On April 9, 2000, Peruvians will go to the polls to elect a new president and Congress. But chances are good that the new president will not be so new. Since handily winning re-election in 1995, President Alberto Fujimori and his cohorts within the National Intelligence Service (SIN) have put into place what appears to be a systematic plan to ensure Fujimori’s re-election to a third term in office. That plan includes removing legal impediments to an unconstitutional third term, gaining control over the electoral agencies charged with carrying out and overseeing the electoral process, and tilting the electoral playing field such that it heavily favors the present incumbent.
The 1993 Constitution extended the number of terms a president could run for office from one to two. When Fujimori launched his 1995 electoral campaign, critics complained that he could not run for a second term because he was first elected in 1990 under a constitution that did not allow for re-election. Despite the controversy, Fujimori ran and won. Just one year into that term, Congress passed Law 26657, which provides an “authentic interpretation of the Constitution”—a heretofore unknown legal concept—which essentially discounts his 1990 election, as it took place prior to the adoption of the 1993 Constitution. Hence, his second term is really just his first term, and in 2000 he can run for a second term, even though it is really his third term. Jurists pointed out that the Congress has no authority to interpret the Constitution. Civil society organizations pointed out that one plus one plus one equals three, not two.
But the intentions of the congressional majority were made painfully clear, and from that point on it continued to take actions to ensure that Law 26657 would pave the way for a third electoral bid. When the Constitutional Tribunal (similar to the U.S. Supreme Court) ruled that Law 26657 was “inapplicable” to the present government, Congress—in yet another unconstitutional move—impeached three members of the Tribunal, preventing any further rulings on the constitutionality of laws. When well over 1.2 million Peruvians signed a petition calling for a popular referendum to determine whether or not Fujimori should be allowed to run again, Congress again acted outside of its legal parameters in striking down the referendum. As polls have consistently showed that nearly 70% of Peruvians do not think that the President should run for a third term in office, a free and fair popular vote could not be risked.
The machinations carried out to ensure the end of the referendum were facilitated by a series of laws and moves on the part of the Fujimori government, in collaboration with official members of Congress, to ensure its ability to influence the electoral apparatus. These actions are intertwined with increasing executive control over the judiciary, which plays a key role in central parts of the electoral process. This has allowed it to influence key decisions made with regards to the electoral process. Specifically, its control over the judiciary has ensured its influence over judges and public prosecutors, significant because of their role in overseeing the elections at voting centers nationwide. Most significantly, agencies within the judiciary name the heads of all three official electoral agencies.
Of the three agencies tasked with ensuring both the efficiency and fairness of the Peruvian electoral process, the National Elections Board (JNE) is the most powerful. The JNE ultimately rules on all questions or complaints regarding the process, announces the outcomes of the elections, and is the official electoral watchdog agency. The JNE is composed of five individuals, including representatives of the Supreme Court (which presides over the JNE), the Public Ministry, the law schools of public and private universities, and the Lima Bar Association. Initially, a JNE ruling could be made by a simple majority vote of three out of the five sitting members. Congress changed that to four out of five in mid-1998, however, making it easier for the minority to exert its opinion. This effectively impedes the JNE from ruling against the future candidacy of President Alberto Fujimori, as only two votes will be needed to prevent the JNE from ruling in favor of a petition to declare the candidacy invalid. Elections of JNE members in mid-1998 brought on board two ardent Fujimori supporters and ensured government influence over at least three of its five members. The present head of the JNE, Alipio Montes de Oca, is widely considered to be a Fujimori ally.
