May 31, 1984: Government extends State of Emergency for
another fifty days over furious CDN protests. But emergency pro-
visions relaxed to allow parties to prepare for campaign. Censor-
ship slackened, allowing La Prensa to print strongly anti-San-
dinista material.
July 19, 1984: Government decides not to lift State of
Emergency, arguing growing military threat. Allows public dem-
onstrations; censorship reduced to matters affecting “national de-
fense.” CDN claim- fair elections still impossible.
July 23, 1984: CDN presidential nominee Arturo Cruz arrives
in Managua. Greeted by 300 supporters.
July 25, 1984: Cruz announces election boycott if no negotia-
tions with contra leaders. Holds rallies around country. attacking
“communist dictators.” La Prensa permitted to print vitupera-
tive attacks; private radio stations allowed to cover CDN ac-
tivities live.
July 26, 1984: Cruz boycotts two rounds of talks with FSLN
because of refusal to negotiate with contras.
August 5, 1984: Nominations close without CDN registering
candidates.
August 6, 1984: After talks with other parties (boycotted by
CDN), government lifts most State of Emergency restrictions.
Retains only some special powers of search and arrest. Sandinis-
tas offer to reopen nominations; CDN refuses. Supreme Electoral
Council broadened to include two members of opposition.
August 15, 1984: CDN drops insistence on talks with contra
leaders, after FDN chief Adolfo Calero shows no interest. San-
dinistas say this is evidence CDN is political wing of contras.
CDN says still interested in elections but insists FSLN discuss
nine-point CDN platform, including general amnesty. Sandinis-
tas refuse.
August 16, 1984: U.S./Nicaraguan talks, believed to discuss
CON role.
August 22, 1984: CDN parties banned under electoral law
penalizing parties which boycott elections. Three top CDN lead-
ers start tour of Costa Rica, Venezuela and Colombia, trying to
persuade presidents of those countries that elections are not
democratic and will be unrepresentative without CDN involve-
ment.
A Guide to the Political Parties
1. POPULAR ACTION MOVEMENT-MARXIST-LEN-
INIST (MAP-ML): Founded in 1972 as split from FSLN; some
Trotskyist influence. Its armed militias fought in insurrection,
then refused to disarm. In 1980, daily newspaper El Pueblo con-
fiscated by government and entire MAP-ML leadership arrested
as “ultraleftists.” Favors rapid radicalization, greater state role in
economy, no political role for bourgeoisie. Presidential candi-
date: Carlos Cuadra.
2. NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST PARTY (P deN): Split
from P in 1970. Founded and dominated by popular leader Eli
Altamirano. Hard-line Moscow tendency, but no official rela-
tions with Soviet CP. Leads small but important labor union,
CAUS, active among textile workers. Wants system of “work-
ers’ soviets. i Presidential candidate: Allan Zambrana (CAUS
General Secretary).
3. NICARAGUAN SOCIALIST PARTY (PSN): Traditional
Moscow-line CP, but less rigid than PCdcN. Led by working-
class hero Domingo Sanchez. Allied to FSLN in Council of State.
One faction joined FSLN in 1978. Small but influential labor
union (CGT-i), active among construction workers. Believes
FSLN is necessary for the time being but that PSN will eventually
emerge as vanguard. Presidential candidate: Domingo Sanchez.
4. SANDINISTA NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT
(FSLN): Founded in 1961 as nationalist, Marxist, anti-imperialist
revolutionary organization. In power since 1979. Headed by
nine-man National Directorate. Claims 900,000 members of San-
dinista-affiliated mass organizations. Presidential candidate:
Daniel Ortega (present coordinator of governing Junta).
5. POPULAR SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY (PPSC): A
party of socialist Catholics; split from PSC in 1976. Allied to
FSLN in Council of State. Led by Mauricio Diaz. Advocates
greater worker control through cooperatives. Has small trade
union, CTN (A). Presidential candidate: Mauricio Diaz.