The National Registry, or RENIEC, is charged with maintaining the electoral voting list and issuing national identity documents. Amongst the three agencies, it has received the most scrutiny and is the most criticized to date for manipulation, corruption and basic incompetence. Perhaps the biggest scandal concerned the issue of SIN infiltration. An investigation by the office of opposition congresswoman Anel Townsend revealed that at least five intelligence agents were operating in positions of authority within RENIEC. Two of the five worked in RENIEC under false names. One, María Cecilia Zuñiga, was secretary to the head of logistics and part of the leadership’s inner circle, working closely with the head of RENIEC.[1]
Another scandal that has plagued RENIEC is the revelation that in the 1995 elections, about 50,000 military and police personnel voted illegally. Members of the security forces are prohibited from voting by the Peruvian Constitution. After these accusations were made public, the military revealed that they had issued voter registration cards (one of the primary forms of identification in Peru) to soldiers in order to ward off assassinations by Shining Path guerrillas, and had presented RENIEC with a list of those who had such documents prior to the 1995 elections. While the argument is certainly valid given the nature of the conflict in Peru at the time, both military and RENIEC officials failed to adequately explain why they were not purged prior to the 1995 elections and why the voter registration cards had not been recalled after the conflict subsided. RENIEC ultimately announced that it had purged 49,534 military and police personnel from its lists. However, critics complain that this was not carried out in a systematic way and that there continue to be no guarantees that all security personnel were purged. This and other problems in cleaning up the voting list point to the need for significant public oversight of the list to prevent errors and potential abuses.
There has also been considerable confusion and controversy over the existence of three voter identification documents. Peruvians have traditionally carried a voter registration card. RENIEC announced its intention to replace the old cards with the Electronic Electoral Card, or LEM, and began the substitution process in 1998. It then reversed course, saying that it would begin issuing a National Identity Card (DNI). For the October 1998 municipal elections, it announced that voters could use any one of the three documents. According to RENIEC, each voter has only one voter identification number and must turn in the old card to get a new one. However, DNI does not have an address listed, and cases have been reported of one person having two documents, allowing the person to vote in two districts. Because of the controversy that ensued following the municipal elections, RENIEC announced that if it received sufficient government resources, only the DNI would be used for the 2000 elections.
The National Office of Electoral Procedures (ONPE) is the agency responsible for actually organizing and carrying out elections, referendums and other popular consultations. The main complaint lodged against ONPE to date is that the criteria for selecting the rest of its personnel remains unclear, and the process is not transparent. The Electoral Law contains no specific criteria laying out the qualifications of ONPE personnel, and if these exist internally, they have not been made publicly available. According to Transparencia, an independent Peruvian election-monitoring organization led by prominent members of civil society, training programs for ONPE personnel are completely inadequate.[2]
With each election following the April 1992 autogolpe, or “self-coup,” both allegations and evidence of fraud have grown. In October 1998 Peruvians went to the polls to elect municipal authorities in the last elections held prior to the 2000 presidential and congressional elections. Widespread procedural problems and irregularities were reported across the country. These irregularities go far beyond what Peru has experienced in previous decades or even in the 1995 elections—and point towards increasing problems with the electoral process itself and possibilities for fraud as the April 2000 elections approach. Moreover, in at least two regions of the country—Cuzco and Ayacucho—independent observers concluded that systematic fraud skewed the electoral results. And, as Transparencia noted, attacks on candidates not affiliated wih the government in certain parts of the country had surged, “creating a climate of insecurity and discouraging electoral participation.”[3] Peruvian electoral authorities have yet to respond adequately to the myriad concerns raised during the 1998 elections.
Harassment and intimidation of opposition politicians has increased to alarming levels as the 2000 elections get into full swing. A range of mechanisms are in place to thwart the activities of opposition candidates, particularly those affiliated with “We Are Peru” and “National Solidarity,” the opposition movements led by Alberto Andrade and Luis Castañeda Lossio, respectively. The SIN is suspected of being behind much of this questionable activity. One alleged SIN document leaked to the Peruvian press describes a SIN operation to monitor the campaign strategies and activities of Alberto Andrade and Luis Castañeda Lossio. These charges are entirely plausible, given the massive wire-tapping that took place during the 1995 elections. As noted by one journalist: “A growing number of critics, both inside and outside of Peru, accuse Mr. Fujimori and his allies in military intelligence of a systematic illegal campaign financed by public funds to discredit and intimidate leading opposition candidates.”[4]
Elected officials affiliated with the two main opposition coalitions routinely face harassment, intimidation and occasional death threats or threats against family members. Surveillance and wire-tapping of opposition activists appears to be commonplace. While attention is focused on national political figures, it is the local party activists who are in the most difficult situation, having little means at their disposal to resist the pressure. For example, dozens of local activists with Castañeda Lossio’s National Solidarity, who were formally affiliated with him when he headed Peru’s social security agency, now face lawsuits of dubious origin for alleged acts of corruption committed when they worked for the agency. Opposition candidates also tend to be the victims of unusual and sometimes violent crimes, and it is not uncommon for their offices to be broken into and ransacked. While it is usually difficult to be certain of a political motivation behind such acts, the rate at which they occur raise serious concerns that they are politically motivated. As a result of these tactics, many local party activists have resigned or been forced to curb their political activities. Others have been persuaded to switch party affiliation to that of the pro-government Vamos Vecino.