6. INDEPENDENT LIBERAL PARTY (PLI): Founded in
1944 as split from traditional Somoza-controlled Liberal Party.
Traditional base of support in second city, Lemi. Radical but anti-
Marxist liberal ideology in European mainstream; member of
Liberal International. Allied to FSLN in Council of State until
April 1984. Presidential candidate: Virgilio Godoy (Labor Minis-
ter until March 1984).
7. DEMOCRATIC CONSERVATIVE PARTY (PCD): Di-
rect descendant of traditional Conservative Party, with base of
support in third city, Granada. Split in June 1984 over participa-
tion in elections. Now led by Clemente Guido and other middle-
class professionals, who are accused by Right of being pro-San-
dinista. PC) member Rafael C6rdova Rivas is member of gov-
erming Junta. Still unclear which of two conservative parties have
grassroots support (see PCN below). Presidential candidate:
Clemente Guido.
8. SOCIAL CHRISTIAN PARTY (PSC): Founded in 1957. In
mainstream of conservative Christian Democracy, with ideology
of “social communitarianism.” Only member of CON alliance
with clear political program. Has been voice of moderation with-
in CON, though condemns FSLN as “communist dictators.” De-
cision to boycott elections has caused problems with party rank
and file. Led by Adsln Fletes, potential CDN vice-presidential
candidate.
9. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY (PSD): Founded in 1979
by dissident conservatives as vehicle for middle classes to take
control of revolution and guide it toward European-style mixed
economy. Not recognized by Socialist International. Member of
CDN: led by CDN president Luis Rivas.
10. CONSTITUTIONALIST LIBERAL PARTY (PLC):
Founded in 1967 as split from traditional Liberal Party. Intended
to recapture old liberal values of “progressive capitalism”; now
dominated by conservative interests. Not recognized by Liberal
International. Led by Alfredo Reyes.
11. NICARAGUAN CONSERVATIVE PARTY (PCN):
Founded as split from PCD in June 1984, disagreeing with PCD
decision to participate in elections. Led by millionaire
businessman Mario Rappaccioli. Identified with old creole aris-
tocracy and large landed and business interests. Not yet officially
recognized as legal party. Dominant voice in CDN.
United States. These interests, they
claim, would best be served by dis-
crediting the elections in order to jus-
tify greater U.S. efforts to destabilize
their administration. Nevertheless, the
repression of all public political op-
position-under the State of Emer-
gency-had won the CDN interna-
tional sympathy and called into ques-
tion the Sandinista commitment to
pluralism. It was assumed the nine
points were negotiable and most ob-
servers agreed that until the State of
Emergency was lifted the opposition
would be under a crippling disadvan-
tage. The onus was on the government
to prove its democratic intentions.
The return of the CDN presidential
candidate, Arturo Cruz, on July 23
after two years’ self-imposed exile in
Washington, changed the whole pic-
ture. The slide in CDN fortunes
started when Rappaccioli revealed
that the CDN had already decided to
boycott the elections before Cruz’s
arrival. At a series of political rallies,
Cruz, who served as ambassador to
Washington from March to November
1981, was at pains to exonerate the
contras, insisting that they took up
arms because the government had de-
nied them any political space.
Less than 48 hours after his arrival,
he announced that the ninth, and until
then, least stressed point in the CDN
program-negotiations between the
government and contra leaders-had
now become the sine qua non of CDN
participation. Two days later the gov-
ernment offered to conduct a round of
negotiations to discuss the CDN de-
mands. But Cruz refused, insisting on
negotiations with the contras first.
Within a week the CDN had for-
mally decided to boycott the elec-
tions. The next day, following discus-
sions with other opposition parties–
the same talks the CDN had boycot-
ted-the government announced the
lifting of almost all the restrictions es-
tablished under the State of Emer-
gency. But Cruz was adamant. “It is
still not enough, we still insist on a
dialogue of national reconciliation,”
he said.