Opposition politicians often face unruly crowds at campaign stops. What are now commonly called “reception committees” appear at local political rallies. When the candidate begins speaking, the disruptions begin and violence is often provoked. Often the sound system mysteriously breaks down. More often than not, local police look on without taking any action to stem the disruptions. On Sepember 16, 1999, National Solidarity sent a letter to Transparencia documenting these sorts of problems in eight cities and towns around the country. For example, in Caraz in July 1999, as Castañeda Lossio was giving a speech one night, all near-by street lights went out and a police band began playing, preventing him from proceeding. In Recuay that same month, the Ministry of Agriculture allegedly blocked roads going into the town, preventing Castañeda Lossio’s arrival. In almost all of the incidents cited, Castañeda Lossio was visibly followed, presumably by SIN agents.
As a result of the executive branch’s excessive influence over the Congress, judiciary and electoral agencies, there is no legal or other recourse for opposition candidates who confront obstacles to participating freely in the electoral process. While the independent press routinely reports on these issues, it reaches a small percentage of the population. The pro-government media, which have a much broader reach, fail to or willingly avoid covering these issues.
The government’s control over the media is also affecting the fairness of the elections, as it has allowed the government to both dominate political coverage and carry out smear campaigns against Fujimori’s principal opponents. The issue of freedom of the press in Peru is subtle. Overt censorship of the press in Peru remains rare, but such censorship is not necessary as the government has developed a range of coercive tactics that have allowed it to gain control at the national level over all but a limited sector of the print media, thereby limiting what most Peruvians read and hear via the media.
As is the case with opposition politicians, journalists routinely face harassment and intimidation, and wire-tapping and other forms of monitoring independent journalists are the norm. Prominent journalists or owners of major media face the constant threat of judicial proceedings. The government also uses the issue of back taxes to exert political pressure on the media. Moreover, the government has become the largest source of advertising revenue, spending double its nearest competitor (the Cristal beer company).[5] That revenue is directed toward media that toe the government line. The combination of such tactics has led to a situation where self-censorship, rather than overt forms of censorship, is the norm.
Pro-Fujimori forces have also spearheaded efforts to slander and discredit Fujimori’s two principal rivals, Andrade and Castañeda Lossio. Press coverage of the two candidates in the government-controlled media is overwhelmingly negative, and Andrade has been the focus of systematic negative attacks in the daily tabloids, or prensa chicha, largely believed to be controlled by the intelligence services with military support. These forces have also mounted a campaign to link Castañeda Lossio to the misuse of state funds when he was the director of the social security agency, with news stories running regularly in the pro-government media.
It is the government’s control over television, however, that will most skew the upcoming elections. Over the course of 1999, all of the major political news programs critical of the government were taken off the air, including César Hildebrant’s highly popular—and extremely critical—news program. Peruvian television (with the exception of one cable channel) is now completely devoid of independent reporting, critical press coverage and even basic news. Not surprisingly, Fujimori dominates the political coverage presented on television. One study carried out by Transparencia showed that in November 1999, Fujimori appeared on television for a total of nearly 26 and a half hours; Andrade and Castañeda Lossio appeared for only four hours and ten minutes combined.
Self-censorship by the major television stations has reached the point where even paid ads by the opposition are prevented from airing. When Andrade officially launched his presidential bid last November, all three major television stations in Lima refused to accept paid advertisements by the candidate.
The use of state resources to favor pro-government candidates is also sharply tilting the electoral playing field. While this is hardly a new phenomenon in either Peru or Latin America more generally, the scale at which it is taking place is unprecedented in Peru, comparable only to the traditional use of state resources by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to maintain its monopoly on power in Mexico. The extremely high percentage of the Peruvian population that has become dependent upon food aid under the Fujimori regime provides the government with a means of exerting leverage over nearly half of the population. In fact, 42.5% of all Peruvian households receive food aid. In the countryside, 65% of families depend on government food handouts. Among the poorest Peruvians, the donated food they receive represents over 20% of their per capita income.[6]
Since the beginning of 1999, according to the Lima weekly Caretas, the government food distribution agency, the National Food Program (PRONAA), has stepped up efforts in delivering food to the thousands of community soup kitchens and in exerting its control over them. Increasingly, PRONAA employees are insisting that the soup kitchens, ostensibly independent and run by local community volunteers, put up pro-government signs outside their locales and in some cases are even dictating who within the soup kitchen is to preside over the organization.[7]
The local soup kitchens and other community groups are told that their week’s food or other government assistance will be cut off if they do not participate in pro-government rallies or other events. For example, numerous complaints were lodged following festivities for President Fujimori’s birthday party, which took place on the evening of July 27, 1999. Members of soup kitchens publicly stated that they were told they would not receive the week’s supplies if they did not attend the rallies, which were broadcast on all of the major television networks all evening long. “All of the soup kitchens in our area received the same message,” said one community leader from the Canto Grande neighborhood. “Go to the plaza and join in the birthday celebration or you will not get food this week.”[8] Cirila Suárez Campoverde, president of a soup kitchen in Villa El Salvador, said that her soup kitchen was told it would lose its food donations if it did not change its political leanings.[9]
Given the range of factors creating an uneven electoral playing field and the way in which the government has exerted its control over electoral agencies, it should come as no surprise that Peruvians are increasingly skeptical of the electoral process. Relative to other Latin American countries, Peru’s elections were, prior to 1995, generally considered to be fair and were rarely questioned at the national level. But that perception has changed within Peru. “At least 75% of Peruvians doubt that expression is free or elections are fair,” says scholar Cynthia McClintock. “Particularly dramatic is the decline in the number of Peruvians who consider recent and/or upcoming elections to be fair. Whereas in 1990, 60% of Lima residents believed that, in general, the country’s elections were clean rather than fraudulent, by 1998 the figure had fallen to 26%, below the regional average.”[10]
Ultimately, lack of public confidence in the process itself means that those elected by it run the risk of losing legitimacy and public trust—a factor President Fujimori should keep in mind as he nears a third term in office.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Coletta Youngers is a Senior Associate at the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA). This article is based on a more detailed report on the Peruvian elections forthcoming from WOLA.
NOTES
1. Information provided to WOLA by the office of Anel Townsend in August 1998 and November 1998; and Patricia Kadena, “Sí existen agentes del SIN en Reniec,” La República (Lima), November 1997.
2. WOLA interview with Transparencia delegation, September 21, 1999.
3. Transparencia, “Preinforme del Proceso Electoral,” October 6, 1998, p. 5.
4. Monte Hayes, “Fujimori’s rivals claim dirty tricks,” The Washington Times, December 4, 1999.
5. “La Inversion Publicitaria Enero-Julio 1999 en US$,” Anda, No. 19 (September 1999), p. 8.
6. Asociación Pro-Derechos Humanos (APRODEH) and Centro de Asesoria Laboral del Peru (CEDAL), “Resultados de la encuesta niveles de vida 1997,” Peru: Enfrentando un mar de pobreza y exclusion social (Lima: APRODEH/CEDAL, December 1998), p. 61.
7. “Mecánica naranja,” Caretas (Lima), June 24, 1999.
8. WOLA Interview, July 27, 1999.
9. “Chanteando a los Pobres—
PRONAA en Campaña reelecionista,” La República (Lima), August 28, 1999.
10. Cynthia McClintock, “Should the Authoritarian Regime Label Be Revived? The Case of Fujimori’s Peru, 1995-1998” (Paper delivered at the XXI meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 24 – 26, 1998), p. 11.