Banking on U.S. Invasion
For the first time irritation in the
diplomatic community was directed at
the CDN. One Western ambassador
complained that “Giving up the right
to play the political game is like sig-
nalling that they are relying on the
Americans to put them in power
through invasion.”
“Cruz should have run and used
negotiations as the central plank in his
campaign platform,” said another.
“As an excuse for pulling out it won’t
do. It makes you wonder if the San-
dinistas are right and the CDN never
intended to run at all.”
But, if CDN support internationally
has been eroded, it is business as
usual in Washington. The State De-
partment has let it be known that it
will still not recognize the elections
unless the CDN runs. For his part,
Cruz has announced plans to conduct
a European tour to discredit the elec-
tions.
Yet there is still a chance that a role
can be found for the CDN. The San-
dinistas have been deliberately slow to
apply the legal provisions which
would allow them to proscribe parties
which abstain in the elections. And
the CDN has now dropped its demand
for talks with the contras, albeit two
weeks after nominations closed. The
government still retains one last hope
that it can persuade Washington to
recognize the polls, which would
mean an end to the war, and has
agreed to discuss the issue in the cur-
rent bilateral talks being conducted in
Mexico.
The White House too may want to
reach an agreement, for the alterna-
tives are unpleasant. An invasion, the
president knows, would leave several
thousand Americans dead. A continu-
ation of the contra war of attrition has
political costs back home, and does
not look likely to lead to a Sandinista
collapse. On the contrary, the damage
the war is doing to the economy will
continue to drive more and more op-
ponents from the middle class to
emigrate, leaving the revolutionaries
ever more firmly in control.
If the talks fail, however, the San-
dinistas are hoping to dispel the im-
pression that the CDN is their only au-
thentic opposition. Their recent con-
cessions have assured the participa-
tion of six other parties in the elec-
tions. Two of these, the Independent
Liberals and the Democratic Conser-
vatives, have already started to cam-
paign on an anti-Marxist ticket in de-
fense of private enterprise.
Large Voter Registration
“To say the elections won’t be rep-
resentative without the CDN is like
saying that the elections in the States
aren’t representative unless the Com-
munist Party stands,” observed a
leader of the Conservatives. He is
convinced that his party can pick up
many votes that would have gone to
the CDN. “Maybe once the foreign
press watches us campaign they will
see that there is a true opposition here;
there’s more difference between us
and the Sandinistas than between the
Democrats and the Republicans.”
The Sandinistas agree and claim that
every major political current will be
represented at the polls.
The other factor the Sandinistas are
relying on is a large ballot. Already
nearly 1,600,000 people have regis-
tered as voters, 400,000 more than an-
ticipated. The Sandinistas argue that if
a large proportion of these turn out to
vote and are prepared to opt for one of
the available alternatives it will be dif-
ficult to say the elections are unrepre-
sentative. “After all, that’s what hap-
pened in El Salvador,” one official
pointed out. Under Nicaraguan law it
is illegal to encourage voters to ab-
stain. If CDN leaders try they are
likely to find themselves arrested very
quickly.
Hundreds of international observers
and foreign journalists are expected to
witness the elections. Their presence
will make it difficult for the govern-
ment to use strong arm tactics to bring
out the vote, even if it wanted to. And
it should make fraud equally difficult.
If there is a large turnout it should be
because of a genuine enthusiasm for
the elections.
The Sandinistas hope the combina-
tion of the CDN boycott, the partici-
pation of anti-Marxist parties and a
large turnout will prove the elections
both fair and representative. But in the
end, if Washington remains uncon-
vinced-as some members of the Na-
tional Directorate believe they will-
the Sandinistas are prepared. As
Bayardo Arce said with a shrug of his
shoulders, “If the Yankees are not
convinced, the boys are in the moun-
tains waiting for them.”
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